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ABSTRACT 
 
HEIDEGGER AND DELEUZE: THE GROUNDWORK OF EVENTAL ONTOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
By 
James Scott Bahoh 
May 2016 
 
Dissertation supervised by Professor Daniel Selcer 
 This dissertation examines the concept of event, as found in the ontologies developed by 
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995). The texts I focus on are 
Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit (1927), “Vom Wesen des Grundes” (1928), “Vom Wesen der 
Wahrheit” (lecture 1930, print 1943), Beiträge zur Philosopie (vom Ereignis) (written 1936-38, 
but not published until 1989), and Deleuze’s Différence et répétition (1968). My focus is on the 
way each philosopher advances an account of the event in relation to a set of key fundamental 
themes. For Heidegger, these are truth, difference, ground, and time-space. For Deleuze I also 
discuss ground and time, but focus especially on difference. Deleuze’s account of difference 
entails a distinction between a “virtual” register of dialectical Ideas and an “actual” register of 
systems of simulacra, and clarifying his concept of event in relation to these plays a dominant 
role in my analysis. Deleuze’s account of dialectical Ideas is profoundly influenced by that of the 
 v 
early twentieth century mathematician and philosopher, Albert Lautman (1908-1944). Lautman, 
in turn, developed his account through an engagement with Heidegger’s early work. In Chapter 
V, I reconstruct the Heideggerian line of influence on Deleuze via Lautman. Beginning in the 
mid-1930s Heidegger understands being to be evental in nature, while difference constitutes an 
essential dimension of the event, though the latter point is often neglected in the scholarship. 
Truth, ground, and time-space articulate the structure and dynamics of being as event. For 
Deleuze, being is difference, but difference differentiates by way of events. Ground, time, 
systems of simulacra, and dialectical Ideas articulate the structure of being’s evental 
differentiation and the genesis of worlds of beings possessing quasi-stable identities modulated 
by their complex relations. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
Thematic Focus 
 
Throughout the history of Western philosophy, events have most often been assigned a 
secondary or derivative status with respect to substances or subjects, which are taken to 
underwrite them. An event, for instance, is understood to be a modification of the attributes of a 
substance. Linguistically, this framework is replicated in our grammar: a sentence begins with a 
subject and a predicate, while an event is represented as a change in predicate. However, since 
the 1930s, a number of philosophers have argued that no ontology can be sufficient without 
assigning events a primary, fundamental, and ontologically positive status in their own right.1 
Remarkably, many have further argued that no ontology can be sufficient without assigning 
being an evental nature itself.2 In other words, they have advanced what I will call “evental 
ontologies.” Many of the central texts arguing for evental ontologies are exceptionally difficult to 
interpret, and this is often a result of the way their arguments undermine the technical vocabulary 
of the tradition and its grammar built around subject predication. As a consequence, the reasons 
for taking such a position are frequently glossed over in relevant scholarship, which opts for 
either uncritical adoption of the terminology of evental ontologies or the dismissal of them on the 
grounds of their conceptual obscurity and seeming contrivance. This dissertation aims to rectify 
                                                 
1 For instance, Donald Davidson writes, “I do not believe we can give a cogent account of action, of explanation, of 
causality, or of the relation between the mental and the physical, unless we accept events as individuals,” and that 
we require “an explicit ontology of events” (Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events [New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001], 165). 
2 Martin Heidegger writes, “Beyng essentially occurs as the event” (“Das Seyn west als das Ereignis”) (GA65 
30/25). Gilles Deleuze writes, “Being is the unique event in which all events communicate with one another” (LS 
211/180). 
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this, within certain parameters. The core question I address is: Why is it necessary and what 
exactly does it mean to conceive being as event?  
The implications of evental ontology are far-reaching, and so I offer only a limited 
answer. I confine my analysis to the work of two of the numerous recent philosophers who have 
contributed to this problem: Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), whose work inaugurates the 
twentieth century turn to evental ontology, and Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995), who advances it by 
integrating aspects of early modern thought, the history of mathematics, psychoanalytic theory, 
and French structuralism and post-rationalism that Heidegger neglected. My focus is on the way 
each advances an account of the event in relation to a set of key fundamental themes. For 
Heidegger, these are truth, difference, ground, and time-space. For Deleuze I also discuss ground 
and time, but focus especially on difference. It is important to emphasize that Deleuze’s account 
of difference entails a distinction between a “virtual” register of dialectical Ideas and an “actual” 
register of systems of simulacra, and clarifying his concept of event in relation to these plays a 
dominant role in my analysis. Beginning in the mid-1930s Heidegger understands being to be 
evental in nature, while difference constitutes an essential dimension of the event, though the 
latter point is often neglected in the scholarship. Truth, ground, and time-space articulate the 
structure and dynamics of being as event. For Deleuze, being is difference, but difference 
differentiates by way of events. Ground, time, systems of simulacra, and dialectical Ideas 
articulate the structure of being’s evental differentiation and the genesis of worlds of beings 
possessing quasi-stable identities modulated by their complex relations. 
 
 
 
 3 
Textual Focus 
 
My textual focus is as follows. For Heidegger, I offer short analyses of sections of Sein und Zeit 
(1927) and “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” (lecture 1930, print 1943), which supply methodological 
and conceptual elements necessary for clarifying his account of being as event in the 1930s. On 
this basis, I turn my main attention to analyzing in detail Beiträge zur Philosopie (vom Ereignis) 
(written 1936-38, but not published until 1989), the text with the most extensive and developed 
account of his evental ontology.3 I justify my focus on this text in Chapter I, Section 1.4. In 
contrast to interpretations that downplay the significance of the concept of event in Heidegger’s 
work, my approach will solidify its key role and demonstrate why his ontology must be 
characterized most fundamentally as an evental ontology.4 Later, in the midst of my treatment of 
Deleuze in Chapter V, I return to Heidegger and discuss his short treatise “Vom Wesen des 
Grundes” (1928) as well. This text was of decisive influence on the early twentieth century 
mathematician and philosopher, Albert Lautman (1908-1944), whose theory of dialectical Ideas 
Deleuze appropriated and modified for his own use. With respect to Deleuze, I focus on 
Différence et répétition (1968), the first of his two most systematic ontological works (the 
                                                 
3 Heidegger’s work pertinent to his account of the event is complex and ranges through several texts, which can be 
broken into three groups. The first spans 1919 to 1930, framing his subsequent work but rarely explicitly mentioning 
Ereignis. The most important of the early texts is Sein und Zeit. The second group is composed of texts and lectures 
made public by the author between the late 1930s and his death in 1976. The third group includes the crucial and 
complex cluster of private works known either as the seynsgeschichtliches treatises or the private manuscripts, 
written during the 1930s and early 1940s as well as two texts von Herrmann (the editor of Heidegger’s 
Gesamtausgabe) describes as standing in “thematic proximity” to these (von Hermann, “Editor’s Epilogue,” in 
Martin Heidegger, [GA66] Besinnung [Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1997]; English: Mindfulness, trans. Parvis 
Emad and Thomas Kalary [New York, NY: Continuum, 2006) 434/383]). With Beiträge standing at its core, the 
seynsgeschichtliches category also includes Besinnung; Über den Anfang (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2005) 
(written 1941), GA70; Das Ereignis; and the as yet unpublished Die Stege des Anfangs (1944), GA72. The two texts 
in thematic proximity are “Die Überwindung der Metaphysik,” in Metaphysik und Nihilismus (Frankfurt am Main: 
Klostermann, 1999), GA67 and Die Geschichte des Seyns (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1998) (written 1938-
1940), GA69. Other related texts include a Kant/Leibniz course transcribed in Seminare: Kant – Leibniz – Schiller 
(Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2013), GA84.1 and Zum Ereignis-Denken (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 
2013), GA73.1. 
4 Cf. EH, which I engage extensively later. 
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second is the 1969 Logique du sens). These two texts present his most substantial treatment of 
the event prior to his collaborations with Felix Guattari beginning in the 1970s. Given the 
complexity and richness of Différence et répétition, I have chosen to limit my scope to it. 
 
Statement of Basic Programmatic Consonance in Heidegger and Deleuze 
 
It is a common impression that Deleuze is a distinctively non-Heideggerian thinker. This is 
asserted on a number of counts: Deleuze presents an ontology that is not tethered to the limits of 
the experiencing subject (or in Heideggerian terms to the phenomenal world as delimited by 
Dasein’s meaning-making activities), he casts being in terms of difference, considers himself to 
be a metaphysician, and condemns neither early modern philosophy nor the use of mathematics 
in ontology. While Heidegger was certainly an uninspired reader of early modern thought and 
disparaged mathematics, I hope to demonstrate that the first two of these counts misrepresent 
him. Beginning at least as early as 1930 Heidegger, like Deleuze, found it necessary to account 
for the ontological ground enabling human existence to be, a ground irreducible to the human 
being and constituting ontological structures that are independent of any correlation with it. 
Furthermore, I argue that in Heidegger’s work a logic of the event is found that is accessed as a 
differential logic. As mentioned, for Heidegger in Beiträge difference constitutes an essential 
dimension of being as event. As opportunities arise in my analysis of Deleuze, I add to these 
points of consonance and highlight points of dissonance. 
 Deleuze’s references to Heidegger are made explicit in 11 instances in the main text and 
commentary in footnotes throughout Différence et répétition, and none of them comment directly 
 5 
on Heidegger’s concept of event.5 Contrary to common belief, these references are largely 
affirmative in nature. Most often, Deleuze cites Heidegger as an allied thinker advancing the 
philosophy of difference in ways surpassing earlier figures like Aristotle, Leibniz, and Hegel. In 
certain instances, though, these references include important critical remarks that show how 
Deleuze considers himself to move beyond Heidegger. Broadly stated, Deleuze suggests that 
though Heidegger advances a univocal ontology (thus escaping the downfalls of Aristotle’s 
equivocal system) and thinks difference as an originary character of being in a way not 
subsumed within the logic of determinate negation and dialectical contradiction (thus escaping 
the downfalls of Leibniz and Hegel), he ultimately maintains a conception of difference that is 
determined by an interpretation of being in terms of the same (das Selbe). Despite Heidegger’s 
arguments that the same is not the identical or the equal, Deleuze is skeptical that they are 
sufficient “to think original difference and to disconnect this from all mediations.”6 
In his commentary on Deleuze’s use of the concept of univocity, Dan Smith emphasizes 
the “confrontation with Heidegger” in Différence et répétition, Spinoza et le problème de 
l’expression (1968), and Logique du sens, but also “in Deleuze’s work from the start.”7 
According to Smith, a central element of this confrontation (and a central motive of Différence et 
répétition) is the problem of being posed by Heidegger in terms of the ontological difference. 
Smith states the problem as follows: “What is the difference between Being and beings? Or more 
precisely, How is Being distributed among beings?”8 While this is a strange way of interpreting 
Heidegger’s ontological difference, the point, I believe, stands. Heidegger found it necessary to 
                                                 
5 I find 24 uses of the words “Heidegger” or “Heideggerian” within these instances, though I wouldn’t guarantee I 
haven’t overlooked any. These numbers exclude instances within the Bibliography or bibliographic information in 
footnotes. There is a mistake in the index in Patton’s translation of DR, which indicates a mention of Heidegger on 
page 116, while it is in fact on page 117. That index also misses a mention of Heidegger on page 334. 
6 DR 91/66. 
7 Essays 29. 
8 Essays 29. 
 6 
differentiate being from the beingness (Seiendheit) of beings because we can’t understand being 
by asking what beings are insofar as they are beings (as is done in the tradition of Plato’s 
question about τί ἐστι and Aristotle’s τί τὸ ὄν). By establishing the ontological difference, we can 
pose the question of the being of beings and see where it leads. In other words, the ontological 
difference enables the science of being to be reestablished, and that science is its problematic. 
Deleuze finds Heidegger to have faulted in this task, and Différence et répétition is his attempt 
“to push the problematic of ontological difference to its necessary conclusion,” namely, to think 
being as difference.9 Smith puts the point as follows:  
 
According to Deleuze, however, although Heidegger revived the question of 
ontology and gave “renewed splendor to the univocity of Being,” he did not effect 
the necessary conversion according to which “univocal Being belongs only to 
difference” (that is, the term “Being” has one and only one sense, which is 
“difference”). Heidegger, in other words, was unable – or perhaps unwilling – to 
push the problematic of ontological difference to its necessary conclusion. This is 
the project that Deleuze takes up as his own in Difference and Repetition.10 
 
 
While Smith is correct about Deleuze’s position here, Deleuze is incorrect about 
Heidegger’s. This is no fault of Deleuze’s, for in 1968 he did not have access to Heidegger’s 
Beiträge or the related private manuscripts, in which are found a number of relevant 
developments. With these texts now available, I argue the story is different. Difference is an 
essential dimension of the concept of event, in terms of which Heidegger rethinks beyng. And 
pushing the problematic of the ontological difference to the ground enabling the determination of 
the difference between being and beings at all forms a key moment in Heidegger’s 
methodological path, one by which accesses to the differential logic belonging to the event is 
secured. If as Smith claims, “Difference and repetition could be read as a response to Being and 
                                                 
9 Essays 29. 
10 Essays 29. The passages Smith quotes here are found on DR 91 (footnote 1 beginning on 89). In the English 
translation they are found in the main text on 66. 
 7 
Time (for Deleuze, Being is difference, and time is repetition),” then Beiträge could be read as 
Difference and Repetition’s unknowing and anachronistic doppelgänger.11 
 
Statement of Comparative Methodology 
 
My intention in this project is neither to give a Deleuzian interpretation of Heidegger, nor a 
Heideggerian interpretation of Deleuze. On the contrary, I find it vital to reconstruct each on his 
own terms and allow points of consonance and dissonance to arise organically. In particular, 
since there is no evidence of Deleuzian influence on Heidegger’s work, it has been important to 
me to guard against importing Deleuzian ideas into my analysis of it. This is so even, and 
especially, where Heidegger seems to advance positions remarkably similar to Deleuze’s. In my 
analysis of Heidegger I draw certain comparisons with Deleuze, however I maintain that the 
Heideggerian account I have reconstructed is found entirely within Heidegger’s text or logically 
or methodologically entailed by it. Since there is a clear engagement with Heidegger in 
Deleuze’s work, the situation there is different. I discuss the Heideggerian influence on Deleuze 
extensively and use this to clarify Deleuze’s positions. I also discuss Deleuze’s critiques of 
Heidegger and, on the basis of my reconstruction of Heidegger, test them for accuracy. 
Nonetheless, I again maintain that my reconstruction of Deleuze bears equal fidelity to the text, 
its logical or methodological entailments, and points of historical influence on it. 
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Note on the Term “Event” 
 
I use “event” to translate both the German “Ereignis” and the French “événement.” While this is 
not controversial with respect to the French term, the same cannot be said for the German. 
Heidegger’s “Ereignis” has been translated in a number of different and sometimes confounding 
ways: the major translations are “event” (Rojcewicz and Vallega-Neu), “appropriation” 
(Sheehan), “event of appropriation” (Stambaugh), and “enowning” (Emad and Maly). Adding 
complication, Heidegger claimed that his term specifically should not be translated in terms of 
the regular meaning of “event,” i.e., in the sense of an intratemporal occurrence.12 
 As I shall argue in Chapter I, I find an author’s interpretive claims about their own work 
to be of limited significance. The richness and meaning of a text surpasses that which its author 
intended or comprehended. Heidegger’s warnings with respect to the term “Ereignis” fail to 
recognize the possibility of translating it with a regular word and building a technical definition 
for that word that goes beyond its regular use. This is my approach, which is consistent with the 
precedent set by Rojcewicz and Vallega-Neu’s recent translation of Heidegger’s Beiträge. Their 
translation marks a vast improvement over Emad and Maly’s, which rendered “Ereignis” as 
“enowning.” “Enowning” is a bad translation especially for two reasons. First, it is meant to 
capture the sense of “propriety” or “ownership” carried by the German “eigen.” While this is 
indeed an important sense of Heidegger’s term, it is not the only one. Sheehan effectively 
demolishes translation choices like Emad and Maly’s by reconstructing the etymology of the 
term “Ereignis.”13 This shows that its meaning is originally rooted in the Old High German word 
for “eye” – “ouga” – and only more recently gained the sense of “ownership.” With this origin, 
“Ereignis” includes a connotation of sight. “Enowning” excludes this connotation. The second 
                                                 
12 See GA14 25-26/20. 
13 See Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015) 232-236. 
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reason “enowning” is a bad choice is that it is hardly a translation at all. “Enowning” is not a 
regular English word and whatever meaning it has is quite opaque. In order to make sense of it, it 
must be translated as well. But this defeats the purpose of translating the word in the first place.  
Sheehan translates “Ereignis” with “appropriation,” justifying this by arguing that 
“appropriation” captures both the senses of ownership and sight. It carries the meaning of 
ownership in the sense of the Latin “proprietas,” which refers especially to the essential qualities 
belonging to something and making it be what it is. He attempts to connect “appropriation” with 
sight by focusing on Heidegger’s suggestion that in Ereignis, something comes into view. What 
comes into view is Dasein or human existence, specifically with respect to the way that Dasein 
constitutes a cleared or open space that enables its meaning-making activities in the world. In 
Sheehan’s interpretation, this dimension of Dasein is what is most proper to it, i.e., it makes 
Dasein be what it is. Thus, ownership (as propriety) and sight are melded together in the word 
“appropriation.” Even though this is a significant improvement over “enowning,” it still has a 
fatal flaw. The term is extremely theory-laden, particularly insofar as Sheehan’s account of the 
sight involved here rests upon his controversial broader interpretation of Heidegger (which I 
shall engage in Chapters I and II). As I will argue, this broader interpretation is flawed and 
fundamentally misconstrues Heidegger’s ontology as a theory of the meaning-making activities 
of Dasein. Consequently, the basis for Sheehan’s translation choice is undermined. Similar 
problems arise for Stambaugh’s “event of appropriation,” since this loads the translation with 
theoretical content that goes beyond the German term.  
My approach, on the other hand, is quite simple. My view is that it is best to translate 
“Ereignis” with its ordinary English counterpart, “event.” This does not fall into the trap of 
confusing Ereignis with the ordinary sense of an event occurring within time for the simple 
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reason that any serious reader of Heidegger will be able to keep in mind that this is not 
Heidegger’s meaning. “Event” is a standard translation, a recognizable and ordinary term, and 
does not carry the excessive theory-ladenness of the other options. Instead, this straight-forward 
translation allows the content of the concept to be built up through careful analysis of 
Heidegger’s actual use of it within his system. 
 
Introduction to Heidegger’s Concept of Event 
 
In 1927 Heidegger published Sein und Zeit, the central text of his early thought. There, he argues 
Western philosophy requires drastic revision, particularly insofar as the tradition of metaphysics 
has distorted, or even eclipsed, the problem of the nature of being.14 The issue, in Heidegger’s 
judgment, is not simply that metaphysics has gotten this wrong and needs to get its accounts 
straight. Rather, when it comes to the question of being, metaphysics is a flawed mode of 
inquiry. Doing ontology within the framework of metaphysics results in fatally distorted 
accounts of being and, in turn, of the nature and relations of beings. Sein und Zeit aims to rectify 
this by problematizing the foundations of metaphysics and recasting the project of ontology as a 
whole. There, Heidegger develops the phenomenological, existential analysis of Dasein as the 
methodology for accomplishing this. Importantly, Heidegger finds the language and conceptual 
framework of metaphysics to be deeply inscribed in our intellectual traditions, in the ways we 
understand the nature of ourselves and the world, and in our everyday practices. Consequently, 
this analysis is meant as a Destruktion (destruction or deconstruction) of metaphysics and its 
                                                 
14 I replace Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation of Sein as “Being” with “being” throughout. 
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history with respect to both its theoretical and existential manifestations.15 Simultaneously, it is 
meant to develop a better understanding of being. 
In the early 1930s, Heidegger becomes convinced that his work in Sein und Zeit did not 
accomplish a sufficient overhaul of ontology. But this does not amount to a disavowal of that 
work. In his evaluation, Sein und Zeit successfully established necessary and far-reaching 
transformations. In fact, following his argument, the conceptual and methodological position 
from which he critiques Sein und Zeit in the 1930s is accessible systematically only by having 
previously worked through the ontological problematic opened up in 1927. Yet, for technical 
reasons I will address in Chapter II, Heidegger argues that his treatment of the ontological 
problematic in Sein und Zeit does remain metaphysical. In the 1930s, he aims to rectify this by 
rethinking being in terms of Ereignis (event). In other words, being – or rather, what Heidegger 
now calls “beyng” (Seyn) – is described as evental in nature.16 Working out the evental nature of 
being and unpacking its broader philosophical implications become central to Heidegger’s 
project.17 In the margin of “Brief über den ‘Humanismus’” in his personal copy of the 1949 first 
edition of Wegmarken, he notes: “For ‘event’ [Ereignis], has been the guiding word of my 
thinking since 1936.”18 Proper attention to this is imperative for understanding the 
                                                 
15 SZ 19/41. As Richardson emphasizes, Heidegger’s “destruction” is not to be an annihilation of the edifice of 
metaphysics altogether. Problematizing the grounds of metaphysics and carrying out fundamental ontology entails 
working out the non-metaphysical grounds of metaphysics in a more originary ontology, consequently establishing 
the possibility to reground metaphysics such that it might eventually be recuperated (TPT passim). 
16 In Chapter II, I differentiate between the technical senses of Heidegger’s Sein and Seyn (being and beyng). Until 
then, I will use the more conventional “being” to cover them both. 
17 F.W. von Herrmann points out that there is evidence the problematic of the event is active in Heidegger’s work 
beginning as early as 1932 (F.W. von Herrmann, Wege ins Ereignis. Zu Heidegger’s ‘Beiträgen zur Philosopie’ 
[Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1994], 1). For more discussion of early uses of “Ereignis,” see Richard Polt, 
“Ereignis,” in A Companion to Heidegger, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 
376-380 and Polt, EB 33-37. Polt also emphasizes that Heidegger’s January-April 1919 lecture course (published as 
The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview in GA 56/57), is exceptional, for in it “the word plays a 
central part” (Polt, “Ereignis” 375). 
18 Martin Heidegger, “Brief über den ‘Humanismus,’” in Wegmarken (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2004); 
English trans.: “Letter on ‘Humanism,’” trans. Frank A. Capuzzi in Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998) 316nA/241nB (trans. modified). 
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transformation Heidegger’s thought goes through in the 1930s, accounting for many of his 
obscure concepts, and registering their full significance for issues of contemporary ontology. 
Broadly speaking, I maintain that Heidegger’s oft mentioned Kehre is a turn to the event 
– to thinking being as event. Philosophically, it operates at several different levels.19 The turn 
entails a conceptual transformation or a transformation of thought. But, more essentially, it is a 
structural dynamic or operation of being. The occurrence of the turn in Heidegger’s thought is 
commonly cited to mark a distinction between the so-called “early” and “later” periods of his 
work (what Richardson denominates Heidegger I and Heidegger II).20 Making sense of this 
entails a number of methodological, conceptual, and textual complexities, which I will address in 
Chapters I-III. With this turn Heidegger inaugurates the broader turn to evental ontology in mid-
late twentieth and early twenty-first century philosophy. Thinkers such as Jacques Derrida, Jean-
Luc Nancy, Deleuze, and Alain Badiou, to name just a few, carry this forward. Heidegger, 
though, staked out key philosophical problematics that would shape the conversations in which 
they engage. He also forged new conceptual apparatuses to address those problematics, some of 
which have been integrated into contemporary thought, some of which have not. One goal for 
this dissertation is to rehabilitate some of these neglected aspects, highlight their impact on 
Heidegger’s ontology, and explore what they mean for the relation between Heidegger and 
Deleuze’s projects. 
As I will show, there are two core senses of “event” for Heidegger. The first is that of a 
rupture in the history of Western thought that opens the possibility for new, non-metaphysical 
approaches to our theoretical and practical endeavors. This involves a re-appropriation of the 
                                                 
19 For a much more detailed treatment of Heidegger’s Kehre, see Richardson, TPT passim. 
20 Richardson’s distinction between Heidegger I and II demarcates Heidegger’s work prior to 1930 and from 1930 
until his death in 1976, respectively (TPT esp. 22, 230, 476, 623-628, 632-633). For more, see Richardson’s index 
entries “Heidegger I,” “Heidegger II,” and “Heidegger I and II” (TPT 756). Richardson takes Heidegger’s 1930 
lecture “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” to mark the inauguration of Heidegger II (TPT 624). 
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ontological ground from which human existence has become alienated: being. The second sense 
pertains directly to the nature of being itself. Being, Heidegger argues, is evental in nature. 
Though the second of these senses will be my focus, understanding Heidegger’s approach to this 
and its stakes requires first addressing important elements of the first, which I do in Chapter I. 
For Heidegger, the heart of being as event is pure difference. Though he does not clarify the 
particulars well, the structure of the event can be worked out in terms of the logic of this 
difference, which I argue underwrites the ontology presented in Beiträge. Here, being as event is 
the differentiation of difference from itself, together with a logic of determinateness that this 
originates. The logic of determinateness composes the ontological structure of the Da expressed 
in the term “Da-sein.” Truth, ground, and time-space are interrelated registers in which the logic 
of the event is elaborated in the Da.  
 
Introduction to Deleuze’s Concept of Event  
 
In Différence et répétition, Deleuze introduces his concept of event as part of a system that 
proceeds from a radical critique of the history of ontology, with special focus on Plato, Aristotle, 
Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel. Deleuze’s central critical claim is that no previous ontology 
has been sufficient, i.e., there are aspects of reality for which none has been able to account. 
These aspects are forms of difference and repetition that fall between the cracks of any given 
categorial system. Aristotle’s system, for instance, is able to define the type “human” by marking 
the genus “animal” with the specific difference “rational.” This allows one to explain Socrates, 
Plato, Aristotle, and Alexander as instantiations of this general type – each is a rational animal – 
but it fails to explain essentially the individuating differences that make Socrates Socrates and 
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not Plato. In Deleuze’s argument, such insufficiencies are the result of a set of fundamental and 
tightly related mistakes perpetuated by the tradition: namely, the conception of difference as 
secondary to identity, the conception of repetition as generality, and the perpetuation of the 
framework of representation. To solve these problems and produce a sufficient ontology, 
Deleuze argues that sufficient concepts of difference and repetition must be produced and, on 
that basis, the framework of representation must be rethought from a genetic perspective. That is, 
the genesis of representation from non-representational ontological bases must be explained. 
These become Deleuze’s central tasks in Différence et répétition.  
 To produce sufficient concepts of difference and repetition, Deleuze argues that it is first 
necessary to conceive being as univocal (as opposed to Aristotelian equivocity or the Thomistic 
analogy of being). This enables the ontological determination of beings to be explained in terms 
of intrinsic and intensive individuating difference, rather than extrinsic predication or the 
categories of representation. Deleuze develops the basic framework for his univocal ontology 
through engagements with Duns Scotus, Spinoza, and Nietzsche’s eternal return. Deleuze 
suggests that the eternal return provides a basic figure for the ontological dynamics of univocal 
being as difference and repetition, but this remains quite vague. He adds detail with a number of 
different conceptual registers, including that of his complex theory of time. Deleuze proposes 
three logically intertwined syntheses of time that form a genetic flow of univocal being. The first 
synthesis explains duration within what Deleuze calls the “living present.” It, however, is 
possible only on the ground of the second synthesis, which is described in terms of a “pure past” 
or “pure memory” that takes the form of Bergson’s cone of memory. If time were reducible to 
the relation between the living present and pure past, then our reality would be a perpetual 
repetition of the identical, with no radical fecundity or novelty, i.e., no future. Thus, Deleuze 
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argues that the first two syntheses must in turn be grounded in a third synthesis, a future that he 
calls the “pure and empty form of time.” This future is caesural: it is an originary ontological 
break that enables the overall movement of time. This movement, however, is not that of the 
lived experience of fully constituted representational subjects, it is the time marking the genetic 
univocal flow of being as difference and repetition. This parallels the Heideggerian self-
determination of the event in the structures of truth, ground, and time-space, i.e., the logic of the 
Da. Deleuze gives a first and preliminary account of the event in this context. The event is the 
caesural pure and empty form of time, the form in which anything that can occur can occur. Yet 
in this definition, the structure of the event remains somewhat unclear. Providing a full definition 
requires turning to the second main account of the event, which appears in Deleuze’s analysis of 
the structure of virtual problems, dialectical Ideas, or multiplicities and their actualization in 
systems of simulacra. 
 Making sense of this requires clarifying the ontological status of simulacra in his system. 
Deleuze produces his concept of simulacra by engaging Plato, or at least a certain Deleuzian 
version of Platonism. According to Deleuze, the primary task of this Platonism is to differentiate 
between icons or claimants that are well-grounded participants in the quality of an Idea and 
simulacra or false claimants (who is the true statesman or the true philosopher, for example?). 
An icon has being in proportion to its participation in an Idea. And Ideas, being eternal and 
unchanging, are loci of identity. Since simulacra do not participate in the quality of an Idea, but 
present themselves as if they did, Platonism excises them from proper reality. Simulacra do not 
count as legitimate beings. However, this implies a performative contradiction: the system 
implicitly recognizes the being of simulacra insofar as it is designed specifically to distinguish 
between them and icons. Deleuze argues on the basis of this point that by affirming the being of 
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simulacra, he is able to effectuate a certain overturning of Platonism. This overturning 
undermines the legitimacy of the ontological circuit of identity between Ideas and icons and 
forces a new conception of the nature of beings. Namely, for Deleuze, beings are simulacra, or 
rather, coagulations of modulating systems of simulacra. Systems of simulacra are systems in 
which different relates to different by way of difference itself. Identity is generated only as a 
secondary or derivative effect of difference. What, though, is the ontological structure of these 
systems of simulacra? In Deleuze’s account, simulacra exist with two simultaneous ontological 
registers, that of the virtual and that of the actual. Individual simulacra are defined by the 
differential and differencial processes operating in these registers. Events are precisely singular 
differential and differencial processes that structure, generate, and define systems of simulacra.   
 
Overview of Major Literature 
 
At the time of the completion of this dissertation, there are only two other book length studies of 
the intersection of Heidegger and Deleuze at the level of ontology: Miguel de Beistigui’s Truth 
and Genesis: Philosophy as Differential Ontology (2004) and Gavin Rae’s Ontology in 
Heidegger and Deleuze: A Comparative Analysis (2014).21 In addition Janae Sholtz recently 
published a study examining Heidegger and Deleuze’s philosophies of art and politics: The 
Invention of a People: Heidegger and Deleuze on Art and the Political (2015).22 Complimenting 
these are a growing number of journal articles examining the relation of Heidegger and Deleuze 
and books taking up this relation as part of broader projects. Knox Peden’s Spinoza Contra 
                                                 
21
 Miguel de Beistegui, Truth and Genesis: Philosophy as Differential Ontology (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 2004) and Gavin Rae, Ontology in Heidegger and Deleuze: A Comparative Analysis (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
22
 Janae Sholtz, The Invention of a People: Heidegger and Deleuze on Art and the Political (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2015). 
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Phenomenology: French Rationalism from Cavaillès to Deleuze (2014) and Joe Hughes’ 
Deleuze’s ‘Difference and Repetition’ (2009) are good examples of the latter.23 
 Despite such literature and a growing scholarly interest, both the philosophical and 
historical relations of Heidegger and Deleuze remain minimally clarified. Beistigui’s study 
operates within an outdated interpretive methodology dominant in late twentieth century 
continental philosophy in which it was acceptable to adopt an author’s technical vocabulary and 
reconstruct claims without rigorous definition or justification. This leads it to be a provocative 
analysis, but one with a limited degree of philosophical use. Moreover, I will argue that most 
interpreters of Heidegger’s private manuscripts (including Beistigui) have simply botched the 
ontology presented in them. Failure to mark a set of crucial distinctions made by Heidegger leads 
them to fundamentally flawed interpretations of his texts.  
Rae’s approach is correct in its guiding assertion that a comparison of Heidegger and 
Deleuze on any topic must be grounded in an analysis of their ontologies. However, he frames 
his book by defining ontology as the project “trying to answer the question: what does it mean to 
say that something is?”24 This fails to register a fundamental argument Heidegger makes that 
defines his project in the 1930s. Heidegger’s attempt to break out of metaphysics, implementing 
a turn to thinking being as event in Beiträge, requires that being not be conceptualized in terms 
of the being of beings. Ontology must render an account of being in being’s own terms: “beyng 
can no longer be thought on the basis of beings but must be inventively thought from itself.”25 
Without registering this move, any account of Heidegger’s evental ontology remains 
                                                 
23 Knox Peden, Spinoza Contra Phenomenology: French Rationalism from Cavaillès to Deleuze (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2014) and Joe Hughes, Deleuze’s “Difference and Repetition” (London: Continuum, 
2009). 
24 Rae, Ontology vii. 
25 GA65 7/8. 
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fundamentally misconstrued and, given the centrality of this to his later work, consequently fails 
to represent accurately his overall project. 
 
Statement of Scholarly Contributions 
 
This dissertation is organized by both thematic and comparative concerns. Thematically, it aims 
to answer the question noted above (Why is it necessary and what exactly does it mean to 
conceive being as event?), albeit in a way limited in scope to the responses supplied by the two 
main figures I engage. On this front, my intention is to contribute to the broader discourse of 
contemporary ontology and, more narrowly, to that of the theory of event. I hope it might, 
moreover, be of use for those working in related fields of research in which the nature of events 
is important (psychology, aesthetics, political theory, etc.). 
At the comparative level, this project has two main dimensions: one theoretical and one 
historical. With respect to the former, I aim to clarify the consonances and dissonances of 
Heidegger and Deleuze’s ontologies at the level of their most fundamental terms. I focus on the 
concept of the event and the related themes indicated for both practical reasons (an exhaustive 
comparison would be a truly massive task) and a core theoretical reason: the event’s fundamental 
role in each philosopher’s account of being and, in turn, of the nature of beings. Given its 
fundamentality, clarifying the more derivative (and often obscure) terms in each ontology 
requires grounding them in the author’s formulation of the problematic of the event. Failure in 
this regard results, as Spinoza said, in thinking of conclusions as if divorced from their premises. 
Consequently, any comparison between derivative elements of the two ontologies requires the 
same. Thus, this project aims to work out a basis for further, systematically grounded 
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comparison between Heidegger and Deleuze. With respect to historical comparison, my goal is 
to clarify certain aspects of the scholarly and textual influence of Heidegger on Deleuze. This 
influence is profound, yet has not been sufficiently addressed in the scholarship. I draw out 
connections in a number of contexts, including Deleuze’s use of the concepts of difference and 
ground, his analysis Aristotle, and especially in his engagement with Lautman.
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Part 1: Heidegger’s Evental Ontology 
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Chapter I 
 
The Methodological Ground of Heidegger’s Evental Ontology 
 
Chapter Overview 
 
In this chapter, I begin by addressing a set of methodological concerns pertinent to the task of 
analyzing Heidegger’s concept of event. This includes a discussion of the movement of his 
thought as it develops over his career, some points regarding his use of the concept of ground, 
and a proposal for a realigned interpretive approach to his corpus. After that, I outline the two 
primary senses of the event for Heidegger, which I call the “historical” and “ontological” senses 
(my primary focus in Chapters II and III is on the latter). Then, I lay out two interpretations of 
Heidegger’s concept of event prominent in current scholarship: those given by 1) Thomas 
Sheehan and Quentin Meillassoux and 2) Richard Capobianco and Richard Polt. Following this, 
I turn to Sein und Zeit and the ground Heidegger establishes there for his ontological project. 
This is necessary because properly explaining Heidegger’s concept of event in Beiträge requires 
establishing conceptual continuity with the groundwork of Sein und Zeit. Thus, I offer an 
analysis of Heidegger’s account of Dasein as the condition for the possibility of any ontology. 
This allows him to ground the ontological problematic by articulating it along the lines of 
Dasein’s existence, rendering the early methodology for doing ontology as the existential 
analytic of Dasein. Eventually, this would evolve, generating the reconfiguration of the 
ontological problematic found in his Kehre. I then turn to Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein as the 
existential-ontological ground of history, the factical impact of the history of metaphysics on 
Dasein’s existence, and its consequent role in shaping the project of ontology. I also provide a 
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synopsis of the history of error that Heidegger understands to constitute metaphysics. These 
analyses establish a crucial methodological continuity between the historical task of bringing 
about an “other beginning” (i.e., the historical sense of the event) and the ontological 
problematic of truth. This is necessary because in Chapter II, I reconstruct Heidegger’s account 
of the evental nature of being (i.e., the ontological sense of the event) in terms of the problematic 
of truth. Chapter II lays the ground for elaborating the evental nature of being in terms of ground 
and time-space in Chapter III. Together, Chapters I-III establish the roles of difference, ground, 
and time-space in Heidegger’s evental ontology, which connect it directly to Deleuze’s on a 
systematic level. This also frames 1) a number of additional but more minor points of 
Heideggerian influence on Deleuze and 2) the way Deleuze’s project in Différence et répétition 
takes up Heidegger’s in certain ways and carries it forward. I argue in Chapters IV and V that 
attention to these points is important for making sense of Deleuze’s evental ontology. 
 
1: Methodological Concerns: The Structure of the Movement of Heidegger’s Ontology and 
Its Impact on Interpretive Approaches to his Corpus (Generally) and the Concept of Event 
(Specifically)  
 
The event is the self-eliciting and self-mediating center in which all essential 
occurrence of the truth of beyng must be thought back in advance. This thinking 
back in advance to that center is the inventive thinking of beyng. And all concepts 
of beyng must be uttered from there.26 
 
Heidegger’s project in the late 1920s turned around the ontological difference, that is, the 
difference between being and beings. In Sein und Zeit, he argues that being is neither a being nor 
                                                 
26 GA65 73/58-59. 
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the totality of beings.27 Rather, his question is about “the being of beings.”28 Fundamental 
ontology proceeds within the methodological horizon of the existential analysis of Dasein or 
human existence, and Heidegger develops a series of different renditions of the being of Dasein, 
including Being-in-the-world, care, thrown projection, and temporality. After Sein und Zeit, he 
argues that this ontology is ultimately insufficient. Consequently, he recasts the problematic of 
being, and does so repeatedly, extending a series of accounts that – I will argue – finds its apex 
in thinking being as event. Particularly after around 1930, a good deal of the terminology he 
introduces in this process rings very bizarre, and much of this is associated with his concept of 
event. This has contributed to a great deal of confusion in scholarship addressing this concept. 
Clarifying Heidegger’s account of the event requires clarifying the way his ontology 
develops, that is, the movement of his thought. Without this, a number of concepts involved 
become disconnected from aspects of the ontology they were built to articulate. They then seem 
arbitrary or become easily misunderstood. I take this to be the root of many analytically minded 
philosophers’ dismissive attitudes toward Heidegger’s later thought. On the other hand, I also 
take it to be at the root of some sub-cultures of Heideggerian continental philosophy rightly 
criticized for lack of rigor. Rudolph Carnap’s condemnation of Heidegger is a good example of 
how this can go wrong. Lee Braver summarizes his position well as follows: for Carnap 
“Heidegger’s ideas are based on a grammatical mirage which vanishes once logical analysis 
shows what is really going on inside these sentences.”29 However, my view is that when put into 
the context of the methodological evolution of Heidegger’s program, most of his bizarre 
                                                 
27 “The Being of beings ‘is’ not itself a being” (SZ 6/26). Macquarrie and Robinson translate “Seiendes” as “entity” 
or “entities” (see BT 19, fn. 1). I substitute “being” or “beings” throughout my citations. 
28 SZ 6/26. This formulation relies on the ontological difference, without which the question of being would collapse 
into the question of beings as beings (Aristotle’s ὂν ᾗ ὄν). 
29 Lee Braver, “Analyzing Heidegger: a history of analytic reactions to Heidegger,” in Interpreting Heidegger, ed. 
Daniel Dahlstrom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 240. In this essay, Braver gives a good, broad 
account of the reception of Heidegger in analytic philosophy. He focuses on the way four major figures in that 
tradition have addressed Heidegger: Gilbert Ryle, Rudolph Carnap, Richard Rorty, and Hubert Dreyfus. 
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formulations are in fact rigorous. Key to seeing why this is the case is recognizing that the series 
of renditions of the ontological problematic that Heidegger develops throughout his career do not 
correlate with programmatic breaks. That is, they are not the result of the author deciding his 
earlier work is bunk and then developing a new position inconsistent with the previous one.30 Yet 
a surpassing of previous renditions in favor of better ones is involved. The series of accounts 
Heidegger generates manifest a dynamic evolution of his ontology, and making sense of the 
concepts he uses, like that of event, requires clarifying the mechanism of the movement of that 
evolution. 
A good deal of scholarship has addressed this at the macrological scale, particularly with 
respect to the transformation from Heidegger’s pre-Kehre to post-Kehre periods. However, little 
directly thematizes it at micrological scales. Certainly, plenty indirectly addresses the movement 
of Heidegger’s thought by examining particular topics over different points in his career. Yet, 
none that I have found sufficiently explains the engine of this movement itself or what I find to 
be a clear structural homology through these scales. In this section I aim to clarify this, in the 
service of establishing a consistent methodology for reconstructing Heidegger’s concept of 
event, by examining a particular difficulty characterizing his corpus at both macrological and 
micrological levels. The difficulty is as follows: throughout Heidegger’s texts, the foundations of 
the methodology and of the conceptual apparatus through which he gives an account of his core 
problematic are brought into play by the nature of that problematic, according to the very 
account they enable. In other words, there is a reflexive, transformative relation between the 
account and what the account is about, a relation that drives an immanent evolution of that 
account forward and implies the supersession of earlier stages of it. This is particularly evident as 
his thought intensifies around the concept of event. It plays out in further methodological, 
                                                 
30 Richardson argues this point extensively in TPT, passim. 
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conceptual, and textual complexities that inform my analysis of Heidegger’s texts and 
reconstruction of his account of the event. 
 
1.1: Syngenic and Diagenic Axes 
 
In the following, I argue for a realigned methodology for interpreting Heidegger’s corpus. It will 
be useful to present its terms here in advance, since what follows contributes to the justification 
of its use. This interpretive methodology takes the relations between grounding and grounded 
terms to be central in Heidegger’s thought. With respect to this, it is crucial to distinguish his 
understanding of the nature of ground from metaphysical concepts of ground. I expand on this 
throughout the remainder of Chapters I, II, and III. For now, I will simply point out that his 
concept of ground is in no way that of a substratum, ultimate foundation, principle, etc. Briefly 
stated, prior to Heidegger’s Kehre, a ground is the ontological structure enabling something to 
be, performing a function similar to a Kantian condition of possibility without being indexed 
onto the cognitive structure of an experiencing subject. After the Kehre, the difference between 
his concept of ground and metaphysical versions of ground becomes especially clear in Beiträge, 
where all grounding operations entail Ab-grund or abyssal ground, which both originates and 
exceeds ground, thus preventing any ground from becoming absolute. There, a set of interrelated 
structures of ground constitute an essential aspect of beyng as event. 
To clarify the relations between grounding and grounded terms, I employ a distinction 
between what I will call diagenic axes (or axes of ground) and syngenic axes (or axes of the 
grounded). I use the root γένω (geno) because Heidegger’s concept of ground explicitly entails a 
character of enabling what is grounded to be (e.g., as Grund der Ermöglichung) and an originary 
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(ursprüngliche) character (as in “Der Ab-grund ist die ursprüngliche Wesung des Grundes”).31 In 
this sense ground bears an essential genetic character (I expand on its nature at length in 
Chapters II and III). To be clear, I use the terminology of syngenic and diagenic axes to 
distinguish two orders in the register of ground, the genetic character of which must not be 
confused with that of metaphysical concepts of cause. The latter presuppose conceptions of the 
nature of being and of beings that Heidegger rejects. I use the δια and συν prefixes to indicate 
something similar to Saussure’s diachronic/synchronic distinction.32 Where Saussure’s 
distinction is organized on temporal lines, the one I am attributing to Heidegger is organized on 
lines of ground. Diagenic axes run into the ground, i.e., from that which is grounded into its 
ground or, inversely, from ground to that which is grounded. For example, in Beiträge space and 
time can be situated along a diagenic axis with respect to time-space, which is the ground 
whence they are originated.33 Such axes can in some cases be carried along farther: from p to its 
ground q; from q to its ground r; from r to its ground s, etc. I will elaborate such a sequence in 
my analysis of Heidegger’s account of truth as it transforms from Sein und Zeit to Beiträge: truth 
as correctness is grounded in truth as the unconcealment of beings, which is grounded in truth as 
the a priori ontological structures of freedom/openness and concealment/closedness/withdrawal, 
which is grounded in truth as self-differentiation. In distinction, to a syngenic axis belong a set of 
entities, processes, or structures all grounded in the same manner, horizontal to or side-by-side 
one another. For example, at each of the diagenic moments in Heidegger’s account of truth, a set 
of syngenically related terms is developed articulating it. Or again, in Beiträge, space and time 
are on a syngenic axis with respect to each other. Likewise, my pen and my desk are beings 
related on a syngenic axis within the unconcealment of beings. I will come back to a larger 
                                                 
31 WW 177nA/136nA; GA65 379/299. 
32 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics (Chicago, IL: Open Court, 1997). 
33 GA65 371-388/293-306. 
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discussion and justification of the interpretive use of the syngenic/diagenic distinction later in 
this section. 
 
1.2: Heidegger’s Productive Logic: An Analysis of the Complex Evolution of His Ontology 
 
Returning to the issue of the movement of Heidegger’s ontology, I would like to begin by 
looking at an example of the difficulty I have pointed out, so that it can be more easily identified 
later in some of his more abstruse conceptual registers. I will then elaborate on this movement 
through a discussion of what Heidegger calls the operation of “Grundlegung” in his “produktive 
Logic.”34 
In his understanding, one’s factical conditions constitute the standpoint from which any 
philosophical inquiry proceeds. The key factical condition for Heidegger was his position 
internal to the historical and conceptual configuration of metaphysics. From the start, however, 
he problematized metaphysics, particularly with respect to its insufficiency for carrying out the 
project of ontology. In his analyses of the historical and conceptual constitution of metaphysics 
in Sein und Zeit, for example, a crucial downside to metaphysics is its failure to provide a 
sufficient account of the existence of the human being, which Heidegger recasts as “Dasein.” 
Dasein is distinguished from other beings like rocks and goldfish by an important characteristic: 
it has its own being as an issue. Dasein’s existence is such that it includes a constitutive, 
structurally reflexive exposure to the question of its own existence, and through that to the 
question of being. Because Dasein’s existence is constituted in and through this question (even 
when it does not pay attention to this fact), it constitutes an ontologically fundamental, internal 
relation of thought and being. In this way, Dasein is the condition of possibility for any ontology 
                                                 
34 SZ 10/30. 
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(including metaphysics). I explore this in greater detail in Section 4 of this chapter. Because, in 
Heidegger’s mind, metaphysics maintains certain false presuppositions about the nature of the 
human being, it is unable to provide an appropriate account of Dasein. Consequently, 
metaphysics is unable to account for its own ground properly. Heidegger develops and reframes 
this problem incessantly throughout his corpus. 
Since he proceeds from a position internal to the historical and conceptual configuration 
of metaphysics, Heidegger’s reframing of the project of ontology along the lines of the 
existential analysis of Dasein in Sein und Zeit marks a rupture in that configuration. Moreover, 
since the very existence into which Dasein inquires is partially constituted by the operation of 
questioning, each moment of carrying out that operation modulates its existence. This forms a 
Heideggerian version of Frege’s paradox.35 It is worth pointing out that Deleuze assigns a 
distinctive ontological importance to this paradox, which he attributes equally to Lewis Carroll 
and calls the “paradox of regress, or of infinite proliferation.”36 This paradox drives or draws the 
subject matter inquired into beyond the account given of it at any moment in the process of 
questioning. Here, we see an instance of the reflexive, transformative relation between the 
account given and what the account is about that characterizes Heidegger’s work. This operation 
of questioning drives forward the problematic of Dasein’s existence, and, with it, that of the 
ground of ontology and the task of working out the nature of being. In other words, the reflexive 
relation drives an immanent evolution of the account given at any moment beyond itself, 
superseding earlier stages. In this case, the possibility of a total and exhaustive account of 
                                                 
35 The basic idea of this paradox can be seen in a familiar thought experiment. Imagine I have been tasked with 
composing a catalogue of every fact about everything that exists. I begin by listing facts about the things I see 
around me (“The glass is on the table.” “The table is made of wood.” And so on…). Eventually, though, if my list is 
to be complete, it has to include all the facts about the list itself (for example, “The list has N entries.”). And this 
leads to an infinite proliferation. When I add a fact about the list to the list, I’ve changed it, producing new facts that 
must in turn be listed. So, I list them. But each time I add another entry, I change the list again, generating new facts, 
and so on to infinity. In this scenario, there is always a necessary excess of facts over the domain of the list. 
36 LS 41/28. 
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Dasein’s existence is always deferred beyond the one articulated in any particular instance. In 
my discussion of Albert Lautman’s engagement with Heidegger in Chapter V, it will be 
important to recall that Heidegger refers to this movement of surpassing as “transcendence.” 
 For Heidegger, this logic of deferral does not characterize only the epistemological or 
even existential situation of Dasein. It exemplifies an abyssal logic or logic of excess belonging 
to being. In “Vom Wesen des Grundes,” for instance, he discusses this in terms of “freedom” as 
“the abyssal ground [Ab-grund] in Dasein.”37 Again, in Beiträge, he develops this in terms of 
abyssal ground as one of the essential dimensions of the grounding character of being as event.38 
As I will discuss in Chapter II, after a series of programmatic transformations in the early-mid 
1930s, in Beiträge Heidegger begins to think of this abyssal ground in terms of a logic of 
ontologically originary, inexhaustible differentiation. The fact that this logic belongs to being, 
moreover, has an impact on the structure of the methodology by which Heidegger addresses it. 
The way Heidegger’s philosophy navigates the abyssal logic can be clarified by looking 
at what, in Sein und Zeit, he calls the “productive logic” belonging to his methodology.39 It 
describes the way his ontology renders progressively more grounded or appropriate (eigentliche) 
accounts of being. Importantly, a set of modulations of the concept of ground play a central role 
in defining it. As a related point, this logic shows that Heidegger’s methodology does not remain 
within the bounds of hermeneutics of suspicion or deconstruction, but from early on employs a 
rigorous, creative conceptual experimentalism or genetic methodology. 
Heidegger’s discussion of productive logic is situated in his argument for the priority of 
the question and science of being with respect to other sciences (the main examples he comments 
on are mathematics, physics, biology, and theology). The concepts and formal structure he uses 
                                                 
37 WG 174/134, trans. modified, italics removed. 
38 GA65 379/299. 
39 SZ 10/30. 
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here, though, are not confined to making this distinction. They apply to any problematic insofar 
as it includes an account articulating its subject matter and this account experiences a 
Grundlagenkrisis (crisis in its grounds or foundations), forcing it to revise them by developing a 
more appropriate understanding of its subject matter and, in turn, to fundamentally reconfigure 
the broader account by which the problematic field is articulated. These concepts and formal 
structures apply to Heidegger’s own ontology, which consistently tracks the abyssal logic 
entailed in and perpetually disrupting the fundamental terms of the problematic of being and 
reconfigures its account of being on the basis of more originary articulations that this enables. 
In Heidegger’s analysis, all sciences have a Sachgebiet (subject matter).40 This can either 
be a Bezirk (domain) of beings, as in the cases of “history, Nature, space, life, Dasein, language,” 
or the being of beings in general, as in the case of fundamental ontology.41 To a domain (which I 
will also call a “problematic field” following Lautman and Deleuze) belongs a set of 
Grundstrukturen (basic/ground structures) understood to characterize its subject matter and 
determine proper terms for wissenschaftliche Forschung (scientific research) about it.42 Here, 
“the Grundstrukturen of any such area” are not the product of pure theoretical investigation; they 
bear a factical character, having “already been worked out after a fashion in our pre-scientific 
ways of experiencing and interpreting that domain of being [Seinsbezirkes] in which the area of 
subject-matter is itself confined.”43 To illustrate this, our pre-scientific experience of regularity in 
nature might lead to theoretical research producing an account of laws of nature. Here, we 
develop Grundbegriffe (basic/ground concepts) to articulate the Grundverfassung (basic/ground 
constitution) of the subject matter at hand, for example, Newton’s three laws of motion as used 
                                                 
40 SZ 9/29. 
41 SZ 9/29. 
42 SZ 9/29. 
43 SZ 9/29. 
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to articulate the basic constitution of the problematic field of nature.44 The Grundstrukturen we 
understand to characterize a problematic field are revisable on the basis of scientific research. 
The objects thematized by such research provide one means for clarifying them. For example, 
research on natural objects helps to clarify the laws of nature: we can test to see if F = MA or F = 
M/A. Grundbegriffe serve as a ground for more derivative concepts and operations within a 
science, like calculating the trajectory of a cannon ball or explaining planetary motion. As 
Heidegger puts it, “Grundbegriffe determine the way in which we get an understanding 
beforehand of the area of subject-matter underlying all the objects a science takes as its theme, 
and all positive investigation is guided by this understanding.”45 
What does Heidegger mean by “positive” investigation here? Ordinarily, a science’s 
Grundbegriffe take on an axiomatic role, go unchallenged, and become more or less transparent 
to its practitioners. In Heidegger’s terminology, positive investigation or positive science is 
scientific research done in such conditions.46 Positive science includes the type of research 
characteristic of logical positivism, in which systems of propositions are analyzed for internal 
semantic and syntactic consistency, consistency with the rules of an established logical language, 
and, regularly, consistency with the theoretical and methodological propositions of the natural 
sciences. 
However, according to Heidegger, “real progress” in research comes not in its positive 
operations, but by “inquiring into the ways in which each particular area is basically constituted 
[Grundverfassungen].”47 Thus, we see two modalities of science: positive research that operates 
within the logic of a set of Grundbegriffe, which are not themselves in play, and what might be 
                                                 
44 SZ 9/29, trans. modified. 
45 SZ 10/30. 
46 I will use the term “positive” in a different sense later. 
47 SZ 9/29. 
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called “radical” science, which problematizes its Grundbegriffe in order to develop a more 
appropriate (eigentliche) account of the Grundverfassung of its subject matter. In fact, for 
Heidegger: 
 
The real ‘movement’ [eigentliche ‘Bewegung’] of the sciences takes place when 
their basic concepts [Grundbegriffe] undergo a more or less radical revision 
which is transparent to itself. The level which a science has reached is determined 
by how far it is capable of a crisis in its basic concepts. In such immanent crises 
the very relationship between positively investigative inquiry and those things 
themselves that are under interrogation comes to a point where it begins to 
totter.48 
 
 
Heidegger uses this framework to argue for the priority of fundamental ontology with 
respect to all other sciences. His central point is that, whether they recognize it or not, the 
Grundbegriffe of other sciences contain presuppositions about the being of the domain of beings 
constituting their subject matter. Certainly, the factical concepts framing fundamental ontology 
also contain presuppositions, indeed faulty ones, but it is an explicit task of fundamental 
ontology to root them out. In other sciences, the very delineation of a problematic field entails an 
interpretation of the being of the set of beings making up that field: “Since every such area is 
itself obtained from the domain of beings themselves, [the] preliminary research, from which the 
basic concepts are drawn, signifies nothing else than an interpretation of those beings with regard 
to their basic state [Grundverfassung] of being.”49 However, since such sciences are unable to 
                                                 
48 SZ 9/29. 
49 SZ 10/30. There is an additional, implicit logic supporting Heidegger’s claim for the priority of fundamental 
ontology, specifically with respect to ontic sciences. The problematic field of an ontic science is defined by the set 
of beings or aspects of beings it takes as its subject matter (the problematic fields of biology and ethics both include 
human beings, but each with respect to different aspects). In other words, there are sets of beings or aspects of 
beings that are excluded by each ontic science except one. That, in Heidegger’s view, is metaphysics, which is 
guided by the question of what beings are insofar as they are beings, i.e., Seiendheit or Aristotle’s ὂν ᾗ ὄν. Since no 
ontic science can contain all beings under all aspects (insofar as they are beings) in its problematic field without 
becoming identical with metaphysics, none can give a sufficient account of the being of beings in general. Likewise, 
metaphysics is incapable of this because it fails to make the ontological difference between being and beings. It 
investigates beings insofar as they are beings, but not the being of beings. Otherwise, it would become fundamental 
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sufficiently clarify the being of beings in general, they require one that does. That science is 
fundamental ontology. Without it, faulty presuppositions about the being of beings built into a 
science’s Grundbegriffe get transmitted throughout that science as a whole. Without first being 
grounded by fundamental ontology, a science’s Grundbegriffe cannot provide an appropriate 
account of the Grundverfassung of its subject matter. Fundamental ontology must lay the 
grounds for other sciences. Since the historical condition of the sciences is such that their 
Grundbegriffe bear faulty interpretations of the being of beings, fundamental ontology enacts the 
second, radical type of science. It challenges the Grundbegriffe of other sciences, and provides 
the ground in terms of which they can be appropriately revised. 
 Here, we can see the fault in Carnap’s critique of Heidegger. Carnap’s charge results 
from attempts at making sense of Heidegger’s bizarre linguistic constructions from a position 
external to the ontological problematic within which they were produced. His critique fails 
because it does not make the distinction between 1) conceptual or linguistic formulations that 
operate within an established syntax – at the level of positive science – to which grammatical 
analysis within that syntax properly applies and 2) formulations that aim to articulate the ground 
enabling an established syntax to be, i.e., formulations operating in the service of radical science. 
In Heidegger’s account, “such ground-laying [Grundlegung] for the sciences is different 
in principle from the kind of ‘logic’ which limps along after, investigating the status of some 
science as it chances to find it, in order to discover its ‘method.’”50 Grundlegung does not 
operate like positive science within the logic of an established set of Grundbegriffe, but as 
                                                                                                                                                             
ontology, which is precisely what Heidegger is aiming to accomplish. Consequently, neither metaphysics nor any 
other ontic science is capable of supplying an appropriate account of the being of beings. Yet their basic concepts 
contain presuppositions about this. Thus, fundamental ontology is needed to clarify the being of beings and properly 
ground the ontic sciences. 
50 SZ 10/30, trans. modified. I translate “Grundlegung” as “ground-laying,” rather than Macquarrie and Robinson’s 
and Stambaugh’s “laying the foundations” throughout. For historical precedent of the use of this somewhat obscure 
term, see “Grundlegung,” in Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1971), 
accessed April 25, 2016, http://woerterbuchnetz.de/DWB/?lemma=grundlegung. 
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radical science, problematizing them and cutting into deeper ground on the basis of which they 
may be reconfigured. It is this process that Heidegger calls “productive logic.” Grundlegung, he 
writes, “is a productive logic – in the sense that it leaps ahead, as it were, into some area of 
being, discloses it for the first time in the constitution of its being [Seinsverfassung], and, after 
thus arriving at the structures within it, makes these available to the positive sciences as 
transparent assignments for their inquiry.”51 This process is productive because it discloses new 
aspects of the being of a science’s subject matter and produces new, more ontologically 
appropriate Grundbegriffe to articulate it. The productive logic characterizing Grundlegung 
doesn’t simply deconstruct the Grundbegriffe of a problematic field; it does that and ventures 
new Grundbegriffe or accounts to articulate the Grundverfassung of its subject matter in an 
ontologically appropriate way. It is worth mentioning that Heidegger cites Kant as an example of 
this sort of productive logic: “the positive outcome of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason lies in 
what it has contributed towards the working out of what belongs to any Nature whatsoever, not 
in a ‘theory’ of knowledge. His transcendental logic is an a priori logic for the subject-matter of 
that area of being called ‘Nature.’”52 In comparison with Kant, Heidegger reconfigures the core 
problematic of philosophy. Yet, in the 1930s he also begins to argue for structures and logics of 
being that are ontologically prior to all beings, enabling them to be at all. 
Of course, the function of fundamental ontology for Heidegger is not simply to lay the 
grounds for other sciences, but to work out the nature of being. In doing so, fundamental 
ontology enacts the same radical movement with respect to the problematic of being. This is seen 
in a number of registers, including its disruption of the historical framework of metaphysics 
forming its factical situation. As outlined above, this disruption begins by grounding ontology in 
                                                 
51 SZ 10/30-31, trans. modified. 
52 SZ 10-11/31. Heidegger is not using “positive” here in the sense of “positive science.”  
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the existential analysis of Dasein, which leads to the complex, reflexive evolution of ontology 
and the logic of deferral or abyssal logic entailed in its problematic. This complexity and logic 
characterize the problematic of being in Heidegger’s analysis from early to late, not merely the 
methodology of Sein und Zeit. 
The terminology of Heidegger’s productive logic helps clarify this. The radical 
movement of his thought is precisely along what I am calling the diagenic axis (the axis of 
ground), drawn out by the abyssal logic. The evolution of his ontology enacts an incessant line of 
Grundlegung. Each of Heidegger’s renditions of the ontological problematic is generated by 
problematizing the Grundbegriffe of a previous rendition (say, that of the historical framework of 
metaphysics). He tracks the implicit but previously unrecognized logic entailed in the ontological 
features articulated by those Grundbegriffe, but exceeding the account they offer, to a standpoint 
more originary and appropriate (e.g., the nexus of thinking and being constituted by a being that 
has its own being as an issue). He then recasts the Grundbegriffe to articulate his subject matter 
in a more originary and appropriate way, that is, he lays new grounds for the ontological 
problematic (e.g., the concept of Dasein). The account constituted by laying these grounds 
enables a reconfiguration of the entire problematic field at hand. In each rendition, then, 
Heidegger advances the ontological problematic by employing this productive logic. In the 
language of abyssal logic, each rendition is opened up to the abyssal logic entailed in its ground, 
destabilized by tracking that logic deeper into the abyss, and casting a set of Grundbegriffe 
articulating the dimensions of the problematic thus disclosed. This renders a conceptual distance 
or oblique angle with respect to the terms of the previous account, enabling them to be 
fundamentally rethought. 
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This productive logic describes not only the macrological movement of Heidegger’s 
ontology, but micrological movements involved in the transformation and generation of concepts 
within his texts, sections, paragraphs, and sentences. Making sense of his concept of event, as 
well as other obscure concepts and technical formulations, is dependent upon situating them in 
their proper location in the evolution of his account and reconstructing them with respect to their 
function in advancing the productive logic entailed in Heidegger’s problematic of being. In 
Chapter II, my analysis of Heidegger’s transformation of the ontological problematic of truth and 
how this renders a first properly grounded account of being as event will offer a detailed example 
of this productive logic. 
Three initial aspects of Heidegger’s concept of event can be indicated on the basis of the 
complex evolutionary movement of his ontology. First, the event can be figured as a rupture in 
the foundations of metaphysics (this is the historical sense of the event I discuss in Section 2 
below). This rupture has its ontological origins in the logic of deferral or abyssal logic 
characterizing the problematic of being. He pursues this problematic and its logic continually 
drives his thought beyond each rendition of being. The concept of event is meant to articulate 
being in a way free of metaphysical import. Second, Heidegger’s concept of event develops in 
different works.53 In fact, since an abyssal logic is built into it, a totalized concept of the event is 
impossible in principle. It offers an open-ended ontology and renders the evental nature of being 
                                                 
53 It is important to point out that this is not always a smooth or seamless development, but one of fits and starts.  
Heidegger’s reflections on this process in Beiträge §42, entitled “From ‘Being and Time’ to ‘Event,’” are helpful: 
“On this ‘way,’ if to keep falling down and getting up can be called a way, it is always and only the same question 
of the ‘meaning of beyng’ that is asked. Therefore the positions of the questioning are constantly different. Every 
essential questioning must radically change whenever it questions more originally. There is no gradual 
‘development’ here. Even less is there that relation of the latter to the earlier according to which the latter would 
already lie enclosed in the earlier. Since everything in the thinking of beyng is directed toward the unique, to fall 
down is, as it were, the norm here! This also rules out the historiological procedure: to renounce the earlier as ‘false’ 
or to prove that the later was ‘already meant’ in the earlier. The ‘changes’ are so essential that their scale [Ausmaß] 
can be determined only if in each case the one question is pervasively asked out of its own site of questioning” 
(GA65 84-85/67-68). Polt restates one of the key points as follows: “Neither should we say that Being and Time 
already includes what comes later; the movement toward the Contributions is not a deduction of what is implied by 
some previous propositions, but trailblazing” (EB 44). 
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“problematic” in a sense discussed by Deleuze in Différence et répétition that I address in 
Chapters IV and V. Third, Heidegger does not introduce the concept of event in an external, 
adjunct way into his ontology, such that it could be defined independently of it. He arrives at it 
by pressing through the project of Sein und Zeit. That project generates methodological and 
conceptual horizons that are eventually driven beyond themselves by the complex logic of the 
problematic of being. The concept of event articulates this problematic in the advanced stages of 
the evolution of Heidegger’s account. It is within these horizons, or rather through their 
evolution, that the event is defined. Heidegger’s use of this concept marks a supersession of 
earlier forms of his method and its concepts. 
 
1.3: Diagenic Analysis 
 
The complex structure of the movement of Heidegger’s ontology – necessitated by the abyssal 
logic belonging to the problematic of being and the reflexive relation between being and his 
methodology – calls for an interpretive realignment of his texts and concepts. The conventional 
approach to Heidegger’s corpus is chronological or “historiological” (see Section 4.2 below for 
discussion of the latter term). In it, the relations of his texts – or, more properly, their conceptual 
renditions of various problematics – are based on their positions along the timeline of his career. 
In contrast, in the approach I suggest, their relations should be based on a simultaneously 
methodological and ontological relation animating the movement of his thought: that of 
grounded and grounding terms. My view is that Heidegger’s corpus should be arranged 
according to the degree of grounding each text or conceptual scheme is able to attain. That is, 
they should be analyzed according to their position along a diagenic axis (an axis of ground) 
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rather than a chronological axis. This provides a rigorous way to deal with the type of complex 
evolution found in Heidegger’s work and to solve a set of four related interpretive problems. 
Moreover, I take it to be necessary for properly reconstructing his concept of event. 
The first of these problems is what to do with seemingly inconsistent accounts Heidegger 
gives of various subject matters at different points in his work. Is his ontology internally 
inconsistent? For example, as mentioned, in “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” (lecture 1930, print 
1943) the essence of truth is accounted for in terms of originary ontological structures of ἀλήθεια 
(unconcealment, clearing, openness) and λήθη (concealment, withdrawal, closedness). Yet in 
Beiträge, this a-lēthic account no longer constitutes the most originary nature of truth. How can 
such a conflict be explained? The extensive literature dealing with transformation in Heidegger’s 
thought largely focuses on the macrological shift from its early to later stages. I don’t find this 
sufficient for addressing the problem, since transformations of his account often occur at 
micrological levels. 
The second interpretive problem is that if Heidegger’s corpus contains the type of 
reflexive, complex evolution I have described, how can we best navigate its various superseding 
stages with conceptual clarity, avoiding mixing them up and muddling his account? 
The third problem is with Heidegger’s often poetic or mystical sounding language. Did 
he ultimately resort to logically inconsistent, nonsensical, or arbitrary formulations? Is his 
philosophy linguistically rigorous? 
The fourth and final problem is found in recent debates over which of Heidegger’s texts 
should be given philosophical and, consequently, scholarly priority over others. How should one 
sort out which offer the best statements of his thought regarding some issue? In Identität und 
Differenz, for instance, the primary sense of the event is an “owning in which man and Being are 
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delivered over to each other” or “the belonging together of man and Being.”54 In Beiträge, 
however, the event figures primal structural dynamics of beyng taken independently of any such 
reciprocal relation. Many scholars take texts like Identität und Differenz to provide Heidegger’s 
“real” post-Kehre thought because they were honed for publication (Beiträge was not) and were 
written later, thus benefiting from greater refinement. I disagree and will devote Section 1.4 to 
arguing that analyzing Heidegger’s texts in light of the distinction between diagenic and 
syngenic axes solves these problems and shows a key role for Beiträge. 
The methodological use of the notion of ground I am advancing is justified by its 
essential role throughout Heidegger’s corpus, as shown in certain respects in terms of the 
movement of Grundlegung above. This role can be further demonstrated in at least two related 
ways. First is his consistent use of the relation of grounding and grounded terms in his analyses, 
either explicitly or implicit in the logic of his problematics. In either case, relations of ground 
form a consistent organizing principle in his texts. Heidegger’s ontological program is oriented 
by the task of uncovering the originary ground of whichever terms are currently used to 
articulate the problematic of being. This enacts a productive logic of Grundlegung. Though this 
productive logic of abyssal grounding shares certain similarities with transcendental philosophy, 
in Chapter II I argue there are also important differences that set it apart. Second, Heidegger 
several times explicitly thematized the notion of ground in a way bearing decisive impact on his 
program. While relations of grounding and grounded terms are constantly used in his treatment 
of the ontological problematic, the problematic of ground itself forms a key register in which the 
nature of being is addressed. In “Vom Wesen des Grundes,” for instance, Heidegger writes, 
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“‘ground’ is a transcendental characteristic of the essence of being in general.”55 In Beiträge this 
is emphasized stronger still when the event is characterized by a set of grounding operations it 
performs, i.e., the structural dynamics of ground become one of the key registers in terms of 
which the evental nature of being is worked out. There, one finds a merging of the first, 
methodological use of relations of grounding and grounded terms and the ontological operations 
of ground belonging to the event.56 
The distinction between diagenic and syngenic axes allows me to clarify the supersession 
involved in the complex evolution of Heidegger’s ontology as well as the relations between a 
number of his difficult concepts. This solves the first and second interpretive problems because it 
explains the internal relation of concepts as they develop within Heidegger’s texts and how one 
and the same subject matter can be explained in different terms at different stages of the 
ontology.57 When examined in light of the reflexive evolution I have described, together with the 
relations of ground involved, the particular characteristic of a particular conceptual 
transformation can be accounted for. My methodological claim is that the evolution of 
Heidegger’s ontology occurs along a diagenic axis. With each rendition of new Grundbegriffe 
comes a clarification of syngenically related features within the problematic field at hand. 
Sein und Zeit Division I can serve as an example. 1) Heidegger begins with a diagenic 
move, inquiring into the condition of possibility for any ontology, including ontology as 
construed in the systems of the history of metaphysics. He establishes Dasein as this condition, 
                                                 
55 WG 172/132, italics removed. “Transcendental” is used here in relation to Dasein’s transcendence or Überstieg 
(surpassing) (WG 137/107). The term “transcendental” “names all that belongs essentially to transcendence and 
bears its intrinsic possibility thanks to transcendence” (WG 139/109).  
56 It is important to note that for Heidegger the notion of ground is often tied together with that of essence. When 
Heidegger inquires into the essence of something, he is inquiring into the ground that enables that thing to be. Since 
this is the basis on which something is enabled to be whatever it is, this can be called its essence. This is seen, for 
example, in his formulation of essence as the Grund der inneren Möglichkeit (ground of the inner possibility) in 
“Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” (WW 186/143). 
57 Note, however, that I have yet to detail how Heidegger grounds the problematic of being, and thus the whole of 
this complex evolution, via Dasein as the condition for the possibility of ontology. I do this in Section 4. 
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thereby recasting the ground of ontology. 2) On that basis, he establishes the basic state 
(Grundverfassung) of Dasein as being-in-the-world, and then develops a number of syngenic 
aspects of being-in-the-world: all the elements involved in the worldhood of the world, being-
with, being-in, etc. 3) At the end of Division I, Heidegger’s focus again turns to the diagenic axis 
as he searches for a more originary unity whence the different syngenically related aspects of 
being-in-the-world are grounded.58 He writes: 
 
The totality of the structural whole [Die Ganzheit des Strukturganzen] is not to be 
reached by building it up out of elements.… The being of Dasein, upon which the 
structural whole as such is ontologically supported, becomes accessible to us 
when we look all the way through this whole to a single primordially unitary 
[ursprünglich einheitliches] phenomenon which is already in this whole in such a 
way that it provides the ontological foundation for each structural item in its 
structural possibility [so daß es jedes Strukturmoment in seiner strukturalen 
Möglichkeit ontologisch fundiert].59 
 
 
It is not an accident that Heidegger refers to this ontological foundation as the being of 
Dasein. The force driving or drawing forward his problematic of being is the question of the 
ground whence the elements of a current rendition of that problematic are enabled or originated. 
In the passage just cited, the analysis of anxiety serves that methodology, allowing Heidegger to 
arrive at a conception of Sorge (care) as such a ground and as the being of Dasein. 
Because being is in part characterized by the operations of ground it performs, 
Heidegger’s axis of ground forms both an essential methodological and an ontological order. 
Thus, his accounts of being and of related subject matters should be sequenced diagenically 
rather than chronologically. Sequential renditions are produced through the self-modulating, 
reflexive, productive logic of Grundlegung. This draws out the diagenic axis. Each account is 
rendered by working out how its problematic drives or draws the conceptual horizon of the 
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extant account beyond itself, then developing new concepts to articulate that newly uncovered 
dimension, and finally rethinking the terms of the extant account on that basis. This means that 
problematic is driven or drawn to a more originary grounding. Of course, Heidegger sometimes 
follows miscues and dead ends and just gets things wrong. The result is that bits of his corpus do 
not fit seamlessly and consistently into one overarching progression. 
The third interpretive problem has to do with Heidegger’s language and is seen vividly in 
relation to his concept of event. There are extensive analyses of Heidegger’s philosophy and use 
of language, which I will not detail. The issue here is found in the unusual constructions in his 
writing, particularly beginning in the 1930s. Heidegger’s language has invited the charge that, 
especially in his later work, he became sloppy and a mystical, stargazing poet – something 
maintained to be a far cry from a rigorous philosopher. This criticism is exemplified, for 
instance, by Carnap. The error with this indicated earlier can now be reformulated: the Carnapian 
position fails to recognize the structure of the evolution of Heidegger’s ontology, whereby new 
and often bizarre technical conceptual and linguistic formulations are generated out of 
methodological need. It fails not only to recognize the distinction between positive and radical 
science, but between 1) technical formulations that operate on a syngenic axis, to which 
grammatical analysis within the syntax of that axis properly applies and 2) formulations 
operating along a diagenic axis, which aim to articulate the ground enabling the syntax of a 
syngenic axis to be. It thus fails to register the relations of Heidegger’s technical terms, 
mistaking them for the relations that can be accounted for within a positivistic, established 
syntactical system. 
The issue with Heidegger’s language becomes especially apparent when dealing with the 
concept of event. The rupture with metaphysics Heidegger intends the concept of event to 
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establish introduces philosophical material with which the language of the tradition is 
unequipped to deal. Certainly, previous thinkers also developed theories of events, often in ways 
much more interesting than Heidegger recognizes. In his analysis, though, these operate within 
the metaphysical framework oriented by the question of Seiendheit or the beingness of beings: τί 
τὸ ὄν. As a result, the nature of events is taken as secondary to the nature of beings. For instance, 
events are conceived as the modification of the attributes of subjects. Linguistically, this 
metaphysical framework is infused into our grammar: a sentence begins with a subject and a 
predicate. And our technical philosophical vocabulary is adapted to the traditional problems that 
lay within that framework. Heidegger’s concept of event aims to give a more fundamental 
account of being than is possible within the framework of Seiendheit. As I have emphasized, this 
involves problematizing the very foundations of metaphysics and, consequently, its language. 
His project engages the rupture in the tradition’s conceptual structure that the event figures. 
Consequently, uncovering new aspects of the event or related ontological structures requires 
developing new technical language, language that gains its philosophical purchase in the context 
of the evental problematic. Defining and evaluating it requires first taking into account the 
conceptual and methodological transformations that generate it. 
Though it can sometimes be tedious, Heidegger’s specialized language is developed to 
articulate features of a problematic that disrupt our conceptual resources, features that in his 
account traditional philosophical terminology categorically cannot articulate accurately. Our 
regular philosophical standards of clarity and precision can be offended easily when his concepts 
appear imprecise or fuzzy. However, by upholding exactly those standards when analyzing the 
methodological status of Heidegger’s concepts, it becomes clear that they are often necessarily 
imprecise or tentative because the subject matter they are designed to get a hold of is at the 
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frontier of what is thinkable in terms of the conceptual apparatuses available. In other words, 
they are often constructed with as much precision as possible or appropriate to articulate an 
aspect of the ontological problematic that has yet to be grasped in full precision or that is 
inherently imprecise or partially indeterminate. A good example in Beiträge is again the concept 
of abyssal ground, which articulates a highly precise moment in the ontology presented there, but 
a moment that exceeds the reach of traditional concepts of ground and is, in fact, partially 
indeterminate. It is a moment Heidegger struggles to explicate in that text, while the 
indeterminate aspect of abyssal ground is built into and reflected in his account of it. It would be 
a mistake to take this as a flaw in the concept, since the indeterminacy in the concept is inherent 
in the ontological feature it articulates. 
Thomas Sheehan and others have expressed frustration with the hyper-jargonized, 
inconsistent state of the terminology on which much English language Heidegger scholarship has 
relied.60 I strongly agree with this sentiment. Such lingo obfuscates the compelling and rigorous 
accounts Heidegger gives as he grapples with the issues of his concern.61 For reasons noted, 
though, some of these issues do require disruptions of our language and grammar, and the 
development of new constructions to articulate radically reconfigured philosophical landscapes. 
But this does not justify perpetuating needlessly bizarre, often unintelligible jargon in 
scholarship. We can give precise accounts of Heidegger’s concepts even when what they aim to 
grasp involves aspects that are conceptually indeterminable or yet to be worked out with 
                                                 
60 Thomas Sheehan, “A Paradigm Shift in Heidegger Research,” Continental Philosophy Review 34 (2001): 183-
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61 As Lucretius observes, “For dolts admire and love everything more which they see hidden amid distorted words, 
and set down as true whatever can prettily tickle the ears and all that is varnished over with fine-sounding phrases.”  
Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, trans. W. H. D. Rouse, revised by Martin F. Smith (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2002), 53; 1.641-644. 
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precision.62 Heidegger’s thought in his more obtuse writings can be rigorously reconstructed. 
The challenge is simply to be precise about the conceptual horizons within which they work, 
how and where they problematize those horizons, and the aspects of the problematic organizing 
those horizons that they aim to articulate. 
 
1.4: The Place of Beiträge in Heidegger’s Corpus 
 
On this basis, I return to the fourth problem: how to interpret the place of Heidegger’s various 
texts within his corpus. This is primarily prompted by a debate over the importance and validity 
(or lack thereof) of Beiträge and the related private manuscripts. I will argue that we must reject 
a popular interpretive approach that sidelines these texts. It claims that Beiträge should be 
disregarded 1) because of its fractured, rough character and 2) in light of later, published texts 
that also address many of its core themes (Ereignis, in particular).63 I will address the second of 
these points first. 
Broadly speaking, that interpretive approach employs what I have called the 
chronological or “historiological” axis to organize Heidegger’s different texts or different 
renditions of a theme. These are sequenced loosely along a timeline, though a general distinction 
between pre-Kehre and post-Kehre periods is observed, sometimes along with a third transitional 
period in between. Within these groupings, certain texts are said to provide more genuine 
statements of Heidegger’s thought than others. Here, a text’s chronologically advanced position 
                                                 
62 I would like to make the following qualification. I take more of Heidegger’s language to be rigorous than many 
other critical readers of his work. But I also think some goes beyond what can be justified by his methodology. 
63 As an instance of a position favoring the importance of Beiträge, Vallega-Neu writes that it “may be considered 
Heidegger’s second major work after Being and Time.” Daniela Vallega-Neu, Heidegger’s Contributions to 
Philosophy (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2003), 1. For a position downplaying its importance, see 
Capobianco’s EH 35-36 and HWB 20 and 51-52. 
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in the corpus is taken to indicate a philosophically advanced status. The reasoning is that such a 
text had the benefit of more refinement and is thus the more mature statement of the author’s 
thought. I don’t deny that this is often the case. But the reason a later text is more philosophically 
advanced than another is not because of its chronological position. Rather, one is more advanced 
than another because it advances Heidegger’s master problematic of the nature of being or any of 
its sub-problematics further. Thus, if a chronologically earlier text advances the problematic of 
being further than a later one, the former should be arranged interpretively as more 
philosophically advanced. Since the various renditions of these problematics are organized along 
diagenic axes, what it means to be more philosophically advanced is to hold a more originary 
position on a diagenic axis: a more philosophically advanced account is one that articulates the 
ground whence the elements of a less philosophically advanced account are enabled to be. 
When it comes to Beiträge and the related private manuscripts, in the chronological 
approach these are placed on a linear axis according to the dates of their writing, situated among 
Heidegger’s other published texts, lecture courses, etc.64 With respect to the concept of event, 
therefore, chronologically later texts like Identität und Differenz (1957) and Zur Sache des 
Denkens (1962) are taken to hold more philosophically advanced and genuine statements of 
Heidegger’s thought on the topic. This position justifies dismissing aspects of the event in 
Beiträge that are not prominent in later texts. For example, in Identität und Differenz and Zur 
Sache des Denkens, the event is primarily a codependent, co-appropriation between being and 
human existence, and so chronological interpreters dismiss the position advanced in Beiträge 
that the event must be independent of beings (I analyze this independence-claim in Chapter II). 
The chronological approach often correlates with a suggestion that texts Heidegger made 
publicly available during his lifetime should be given preference over rougher, private 
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manuscripts. For instance, Richard Capobianco posits the philosophical superiority of 
Introduction to Metaphysics (1935) over Beiträge on these grounds, implicitly preempting 
Beiträge-based objections to his interpretation of “Being as physis as aletheia.”65 Despite 
Capobianco’s excellent analyses of ἀλήθεια, φύσις, and a number of other elements of 
Heidegger’s work, I find the reasoning for such an interpretive approach unconvincing. First, this 
assumes that Heidegger’s reason for withholding publication of these writings was that he found 
them of sub-par quality. Perhaps. But before jumping to this conclusion good evidence is 
required ruling out other plausible explanations (like maintaining a free space for thinking 
without the restrictions imposed in tailoring a piece for a public audience; fear of alienating his 
audience; professional exigencies; political exigencies; etc.). Second, authors are often poor 
interpreters of their own work. Their reflective statements can certainly be helpful in unlocking 
obscure aspects of their text. But the richness of that text often far exceeds what is recognized by 
the author him or herself. Even if Heidegger did believe his private manuscripts were sub-par, it 
would not mean they in fact are. Monet famously judged many of his Water Lilies to be 
unacceptable and Virgil died with the order that his Aeneid be burned. Despite the cultish 
worship that has developed within Heidegger scholarship, Martin Heidegger was in fact human 
and susceptible to changing his mind and being wrong. Even if he had disavowed Beiträge as 
philosophically faulty – which he did not – he could have been wrong. Third, the richness of a 
text and the account it offers is not necessarily a function of its compositional elegance, unified 
structure (take Nietzsche’s aphorisms, for example), or aesthetic qualities one happens to prefer. 
Exemplifying the problem with this last point, Capobianco expresses a preference for a 
tempered, “gentile” account of Ereignis in Heidegger’s later texts over an “eruptive event-
fulness and momentousness” he finds to characterize Ereignis in Beiträge and the related 
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writings.66 He does not, though, offer any reason as to why these are preferable characteristics; it 
seems he simply likes them. 
With respect to Beiträge in particular, I am dubious about the sentiment that diminishes 
the status of the text on the basis of its fractured, unpolished character: if the content is there, 
then the content is there, even if it is a rough read. I am especially dubious about diminishing its 
status on the basis of the fact that Heidegger did not publish it. If one desires to study the skills 
of a masterful samurai, a choreographed display sanitized for public consumption must always 
fall short. One would want to observe the warrior in the throes of real battle: how do they 
navigate the onslaught of their adversary? How do they improvise in changing conditions with 
setbacks and injuries? How do they handle their sword, use a particular environment to their 
advantage, and exploit their adversary’s unique weaknesses? How do they conserve energy and 
avoid fatigue? The same goes when studying a thinker. Texts polished for publication are 
obviously indispensable, but one should hope to study how a thinker actually thinks as they are 
in the throes of their problematic. This is precisely what we find in Heidegger’s Beiträge and the 
related private manuscripts. Here, Heidegger is writing openly, for himself. In contrast to the 
later texts and lectures dealing with Ereignis made public during his lifetime, Beiträge offers an 
unsanitized account. This is the battlefield version of the concept, not the Discovery Channel 
version. Moreover, to study the limits of a warrior’s skills, one would want to see them in action 
as they employ all within their power to handle a superior adversary, as the adversary begins to 
overwhelm them, and, finally, as the warrior’s body is splintered and disintegrated in an ultimate 
charge into the abyss of the adversary’s sword. Beiträge and the related private manuscripts, I 
suggest, are the texts where Heidegger pushes his thought to its farthest limits and, as a result, 
where it begins to fragment. I will also argue that this means some of their accomplishments are 
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Heidegger’s greatest. Beiträge (together with the related manuscripts) does not just provide 
another rendition of Heidegger’s problematic; it provides the rendition furthest advanced along 
the diagenic axis: the account of the event in Beiträge articulates the ground whence the 
structures used to articulate his problematic in other, public texts are originated. 
Since I hold that the key to Heidegger’s thought is a grounding movement along the 
diagenic axis coupled with clarification of syngenically grounded structures at each stage, this is 
what organizes my interpretive approach and reconstruction of his work. Heidegger’s texts and 
concepts should be sequenced not along a chronological axis, but a diagenic axis. That is, they 
should be arranged according to the degree of grounding each is able to attain and the position of 
the concepts addressed with respect to an axis of ground. From this perspective, as I will 
demonstrate, the account of truth in “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” is more originary than that in 
Sein und Zeit: it provides an account of the ground whence the more derivative structures of truth 
in Sein und Zeit are enabled to be. Similarly, the account of truth in Beiträge articulates the 
ground whence the structures of truth in “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” are enabled to be, and thus 
is more advanced on the diagenic axis. This gets more complex when we look at a text like the 
1949 Bremen lecture, “Einblick in Das Was Ist.”67 Here, Heidegger rethinks the nature of beings 
in terms of das Geviert (the fourfold) on a non-metaphysical ground, namely, the evental account 
of being. But since his texts explicitly dealing with the nature of the event work out the ground 
for an account of the fourfold, they must be read as more advanced on the diagenic axis, even 
though “Einblick in Das Was Ist” is chronologically later than some of them. Likewise, since 
Heidegger’s account of the event in later published texts like Identität und Differenz and Zur 
Sache des Denkens articulate the event at the level of the mutual appropriation of human 
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existence to being and of being to human existence, whereas in Beiträge his account of the event 
articulates the very ground enabling such an appropriation, the former must be read as less 
originary on the diagenic axis than the latter (even though they might provide better accounts of 
parts of their themes). Indeed, in my view the accounts given in Beiträge and the related texts 
articulate the most profound degree of grounding in Heidegger’s corpus. They should be taken as 
its philosophical apex, that is, as having advanced Heidegger’s problematic the farthest. 
 
2: An Outline of the Two Key Senses of “Event” for Heidegger 
 
2.1: The “Historical” Sense of “Event” 
 
It will be helpful now to provide a more detailed orientation to some of the stakes of Heidegger’s 
account of the event and then a condensed map of the conceptual landscape in which that 
account is situated. This will entail making a distinction between two key senses of “event” for 
Heidegger. 
Broadly speaking, Heidegger is concerned with the historical situation in which human 
existence finds itself in the early-mid twentieth century. In Heidegger’s 1936 summer lectures on 
Schelling, he makes a statement about just what age he understands himself to be working 
within: “‘Today,’ that does not mean this very day, nor this year nor even this decade, but rather 
the whole transitional age from the nineteenth to the twentieth century and at the same time this 
transition in its whole European expansion.”68 It is presumed by most Heidegger scholars that 
this historical situation extends to our time today, though I find that after thinkers like Deleuze 
the accuracy of such a characterization of the early twenty-first century is less clear. The 
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situation Heidegger diagnoses is one in which human existence is existentially defined within the 
philosophical, conceptual, linguistic, social, political, and technological framework of 
metaphysics. Philosophically, the history of metaphysics has had certain successes in accounting 
for the nature of beings. In fact, in Beiträge, Heidegger defines metaphysics by its orientation to 
the question of beings as beings (ὂν ᾗ ὄν), which he argues Aristotle articulated in its most 
general form as τί τὸ ὄν (what are beings?).69 The problem, however, is that this orientation 
entails a distinctive myopia and consequently sets into place a philosophical horizon governed by 
that myopia: metaphysics is structurally incapable of understanding its own ground. This trouble 
goes hand in hand with the inability of metaphysics, on Heidegger’s diagnosis, to provide a 
suitable account of being. Because metaphysics is oriented by the question of beings as such, 
when it comes to ask about being, it treats being as if it were a being (a most eminent being or an 
abstract universal) and renders it as God, a substratum, a transcendent idea, etc. As long as our 
efforts to conceptualize being operate within the framework of metaphysics, Heidegger argues, 
we are doomed to failure. The specific character of the foundations of metaphysics and their self-
myopia prevents success in the science of being. Thus, a genuine rupture must be made with 
metaphysics. Since we live within the historical framework of metaphysics, though, that rupture 
must itself be generated from within metaphysics. This rupture is opened up by inquiring into the 
condition of possibility or ground enabling the very historical configuration of metaphysics.70 
This is “the ontico-ontological condition for the possibility of any ontology”: Dasein.71 It is 
important to note that along with the role of this inquiry in effecting such a rupture, Heidegger 
thinks the reconceptualization of this ground has the promise to provide metaphysics a refreshed 
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basis for its own projects, especially that of providing an account of beings. Ultimately, his 
efforts to fulfill this promise have only limited success, appearing as a reconception of beings in 
terms of das Geviert (the four-fold) in 1949 and the 1950s.72 This effort by Heidegger, though, is 
meant to be non-metaphysical for reasons I cannot go into here, and does not appear in Beiträge. 
One count on which I take Deleuze to surpass Heidegger is his greater success in rethinking the 
nature of beings on the basis of an evental ontology. 
As understood in Sein und Zeit, the ground enabling any ontology – and thus metaphysics 
– is Dasein: that being which is in such a way that its own being is an issue for it. Dasein’s 
existence, however, cannot be understood properly as a metaphysical substratum or foundation. 
Nor can it be fully accounted for in terms of metaphysical concepts of subject, object, or any 
other kind of “thing.” Faulty conceptualizations like these have resulted in understanding 
Dasein’s intellectual life to be in the situation described by Robert Sokolowski as the “egocentric 
predicament” in which one’s intellectual processes are taken to be internal, while what one is 
concerned with trying to understand remains external.73 In this case, the task of gaining an 
understanding of being (or anything else for that matter) is relegated to that of coming up with an 
adequate representation of being (as a metaphysically external being of some sort) in one’s 
mind.74 Dasein’s existence, in distinction, constitutes an ontological coincidence or internal 
relation between thinking and being. This character makes Dasein the ground enabling any 
ontology whatsoever.75 It also establishes the possibility of doing ontology in an immanent, non-
representational way. Since, in Sein und Zeit, being is “the being of beings” and Dasein exists 
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with an (usually unthematized) understanding of its own being, this gives Dasein a special 
priority as the being whose being is to be inquired into in the project of ontology. Thus, the 
project of rethinking the nature of being on proper ontological grounds – fundamental ontology – 
operates via the existential analytic of Dasein. To return to the language of rupture, since this 
rethinking addresses the very ground of metaphysics, it enacts its first “tearing-open.” 
As we will see, however, according to Heidegger’s own post-mortems of Sein und Zeit, 
this project of fundamental ontology did not go far enough: its understanding of being – and of 
human existence – remained essentially determined by the metaphysical framework because it 
continued to think being on the basis of its relation to beings (namely to Dasein). Doing ontology 
on the basis of this relation is a product of Aristotle’s formulation of the question, τί τὸ ὄν (what 
are beings?), which resulted in his faulty determination of being as οὐσία, or more broadly what 
Heidegger calls Seiendheit (beingness).76 Thus, for Heidegger, a more profound rupture with 
metaphysics is required if we want to free ourselves from its grip and develop a fresh account of 
the nature of being that does not rely on faulty conceptual apparatuses. This rupture is figured as 
the transition from the project of a fundamental ontology of Dasein to the project of thinking 
being as event. Heidegger thinks that if we were to accomplish this, a genuinely new or “other 
beginning” (andere Anfang) for thought would become possible.77 This rupture, which 
Heidegger continually strives to effect but never thinks he has sufficiently accomplished 
(although I think he is more successful in this respect than he realized), is one register of the 
significance of the event. In what follows, I call this the “historical” sense of the event: the event 
as a rupture in the framework of metaphysics that drives or draws thought beyond it, but which 
can only be pursued from within its factical, historical horizons. 
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2.2: The “Ontological” Sense of “Event” 
 
“Event” has a second sense that for Heidegger bears an ontological priority over the historical 
one. I will call it the “ontological” sense of the event. Here, event becomes the core concept in 
terms of which Heidegger rethinks the nature of being itself (striving to do so independently of 
metaphysical influence) and, in turn, the plight of human existence. I take this sense to constitute 
the richest register of the event in Heidegger’s thought. When the project of developing an 
evental ontology is merely a glimmer on the philosophical horizon, the historical, ruptural sense 
of the event might be regarded as primary. Yet, this historical sense is unthinkable without 
whatever ontological element it might be that drives or draws thought beyond metaphysics. In 
other words, if metaphysics provided a sufficient ontological framework, it would be impossible 
for thought to discover aspects of being that are irreducible to that framework, and so there 
would be no possibility of a rupture (historical or otherwise). However, I am arguing that for 
Heidegger’s ontology, thought is constitutively bound to a logic of being (as event) that 
categorically undermines the foundations of metaphysics, and, further, that this is a necessary 
condition for the historical sense of the event. Obversely, since our factical conditions are such 
that we exist and think within the framework of metaphysics, developing an account of that 
ontological element (the evental nature of being) can only be accomplished in a way that begins 
within and is sculpted by such conditions, and takes this situation itself into account. In this way, 
the ontological sense of the event bears a priority over the historical, though the two remain 
bound together. In the ontological sense, the event is a dynamic of pure difference, driven by the 
differentiation of that difference from itself such that it self-determines in processes of 
appropriation (Er-eignis) and expropriation (Ent-eignis), which, elaborated in the registers of 
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truth, ground, and time-space, constitute the genetic ground of worlds of beings. I provide a 
schematic outline of the components of this definition below and then proceed (through Chapter 
III) to provide interpretive arguments justifying this reconstruction. 
In the ontological sense, being itself is the event. Here, the event is an abyss or excess of 
difference, that is, an originary dynamic of self-differentiation (Unterschied or Entscheidung). 
How can the event be both an abyss and an excess of difference? Although abyss and excess may 
seem to be opposites, Heidegger’s language of the “abyss” is directly connected to the discourse 
of “ground” that I have already begun to explore: abyss is Abgrund – the prefix evoking both a 
“lack” and an “origin” of ground. Heidegger therefore holds that while the abyssal dimension of 
the event involves a sense of total lack, this is a genetic or originary lack – a lack that self-
grounds all that is. In this account, the abyss is excessive in two distinct senses: 1) it is the 
ground whence all that is is as the abyss’s overflow, and 2) its dynamic is such that it withdraws 
from and exceeds that which it grounds.78 Heidegger sometimes refers to this abyssal or 
excessive character as an ab-gründige Unerschöpfung (abyssal undepletion) or 
Unerschöpflichkeit (inexhaustibility).79 The dynamic of self-differentiation is a primordial and 
perpetual ontological displacement, which is figured by and unfolds within a “turning” of 
moments of Er-eignis (appropriation) and Enteignis (expropriation).80 As I will argue in Chapter 
II, although some scholars suggest that Heidegger’s event is identical with operations of 
appropriation and expropriation, this is incorrect: these are included in the dynamics of the event, 
                                                 
78 See, for instance, Beiträge §242, where Heidegger understands the essence of truth to articulate the genetic 
appropriation of that which is: “the abyssal ground [Ab-grund] is also, and primarily, the originary essence of the 
ground, of its grounding, of the essence of truth” and “What is its [the abyssal ground’s] mode of grounding? The 
abyssal ground is the staying away [Weg-bleiben] of the ground” (GA65 379/299). 
79 GA65 29/25 and 382/302. 
80 For Polt’s discussion regarding whether Ereignis is a singular, occasional, or continual event, see EB 74-87. On 
the “turning” in question here, see GA65 185/145: “das in sich kehrige Ereignis” (“the intrinsically turning event”), 
29/25, 34/29, 57/46, 95/76, and §255. I discuss this in more detail in Chapter II. For more on the dynamic of 
“appropriation” and “expropriation,” see, for example, GA14 24-28/19-23. 
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but certain aspects of the event exceed the logic of appropriation and expropriation. In different 
ways, the evental dynamic both generates and dissolves ground and, in turn, grounds or enables 
the manifestation or coming to presence of beings. That is, it enables beings to be. 
Heidegger understands the process of this manifestation in terms of his concept of truth. 
At an important level, truth is articulated as a dynamic relation between originary concealment or 
withdrawal (λήθη) and unconcealment (ἀλήθεια). The majority of scholarship on the subject 
maintains that this a-lēthic framework constitutes the most originary conception of truth in 
Beiträge. I argue, again in Chapter II, that this is not so. Ἀλήθεια and λήθη are grounded in 
originary difference or self-differentiation, and so Heidegger’s concept of truth in this text is 
most originarily differential, not a-lēthic. Bringing the event together with this concept of truth, 
Heidegger proposes an account of the advent of the world: at the a-lēthic level, the event is a 
process by which the structures of originary concealment and unconcealment are appropriated in 
a co-determinate relation of simultaneous strife and intimacy, and this unfolds in a way giving 
determination to or forming the finite contours of a world. 
This process is integrally related to Heidegger’s thinking of time (as the temporal 
character of being) and history. In part, the event figures an originary domain, ontologically prior 
to the historical, out of which historical epochs unfold. In fact, for Heidegger, history is an 
epochal history, where an epoch is not simply a “span of time” but a determination or formation 
of being that is enabled or given its determination (i.e., is sent or “destined” [geschickt]) by an 
originary holding back or withdrawal ontologically prior to that formation of being: “A giving 
which gives only its gift, but in the giving holds itself back and withdraws.”81 Here, the 
“sequence of epochs” or transformations of being is determined by withdrawals that enable 
                                                 
81 GA14 13/9 and 12/8. 
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them.82 Whereas Polt concludes that for Heidegger Ereignis is an occasional event that occurs as 
the inception of an historical epoch (“it happens only at a few, inconspicuous moments”), I 
conclude that the inception of such historical epochs is one aspect of a more primordial event. 
This primordial event can be essentially characterized neither as occasional nor continual – either 
approach would locate the event within the domain of temporality, whereas this event is 
originary with respect to temporality.83 In other words, Ereignis grounds the time in which any 
occasional event might occur. 
Metaphysics, which is characterized by the “forgottenness” or eclipse of the withdrawal 
of being in favor of the presence it enables, understands being in terms of presence.84 Thus, 
Heidegger argues, the event, and the withdrawal or refusal essential to it, is ontologically prior to 
the metaphysical determination of being as beingness (Seiendheit). Because metaphysics, 
furthermore, understands human existence on the basis of being as presence, the event is also 
ontologically prior to human existence, metaphysically determined. In contrast, Heidegger 
recasts the human being on a more originary ontological ground, resulting in an account in which 
a mutual appropriation of being to human existence and human existence to being is one 
dimension of the event. Thomas Sheehan, Quentin Meillassoux, and a number of other 
interpreters take this mutual appropriation to form the heart of Heidegger’s conception of the 
event. I will show, however, that this is incorrect, at least within Beiträge. This mutual 
appropriation is a dimension of the event, but the event includes other structures and processes 
that cannot be captured by the logic of appropriation. Indeed, in its most originary sense, being 
as event is entirely independent of any relations with beings, most notably human beings. As I 
will demonstrate, the prevalent misinterpretation is a result of overlooking a crucial step 
                                                 
82 GA14 13/9. 
83 EB 81. 
84 WW 195/149. 
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Heidegger takes in his account of the essence of truth in Beiträge: inquiring into the originary or 
genetic ground of the very structures of λήθη and ἀλήθεια. 
 
2.3: A Note on Radical Critique 
 
Having outlined both the historical and ontological senses of event, a related point can be made 
here regarding what should be expected of a full ontology. In Joe Hughes’ analysis of Deleuze, 
he emphasizes a criterion found in Maimon’s critique of Kant. Simply put, Maimon claims that 
Kant’s critical philosophy is successful to the degree that it derives the conditions of possibility 
for experience and lays out the boundaries of knowledge in terms of the legitimate functioning of 
the faculties. However, Kant’s critique is insufficient because it does not give an account of the 
genesis of the faculties. It does not show “the genesis of what has been criticized.”85 Only in 
doing so can it be sufficient, or rise to the level of what can be called “radical critique.” Kant’s 
Kritik der Urteilskraft can perhaps be read as an attempt to recast his system in this manner. 
Likewise, Deleuze’s Différence et répétition recasts Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft 
such that the critical project satisfies this criterion. For Deleuze, the prime critical target is the 
regime of representation and its categorial systems, together with the ontological priority of 
identity presupposed by this type of system. In Deleuze’s argument, making identity prior to 
difference renders any such system insufficient. To fix this, Différence et répétition proposes an 
ontology in which difference is primary, and the regime of representation and the identity upon 
which it relies are generated only secondarily. What, following Maimon, Deleuze recognizes is 
that for this project to be successful, it must not only critique systems grounded in identity and 
their complicit representationalism as well as replace them with an ontology of difference, but 
                                                 
85 DDR 3. 
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furthermore, this differential ontology must explain the genesis of identity and representation, 
giving an account of how they come to eclipse difference and of the distortion that process 
constitutes. 
I would like to demand a similar requirement of Heidegger. The prime target of 
Heidegger’s critique is what he calls metaphysics, which is to be supplanted with an evental 
ontology. However, if this Heideggerian evental ontology is to be a full one, it cannot simply 
point to the errors and limits of metaphysics; it must also explain the genesis of metaphysics and 
its relation to being (as event). More precisely, for an evental ontology to rise to the level of 
radical critique: 1) It must account for the way that which exceeds the framework of metaphysics 
does so – Heidegger explains this in terms of the insufficiency of metaphysics to account for its 
own ground and other features of the problematic of being exhibited in his early 
phenomenological and later conceptual analyses. 2) It must account for the genesis of 
metaphysics. In Heidegger’s work, this, in turn, involves two aspects: A) the “deconstruction” of 
the historical and conceptual foundations sustaining the dominance of metaphysics and its 
occlusion of more originary ontological problematics; and B) the promised, though perhaps 
never actualized, recuperation of metaphysics such that it is properly grounded in the event and 
reconstructed from it. This would constitute a fundamental transformation or re-appropriation of 
metaphysics on proper ontological grounds and require a robust theory of distortion. Though I 
discuss the mechanism of distortion in Heidegger’s evental ontology in Chapter II (in terms of 
his notion of “Un-wesen” or “distorted essence” of truth), I find his work to fall short when it 
comes to satisfying criteria 2B.86 
 
                                                 
86 GA65 347/274. 
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2.4: A Note on the Methodological and Ontological Relation of the Historical and 
Ontological Senses of the Event 
 
In Beiträge – and in Heidegger’s work generally – the event carries the two interrelated 
significances indicated: as an historical event, it figures a rupture in the historical and conceptual 
framework of metaphysics that produces another beginning for thought; as an ontological event, 
it articulates the nature of being itself. 
Importantly, though the event in the second sense bears ontological priority, the historical 
sense bears a temporary methodological priority because it constitutes the concept of the event 
available from within the horizon of metaphysics. A properly grounded articulation of being as 
event is not available within this horizon. Thus, the horizon of metaphysics must be breached, 
enacting the historical event, by an ontological method that can generate access to aspects of 
being more originary than the determination of the historical epoch of metaphysics. In 
Heidegger’s philosophy, this is the productive logic of Grundlegung, which advances ontology 
along the axis of ground. Hence, the historical sense of the event bears methodological priority 
until the method attains a sufficiently originary grounding. At that point, methodological and 
ontological priority merge and the sense of the event as the articulation of being itself takes on 
methodological primacy. That is, philosophical methodology takes on the logic of the event, 
develops an account of the event from a standpoint immanent to that logic, and establishes the 
ground for a consequent rearticulation of the domain of history. 
Heidegger devotes a great deal of attention to working through the problematic of the 
history of metaphysics. This includes developing a theory of the history of metaphysics that is 
built into his ontology and producing numerous exquisitely detailed analyses of canonical texts. 
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This renders often brilliant, but often controversial, insights into the origins of Western thought. 
It also supplies him with deconstructed concepts to be deployed in the problematic of being (the 
ἀλήθεια/λήθη pair, for instance). As I will argue in Section 4.2 below, discerning the particular 
conceptual origins and transformations of this history is essential to understanding how it shapes 
our existential conditions today and the factical impact on the project of ontology. However, in 
Heidegger’s program none of this is sufficient for developing a properly originary, non-
metaphysical account of being; in other words, focusing on the historical event is insufficient for 
rendering an account of being as event. This requires focusing on the problematic of being itself 
on the basis of the methodological grounding supplied in Sein und Zeit, employing the 
productive logic of Grundlegung, and grounding ontology in an originary logic of being. For this 
reason, my reconstruction of Heidegger in this dissertation focuses on the ontological sense of 
the event. However, to establish the methodological and conceptual continuity between the 
historical and ontological senses, Section 4.2 provides a more detailed account of the ontological 
ground of the problematic of the history of metaphysics offered in Sein und Zeit. This outlines 
the conceptual location of this problematic in Heidegger’s broader ontology and shows the 
foundation for explaining why working out the ontological sense of the event simultaneously 
enacts the historical event. Chapter II will then turn to Beiträge, where truth is the primary 
register of the ontological problematic through which proper conceptual grounding in the logic 
of the event is secured. 
Prior to grounding ontology in the logic of the event, the productive logic of 
Grundlegung necessarily includes the dimension of what I will call “negative” or “deflationary” 
deconstruction. The “positive,” productive, and conceptually experimental operation of 
Grundlegung remains structurally mitigated by the negative task of deconstruction, since the 
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terms of the ontological problematic are defined in an essential way by the alienation from being 
manifested in the history of metaphysics.87 The positive operation is bound to the task of 
rectifying this alienation, that is, grounding human existence, Da-sein, history, etc., in being. 
Once this is accomplished by attaining a methodological grounding in the logic of the event, the 
negative aspect of the ontological problematic can be sidelined. This grounds a thoroughly 
positive methodology, which elaborates the logic of the event and enacts a logically immanent, 
“inflationary” conceptual experimentalism. In Chapter III, I will show how this can be done in 
terms of Heidegger’s concepts of ground and time-space. Concepts generated through this 
positive methodology articulate the evental problematic and its structural dynamics. They also 
offer a basis for developing appropriately grounded accounts of more derivative structures 
(beings, worlds, historical configurations, and other ontological structures that I will discuss in 
Chapters II and III), that is, they offer a basis for an appropriately grounded experimental 
metaphysics.88 Though this claim goes beyond Heidegger’s text to a certain degree, I believe it is 
a logical entailment of his evental ontology. It also shows that Deleuze’s claim to be a 
metaphysician is not categorically inconsistent with Heideggerian thought. 
 
 
3: Critical Review of Two Dominant Interpretations of Ereignis 
 
In the following, I provide a critical outline of two interpretations of Heidegger’s concept of 
event that are dominant in recent scholarship. In Chapter II Sections 1.2 and 2.1, I argue more 
extensively that both are faulty. The first claims the event is the mutual appropriation of human 
                                                 
87 My use of “positive” here is not the same as Heidegger’s use, discussed in terms of positive science. 
88 As I will emphasize later, in Beiträge, Heidegger defines metaphysics especially in terms of its essential 
orientation toward providing an account of the nature of beings. 
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existence to being and being to human existence. In this schema, this co-appropriation includes a 
necessary dependence upon human existence. Consequently, if human existence were 
annihilated, being as event would not occur. This is the interpretation advanced by Sheehan and 
Meillassoux. The second interpretation takes the event (being itself) to be ἀλήθεια, φύσις, or the 
giving of what is given. This position is represented by Richard Capobianco and Richard Polt. I 
take the first of these to be incorrect and the second to be incomplete. 
 
3.1: The Position that Ereignis is the Mutual Appropriation of Human Existence to Being 
and Being to Human Existence (Sheehan and Meillassoux) 
 
Sheehan offers his account of das Ereignis within the context of his discontent with focus on the 
language of Sein in Heidegger scholarship. His core philosophical claims revolve around the idea 
that “the major obstacle in interpreting Heidegger today is the continued use of the ontological 
language of ‘being’ and ‘beings.’”89 Thus, Sheehan’s position entails reinterpreting the most 
basic directive of Heidegger’s thought: his “core topic” – die Sache selbst – was never being, but 
rather meaning (Sinn or Bedeutung).90 “Scholars” he writes, “must realize that throughout his 
texts the term ‘being’ was only a provisional and ultimately misleading way of saying 
‘meaning.’”91 This thesis goes hand in hand with the other noted earlier: that because meaning 
“occurs only in correlation with human understanding,” Heidegger’s problematic is contained 
entirely within the domain of the human being or Dasein as being-in-the-world.92 Sheehan 
                                                 
89 FE 42. 
90 FE 43. 
91 FE 42. 
92 In Sheehan’s words, “Heidegger’s extensive corpus from beginning to end remained a hermeneutics of Dasein or 
an analytic of human existence” (Thomas Sheehan, “Astonishing! Things Make Sense!” Gatherings: The Heidegger 
Circle Annual 1 [2011]: 3). 
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insists, “Heidegger remained on one level only, that of the man-meaning conjunction, and 
everything in his corpus is about that.… [H]e never got beyond human being, and never intended 
to.”93 Sheehan maintains this to be true for both Heidegger I and Heidegger II.94 To me, this 
places Heidegger too close to the anthropology he explicitly denies is his project in Sein und 
Zeit.95 
Sheehan does affirm that the defining question of Heidegger II – the “basic question” 
(Grundfrage) – is the question of what gives meaning: “getting to the constituting source of 
meaning as such.”96 “If meaning-giving (Welt, Lichtung) is responsible for things being 
meaningful, what is responsible for Welt and Lichtung as such?”97 The answer, he agrees, comes 
in terms of Ereignis. However, Sheehan reabsorbs Ereignis into the framework of meaning: 
Ereignis is “the appropriation of man to the meaning-giving process” – i.e., to being, world 
(Welt), Lichtung, or, using Sheehan’s alternative term, “mind.”98 Sheehan means “mind” here “in 
the very specific Heideggerian sense of the structural condition for making intentional sense of 
                                                 
93 Sheehan, Astonishing! 4. 
94 FE 43. Sheehan borrows this terminology from Richardson (see Introduction n20). 
95 Sheehan’s thesis can be distilled as follows: for Heidegger, “Sein” is synonymous with “Sinn,” i.e., meaning 
correlative with human existence. As he states it, “the Da-sein / Sein correlation is transformed into the Da-sinn / 
Sinn conjunction” (Sheehan, Astonishing! 3). Thus, “Sein” now rendered as “Sinn” names Heidegger’s core topic. 
Or alternatively, if the word “Sein” can be taken to signify his core topic, this is only because by “Sein” Heidegger 
meant “Sinn.” For Sheehan, Sein = Sinn = Heidegger’s core topic – die Sache selbst. I disagree with this thesis. My 
initial contention is that Heidegger was a smart guy – if he had meant Sinn and not Sein, he would have said so. But 
this is clearly not a sufficient argument. I think Heidegger is in fact doing ontology and this ontology affirms a 
rupture in meaning or meaninglessness at its heart. In an article I might submit to a journal after some revision, I 
argue that this is evident in his account of the λήθη co-constituting the essence of truth, in terms of which the 
problematic of being is sometimes articulated. Because of this it is impossible to take “Sein” to mean “Sinn” and 
simultaneously to name Heidegger’s core topic. I then turn to a short analysis of the idea that in Heidegger II, being 
and human existence are locked into a reciprocal correlation. Here I show that in Heidegger’s account, certain 
aspects of the essence of truth are not dependent on any relation with human existence and thus the rubric of 
reciprocity does not match up to Heidegger’s account. 
96 FE 54 and 51. 
97 FE 51. Or again: “Heidegger’s sights were ultimately set not on that which is meaningful (in traditional language, 
das Seiende) not even on what gives it meaning (traditionally, das Sein) but rather on the source of meaning (das 
Wesen/die Wahrheit des Seins)” (FE 51). 
98 FE 53, italics removed, and 56. 
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anything.”99 To clarify: “Mind in this sense is a priori ‘open’ and meaning-giving. When things 
come to mind, they are disclosed.”100 But, according to Sheehan, this openness or disclosure only 
is insofar as it is held open by human existence. Thus, being/world/Lichtung/mind/meaning-
giving is dependent on human existence, so the appropriation of human existence to the 
meaning-giving process is reciprocal – it is a co-appropriation.101 This allows Sheehan to offer a 
fuller statement of his interpretation of Ereignis: “Ereignis is this hermeneutical circle of 
reciprocal need: human being’s need of Welt/mind as meaning-giving, and Welt/mind’s inability 
to subsist without human being.”102 
I think this is a faulty account of Ereignis. As I will show later, in Beiträge certain 
aspects of the event – and of the essence of truth – are not dependent on any relation with human 
existence. Thus, the rubric of reciprocity does not match up to Heidegger’s account.103 
Furthermore, the position advanced by Sheehan steps into a philosophical trap: the 
correlationism critiqued by Meillassoux in After Finitude.104 Correlationism, for Meillassoux, is 
the position following upon Kant’s critical philosophy that “we can only ever have access to the 
correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the 
other.”105 In my view, this correlationism can be rendered in both epistemological and 
ontological registers, which in many cases overlap. In the former, whatever human existence 
aims to think or know – be it an object in itself, an unconditioned absolute, being, etc. – that 
thing is only ever accessible on the basis of its relation to us, i.e., as something for us and never 
                                                 
99 FE 56, italics removed. 
100 FE 56. See Sheehan’s text here for more discussion of his concept of mind. 
101 For more detail on Sheehan’s understanding of Ereignis as reciprocity, see FE 57 and 59-60. 
102 FE 56-57. Sheehan restates these positions in a larger statement of his interpretation of Heidegger in his most 
recent book, Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015). 
103 In fact, I think this is evident even in Heidegger’s account of truth in “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit.” 
104 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, trans. Ray Brassier (London: 
Continuum, 2008). 
105 Meillassoux, After Finitude 5. 
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independently of any relation to us. A good example of this is Kant’s transcendental philosophy 
and its establishment of the phenomenal/noumenal distinction. In the ontological register, 
correlationist philosophies maintain that human existence always is in a correlation with being 
(or world or language or whatever the primary ontological term is taken to be) and, inversely, 
being always is only in a correlation with human existence. In other words, such philosophies 
would maintain that neither being nor any aspect of being can be accounted for as independent of 
human existence: No human existence, no being. 
Meillassoux takes Heidegger to be a paradigm case of just such ontological 
correlationism, particularly with respect to the concept of event. He writes: 
 
On the one hand, for Heidegger, it is certainly a case of pinpointing the occlusion 
of being or presence inherent in every metaphysical conception of representation 
and the privileging of the present at-hand entity considered as an object. Yet on 
the other hand, to think such an occlusion at the heart of the unconcealment of the 
entity requires, for Heidegger, that one take into account the co-propriation 
(Zusammengehörigkeit) of man and being, which he calls Ereignis. Thus, the 
notion of Ereignis, which is central in the later Heidegger, remains faithful to the 
correlationist exigency inherited from Kant and continued in Husserlian 
phenomenology, for the ‘co-propriation’ which constitutes Ereignis means that 
neither being nor man can be posited as subsisting ‘in-themselves’, and 
subsequently entering into relation – on the contrary, both terms of the 
appropriation are originarily constituted through their reciprocal relation.106  
 
 
In Meillassoux’s account, Heidegger is a correlationist because ultimately he is able to 
think being only on the basis of a co-propriative relation between being and human existence. 
Moreover, he takes Ereignis to be exactly this co-propriative relation. Sheehan’s interpretation of 
Heidegger fits this model precisely. As we have seen, for Sheehan, because “being” means 
“meaning” and meaning is always correlative with human existence, being is always correlative 
                                                 
106 Meillassoux, After Finitude 8. 
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with human existence. In fact, he terms this the “human correlativity with meaning.”107 
Moreover, for Sheehan, “Ereignis” names the hermeneutical circle of reciprocal need between 
human existence and that which gives meaning (world, openness, mind, etc. – what we are used 
to calling “being”).108 
There are at least two different ways to argue against this sort of ontological 
correlationism, both depending on what we mean by “being.” The first is to locate being as the 
being of beings, as Heidegger does in Sein und Zeit. Then, one could argue that even in the 
absence of all human existence, beings would still be. Meillassoux begins his critique of 
correlationism with this idea, focusing on timeframes anterior to life on earth. Correlationist 
philosophies, he argues, cannot properly account for what he calls the “ancestral,” i.e., “any 
reality anterior to the emergence of the human species – or even anterior to every recognized 
form of life on earth.”109 This includes things like “the accretion of the earth (4.56 billion years 
ago).”110 In “Facticity and Ereignis,” Sheehan entertains a different version of this idea as an 
objection to his position: suppose a huge meteorite impacts earth and extinguishes all life on the 
planet. It would seem that beings like the sun, black holes, and carbon atoms still would be. 
Thus, it would seem, “when Dasein is gone, there still will be Sein.”111 Disappointingly, Sheehan 
dismisses this critique with a circular line of reasoning. He simply reasserts his interpretation of 
                                                 
107 FE 48. 
108 Sheehan’s correlationist interpretation of Heidegger is further expressed in the following examples. Example 1: 
“Heidegger himself understood Sein phenomenologically, i.e., as Sinn (meaning) in correlation with the Da of Sinn, 
man as ‘where-meaning-appears’” (FE 49). Example 2: “Ohne Da-sein, kein Sein; ohne Sein, kein Da-sein (without 
human being, no being; without being, no human being).” Sheehan restates this in light of his thesis as “Ohne Da-
Sinn, kein Sinn; Ohne Sinn, kein Da-sinn” (FE 47-48). Example 3: In the phenomenological reduction “from being 
to meaning, and from meaning to its constituting source – the outcomes are always a matter of correlation. In the 
first reduction the phenomenologist’s focus is on the intentional correlation between understanding and the thing. In 
the second reduction, the phenomenological gaze focuses on one’s transcendence to meaning (= one’s a priori 
engagement with it), a correlation that is the source of meaning giving” (FE 45). 
109 Meillassoux, After Finitude 10. Beyond this, I will not detail the critiques of correlationism raised by Meillassoux 
here. 
110 Meillassoux, After Finitude 9. 
111 FE 48. 
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being as meaning and meaning as dependent on human existence (beings have being insofar as 
they are made meaningful by human existence), which allows him to maintain that after the 
meteorite Sein will in fact not be. This is consistent with his broader interpretation of Heidegger. 
But as an argument for that interpretation and as a way out of the meteorite problem, it fails. 
Whether or not the Heidegger of Sein und Zeit can answer to this sort of meteorite 
problem is something I won’t address here. I am more interested in a second way of arguing 
against ontological correlationism. It takes a tack away from understanding being as the being of 
beings and argues correlationism is false because being itself has aspects that are not dependent 
on any relation with beings (notably, the human being). Recall that in Sheehan’s account, the 
program of Heidegger II is oriented by the question of what gives meaning, i.e., what enables 
meaning to be at all. This is Ereignis, which he understands to be the reciprocal need human 
existence has for being and being has for human existence. In other words, Ereignis constitutes a 
strict ontological correlationism in which being only is in relation with human existence. 
Both Meillassoux and Sheehan are wrong because for Heidegger there are aspects of 
being (as event) that are decisively not dependent on any relation with human existence. I 
establish the reasons this is so in Chapter II and take a moment there to return to the 
correlationist interpretation and provide an argument against it. In sum, in the evental ontology 
worked out in Beiträge, Heidegger argues not only for the independence of essential aspects of 
the event from human existence, but gives an account of specific structures and operations of the 
event that are independent of any relation to beings whatsoever. One of these is the operation of 
“clearing” (Lichtung) at the heart of the essence of truth, which generates the structures of 
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openness and concealment.112 One of Heidegger’s key claims in that text invalidates both 
Sheehan’s claim that Sein = Sinn = Heidegger’s core topic and the correlationism it embodies in 
Sheehan’s account of Ereignis. The claim is that the essence of truth is “definitively detached 
[abgelöst] from all beings.”113 That is, the structural operation of the event that constitutes the 
essence of truth must be understood independent of any relation to beings – including, 
importantly, human beings. 
 
3.2: The Position that Ereignis is Being itself as Anwesen, Ἀλήθεια, Φύσις, or the Giving of 
What is Given (Capobianco and Polt) 
 
The second interpretation I wish to look at takes “Ereignis” to be an alternative name for what is 
articulated by “anwesen” (presencing) or “das Anwesen des Anwesenden” (the presencing of 
what is present), “ἀλήθεια,” “φύσις,” and number of other terms used by Heidegger.114 This 
position is represented by Capobianco and, to an extent, Polt. My main focus will be on 
Capobianco’s version. For him, “anwesen,” “ἀλήθεια,” and “φύσις” denote roughly the same 
thing: not only the manifestation of worlds of beings or meaning, but what enables such 
manifestation at all. Polt glosses this as “the giving of the given” (cf. Heidegger’s formulation, 
“es gibt”).115 This is more accurate than Sheehan and Meillassoux’s account, but ultimately 
                                                 
112 According to Heidegger in Beiträge, the essence of truth is die Lichtung für das Sichverbergen (the clearing for 
self-concealing) or Lichtung des Sichverbergens (the clearing of self-concealing) or again, die lichtende Verbergung 
des Seyns (the clearing concealment of beyng) (GA65 348/275, italics removed; 329/261; and 380/300). 
113 GA65 329/261. 
114 For more discussion regarding Heidegger’s use of “anwesen,” see EH 27-28. There Capobianco distinguishes 
between a number of his related terms. For my current purposes, it is sufficient to say that “anwesen” names the 
ontological process of presencing (Capobianco translates it with that gerund) and must be distinguished from das 
Anwesende (“that which appears or is present”) and Anwesenheit (presence), as in, “what is present in its sheer 
‘presence’ (Anwesenheit).” The latter are characteristic of metaphysical definitions of the beingness of beings. 
115 EB 24. For more on Polt’s interpretation of “the giving of the given,” see EB 24-33. 
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incomplete.116 Capobianco’s work reflects the fact that this process is immensely complex. 
Presently, though, it will be sufficient to lay out the broad parameters of his reading. This will 
allow me to return to it in Chapter II to pose a critique and mark the key differences in my own. 
In Engaging Heidegger, Capobianco frames his interpretation of Ereignis by positioning 
himself against those (like Sheehan) who would reduce Heidegger’s core question from one 
about being to one about meaning and also against those who might claim “Ereignis” names a 
fundamentally different matter for thought than did “being” in Heidegger’s earlier work. He 
insists “Ereignis” is “(only) another name for Being itself”: even though Heidegger used a 
number of different central concepts throughout his career, they each were meant to articulate the 
same “fundamental matter.”117 He makes this interpretive point as follows:  
 
[Heidegger] was clear and emphatic right to the end of his life that the single, 
defining concern of his path of thinking regarded the originary, fundamental, 
unifying meaning of Being, named by him over the many years as Beyng (das 
Seyn), Being itself (das Sein selbst), Being as such (das Sein als solches), and 
Being as Being (das Sein als Sein).118 
 
And: 
The single, whole phenomenon – Being itself – that he named and renamed again 
over the course of his lifetime of thinking, and the abundant variety of names that 
he put into play succeeded in bringing into view the varied features of this one, 
simple phenomenon. So it is that we may also speak of the unconcealing of 
beings (aletheia), the emerging of beings (physis), the laying out and gathering of 
beings (Logos), the unifying, unfolding of beings (hen), the presencing of beings 
(Anwesen), the lighting/clearing of beings (Lichtung), the freeing of beings (das 
Freie); the letting of beings (Lassen), the giving of beings (Es gibt), and the 
appropriating or enowning of beings (Ereignis). All of these names, and still 
others, say (sagen) and show (zeigen), in somewhat different ways, the primordial 
phenomenon. Or to put this in Heidegger’s terms, all of these names are the Same 
                                                 
116 Capobianco and Polt’s versions both make the mistake of thinking Ereignis on the basis of a relation to beings. 
Polt understands Ereignis in the framework of the giving of the given, where what is given are worlds of beings or 
meaning. Capobianco understands it in terms of being itself as the condition for or the process of manifestation of 
worlds of beings or meaning. This, however, designates only one, derivative dimension of Ereignis. 
117 EH 35 and 34. Capobianco uses “Being itself” (with the capitalized B) as a sort of shorthand for referring to this 
fundamental matter for thought in a way meant to include all these various formulations employed by Heidegger. 
118 EH 34. 
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(das Selbe), but not simply identical (das Gleiche) in an empty, purely formal, 
logical sense.119 
 
 
For Capobianco, “Ereignis” is (only) another name used to articulate the problematic of 
“Being itself” in a fundamental way. Consequently, Ereignis should be given no special status 
with respect to anwesen, ἀλήθεια, φύσις, etc. Each of these contributes to the author’s work of 
“bringing into view the varied features of this one, simple phenomenon,” Being itself.120 In fact, 
though Capobianco does not make this claim explicit, his strong readings of ἀλήθεια and φύσις 
suggest he takes these concepts to address this problematic in richer ways than Ereignis, and that 
we should prefer to focus on them. 
 I affirm with Capobianco that Heidegger maintained a unified focus throughout his career 
on what he found to be the essential matter for thought. This was not meaning (Sinn or 
Bedeutung). Nor was there a “break” in his work in which he abandoned an earlier project and 
began a new one fundamentally inconsistent with the first.121 Addressing the second of these 
points, Capobianco emphasizes, “Heidegger did not marginalize the Seinsfrage in favor of the 
thematization of Ereignis in the years following his private Ereignis-writings.”122 In other words, 
the turn to Ereignis was no dismissal of the core problematic in Heidegger’s earlier thought. I 
agree with this claim, but not in the same sense or for the same reasons Capobianco makes it. 
Heidegger’s turn to Ereignis in the 1930s was a continuation of his earlier work, but he was not 
spinning in place and merely rethinking his problematic in different terms that might allow 
greater clarity through alternative expositions. Heidegger’s account of Ereignis in Beiträge was 
produced precisely by pursuing the Seinsfrage to a more originary ground than the concept of 
                                                 
119 EH 4. 
120 EH 4. 
121 This is more or less a reaffirmation of the case for continuity in Heidegger’s thought made by Richardson in TPT. 
122 EH 36. Capobianco means between the years 1944-1956 here. Of course, as he points out, Ereignis did move 
back to a focal role for Heidegger in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
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Sein was able to render. It rearticulates his problematic in a more originary way. He came to 
thematize Ereignis as a result of supplanting more derivative renditions of the ontological 
problematic, which the Seinsfrage progressed through in a methodologically immanent way in 
Heidegger’s earlier work. The mistake in Capobianco’s reading is that – aside from the broader 
shift from Heidegger I to Heidegger II – he takes the various accounts in which Heidegger 
addressed his core problematic to be syngenic recastings of that problematic, and fails to register 
the diagenic arrangement of certain of them.   
Consistent with his interpretation, Capobianco argues “there is neither sufficient nor 
convincing textual evidence to maintain that he ever considered Ereignis as a more fundamental 
matter for thought than das Sein.”123 As I will show in Chapter II, this is false. In Beiträge, 
Heidegger makes a crucial distinction between Sein and Seyn, and Ereignis articulates the nature 
of Seyn. Seyn as Ereignis articulates precisely a more fundamental matter for thought than Sein: 
“Sein” designates one particular rendition of Heidegger’s core problematic, and “Seyn” as 
Ereignis designates a more originary rendition of it. Capobianco’s claim can be maintained only 
by ignoring crucial distinctions made in Beiträge and the related manuscripts, which he does by 
dismissing these as second class texts on the basis of their fractured composition and the fact that 
their author opted not to publish them during his lifetime. As I have argued above, this is a 
fatally flawed interpretive hypothesis. Such an approach, though, paves the way for the 
interpretation of Ereignis Capobianco gives. 
If, for Capobianco, “Ereignis” is “(only) another name for Being itself,” what is “Being 
itself”?  He understands this to be “the temporal-spatial, finite and negative, unconcealing of 
beings (das Seiende) in their beingness (die Seiendheit) as made manifest meaningfully by 
                                                 
123 EH 34. 
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Dasein in language.”124 For Capobianco, this amounts to the claim that being as Ereignis is none 
other than anwesen or “Being as physis as alêtheia.”125 It is important to make the point clear that 
this is not meant to suggest that Ereignis or Being itself is presence, but that it is the dynamic 
process in which beings come into and go out of presence.  
 
Characterizing Being itself as the appearing or manifesting of beings does not in 
the first place refer to the sheer, abiding “appearance” or “presence” of beings 
(which came to be spoken of in the metaphysical tradition as the eidos, morphe, 
ousia, energeia, actualitas, essentia), but rather to anwesen selbst, presencing 
itself, or to “Bewegtheit” (Heidegger’s translation of Aristotle’s kinesis), namely, 
the “movedness” of all beings into and out of presence, which Heidegger 
meditated on at length, especially in his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, B, 
I.126 
 
Compare the following statements, which make this point in a variety of ways:   
 “Being/Ereignis originates (gives, grants, lets, enables, allows) beings in their 
beingness.”127 
 “For Heidegger, then, das Ereignis ‘is’ the Originating (die Anfängnis) ‘is’ Beyng.”128   
 Being/Ereignis is the “originating of presence.”129 
 “Ereignis as Es gibt gives (grants, allows, enables) beingness; but Ereignis and Being 
itself: the Same.”130 
                                                 
124 EH 34. 
125 HWB 50. Capobianco retains the terminology of Sein (Being) when addressing Ereignis because he maintains 
that Sein and Seyn ultimately addressed the same matter for thought. 
126 HWB 25. 
127 EH 47. 
128 EH 43. Capobianco points out that the term “die Anfängnis” appears in GA70 to name an originating more 
originary than any Anfang: “In the 1941 manuscript Über den Anfang, he uses an obscure, antiquated German word 
to name this unifying ‘beginning’ (Beyng itself as Ereignis) that holds sway over both [the first and other] historical 
‘beginnings’ (die Anfänge). The unusual word he uses, which can be traced back to Early New High German 
(roughly 1350-1650), is die Anfängnis, which I translate as ‘the Originating’” (EH 42). For more on this use of 
“Anfängnis,” see Capobianco’s helpful discussion in EH 42-43. 
129 EH 47. 
130 EH 49. 
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 “Being as ‘manifestness’ or ‘manifestation’ (Offenbarkeit), this is the matter itself 
(die Sache selbst) of Heidegger’s thought.”131 
 “The word Ereignis makes manifest the Being-way by virtue of the three fundamental 
resonances of the word itself, namely, (1) the ‘event’ or ‘happening’ that is the 
efflorescence and effulgence of beings coming into (2) their ‘own’ (the eigen of 
ereignen) and thereby (3) coming out into ‘full view’ to Dasein (ereignen related to 
eräugnen, literally ‘to come before the eyes’…).”132 
 
The key point these citations show is that in Capobianco’s account, Ereignis is that which 
enables the manifestation or coming to presence and passing out of presence of beings. This 
process is alternatively addressed by Heidegger in terms of anwesen, ἀλήθεια, φύσις, Es gibt, 
and the other concepts listed in the citations above. This is not a flatly incorrect reading, for it 
faithfully represents accounts of Ereignis given by Heidegger in a number of texts from the 
1950s and 60s. However, when it comes to Beiträge, and thus to the broader interpretation of 
Ereignis in Heidegger’s work, it misses the mark.133 
There is one more important point to make here: Capobianco has affirmed that in his 
interpretation φύσις or ἀλήθεια occurs even if human existence is not around, for instance in the 
Proterozoic era.134 These concepts articulate ontological structures that are not dependent upon 
                                                 
131 HWB 7. 
132 HWB 21. 
133 For Polt, similarly to Capobianco, Ereignis is “the ‘happening’ through which being ‘takes place’ in the ‘there’ of 
being-there” (EB 29n3). Here, Polt is affirming his agreement with Walter Pratt that this is a good account of 
Ereignis). This means beyng (Seyn) “is best interpreted as the giving of being, that is, as the event in which beings 
as such and as a whole are enabled to make a difference to us” (EB 29). We must be careful not to conflate being 
(Sein) and beyng (Seyn) here. For Polt, Sein “is the givenness of beings as such and as a whole – that is, not the 
‘mere fact’ that something is given, but the background meaning that enables us to recognize anything as given” (EB 
28). Seyn, in distinction, is the giving of that givenness.   
134 Capobianco, oral remark (in response to a question by Sheehan) at the 2013 meeting of the Heidegger Circle in 
New Haven, Connecticut. 
  75 
human existence. I agree with him on this point, in opposition to Sheehan’s position that without 
human existence being (as Ereignis) does not occur. 
In my analysis of Beiträge below, I show that the story Capobianco tells is only part of 
the story of Ereignis. That which enables the manifestation or coming to presence and passing 
out of presence of beings is one crucial register or dimension of Ereignis. But, this is a derivative 
register that must be rethought on the basis of a more originary one. There are two very specific 
problems with his interpretation, which show it is incomplete and essentially flawed. First, it 
conceives Ereignis on the basis of a relation to beings, which Heidegger argues is a fatal flaw of 
metaphysics. Second, it fails to register dimensions of the event that exceed ἀλήθεια, φύσις, 
anwesen, or “the temporal-spatial, finite and negative, unconcealing of beings (das Seiende) in 
their beingness (die Seiendheit) as made manifest meaningfully by Dasein in language.”135 
Indeed, as I will argue, certain dimensions of the event exceed even the logic of appropriation 
and expropriation itself. 
 
4: The Groundwork of Sein und Zeit 
τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι 
-Parmenides, Fragment 3 
 
If Sections 1-3 of this chapter provide a map to the stakes and ideas involved in Heidegger’s 
account of the event, the following will more precisely examine how, in Sein und Zeit, he 
establishes the philosophical and methodological ground from which his program proceeds. 
There, he frames the core problematic he would engage for the remainder of his career (the 
Seinsfrage or “question of being”) and a primary set of terms for addressing it. Heidegger’s 
account of the event in the 1930s is developed by pursuing his core problematic through the 
                                                 
135 EH 34. 
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philosophical terrain he works out in this earlier period. That is, the complex evolution of 
Heidegger’s account, along the diagenic axis, takes the groundwork established in Sein und Zeit 
as its philosophical point of departure. Consequently, it is necessary to outline certain major 
conceptual moments determining that ontological groundwork. My intention here is to briefly 
distill the basic structure of his early ontology (in the Introduction to Sein und Zeit and a few 
other parts of that text) from which the major elements framing his later account of the event 
proceed. Specifically, I look at the way Heidegger recasts the problematic of being by 
establishing Dasein as a distinctive ontico-ontological structure that operates as the condition for 
the possibility of ontology. In this formulation, the question of being is not abstract, but situated 
as a structure of existence. I then address Heidegger’s understanding of the historical errancy 
manifested by metaphysics, the existential impact of this on Dasein, and the consequent impact 
on fundamental ontology (as the existential analytic of Dasein). This enables me to show how 
Heidegger’s pursuit of the question of being via the existential analytic of Dasein as the ground 
enabling any ontology (in Sein und Zeit) simultaneously enacts incremental progress in the 
project of ontology and toward rectifying Dasein’s alienation in the historical configuration of 
metaphysics. In fact, these two registers of philosophical progress are essentially bound together. 
This groundwork in Sein und Zeit opens up a path of conceptual access that traverses the 
problematic of truth to an appropriately grounded concept of the event. I turn my focus to truth in 
Chapter II. 
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4.1: Dasein as the Condition for the Possibility of Doing Ontology 
 
It is well known that Heidegger’s philosophical project was the study of the nature of being. This 
was prompted by his early encounter with Franz Brentano’s Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung 
des Seienden nach Aristoteles (1862), which raised for him the question of “the meaning of the 
word ‘being’ (ὄν) for Aristotle.”136 In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger frames his project as 
Fundamentalontologie (fundamental ontology), which problematizes the foundations of the 
tradition of ontology and recasts the whole of its problematic field.137 Fundamental ontology is 
not a regional ontology, but the philosophical science of the nature of being, on the basis of 
which the terms of any regional ontology should be clarified. This is because any regional 
ontology presupposes an understanding of the being of the terms with which it is concerned. If 
the being of those terms is misunderstood, that mistake gets transmitted throughout the regional 
problematic. 
In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger argued that being is neither a being nor the totality of beings. 
Rather, his question is about the being of beings. By the time of Beiträge this underwent a 
substantial reformulation, which I address in Chapter II. Prior to systematic philosophical 
elucidation, “being” signifies “that which determines beings as beings, that on the basis of which 
beings are already understood.”138 Richardson clarifies: being is “that which enables beings to be 
(present) to man and men to each other.”139 Or again, it is the “lighting-process by which beings 
are illuminated as beings.”140 These formulations elucidate being at only a minimal level, yet two 
                                                 
136 TPT 4.  
137 SZ 13/34. 
138 SZ 6/25-26. Additionally: “Sein liegt im Daß- und Sosein, in Realität, Vorhandenheit, Bestand, Geltung, Dasein, 
im ‘es gibt’” (SZ 7/26). 
139 TPT 6. 
140 TPT 6. On the etymology and broader sense in which Heidegger understands the word “Sein,” see TPT 
Introduction. Also see TPT 10. 
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important points can be drawn from them. First, Heidegger’s conception of being refers both to 
an ontological register (being is “that which determines beings as beings”) and an 
epistemological register (being is “that on the basis of which beings are already understood”), 
and he holds these to be fundamentally conjoined. Second, the character of being includes an 
enabling power, it enables beings to be.141 This exhibits the link of the Seinsfrage to questions of 
ground, conditions of possibility, and necessary or sufficient reason. It also links Heidegger’s 
program with those of Kant and post-Kantians broadly. 
In the opening sections of Sein und Zeit, Heidegger identifies a set of philosophical 
prejudices that deny the importance of the question of being: being is mistaken as “the most 
universal and the emptiest of concepts,” as “indefinable,” or as the most “self-evident” of all 
concepts.142 He also summarizes what he finds to be a series of errors in the history of 
philosophy that prevented the proper formulation and analysis of this question. I discuss the 
particulars of these in Section 4.2.3 of this chapter. The central mistake is a failure to properly 
work out the ground (here understood as the condition of possibility) for doing ontology. The 
foundational philosophical move preventing this was initiated by Plato, but crystallized in 
Aristotle’s interpretation of being as οὐσία, reducing the temporal character of being to the 
dimension of presence. In Heidegger’s account, this marks the advent of metaphysics and its 
“forgetting” of being. Here, the history of philosophy since Plato and Aristotle can be read as the 
transmission and transformation of error with respect to the ground of ontology. In other words, 
metaphysics is the history of the forgetting of being. Heidegger aims to break the hold of the 
erroneous foundations of metaphysics and rehabilitate the question of being via a fresh analysis 
of the condition for the possibility of any ontology. Needless to say, he is not modest in his 
                                                 
141 Ref. Heidegger’s Grund der Ermöglichung (ground of enabling), which is sometimes found in Beiträge as Grund 
der Möglichkeit (ground of possibility) (WW 177/136 fn. a; GA65 297/234). 
142 SZ 2/21 and 4/23. 
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ambitions to rectify twenty-two hundred years of philosophy. The way his solution functions can 
be seen clearly by framing it through the implicit critique of the metaphysics of 
representationalism contained in the Introduction to this text. This also marks an important 
programmatic overlap between Heidegger and Deleuze. For both, developing a sufficient 
ontology entails a critique of representationalism. 
The historical failure to properly work out the ground of ontology has tethered Western 
thought to a series of representationalist philosophies of mind and epistemologies (e.g., Aquinas, 
Descartes, and Kant). These are predicated on a metaphysical divorce between the mind that 
aims to know and the object it aims to know about. In other words, this manifests the “egocentric 
predicament” in which one’s intellectual processes are taken to be internal, while what one is 
concerned with trying to understand remains external to that intellect.143 As a result, the 
fundamental problem of philosophy becomes establishing how the mind can have proper access 
(or any access) to its object. How can the relation of externality between mind and object be 
overcome? This problem can be clarified in terms of a paradigmatic version of 
representationalism rooted in the scholastic tradition. In it, the task of thought is to accomplish 
an adaequatio intellectus ad rem: an adequation of the intellect to the thing, i.e., a true account of 
the object of thought in the intellect.144 In the case of Aquinas, for example, this operates by 
means of an analogical relationship to be established between the intellect’s representation and 
the thing it represents. The problem, though, is that an analogical representation of the thing is 
                                                 
143 Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology 9. 
144 Heidegger has a nice discussion of this in terms of the problematic of truth in “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit,” Part 1 
(WW 178-182/137-140). 
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never the thing itself, so an abyss always subsists between the intellect and its object. The thing 
itself always remains transcendent to the intellect.145 
Now, if the ontological problematic is approached from the perspective of the 
representationalist tradition and being takes the position of the object, the problem becomes: how 
can the mind gain an adequate representational knowledge of being?146 In other words, the 
question of how ontology is possible is presented as a problem of correct means of access (der 
rechten Zugangsart).147 For Heidegger, since being is the being of beings, ontology must proceed 
by analysis of the being of appropriate beings. The problem of access to being, consequently, is 
seen as a problem of access to such beings. Here, Heidegger rejects the term “mind” as an 
artifact of metaphysically faulty theories of the human being, opting for hermeneutically and 
phenomenologically dynamic terms like “understanding,” “interpretation,” and “thought.”148 Yet, 
if philosophical thought poses the Seinsfrage, it must have the right kind of access to being (via 
the appropriate beings) – and must proceed on that basis – if the project of ontology is to have 
any success.149 Borrowing a Cartesian term, why doesn’t a real difference hold between the two? 
                                                 
145 For a discussion of how Heidegger’s work can address issues in contemporary epistemology, see Markus Gabriel, 
“Is Heidegger’s ‘Turn’ a Realist Project?” in Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Political 
Philosophy, special issue (2014): 44-73, www.metajournal.org. 
146 Of course, for Heidegger, part of the solution is found in the fact that being is not an object. 
147 SZ 6/26. 
148 Heidegger has a technical conception of thought in his later work, which is not what I mean with this term here. 
Here, I mean “thought” in the sense that might be given in terms of Sein und Zeit: the existential structures and 
processes that make up human existence’s disclosure, interpretation, and understanding of meaning, while all of this 
takes place via one’s concernful absorption in networks of significance and equipment (being-in-the-world), and is 
codetermined by the structures of factical, thrown projection. 
149 Perhaps, it might be objected, the project of ontology is in fact impossible. In that case, Heidegger has no 
business working from the presupposition that it is possible. However, the point to his argument is that the claim that 
ontology is possible is not a presupposition at all. The very fact that we have any understanding of being whatsoever 
– which is demonstrated, for instance, by the fact that we have a concept of being, or even by the fact that we use the 
verb “to be” in a sensible way – proves that a thematic inquiry into the nature of being (ontology) is possible. This 
does not guarantee success in ontology, just that it is not categorically impossible. The first task, then, is to clarify 
the ground that enables the possibility of such a project. Note that this broader point is a Heideggerian version of 
Schelling’s principle that “like is known by like” (alt. trans: “like is recognized by like”) which Schelling borrows 
from Sextus Empiricus’ tois homoiois ta homoia gignoskesthai. See GA42 93/54; PIEHF 10; Sextus Empiricus, adv. 
Grammaticos L. I, c. 13, ed. Fabricius. (Leipzig: J. F. Gloedichtius’ Sons Fr. Gloeditschii B. Filii, 1718), p. 238, 
quoted in Schelling, PIEHF. Schelling reformulates the point again as follows: “he alone grasps the god outside 
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Or, why aren’t the question and its subject matter condemned to a purely external relation, 
rendering them like two Lucretian atoms falling parallel through the pre-clinematic void with no 
encounter possible? Structurally speaking, for ontology to be possible, an appropriate point of 
intersection must be secured through which thought can have access to being. That is, an internal 
relation must be established. What breaches the gap? 
Heidegger does not attempt to solve this problem directly. His position entails a 
demonstration that the terms in which the problem is posed are mistaken. Representationalism is 
not in fact a problem at all, because thought and its “objects” are not in a relation of exteriority. 
The conception of such a relation is itself an artifact of metaphysics that gets the situation wrong. 
Heidegger’s analysis of being-in-the-world details this with respect to Dasein’s relation to other 
beings. Prior to that, though, his formulation of the distinctive character of Dasein demonstrates 
this with respect to being. Here, the ground enabling ontology is already in place before one 
begins a thematic investigation of being. Yet, methodologically, since our dominant factical 
situation is one of a position internal to the history of metaphysics, proper access of thought to 
being must be demonstrated. 
Heidegger does this, breaching the gap (or rather showing there never was a gap to 
breach) by reformulating the question about being in a way articulated along the lines of a fresh 
analysis of the ground enabling ontology. From the perspective of representationalism, 
                                                                                                                                                             
through the god in himself” (PIEHF 10). On the same page, Schelling additionally associates this principle with 
Pythagoras, Plato, and Empedocles. The point is found again in Parmenides, Fragment 3, which Heidegger cites at 
the beginning of his discussion of truth in SZ §44: τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι (SZ 212/256). In Plato, we 
find it in The Republic at 508a-b, where “the eye” “is the most sunlike of the organs,” being that in which “sight” 
exists, and sight is “naturally related” to “the sun” (Plato, The Republic, trans. Alan Bloom [Basic Books, 1968], 
188). Heidegger refers to this as follows: “Here one remembers at the same time the Platonic-Plotinian: Ou gar an 
popote eiden ophthalmos hellion, helioeides me gegenemenos. ‘For the eye could not see the sun if it were not itself 
‘sun-like’” (GA42 96/55). He points out again that the same idea is expressed in a passage from Goethe’s 
introduction to Zur Farbenlehre: 
If the eye were not sun-like 
How could we look at light? 
If God’s own power didn’t live in us 
How could we be delighted by the god-like? 
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Heidegger reconfigures the relation of thought and being. In his argument, thought and being are 
not condemned to a relation of exteriority; instead, a relation of coincidence or interiority can be 
demonstrated. This point is established in a fundamental insight shared with a number of 
philosophers including the German Idealists and Parmenides, for whom Heidegger had great 
respect. Namely, thought is not an ontologically ephemeral faculty of representing objects that 
are, over and against it, ontologically real. Thought is.150 The insight that thought is, or that 
thinking (interpreting, understanding, disclosing meaningfully, etc.) is part of the very existence 
of the being who thinks, provides the solution to the problem of access.151 Ontology is possible 
because thought constitutively entails at least a minimally meaningful articulation of at least a 
minimal domain of being: its own being, the being of a meaningful articulation (even if this is 
unclear, faulty, and incomplete). The being who thinks constitutes this moment of coincidence. 
As such, its existence is the ground enabling the possibility of ontology. This exhibits an 
additional point of methodological importance for Heidegger: the fact that thought is, 
constituting a coincidence of thought and being, enables ontology to proceed via a direct 
connectivity between the operations of inquiry and the subject matter inquired into. In other 
words, this establishes a path of methodological immanence for the project of ontology. I use the 
term “immanence” here to describe the facts that being is the milieu of thought, that to begin 
doing ontology thought must only turn toward its own being, and that thought requires no 
extrinsic methodological principles in order to do ontology. As I emphasize below, though, this 
doesn’t negate the need for deconstructing, in relation to Dasein’s historicality, the history of 
                                                 
150 “Being” might be rephrased awkwardly as “isness.” Cf. Markus Gabriel and Slavoj Žižek’s point as it addresses 
post-Kantian Idealism: “the whole domain of the representation of the world (call it mind, spirit, language, 
consciousness, or whatever medium you prefer) needs to be understood as an event within and of the world itself. 
Thought is not at all opposed to being, it is rather being’s replication within itself” (Markus Gabriel and Slavoj 
Žižek, Mythology, Madness and Laughter: Subjectivity in German Idealism [London: Continuum, 2009], 3). 
151 As I will detail in Section 4.2.3 of this chapter, Heidegger thinks Descartes’ insight into this was significant but 
ultimately insufficient because he substantialized the nature of thought’s being. 
  83 
metaphysics in which such principles are posited. Furthermore, Heidegger’s ontology posits no 
metaphysically transcendent aspects of being. Via this ground of this methodological 
immanence, working out an account of being can bypass the pitfalls of representational thought. 
The complex evolution of fundamental ontology proceeds as the evolution of the existence of the 
being who thinks, insofar as it pursues the question of being. This marks a transformation of the 
question of being from an artificial abstractness in which it had been framed historically into a 
structure of the very flesh of existence. 
 In Heidegger’s terminology, these points are made as follows. As noted above, in Sein 
und Zeit Heidegger maintains that being is always the being of beings. But questioning or 
“inquiry is itself the behaviour of a questioner” – a being who thinks or questions.152 If the 
questioner is to ask about the nature of being, she must inquire into the being of some being or 
beings. But, which? Some “external” being? No, that unnecessarily complicates the project by 
raising a field of problems found in representationalist approaches. One being bears a distinctive 
characteristic that makes it preferable: the questioner herself. The questioner is a being that is 
distinct from others insofar as it is both a being and posits the question about being. Thus, the 
question about being and the being that is to be interrogated with respect to its being overlap – 
or, rather, coincide – in the questioner. Moreover, the questioner’s being is in the distinctive 
manner of inquiring into and thinking its own being. It is a being for whom “the very asking of 
this question” is its “mode of being; and as such it gets its essential character from what is 
inquired about – namely, being.”153 In other words, the very being who inquires into being does 
so by existing (in part) as the inquiry into its own existence. Heidegger calls this being “Dasein,” 
                                                 
152 SZ 5/24, my italics. 
153 SZ 7/27. 
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human existence.154 Dasein is the being that “is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological.”155 
Thus, Dasein’s existence holds an intrinsic relation of thinking and being, on the basis of which 
any understanding of being is made possible. Dasein exists as the condition for the possibility of 
any ontology. 
It is important to be clear that this fact does not mean Dasein has a clear or sufficient 
understanding of being or even of its own existence. Most of the time, Dasein understands its 
own existence and, in turn, being, only in a vague, undeveloped way. In Heidegger’s words, 
though we questioners, as Dasein, “always conduct our activities in an understanding of being,” 
this is “a vague average understanding of being.”156 Nonetheless, “the meaning of being” is 
“already… available to us in some way,” despite the fact that this is for the most part “infiltrated 
with traditional theories and opinions about being.”157 That is, we exist as always having 
interpreted and understood our own existence, but the terms with which we usually do this are 
inherited from our historical situation, the generally thoughtless masses, the clichés of pop 
culture, etc., through which we can have only a significantly impoverished or inauthentic 
understanding. Moreover, most of the time we don’t even think explicitly about the nature of 
being or of our own existence. Yet, because of the coincident relation of our understanding and 
being that makes even impoverished, inauthentic understanding possible, when we do take up the 
question of being explicitly, our inquiry can be “guided beforehand” by our vague average 
understanding of being.158 That is, we can take this as our interpretive cue for developing a more 
                                                 
154 SZ 7/27. 
155 SZ 12/32. Dasein “is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very being, that being is an issue for it.… 
[T]his is a constitutive state of Dasein’s being, and this implies that Dasein, in its being, has a relationship towards 
that being – a relationship which itself is one of being. And this means further that there is some way in which 
Dasein understands itself in its being.… It is peculiar to this being that with and through its being, this being is 
disclosed to it” (SZ 12/32). 
156 SZ 5/25, italics removed. 
157 SZ 5-6/25. 
158 SZ 5/25. 
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authentic understanding. The relation of coincidence or intrinsic connectivity that grants the 
Seinsfrage access to Sein, and thus renders the project of ontology possible at all, is an essential 
character of Dasein’s existence.159 
 This establishes one of Heidegger’s major ontological moves at the beginning of Sein und 
Zeit: securing the intrinsic link between thought (together with the Seinsfrage) and being in 
Dasein. Dasein, “in its very being,” has “that being as an issue for it”; “Understanding of being is 
itself a definite characteristic of Dasein’s being.”160 To be clear, Heidegger in no way simply 
equates thinking and being – this is no vulgar idealism. Rather, structurally speaking, thinking 
intersects being: thinking and being are connected in a moment of coincidence. Not all being is 
the being of thought, but all thought is. This enables thought to proceed in a non-representational 
way and generates the entire methodology of the existential analysis of Dasein that makes up 
most of Sein und Zeit. Without it, his project would be impossible. 
 It is important to emphasize that although Heidegger’s order of argumentation or 
methodological order in Sein und Zeit moves from the level of questioning as the behavior of a 
questioner to Dasein as the ontico-ontological condition for the possibility of fundamental 
ontology, the order of ontological dependence is exactly the inverse. It is the ontological 
structure of Dasein that is the basis for inquiry into being as the behavior of a questioner. Thus, 
in the order of ontological justification, Dasein takes priority. The condition for the possibility of 
doing fundamental ontology is the distinctive character belonging to Dasein. It follows only upon 
this condition that the inquiry into being is the behavior of a questioner. Dasein is the ontological 
structure that enables the possibility of doing ontology. The upheaval of the history of 
                                                 
159 Note that understanding and interpretation constitute only part of Dasein’s existence. Though these are laced 
through Dasein’s factical dimension, as thrown, Dasein’s factical dimension includes historical, corporeal, linguistic, 
etc., aspects that exceed its understanding and interpretation. 
160 SZ 12/32; italics removed. 
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metaphysics and the rest of Heidegger’s work must be understood as proceeding from this 
distinctive structure. And establishing it sets up another major ontological move with extensive 
methodological implications: situating the Seinsfrage directly in the existential constitution of 
the questioner. 
 
4.1.1: The Seinsfrage, Existentially Situated 
 
Heidegger’s formulation of the Seinsfrage is grounded by articulating it along the lines of Dasein 
as the existential-ontological condition for the possibility of doing any ontology. Consequently, it 
is not an abstract question. The problematic of being coincides with Dasein’s concrete existence. 
Any abstraction in which this problematic appears is constituted by an eclipse of its ground, i.e., 
by an alienated state of Dasein. Rather, here, the Seinsfrage is Dasein’s existence insofar as 
Dasein turns toward thinking being, that is, inquires into the coincidence of thinking and being 
that it constitutes. Addressing the Seinsfrage is an operation of Dasein’s existence, insofar as 
Dasein thinks along the immanent trajectory into its own being.161 
 This is a crucial point with respect to the task of reconstructing Heidegger’s account of 
the event. The complex evolution of Heidegger’s ontology proceeds precisely by pursuing the 
                                                 
161 On the basis of this analysis a further point can be made about the project of Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit. In the 
Introduction to that text, he raises the question of being and then methodologically situates it in the existential 
analytic of Dasein. Here, the existential analytic of Dasein – as crucial and extensive as it is in this text – is not 
Heidegger’s primary concern. Rather, it is the necessary methodological arena in which the fundamental ontology 
can be pursued or worked out: “fundamental ontology… must be sought in the existential analytic of Dasein,” but 
“the analytic of Dasein remains wholly oriented towards the guiding task of working out the question of being” (SZ 
13/34, italics removed, and 17/38). This point is important for showing the mistake in Sheehan’s claim that 
throughout Heidegger’s entire career he is primarily concerned with the human being, not being, and that 
consequently the question about being is really a question about meaning. In Sheehan’s claim, the Seinsfrage should 
be understood as a Sinnsfrage. To my mind this runs the risk of posing some meaning or logos or law as 
ontologically prior to the inception of the domain of beings, i.e., anterior to the world (the domain of meaning) – in 
other words, a theological meaning. Cf. Althusser’s concept of the “non-anteriority of Meaning” in “The 
Underground Current of the Materialism of the Encounter,” trans. G. M. Goshgarian, in Philosophy of the 
Encounter, ed. Francois Matheron and Oliver Corpet (London: Verso, 2006), 169. 
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problematic of being in this trajectory. In other words, the trajectory of methodological 
immanence opened up by grounding the Seinsfrage in Dasein’s existence is the famous 
“pathway” Heidegger continued along for the remainder of his life. It establishes the problematic 
horizon within which his ontological project proceeds. In Sein und Zeit, this operates through the 
existential analytic of Dasein, generating more and more originary accounts of Dasein’s 
existence by inquiring into the ground enabling the terms in which Dasein is understood and then 
reflexively recasting those terms (being-in-the-world, care, thrown projection, ecstatic 
temporality). In terms of that text, this line of questioning enables Dasein incrementally to take 
ownership of itself, that is, appropriate itself as authentic. Pursuing the ontological problematic 
enacts a grounding of Dasein insofar as the “forgetting” of being constitutes Dasein’s existential 
and historical alienation. This drives the horizon of Dasein’s understanding of its own existence 
and, in turn, of being, forward along a diagenic axis. As I will show in Chapter II, in the early 
1930s Heidegger argues that this leads to a macrological reconfiguration of the ontological 
problematic. Namely, it progresses to a point where the horizon of Dasein’s understanding of 
being no longer coincides merely with its own existence. He begins to rethink the problematic of 
being in terms of ontological structures more originary than human existence, structures 
grounding the possibility for human existence to be. Eventually, in the mid-late 1930s, this 
develops into Heidegger’s recasting of being as event. However, all these later stages – and the 
ontological structures articulated in them – are accessed via the grounding of the Seinsfrage in 
Dasein’s existence and the consequent pursuit of the ontological problematic through the 
existential analytic of Dasein in Sein und Zeit. This is not to say that they remain within the 
horizon of the existential analytic, but that the later stages of Heidegger’s work are generated 
through a complex evolution that is first grounded in that methodological configuration. 
  88 
4.2: The Ontological Groundwork of the Problematic of the History of Metaphysics 
 
In the remainder of this chapter, I focus on the account in Sein und Zeit of the way the 
problematic of being was derailed by the history of metaphysics and how this is grounded in the 
historical character of Dasein’s existence. Here, the historical alienation we call “metaphysics” is 
rooted in an existential alienation (though I would argue that for Heidegger it is irreducible to 
existential alienation insofar as metaphysics is inscribed into the artifacts, languages, institutions, 
and practices of the Mitwelt into which Dasein is thrown). A particularly important consequence 
follows from this: doing fundamental ontology via the existential analytic of Dasein 
incrementally rectifies the error of the historical configuration of metaphysics in which Dasein 
exists. Dasein’s operation of self-grounding via the existential analytic is an incremental 
disruption and reconfiguration of the ground of metaphysics. This is Heidegger’s early 
formulation of the problematic that would evolve to frame the concept of event in its historical 
sense. As I will show in Chapter II, when Heidegger begins advancing accounts of ontological 
structures more originary than Dasein (as human existence) during his Kehre, this enables yet 
more radical reconfigurations of the ground of metaphysics and its history. Crucially, pursuit of 
the ontological problematic enacts the most fundamental disruption of the history of 
metaphysics. For Heidegger, the full picture of this disruption should include analyses of 
canonical texts marking the particular configurations of this history. This, however, goes beyond 
the scope of my current project. My focus is on the ontological sense of the event, which I take 
to be most fundamental for Heidegger. Thus, my task in this section, aside from establishing 
greater conceptual context, is to establish how the terms of the problematic of historical 
alienation are grounded in the problematic of being, such that addressing the latter 
  89 
simultaneously addresses the former, or, at the least, establishes the basis for doing so. In 
Chapter II, I focus on the problematic of truth, which forms a key register of the problematic of 
being. Working through it enacts a disruption of the history of metaphysics on ontological bases. 
In Heidegger’s analysis in Sein und Zeit, both history and truth are constitutive dimensions of 
Dasein’s existence. Consequently the existential analytic provides the groundwork for addressing 
each. Here, Dasein’s “disclosedness” is particularly important. In “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit,” 
when Heidegger’s analysis of truth begins manifesting the Kehre, Dasein’s disclosedness 
remains a touchstone via which more originary ontological structures are accessed. Attention to 
this shows that as Heidegger’s program evolves, it maintains a methodological continuum 
between the problematics of history and truth, such that addressing what is most essentially at 
stake in the former (the ontological dynamics constituting the essence of truth) simultaneously 
addresses what is most essentially at stake in the latter (the historical event).   
 
* 
The tradition of Western thought has failed to adequately clarify our understanding of being and, 
moreover, even to adequately formulate the question of being. Thus, as I have emphasized, 
Heidegger argues the Seinsfrage must be raised anew, a task that requires it first be properly 
formulated. The above analysis of Dasein as the condition for the possibility of ontology serves 
this end. While Heidegger affirms that a number of ancient Greek thinkers – including Plato and 
Aristotle – did genuinely engage the question of being on some levels, he also locates its eclipse 
in certain of the conceptual moves they make. This “forgetting” of being, he thinks, originated 
the epoch of metaphysics. In particular, he often focuses on the way it takes hold in Aristotle. 
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This, he argues, would come to define the history of Western philosophy and give rise to a 
“dogma” that rejects the question of being.162 
Heidegger’s account of the historical and conceptual structures of metaphysics and their 
relations to the projects of philosophy (particularly reformulating the Seinsfrage), is quite 
complex and, as would be expected, transforms through different texts.163 In Sein und Zeit §6, he 
outlines this by tracing metaphysics through a few touchstone configurations in Aristotle, 
Descartes, and Kant. I will outline this in a moment. Establishing the weight of this analysis with 
respect to the question of the event requires first discerning a few key registers of the conceptual 
framework within which it operates. For, Heidegger’s point is not simply to provide an 
intellectual history within which he might position himself. This history is situated in a more 
fundamental problematic: (1) that of the inscription of Dasein’s historical heritage into its 
interpretation of its own existence and, in turn, interpretation of being. This problematic is in turn 
situated in an even more fundamental one: (2) that of the historical nature of Dasein’s existence 
itself. 
 
4.2.1: The Historical Character of Dasein’s Existence 
 
To make sense of these problematics, we can distinguish between two pertinent registers of 
history in Sein und Zeit.164 First is Weltgeschichte (world-history), which is comprised of the 
sequence of entities and occurrences in the world that would make up the world’s history if, for 
                                                 
162 SZ 2/21. This dogma, he says, has persisted on the basis of certain “presuppositions and prejudices” that “are 
rooted in ancient ontology itself” (SZ 2-3/22). 
163 For more detailed discussion of Heidegger’s understanding of metaphysics, see: TPT 3-10 and 16-20. 
164 For more on this, see SZ §72-77, pp. 372-404/424-455. 
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instance, they were arrayed on a timeline.165 The science of such Weltgeschichte is designated 
Historie (“historiology,” in Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation).166 
The second register is that of Dasein’s Geschichtlichkeit (historicality).167 This designates 
first and foremost that Dasein’s existence is historical. The sense of this is not that Dasein exists 
as a part of Weltgeschichte, but that “what is primarily historical is Dasein.”168 In other words, 
history is a characteristic or function of Dasein’s existence and it must be understood on the basis 
of that existence.169 Heidegger understands this as follows. Dasein’s existence (care) is 
“grounded in temporality,” that is, it exists as thrown projection or “ecstatico-horizonal 
temporality” (ekstatisch-horizontalen Zeitlichkeit).170 Dasein’s Geschichtlichkeit is a function of 
its temporality.171 Only because Dasein exists as temporal can it be historical. What does it mean 
to say Dasein exists as temporal? In brief outline: As thrown into a concrete factical situation, 
Dasein is always “in the process of having-been (gewesend)” and, as projection, is always 
“essentially futural (zukünftig).”172 “Having-been” designates the factical, “past” dimension of 
Dasein’s existence:  
 
In its factical being, any Dasein is as it already was, and is ‘what’ it already was. 
It is its past, whether explicitly or not. And this is so not only in that its past is, as 
it were, pushing itself along ‘behind’ it, and that Dasein possesses what is past as 
a property which is still present-at-hand and which sometimes has after-effects 
upon it: Dasein ‘is’ its past in the way of its own being, which, to put it roughly, 
‘historizes’ [geschieht] out of its future on each occasion.173 
                                                 
165 SZ 20/41. 
166 SZ 20/41. 
167 SZ 20/41. 
168 SZ 382/433. Historicality is “the essence of history (Geschichte)” (SZ 378/249). 
169 Dasein “is not ‘temporal’ because it ‘stands in history’, but…, on the contrary, it exists historically and can so 
exist only because it is temporal in the very basis of its being” (SZ 376/428, italics removed). 
170 SZ 382/434 and 393/445. Again: “temporality [is] the primordial condition for the possibility of care” (SZ 
372/424). 
171 Thus, Heidegger notes, “the Interpretation of Dasein’s historicality will prove to be, at bottom, just a more 
concrete working out of temporality” (SZ 382/434). 
172 SZ 385/437, italics removed. 
173 SZ 20/41. 
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As the last clause in this passage indicates, the relation of Dasein’s having-been and its 
futural dimensions is somewhat complex. Since our orientation toward our having-been 
dimension is always through our projection of the possibility of interpreting and understanding 
that having-been, our having-been includes a distinctively futural aspect. Likewise, since our 
futural projection is always a projection on the basis of our factical conditions and our having-
been, our futural dimension includes a distinctively past or having-been aspect. It is worth 
pointing out that when, in Chapter III, I analyze Heidegger’s account of time-space in Beiträge, 
this structural co-implication of the futural and having-been dimensions of temporality will once 
again be important.  
Within the register of history, the unified structure of Dasein’s historical, ecstatico-
temporal existence is articulated as its “historizing” or “occurrence” (Geschehens).174 
Weltgeschichte and Historie, for Heidegger, are grounded in Dasein’s Geschehens, without 
which they could not be at all.175 
 
Historicality [Geschichtlichkeit], as a determinate character [Bestimmung], is prior 
to what is called “history” [Geschichte] (world-historical historizing). 
“Historicality” stands for the state of being that is constitutive for 
[Seinsverfassung] Dasein’s ‘historizing’ [Geschehens] as such; only on the basis 
[Grunde] of such historizing is anything like ‘world-history’ possible or can 
anything belong historically [geschichtlich] to world-history.176 
 
Weltgeschichte and Historie are both modes of Dasein’s Geschehens: that is, they are 
“world-historical historizing” (welt-geschichtlichen Geschehens).177 “Geschehens” designates 
Dasein’s ecstatic structure insofar as Dasein (qua “care”) is “stretching along [Erstreckung] 
                                                 
174 SZ 375/427/BTs 358. 
175 SZ 20/41. 
176 SZ 19-20/41. 
177 SZ 389/441. 
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between birth and death.”178 Here, birth and death, of course, are not datable events on a world-
historical timeline, but essential limits of Dasein’s existence; limits that structure Dasein and 
grant its finitude.179 Consequently, Dasein is at once “being-towards-death” and “being-towards-
the-beginning.”180 More precisely, Dasein exists as stretched between these immanent futural 
and factical limits; it is this “between.”181 In this way, Dasein’s Geschehens is the dynamic of its 
existence as stretched between the factical limit of birth and the futural limit of death. 
Late in Sein und Zeit Heidegger differentiates between inauthentic (uneigentliche) and 
authentic (eigentliche) modes of Weltgeschichte. In the inauthentic case, “the being of the world-
historical is experienced and interpreted in the sense of something present-at-hand which comes 
along, has presence, and then disappears” (this is the sense in which I have just been using it).182 
Here, Dasein understands Weltgeschichte and Historie as primary, failing to understand them 
appropriately on the ground of Geschehens. In turn, Dasein understands its own historical 
condition inauthentically because it understands it in terms of a Weltgeschichte of present-at-
hand entities and events. Thus, since Weltgeschichte is possible only on the basis of Dasein’s 
Geschichtlichkeit, when Dasein understands its historical condition in terms of Weltgeschichte, 
this constitutes an inauthentic mode of Geschichtlichkeit.183 
                                                 
178 SZ 372-373/424-425: italics removed, trans. modified. 
179 Death, as the inescapable and most essential possibility belonging to Dasein and determining its futural limit, and 
birth, as Dasein’s factical limit, in a sense do form the ultimate limits of Dasein’s existence: beyond these, Dasein 
does not exist. But death and birth, as the very horizons of finitude characterizing Dasein’s futurally oriented 
projection into possibilities and factical conditions, are dynamic horizons, limits that are always with Dasein. They 
are the articulated limits of Dasein’s dynamic, concrete finitude. Since birth and death are inescapable, and 
structurally determinative for the entirety of Dasein’s existence, that existence always bears a structural reference 
toward these limits: Dasein is at once “being-towards-death” and “being-towards-the-beginning” (SZ 373/425). 
Dasein exists as stretched or distended between these futural and factical limits. In Heidegger’s words, it is this 
“between [Zwischen]” (SZ 374/427). Dasein’s Geschehens is the dynamic of its existence as stretched between the 
factical limit (“birth”) and the futural limit (“death”). 
180 SZ 373/425. 
181 TPT 84; SZ 374/427. 
182 SZ 389/441. 
183 See SZ 389-390/441-442. 
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Authentic Welt-Geschichte, on the other hand, “has a double signification.”184 First, this 
signifies “the Geschehen of the world in its essential existent unity with Dasein.”185 In this case, 
Historie does not investigate past entities and events – taken as present-at-hand – but “the 
disclosure of historical entities.”186 That is, it investigates the ontological structure that enables 
such things to be historical at all and which allows Dasein to thematize the past.187 The term 
“Historie,” though, is often reserved by Heidegger scholars for the inauthentic mode. Second, 
authentic Welt-Geschichte signifies “the ‘Geschehen’ within-the-world of what is ready-to-hand 
and present-at-hand, insofar as entities within-the-world are, in every case, discovered with the 
factically existent world.”188 Authentic Historie, in this case, does investigate entities and events 
of the past, but precisely on the basis of the ontological structure addressed in the first 
signification. 
Thus, authentic Weltgeschichte can be taken to designate both the historical character of a 
world, insofar as that is grounded in Dasein’s Geschichtlichkeit, and the historical character of 
entities and events insofar as they are, in turn, part of such a world of significance. Historical 
artifacts, for instance, are characterized by being things of the “past.” But this past is “nothing 
else than that world within which they belonged to a context of equipment and were encountered 
as ready-to-hand and used by a concernful Dasein who was-in-the-world.”189 “That world is no 
longer. But what was formerly within-the-world with respect to that world is still present-at-
hand.”190 
                                                 
184 SZ 389/440. 
185 SZ 389/440. 
186 SZ 393/445. 
187 See SZ 393/445. 
188 SZ 389/440-441. 
189 SZ 380/432. 
190 SZ 380/432. 
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Additionally, it is important to point out that insofar as Dasein as being-in-the-world is 
Mitsein, the world-historical fabric is woven through the Mitwelt, or with-world. More 
fundamentally: “if fateful [schicksalhafte] Dasein, as being-in-the-world, exists essentially in 
being-with Others, its historizing [Geschehen] is a co-historizing [Mitgeschehen] and is 
determinative for it as destiny [Geschick]. This is how we designate the historizing [Geschehen] 
of the community, of a people.”191 
Heidegger includes a more developed account of authentic Geschichtlichkeit on the basis 
of concepts of anticipatory resoluteness (vorlaufende Entschlossenheit), repetition 
(Wiederholung), fate (Schicksal), destiny, and the “moment of vision” (Augenblick).192 I will 
bypass further discussion of this here in order to keep focus on his treatment of the historical and 
conceptual structures of metaphysics and how these impact the inquiry into being and, in turn, 
his development of the concept of event. With the above distinctions made, we can now return to 
clarify this. 
 
4.2.2: The Problematic of History in Fundamental Ontology 
 
My considerations regarding Dasein’s Geschichtlichkeit and Weltgeschichte pose the two 
problems – or, rather, conditions – for Heidegger’s project of fundamental ontology that I 
outlined earlier. The first condition is that the conceptual, linguistic, equipmental, affective, 
interpretive, etc., matrices in terms of which Dasein understands its own existence and, in turn, 
understands being are defined by the historical context into which it is thrown. Dasein exists as 
factical, that is, as thrown into a factical context which determines its existence. We happen to be 
                                                 
191 SZ 384/436, italics removed. 
192 SZ 382/434, italics removed; 385/437, italics removed; 384/436; and 386/438, italics removed. 
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thrown into the factical, historical context of the metaphysical tradition. Thus, the terms in which 
we understand our own existence and understand being are defined by it. The problem is that the 
metaphysical tradition is structurally incapable of asking the question about being properly. 
Why? The answer, for Heidegger, is found in the (authentic) historiological analysis of the 
foundations of the concrete formations of thought ranging from the ancient Greeks to his time. 
That is, this problem is not simply identifiable with the fact that Dasein’s understanding is 
defined by the historical context into which it is thrown, but must be understood in terms of the 
specific historical configurations governing that understanding (in the present analysis, key 
aspects of Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant). As shall be seen shortly, it is because metaphysics is a 
modality of thought that is constituted at a fundamental level by the interpretation of being in 
terms of the time determination of presence. This interpretation of being goes hand in hand with 
interpretations of the human being as a substantialized or subjectivized thing (ens, res, etc.) and 
the exportation of the problematic of temporality from Dasein’s existence. These, moreover, 
constitute specific ways metaphysics fails to properly account for its own grounds. 
The second and more fundamental problem or condition is that in our epoch, Dasein’s 
existence is itself shaped by the metaphysical-historical framework into which it is thrown. This 
constitutes a fundamental alienation of Dasein from itself. As seen above, Dasein is its factical 
having-been and is its futural projection, i.e., Dasein is historical. Although this historicality is 
the ontological ground for any particular world-historical configuration, it always and only exists 
as situated within a concrete world-historical configuration. That is, Dasein exists always as 
thrown into a concrete factical situation and projects futurally on the basis of that factical 
situation. Moreover, Dasein’s understanding and interpretation are part of its very historical 
existence. Consequently, insofar as Dasein interprets, understands, and projects itself in terms of 
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its metaphysical-historical situation, it exists as metaphysical. It exists as alienated from itself. 
This doesn’t mean that Dasein is in fact a metaphysical thing (e.g., a substance or a subject), but 
that in Dasein’s existential makeup, the horizon of its understanding of its own existence and the 
horizon of the possibilities it projects for itself, is determined as the horizon of metaphysics. The 
problem is that this is a false horizon. The possibility of Dasein inquiring into the nature of being 
on the basis of an inquiry into its own being is precluded. 
 The historical analyses in Sein und Zeit develop a basis for addressing these conditions 
and setting ontology on the right track. This operates on different, but intertwined, levels: 1) 
They map out an historiological intellectual history within which Heidegger positions himself 
and frames what he sees as the conceptual failings of his predecessors. Among these failings is 
that of properly asking the question about being, the rectification of which Heidegger takes to 
mark his own place in this history. 2) As a result of this, Heidegger’s analyses problematize the 
historical-conceptual foundations of metaphysics and, thus, the grip of the framework of 
metaphysics on our understanding. This generates a space within which metaphysics as a whole 
can be problematized. Furthermore, this indicates a set of specific ways we can rupture the 
foundations of the metaphysical tradition, develop more fundamental ontological concepts and 
methods, and employ those concepts and methods to reformulate the question of being. In other 
words, this allows us to generate a conceptual and existential space in which to address the 
question of being that does not just repeat the foundations of the metaphysical tradition yet again, 
but ruptures them. 3) These historical analyses advance a transformation of human existence 
itself: by problematizing the foundations of metaphysics, the human being’s understanding of 
itself in metaphysical terms is problematized.193 It is forced to confront the question of its own 
existence without the benefit of the framework of metaphysical concepts in terms of which it 
                                                 
193 For a related discussion, see Polt’s account of “reinterpretive events” (EB 78-80). 
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might define itself. The transformation is set into place when the human being reinterprets itself 
phenomenologically on the basis of its distinctive ontico-ontological characteristic (that it is a 
being for whom its own being is an issue), and thus as Dasein. By reformulating the question 
about being on the basis of this characteristic, Dasein can work to rectify its alienation from 
itself, understand its own existence more authentically, and develop a more authentic 
understanding of being. This transformation is complex. It does not amount to simply 
disavowing the history of metaphysics or its impact on one’s existence, for Dasein is historical, 
and so “the inquiry into being… is itself characterized by historicality.”194 Nevertheless, we have 
been thrown factically into the framework of metaphysics and its history. Thus, 
 
The ownmost meaning of being which belongs to the inquiry into being as an 
historical inquiry, gives us the assignment of inquiring into the history of that 
inquiry itself, that is, of becoming historiological. In working out the question of 
being, we must heed this assignment, so that by positively making the past our 
own, we may bring ourselves into full possession of the ownmost possibilities of 
such inquiry. The question of the meaning of being must be carried through by 
explicating Dasein beforehand in its temporality and historicality; the question 
thus brings itself to the point where it understands itself as historiological.195 
 
4.2.3: An Outline of the Historical Failure Regarding the Question of Being 
 
With this sketch of the issues framing Heidegger’s treatment of history (in particular, the history 
of metaphysics) and the project of ontology in mind, I now turn to a very brief reconstruction of 
that history as it is abbreviated in Sein und Zeit. 
In Heidegger’s analysis of the Greeks in Sein und Zeit §6, he mentions only Parmenides, 
Plato, and Aristotle by name. Aristotle, though, is taken to crystalize the “loftiest and purest 
                                                 
194 SZ 20/42. 
195 SZ 20-21/42. 
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scientific stage” of “the foundations of ancient ontology.”196 These foundations are found in 
correlated interpretations of being and human existence on the basis of one temporal mode: 
presence. First, being is interpreted “as παρουσία or οὐσία, which signifies, in ontological-
Temporal terms, ‘presence’ [Anwesenheit].”197 Beings, in turn, are consequently interpreted as 
essentially present: “Beings are grasped in their being as ‘presence’; this means that they are 
understood with regard to a definite mode of time – the ‘Present’ [Gegenwart].”198 Second, this 
correlates with the interpretation of the human being – a being – as ζῷον λόγον ἔχον – “as that 
living thing whose being is essentially determined by the potentiality for discourse 
[Redenkönnen].”199 As Macquarrie and Robinson indicate, Heidegger’s point here is to show that 
“λόγος is derived from the same root as the verb λέγειν (‘to talk,’ ‘to hold discourse’),” which he 
“identifies… in turn with νοεῖν (‘to cognize,’ ‘to be aware of,’ ‘to know’).”200 But, for 
Heidegger, the awareness “νοεῖν” signifies is an awareness of something as present, i.e., 
understood on the basis of its presence: 
 
λέγειν itself – or rather νοεῖν, that simple awareness of something present-at-hand 
[Vorhandenem] in its sheer presence at hand [Vorhandenheit], which Parmenides 
had already taken to guide him in his own interpretation of being – has the 
Temporal structure of a pure ‘making-present’ [Gegenwärtigens] of something.201 
 
This association of λόγος and νοεῖν with λέγειν as making-present, in turn, reinforces the 
correlated first point above – that being and beings (including, importantly, the human being) are 
interpreted on the basis of the temporal determination of presence. For, if understanding is taken 
                                                 
196 SZ 26/48. 
197 SZ 25/47. 
198 SZ 25/47. It is worth pointing out that Heidegger does not think this interpretation was the result of a conscious 
decision Aristotle or any other Greek philosopher made, and which could have been decided alternatively. It was 
rather, he suggests, implicit in the historical character of the Greek era. 
199 SZ 25/47.  
200 BT 47, trans. fn. 3.  
201 SZ 25-26/48.  
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to mean noetic understanding, then when we understand being and when we understand human 
existence, we understand them on the basis of presence. The human being becomes determined 
as a thing, ontologically present, over and against other such things. 
Scholastic philosophy later carried on this basic framework in which the human being is 
conceptually determined as a thing fully ontologically present. The scholastics, though, recast the 
human being as an ens creatum, in contradistinction to a transcendent God, the ens increatum.202 
The scholastics are mentioned here primarily to point out that through their formulation of the 
human being as an ens creatum, the Greek foundations of metaphysics were transmitted to 
Descartes at the dawn of modernism, who, at the crucial moment of his critical doubt re-
implemented the concept of ens. 
 In Heidegger’s analysis, Descartes’ radical critique of scholasticism, expressed in a 
general way by the method of doubt carried out in his Meditationes, ultimately failed to make a 
break with this fundamental ontological framework. When Descartes arrived at his fundamentum 
inconcussum (“cogito sum”), he cast the cogito as a res cogitans, and “defined the res cogitans 
ontologically as an ens.”203 Consequently, Descartes reconfigured metaphysics internally, but 
remained within its fundamental conceptual framework – the interpretation of being and beings 
in terms of presence. Descartes’ ultimate failure, in Heidegger’s eyes, was to have not worked 
out “the kind of being which belongs to the res cogitans, or – more precisely – the meaning of 
the being of the ‘sum’.”204 This is precisely something Heidegger has in mind to rectify through 
his recasting of the human being as Dasein and the subsequent existential analysis of Dasein. 
                                                 
202 SZ 24/46. 
203 SZ 24/46. 
204 SZ 24/46. 
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 Kant, Heidegger thinks, was on the precipice of a fundamental transformation of 
metaphysics. For, he brought “the phenomenon of time back into the subject.”205 Rather than 
maintaining time as a characteristic of an external, objective universe, Kant shifts time to a 
position internal to the subject: time is the “form of inner intuition,” “the formal a priori 
condition of all appearances whatsoever.”206 For Heidegger this shift means that the nature of 
time itself was in play and, with it, the domination of the mode of presence. Moreover, 
integrating time back into the human being opened the possibility of reevaluating the temporal 
character of the human being itself and, in turn, of being. Kant’s failure – and his consequent 
repetition of the fundamental configuration of metaphysics – is found in the fact that he did not 
take these further steps. “There were two things that stood in his way: in the first place, he 
altogether neglected the problem of being; and, in connection with this, he failed to provide an 
ontology with Dasein as its theme or (to put it in Kantian language) to give a preliminary 
ontological analytic of the subjectivity of the subject.”207 Thus, he adopted the basic Cartesian 
designation of the human being as a subject. As a result, “the decisive connection between time 
and the ‘I think’ was shrouded in utter darkness; it did not even become a problem.”208 It is 
worth pointing out that Deleuze highlights exactly this connection in Kant, agreeing that the 
latter failed to recognize its consequences. These are expressed in pithy form by Hamlet’s 
formulation, “time is out of joint,” which Deleuze adopts as the motto of his third temporal 
synthesis in Différence et répétition. 
* 
                                                 
205 SZ 24/45. 
206 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 
76 and 77. 
207 SZ 24/45. 
208 SZ 24/45. 
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In this dissertation it is not my goal to recount this eclipse and the history that follows out from it 
in much more detail. I limit myself to tracking major points of inflection shaping this history 
only insofar as they are essential to Heidegger’s arguments addressing the event. 
 
4.2.4: Statement of Methodological Continuity between the Historical and Ontological 
Problematics of Event 
 
This analysis of how, in Sein und Zeit, Heidegger understands the historical alienation we call 
“metaphysics” to be rooted in Dasein’s existential alienation is important for clarifying his later 
account of the event for the following reasons. As mentioned, more than simply clarifying his 
understanding of the history of metaphysics, it shows that for the Heidegger of Sein und Zeit, 
doing fundamental ontology via the existential analytic of Dasein incrementally rectifies the 
error of the historical configuration of metaphysics in which Dasein exists. Dasein’s operation of 
self-grounding via the existential analytic is an incremental disruption and reconfiguration of the 
ground of metaphysics. Recall that the transformation of the ontological problematic Heidegger 
advances during and after the Kehre is achieved through the immanent, complex evolution of the 
configuration it took in the existential analytic of Sein und Zeit. In Chapter II, this will allow me 
to show that when he begins advancing accounts of ontological structures more originary than 
Dasein (as human existence) in the 1930s, this generates yet more radical reconfigurations of the 
ground of metaphysics and its history. I thus focus on how this operates via the problematic of 
truth, which forms a key register of the problematic of being. Dasein’s “disclosure” plays a 
central role in Heidegger’s analyses of both history and truth. Attention to this allows me to 
establish a methodological continuum between the problematics of history and truth, such that 
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addressing what is most essentially at stake in the latter (the ontological dynamics constituting 
the essence of truth) simultaneously addresses what is most essentially at stake in the former (the 
historical event). My approach to the event in Chapter II is shaped by one crucial point: it is true 
that the historical sense of the event bears a specific, temporary methodological priority in 
Heidegger’s program, insofar as the possibility of giving an account of being as evental in nature 
is beyond the horizon of the metaphysical “first beginning.” Thus, working out the ontological 
sense of the event entails a rupture of the first beginning. However, this entailment is not one in 
which working out an evental account of being is contingent on the historical event. The 
situation is the reverse. An account of being as event is not accomplished by analysis of intra-
historical terms or even of the domain of history, but by pursuing the question of the ground 
enabling the domain of history, i.e., the operations of being enabling the determination of any 
historical configuration. The ontological dynamics constituting the essence of truth are one of 
these. Despite Heidegger’s concern with the problematic of history and the occurrence of another 
beginning, this other historical beginning is to be accomplished by way of the ontological 
problematic, i.e., by working out an evental account of being and thereby properly grounding 
history.209 The historical event occurs as a byproduct of articulating the evental nature of being. I 
turn to the latter by way of an analysis of the ontological problematic of truth in what follows. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
209 “The other beginning must be brought into effect entirely out of beyng as event and out of the essential 
occurrence of its truth and of the history of that truth” (GA65 58/47). 
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Chapter II 
 
Heidegger: Truth and Event 
 
Chapter Overview 
 
In Section 1.1 of this chapter I reconstruct central elements of Heidegger’s a-lēthic account of 
truth in Sein und Zeit §44. In Section 1.2 I track the main transformations this account undergoes 
in “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit.” Crucial for my arguments is a change in the relation between 
truth and Dasein. In Section 2, I turn to Heidegger’s Beiträge. I begin by analyzing a series of 
important programmatic shifts he advances in that text, emphasizing the relation of these shifts 
and his claim (often overlooked) that being must be recast in a way independent from beings. I 
then examine how this impacts the problematic of truth. This leads to an analysis of a 
transformation in Heidegger’s conception of difference. Though the essence of truth, in 
Heidegger’s account, is usually taken to be a-lēthic in character, I show that it is in fact 
differential. Working out the logic of difference constituting the essence of truth provides a first 
grounded stance in the logic of the event. On this basis, I elaborate the logic of the event, both in 
the terminology of truth and on its own terms. 
 
1: Dasein and the Precursory Question of Truth 
 
In Beiträge, Heidegger claims “the question of the essence of truth” must be “posed radically as 
the question that is preliminary [Vorfrage] to the basic question [Grundfrage] of philosophy 
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(How does beyng essentially occur [west]?).”210 Famously, Beiträge answers this basic question 
by arguing that “beyng essentially occurs as event.”211 Despite its status as a Vorfrage to this 
Grundfrage, the question of truth is not simply a propaedeutic. Truth forms an essential register 
of the event itself and its structural dynamics: “beyng qua event essentially occurs as truth.”212 
My task in this chapter is to reconstruct how the problematic of truth serves both 
methodologically as a path to an account of beyng as event and as an essential aspect of the 
event itself. Though there is extensive literature on Heidegger’s conception of truth, these two 
crucial relations truth has to the event remain poorly understood. As I will argue, most 
scholarship has failed to register important changes the account of truth undergoes in Beiträge, 
which directly impact how we ought to understand his concept of event. 
As is well known, dating back to his early work, Heidegger argues that truth cannot be 
primarily logical (formal), propositional, epistemological, calculative or, more broadly, 
representational in character. These versions are unable to explain essential aspects of inner 
workings of truth. Heidegger’s position follows from the conviction that a true statement or 
judgment, for instance, is not nothing, but is “something” in its own right, i.e., has an ontological 
status that is important and cannot be dismissed as something merely ephemeral that arises when 
humans get to know reality and do away with illusion. Rather, a true statement or judgment (and 
likewise a false one) is part of reality, or in Heideggerian terminology, is something that is. 
Sufficiently accounting for truth, then, requires explaining the being of truth. As I will discuss, 
Heidegger takes this a step further, maintaining that truth is most primarily ontological in 
                                                 
210 GA65 387/305; cf. TPT 7. I will clarify the significance of the terminological shift from “Sein”/”being” to 
“Seyn”/“beyng” in Section 2 below. In short, Heidegger spells “Seyn”/“beyng” with a “y” to signify that it is no 
longer understood in relation to beings, but independently, in itself. 
211 GA65 344/272: “Das Seyn west als Ereignis.” 
212 GA65 348/275: “Seyn… als Ereignis west als Wahrheit.” 
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character.213 That is to say, “truth” or what he comes to call “the essence of truth” designates 
aspects of being or of the ontological problematic itself. It serves as the ground enabling those 
other forms of truth (to whatever extent they might be sustainable), which are secondary or 
derivative in relation to it, i.e., less originary on the diagenic axis. 
As I emphasized in Chapter I, Sein und Zeit grounds the problematic of being in the 
existence of Dasein, the analysis of which forms the methodological arena for fundamental 
ontology. Consequently, truth is explained within that arena – at least until the problematic of 
being moves to a ground more originary than Dasein. This shift is seen in Heidegger’s Kehre, 
beginning in the early 1930s. In Sections 1.1 and 1.2 below, I begin by summarizing the status of 
truth in Sein und Zeit and perhaps the earliest text in which the Kehre is visible, “Vom Wesen 
der Wahrheit” (lecture 1930, print 1943). Then in Section 2 I turn to an analysis of truth in 
Beiträge. There, it is through the problematic of the essence of truth that thought first gains a 
proper ground for articulating the evental nature of beyng. As this all suggests, Heidegger’s 
account of truth undergoes a series of important transformations. I focus on three, which 
correspond with these three texts. 
In the 1920s and early- to mid-1930s Heidegger develops what I will call an a-lēthic 
account of the essence of truth. That is, he casts truth and untruth in terms of the Greek ἀλήθεια 
and λήθη. Untruth or λήθη, is not falsity or the failure of truth, but a necessary, coessential 
dimension of it. Ἀλήθεια and λήθη structurally entail one another and together form an ongoing 
ontological dynamism. As the alpha-privative of “λήθη,” the word “ἀλήθεια” (“ἀ-λήθεια”) 
exhibits this essential correlation. 
                                                 
213 Capobianco has a nice discussion of this in HWB, insisting that “on this point, Heidegger drew his inspiration 
from Aristotle (not Husserl) and specifically from Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Theta 10 at 1051b … where Aristotle 
states that ‘being’ is spoken of not only in terms of the categories and with respect to the potentiality and actuality of 
these, but also in the most proper sense (reading kyriotaton) as the ‘true’” (HWB 12). 
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Two main stages of the a-lēthic account can be identified. I address the first in Section 
1.1 of this chapter. It is expressed in Sein und Zeit, where ἀλήθεια and λήθη are understood as 
the “Unverborgenheit” (“unhiddenness”/“unconcealment”) or “Entdecktheit” 
(“uncoveredness”/“discoveredness”) and “Verborgenheit” (“hiddenness”/“concealment”) of 
beings in a world.214 This is a phenomenological account of the nature of truth, since it describes 
the way in which beings become present as phenomena for Dasein (human existence), and 
recede from that presence.215 Here, ἀλήθεια and λήθη are grounded in (and thus dependent upon) 
Dasein’s Erschlossenheit (disclosedness) and are coextensive with the phenomenal world Dasein 
discloses. Ἀλήθεια and λήθη describe aspects of Dasein’s own existence, addressed by 
Heidegger at different points in the text in terms of being-in-the-world, care, thrown projection, 
and temporality. 
The nature of truth, particularly with respect to its relation to logic, was a central concern 
in Heidegger’s early work before the 1927 publication of Sein und Zeit.216 Yet during the decade 
following Sein und Zeit, the problematic of truth takes on a pronounced role in Heidegger’s 
treatment of the Seinsfrage itself. During the same period, in his private works, the notion of 
event rises to the forefront of his characterization of being. In this period a second stage of the a-
lēthic account of truth emerges, which I address in Section 1.2 of this chapter. This is expressed 
well in “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit.” There, a shift takes place in the arrangement of Heidegger’s 
ontology: the elements of the essence of truth – along with “Da-sein” – are cast as more 
originary than human existence.217 That is, human existence is argued to be ontologically 
                                                 
214 SZ 219/262/BTs 210. 
215 For a detailed discussion of Heidegger’s phenomenological conception of truth, particularly as it responds to 
Husserl, see Daniel Dahlstrom, Heidegger’s Concept of Truth (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
Ch. II. 
216 Dahlstrom recounts this well in Heidegger’s Concept of Truth, Ch. I. 
217 As I will discuss later, Heidegger’s modification of the term “Dasein” to “Da-sein” signifies this shift.  
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consequent upon them. In this account, the a-lēthic essence of truth articulates correlated 
ontological structures and their dynamic, which enable beings to come to presence, i.e., to be.218 
Here, Heidegger understands truth or ἀλήθεια as Freiheit (freedom), Offenheit (openness), or 
Lichtung (clearing), which articulate an ontological structure enabling the movement of 
unconcealment, disclosure of beings, or origination of a meaningful world.219 Untruth or λήθη 
becomes originary Verbergung/Verborgenheit (concealing/concealment) or verbergenden 
Entzugs (concealing withdrawal), the ground enabling ἀλήθεια.220 Here, truth as ἀ-λήθεια 
articulates at least three correlated aspects of the ontology Heidegger works out in this text: 1) 
the terrain of beings or meaning constituting a world, 2) the genetic process by which such 
beings come to presence or become manifest and recede from presence, and 3) the ontological 
structures enabling that genetic process. As I will show later, insofar as the problematic of truth 
functions as a way for Heidegger to address the genesis of determinate worlds of beings, it 
parallels Deleuze’s account of individuation in Différence et répétition. 
Most available scholarship addressing Heidegger’s account of truth in Beiträge takes it to 
remain within the basic framework of the second stage of the a-lēthic account. I take this to 
overlook significant structural and conceptual changes advanced in that text. My analysis in 
Section 2 of this chapter turns to this. As I hope to demonstrate, Heidegger moves into a third 
stage, which can no longer be properly accounted for in terms of the a-lēthic framework. Here, 
he inquires into the ontological ground generating the very structures of ἀλήθεια and λήθη, 
thereby moving to a position more originary on the diagenic axis. Ἀλήθεια and λήθη are 
originated in a primal process of differentiation, which constitutes not only the essence of truth 
but a key operation of the evental dynamic of beyng. Thus, in this third stage Heidegger’s 
                                                 
218 WW 188/144. 
219 WW 188/144, 201/154, and 193/148. 
220 WW 201/154. 
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ontology offers a differential account of truth, which is more originary than the earlier a-lēthic 
accounts.221 
A great deal of confusion has surrounded Heidegger’s evental ontology, especially as 
presented in Beiträge. I attribute much of this to a failure in the scholarship to adequately clarify 
the structural relations defining many of Heidegger’s idiosyncratic concepts. I further attribute 
that to a failure to register Heidegger’s shift to a differential concept of truth, since this provides 
access to the logic of the ground articulating these relations, that is, to the logic of the event. If 
the problematic of truth is the problematic preliminary to that of beyng as event, then how one 
understands Heidegger’s account of the essence of truth directly impacts how one understands 
his account of the event. Understanding the essence of truth to be most fundamentally a-lēthic, 
leads to an account of the evental nature of beyng in terms of the a-lēthic framework.222 
However, this leads to confusion regarding many concepts related to the event, which appear out 
of joint, disconnected, or connected only extrinsically by Heidegger’s fiat. Reconstructions of 
Heidegger’s concepts within the a-lēthic framework, then, are unable to make sense of important 
parts of the text without reducing them to mysticism, arbitrariness, or proclamations of the 
master (hence the reliance of so much related Heidegger scholarship on jargon). This is because 
the a-lēthic framework falls short of the most originary level of grounding active in the text. 
Making sense of Beiträge’s concepts without registering this is like trying to understand the 
pieces of a game without understanding the rules in terms of which their characteristics are 
defined. In contrast, as I hope to show, registering Beiträge’s differential conception of the 
essence of truth enables a more originarily grounded articulation of the event, on the basis of 
                                                 
221 This does not mean he gets rid of the a-lēthic terminology. Ἀλήθεια and λήθη remain crucial in this differential 
account, but they are no longer sufficient for accounting for the essence of truth. 
222 For example, this leads Capobianco in EH to understand Ereignis to provide an account of being that is 
fundamentally equivalent to that given in terms of ἀλήθεια, but merely using an alternative terminology. 
  110 
which those concepts snap into place. This allows a rigorous analysis of those concepts and their 
intrinsic, essential relations and, in turn, a reconstruction of his broader evental ontology in a 
unified, consistent fashion. 
It is worth making one further terminological point. If the first stage of Heidegger’s a-
lēthic account of truth acquired its terminology through phenomenological description, the 
second and third retain much of that terminology. However, as his ontology moves beyond 
phenomenology, the significance of those terms becomes increasingly structural rather than 
descriptive. Part of the confusion about them arises from focusing on the meaning of the words 
used, rather than the structural aspects of the problematic they articulate. 
As this all indicates, the problematic of truth forms a major conceptual context situating 
Heidegger’s thought regarding the event during the 1930s and 1940s. Others include ground, 
time or time-space, history, language, art, technology, and the plight of alienated human 
existence as it strives to ground itself or succumbs to the oblivion of being. As noted, though, it 
is through the problematic of the essence of truth that access to the event is first gained in an 
appropriately grounded way. Here, the program itself of inquiring into the essence of truth enacts 
a process of grounding, whereby thought becomes grounded in increasingly originary positions 
on the diagenic axis. This simultaneously effectuates conceptual transformations that set thought 
into the problematic of the event in an appropriate way. In Heidegger’s ontology, the logic of 
thought, that is, the logic of the being of thought, is continuous with the logic of being. Thus, by 
tracking the former it is possible to gain access to the latter. Truth, particularly in the earlier 
Heidegger, is a jumping off point for this process, for there “truth” designates being, insofar as 
being is disclosed in a meaningful way to Dasein’s thought.  
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As I emphasized in Chapter I, Heidegger’s account of the event is philosophically 
dependent on the lines of thought that lead up to it. Hence, the following analysis of the 
evolution of his understanding of truth will serve 1) to establish continuity from his formulation 
of the Seinsfrage in Sein und Zeit to his account of the event in Beiträge and 2) to articulate the 
problematic of truth as a key preliminary problematic enabling conceptual access the event and a 
properly grounded elaboration of the evental nature of beyng. My attention to Sein und Zeit and 
“Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” is guided by these two tasks. My reconstruction of the differential 
conception of the essence of truth in Beiträge serves as a basis for reconstructing his account of 
the evental nature of beyng, which entails developing a structural dynamics or logic of the event. 
In Chapter III I elaborate this via the problematics of ground and time-space. 
 
1.1: Truth and Dasein in Sein und Zeit 
 
In Sein und Zeit §44 Heidegger makes two points about the nature of truth that are key for 
registering its relevance for his ongoing ontological project and understanding how it transforms 
in the 1930s. First, “truth, understood in the most primordial sense, belongs to the basic 
constitution of Dasein”; it is an “existentiale” (Existenzial) of Dasein, the human being.223 
Second, “Dasein is equiprimordially both in the truth and in untruth.”224 I clarify these statements 
below. 
Heidegger often begins his analysis of a topic by summarizing canonical accounts he will 
argue are insufficient or that contain an essential insight that later becomes distorted. His 
treatment of truth in Sein und Zeit follows this pattern. Parmenides’ famous Fragment 3 
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expresses the insight that there is a primordial association of being with truth (under the guise of 
νοεῖν): “he ‘identified’ being with the perceptive understanding of being: τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν 
τε καὶ εἶναι.”225 Aristotle figures the simultaneous adoption and distortion of this insight. For 
Aristotle, “philosophy itself is defined as ἐπιστήμη τῆς ἀληθείας – ‘the science of truth.’ But it is 
also characterized as ἐπιστήμη, ἣ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὄν – as ‘a science which contemplates entities 
as entities’ – that is, with regard to their being.”226 Thus, the association of truth with being is 
maintained. However, Aristotle also “assigned truth to the judgment [or assertion] as its 
primordial locus” and “set going the definition of ‘truth’ as ‘agreement.’”227 Heidegger 
challenges these positions. 
 It is worth beginning with two preliminary notes about this engagement with Aristotle. 
First, as I emphasized in Chapter I, in Beiträge Heidegger argues that the philosophical 
orientation to the question of ὂν ᾗ ὄν leads to insufficient accounts of being as Seiendheit and is a 
defining characteristic of metaphysics. Here, in Sein und Zeit, Heidegger speaks of this 
orientation in a positive light, as aligned with the project of fundamental ontology. This contrast 
exhibits an important way Heidegger’s thought evolves during the Kehre. Second, the 
Aristotelian framework of judgement and its correlation with representation forms one of the 
central targets of Deleuze’s critique in Différence et répétition. The challenge Heidegger takes 
the problematic of truth to pose to Aristotle and that Deleuze sees posed by the problematic of 
difference overlap in key respects. Both Heidegger and Deleuze contend that the model of 
representation or of judgment set in place by Aristotle – and the philosophical tradition 
perpetuating it – is insufficient because it fails to account for important ontological features. In 
both cases these features are claimed to be ontologically prior to and generative of or originary 
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for representation/judgment, which is thereby derivative. For Heidegger in Sein und Zeit, these 
are cast in terms of the being of truth, or the processes of uncovering and covering (grounded in 
Dasein’s existence) whereby beings come into and withdraw from phenomenal presence. For 
Deleuze, they are cast in terms of being or becoming as difference and repetition, together with 
genetic processes of individuation whereby beings come to exist and pass out of existence. I 
detail Deleuze’s analysis of this in Chapters IV and V. 
 In Heidegger’s analysis, Aristotle proposed that “the soul’s ‘Experiences’ [Erlebnesse], 
its νοήματα (‘representations’ [‘Vorstellungen’]), are likenings [Angleichungen] of Things,” and 
this set the precedent for “the later formulation of the essence of truth as adaequatio intellectus et 
rei,” which I briefly discussed in Chapter I.228 Heidegger uses “Angleichung” here to translate 
both “adaequatio” and “ὁμοίωμα.”229 The history of defining truth in terms of adaequatio is 
extensive. In its pre-Kantian form, Heidegger highlights its transmission from Isaac Israeli to 
Avicenna and to Aquinas, who “also uses for ‘adaequatio’ (likening [Angleichung]) the terms 
‘correspondentia’ (correspondence) and ‘convenientia’ (coming together).”230 Though neo-
Kantian epistemology might suggest the model of adaequatio is untenable after the critical 
revolution, Heidegger insists that Kant’s system retained it, citing Kant’s initial response in 
Kritik der reinen Vernunft to the question “What is truth?”: “The nominal definition of truth, that 
it is the agreement of knowledge with its object, is assumed as granted; the question asked is as 
to what is the general and sure criterion of the truth of any and every knowledge.”231 Here, the 
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model of adaequatio can be understood to be consistent with Kant’s system, so long as we 
remember the redefinition of the object it entails. 
 The jumping off point for Heidegger’s critique of the model of adaequatio is his claim 
that “the agreement of something with something has the formal character of a relation of 
something to something. Every agreement, and therefore ‘truth’ as well, is a relation.”232 
However, the ontological status of this relation and the implications for what is related are 
unclear. Heidegger proceeds by carefully inquiring into this, not by simply arguing that the 
model is flawed and should be jettisoned as is often suggested by commentators. He asks: “What 
else is tacitly posited in this relational totality of the adaequatio intellectus et rei? And what 
ontological character does that which is thus posited have itself?”233 More pointedly, his critique 
proceeds by “inquiring into the foundations [Fundamenten] of this ‘relation.’”234 Though he uses 
the terminology of “foundation” here, the result will not be an account of a metaphysical or 
absolute foundation, but of the ontological structures enabling adaequatio, that is, of what I have 
earlier referred to in terms of “ground.” It is clear here that Heidegger’s critique begins with a 
diagenic step. His broader statement of how this will proceed, moreover, exhibits each of the 
central moments in the movement of Grundlegung: First, “our analysis takes its departure from 
the traditional conception of truth, and attempts to lay bare the ontological foundations 
[Fundamente] of that conception.”235 Second, “in terms of these foundations the primordial 
[ursprüngliche] phenomenon of truth becomes visible. We can then exhibit the way in which the 
traditional conception of truth has been derived from [die Abkünftigkeit] this phenomenon.”236 In 
other words, the analysis will generate an account of structures of truth that are more originary 
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on the diagenic axis than those described in the traditional model, while the latter are derived 
from and explained by the former. Third, “our investigation will make it plain that to the 
question of the ‘essence’ of truth, there belongs necessarily the question of the kind of being 
which truth possesses.”237 Articulating these more originary structures of truth is articulating that 
which makes the derivative structures what they are, i.e., the essence of truth. Clarifying that 
means articulating the being of truth. 
 We usually consider intellectus and res to be different kinds of things, so with regard to 
what do they agree when in a relation of adaequatio? In other words, what grounds their relation 
such that adaequatio is possible? In an historically standard epistemology, one has truth when 
one has knowledge (as opposed to falsity, illusion, or opinion) and knowledge is manifest in 
judgments (subject predication), which are formulated linguistically in assertions (Aussage) or 
propositions (Sätze). But “in judgment one must distinguish between the judging as a Real 
psychical process, and that which is judged, as an ideal content.”238 In turn, both of these must be 
distinguished from “the Real Thing as that which is judged about.”239 We have truth when the 
ideal content of a judgment has a relation of agreement to the real thing. 
This model’s insufficiency is seen in “the ontologically unclarified separation of the Real 
and the ideal” or, inversely, the model’s inability to say whether the relationship of agreement 
between ideal content and real thing is itself “Real or ideal in its kind of being, or neither of 
these.”240 Thus Heidegger asks: “How are we to take ontologically the relation between ideal 
entity and something that is Real and present-at-hand?”241 In the more general terminology of 
adaequatio, what is the ontological character of the relation between intellectus and res? 
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Historically, answers have often focused on explaining in what that relationship subsists, and 
Heidegger tentatively adopts that language here. However, he does not suggest any substratum 
and his solution entails a rejection of the fundamentality of the epistemological model supporting 
this version of the real/ideal distinction. The absolute distinction between real judgment, ideal 
content, and real thing is sustainable only so long as a system fails to discern the fact that the 
relation between judgment and thing, or between intellectus and res, is, i.e., has its own positive 
ontological status. Since the terms of that model are unable to define this status, the being of the 
relation is irreducible to them. 
 Heidegger argues that to clarify the being of this relation (i.e., the essence of truth) we 
can examine the way “knowing demonstrates itself as true”; in other words, “in the phenomenal 
context of demonstration, the relationship of agreement must become visible.”242 Heidegger’s 
point is that what is interesting about demonstration is not the mechanism of how the adaequatio 
of assertion and thing is confirmed or disconfirmed; rather, it is that all such mechanisms – to 
whatever degree they might be successful – are underwritten by the phenomenal access one has 
to the thing. If the being of the one who asserts were such that access were impossible, the 
adequacy or inadequacy of the assertion could never be demonstrated. Truth as adaequatio 
would be structurally impossible (barring a benevolent metaphysical guarantor). Likewise, what 
is interesting about assertion here is not its role in adaequatio, but the fact that, as Heidegger 
puts it, “asserting is a way of being toward the Thing itself that is.”243 More specifically, it is a 
way of being in which the one who asserts gains phenomenal access to the thing, i.e., encounters 
it meaningfully in a world, and does so in such a way that it might be encountered “just as it is in 
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itself.” This is not to suggest that one accesses the thing as noumenon in the Kantian sense. 
Rather, what Heidegger means by “the thing” here is the thing as encountered as phenomenon. 
Needless to say, Heidegger thinks his recasting of philosophy as fundamental ontology 
undermines Kant’s epistemological framework not because it somehow gives us access to 
noumena, but instead because it denies the validity of the transcendental subject and its cognitive 
apparatus, and thus the validity of the phenomenon/noumenon distinction itself. Heidegger, of 
course, replaces the Kantian concept of phenomenon with his own: “that which shows itself in 
itself, the manifest”; for Heidegger, phenomena “are the totality of what lies in the light of day or 
can be brought into the light – what the Greeks sometimes identified simply with τὰ ὄντα 
(beings).”244 
Heidegger describes the way we gain phenomenal access to something in terms of 
“entdecken” (uncovering or discovering). Asserting is one way (among others) of being toward a 
thing such that it might get uncovered. Asserting might also fail, of course. For Heidegger, “to 
say that an assertion ‘is true’ signifies that it uncovers the being [Seiende] as it is in itself. Such 
an assertion asserts, points out, ‘lets’ the being be seen [läßt sehen] (ἀπόφανσις) in its 
uncoveredness.”245 On this basis, the kind of being an assertion has when it is true can be 
designated: “the being-true [Wahrsein] (truth) of the assertion must be understood as being-
uncovering [entdeckend-sein].”246 Since, in Heidegger’s view, being-uncovering is what 
constitutes the truth of an assertion in this originary sense, as well as the ontological ground on 
which adaequatio might be possible at all, he claims that “‘being-true’ (‘truth’) means being-
uncovering.”247 In an effort to lend this thesis historical support, Heidegger suggests it was 
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“understood in a pre-phenomenological manner” by the ancients and translates it into Greek 
terminology: 
 
If a λόγος as ἀπόφανσις is to be true, its being-true is ἀληθεύειν in the manner of 
αποφαίνεσθαι – of taking beings out of their hiddenness and letting them be seen 
in their unhiddenness (their uncoveredness). The ἀλήθεια which Aristotle equates 
with πρᾶγμα and φαινόμενα … signifies the ‘things themselves’; it signifies what 
shows itself – beings in the ‘how’ of their uncoveredness.248 
 
For the purposes of my analysis, whether or not this is a justifiable interpretation of 
Greek thought is not important. What matters is that Heidegger takes truth or being-true to be 
uncoveredness, which is designated alternatively as “ἀλήθεια.” Heidegger’s use of “ἀλήθεια” 
marks a point of intervention into the tradition, at which he sees himself both recuperating an 
original sense of the term and correcting later distortions of it. 
Heidegger’s derivation of the definition of truth as uncoveredness or ἀλήθεια has 
operated by examining the traditional model of truth, observing its insufficiency, and working 
out the ontological ground it presupposes. But how does this connect with the methodological 
horizon belonging to fundamental ontology? For, if “truth rightfully has a primordial connection 
with being, then the phenomenon of truth comes within the range of the problematic of 
fundamental ontology.”249 Additionally, it is quite vague to say that the primordial kind of being 
constituting truth is “uncoveredness.” How might a more detailed account of the structure of 
uncoveredness be provided? Heidegger’s account addresses both of these questions on the basis 
of his earlier arguments claiming that Dasein is being-in-the world, which subvert the categories 
of intellectus, res, etc., and the metaphysical separation between them that leads to the 
epistemological problems involved in representationalism. “Being-true as being-uncovering,” 
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Heidegger claims, is “ontologically possible only on the basis [Grunde] of being-in-the-world. 
This latter phenomenon, which we have known as the basic state [Grundverfassung] of Dasein, 
is the foundation [Fundament] for the primordial phenomenon of truth.”250 
This allows us to make sense of Heidegger’s key claim that truth belongs to the basic 
constitution of Dasein, i.e., is an existentiale of Dasein. The problematic of truth is situated 
within the problematic of being as the existential analytic of Dasein, and Dasein grounds truth as 
an ontological structure. Consequently, truth is structurally dependent upon Dasein’s existence: 
“Because the kind of being that is essential to truth is of the character of Dasein, all truth is 
relative to Dasein’s being.”251 Or, alternatively, “being-true as being-uncovering, is a way of 
being for Dasein.”252 
Heidegger thinks this grounding of truth in Dasein can be stated more fundamentally. The 
structure of Dasein’s being that enables all the dimensions of its being-in-the-world and its pre-
theoretical openness to being is its Erschlossenheit (disclosedness). Disclosedness is the ground 
enabling Dasein’s constitutional correlation with, or absorption in, a world of beings or meaning. 
Its basic structure is exhibited in the ecstatic structure of care, or thrown projection, and can be 
elaborated in terms of a set of existentialia that constitute it: Befindlichkeit (state-of-mind), 
Verstehen (understanding), and Rede (discourse).253 This is important because it means that the 
essence of truth can be articulated even more originarily in terms of disclosedness than of being-
in-the-world. More specifically, “truth, in the most primordial sense, is Dasein’s disclosedness, 
to which the uncoveredness of entities within-the-world belongs.”254 The inquiry into the nature 
of truth in Sein und Zeit leads ultimately to an inquiry into the disclosedness of Dasein. In 
                                                 
250 SZ 219/261, italics removed. 
251 SZ 227/270. 
252 SZ 220/263. 
253 SZ 220/263. 
254 SZ 223/265. 
  120 
Heidegger’s words: “only with Dasein’s disclosedness is the most primordial phenomenon of 
truth attained.”255 
With this in mind, we can explain Heidegger’s claim that “insofar as Dasein is its 
disclosedness essentially… to this extent it is essentially ‘true’. Dasein is ‘in the truth’.”256 Truth 
is grounded in Dasein’s disclosedness, but what is disclosed (along with Dasein) are beings or 
networks of meaning in the world. In other words, the structure of disclosedness extends into 
what is disclosed. In this sense, via its disclosedness Dasein exists as enmeshed within the 
network of meaning or world of beings it discloses, i.e., uncovers. The domain of truth includes 
all that is disclosed or uncovered. It articulates the dynamic fabric of the world or of meaning, as 
disclosed by Dasein, within which Dasein exists. 
How, then, is sense to be made of the Heidegger’s closely connected claim that Dasein is 
equally in untruth? Clarifying this requires looking to the “full existential meaning of the 
principle that ‘Dasein is in the truth’,” which includes not only Dasein’s “disclosedness in 
general” but the fact that Dasein’s existence is characterized by Geworfenheit (thrownness), 
Entwurf (projection), and Verfallen (falling).257 Thrownness and falling are most important here. 
“Thrownness” names the fact that Dasein does not choose the factical context in which it finds 
itself existing. Insofar as it exists, Dasein is simply always already woven into and conditioned 
by it. On the basis of its factical context, Dasein “projects” a network of relations of significance 
and possibilities (a world) through which it advances projects, navigates obstacles, and presses or 
is drawn forward temporally. Among Dasein’s possibilities are those of striving for ownership of 
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its existence by hermeneutically pursuing the question of its own being (authenticity) or of 
slipping into the prefabricated language, interpretive matrices, and circumscribed possibilities of 
action supplied by the masses (inauthenticity). “Falling” is the process of slipping into 
inauthenticity, the gravity of which can never be conquered once and for all. It also includes 
what Richardson calls the “negatived” aspects of the world of beings Dasein discloses: the fact 
that aspects of the world are concealed and that what is disclosed as present is sometimes 
distorted and recedes in one way or another from presence in time (occlusion, being forgotten, 
death, etc.).258 As part of this process, beings “show themselves… in the mode of semblance.”259 
Dasein is disclosive, thrown projection to which belongs the essential characteristic of falling, 
but by the gravity of falling, “what has formerly been uncovered sinks back again, hidden and 
disguised.”260 Consequently, Heidegger writes, “to be closed off and covered up belongs to 
Dasein’s facticity.”261 Thus, “because Dasein is essentially falling, its state of being is such that it 
is in ‘untruth’,” and untruth as coveredness is understood as semblance, occlusion, or withdrawal 
in the field of Dasein’s disclosedness.262 
In summary, to say Dasein is in the truth necessarily entails it is equiprimordially in 
untruth.263 Dasein’s existence is articulated in the two movements of unconcealment and 
concealment. Dasein discloses networks of meaning or worlds of beings, which are 
phenomenally present only on the basis of its existence. The truth/untruth dynamic is the context, 
fabric, or terrain of meaning or beings in which Dasein is absorbed. 
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1.2: Truth and Dasein in “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” 
 
During the 1930s, the problematic of truth takes on a more pronounced role in Heidegger’s 
treatment of the Seinsfrage, coming to form a central register in terms of which he articulates the 
nature of being. The essay “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” is his central statement on this matter 
during the early part of that decade. In a paragraph added in its 1949 edition, he emphasizes the 
point, writing that “truth signifies the sheltering that clears [lichtendes Bergen] as the 
fundamental trait [Grundzug] of being.”264 More broadly, through the problematic of truth, 
Heidegger aims to articulate the ontological process by which beings come to be, i.e., come to 
and recede from presence or become manifest in a world. Truth is being, insofar as being is 
manifest in beings. 
In distinction from Sein und Zeit, “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” presents an important shift 
in the relation between truth and Dasein (as human existence): rather than maintaining that the 
essence of truth is found in human existence’s disclosedness and that derivative forms of truth 
are grounded therein, Heidegger now claims that human existence is grounded in the essence of 
truth. This conception continues to hold that truth essentially entails an ontological structure of 
disclosedness, but one more originary than Dasein’s. To mark this distinction, Heidegger 
employs a terminological distinction between “Dasein” and the hyphenated “Da-sein.” “Dasein” 
refers to human existence as described in Sein und Zeit, while “Da-sein” refers to this more 
originary structure of disclosedness. This position entails a further shift in the status of truth: no 
longer merely the meaningful disclosure of worlds of beings to human existence, truth becomes 
understood in terms of the dynamics of a set of correlated a priori ontological structures 
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constituting the disclosedness of Da-sein. Nevertheless, as I will argue, Heidegger does not 
institute a new metaphysical transcendence. These structures enable the manifestation of worlds 
of beings but are immanent to them. 
This transformation is significant for a number of reasons, including the way it positions 
Heidegger as a type of ontological realist, challenging Kant’s definition of the range of 
legitimate philosophical thought and the modified version of this found later in the 
phenomenological tradition. In fact, “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” is particularly important 
because in it are found both the phenomenological apparatus of Heidegger’s early work and his 
move to articulate the logic of the ground enabling phenomenal presentation. Obviously, this 
ground is not a transcendental subject and its cognitive apparatus (as it might have been for 
Kant), but neither is it even conceptually indexed onto the meaning-making activities of Dasein 
(as it might have been for Heidegger himself in Sein und Zeit). Rather, it is articulated in terms of 
ontological features structurally prior to the domain of phenomena, rendering an account that 
cannot be called strictly phenomenological. It is in this way that, stated more sharply, 
Heidegger’s subtle moves undermining the Kantian and phenomenological horizons bring him 
toward a form of ontological realism. Though he never states the claims overtly in this way, his 
ontology supports the views that 1) there are aspects of being that are ontologically prior to and 
thus independent of human existence and 2) we can give an account of them, even if our 
methodology entails a necessary incompleteness and ongoing evolution of this account. Well 
aware that his project challenges Kant, he references the latter’s famous metaphor of the light 
dove of metaphysics: “With this question concerning essence do we not soar too high into the 
void of generality that deprives all thinking of breath?”265 His answer is of course “no.” This is 
remarkable because contrary to strong phenomenological readings of Heidegger, like that of 
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Sheehan, Heidegger begins undermining philosophy’s tethers to the human being. His move, 
moreover, parallels Deleuze’s critique of Kant in Différence et répétition insofar as it seeks an 
ontological ground more originary than the machinery of representation grounded in the 
transcendental unity of apperception, more originary even than the meaning-making activities of 
Dasein. 
As its title indicates, the task of “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” is to articulate the essence of 
truth. In fact, the concept of “essence” is perhaps as important as “truth” in the essay. For, 
according to Heidegger, “in the concept of ‘essence’ philosophy thinks being.”266 He sees a 
fundamental link between essence and truth, such that by problematizing truth the nature of 
essence is brought into to play. Detailing this relation, which becomes important particularly in 
the essay’s concluding reflections, would carry my discussion far afield. For my focus, 
Heidegger’s provisional definition of essence will suffice. Namely, by “essence” he means 
“Grund der Ermöglichung” (“ground of enabling”) or, alternatively formulated, “Grund der 
inneren Möglichkeit” (“ground of the inner possibility”).267 Thus, the inquiry into the essence of 
truth is one into the ground enabling truth, that is, into that which enables truth to be whatever it 
is. Given that Heidegger understands something’s essence and ground to be aspects of its being, 
the subject of inquiry may also be formulated as “the being of truth.” This is notable because a 
few years later in Beiträge he pairs this formulation with its inversion: “the being of truth” he 
                                                 
266 WW 200/153. I modify the translator’s “Being” to “being” throughout my discussion of this text. 
267 WW 177/136 and 186/143. In the first paragraph of the essay’s closing note, a paragraph added in the 1949 
edition of the text, Heidegger says that “essence is understood verbally” (WW 201/153). There he also offers a brief, 
highly condensed statement crystallizing the relation he takes to hold between truth and essence: “The essence of 
truth is the truth of essence” (WW 201/153, italics removed). I will not unpack this technical formulation here. It is 
also worth pointing out that in the 1954 edition, Heidegger inscribed a marginal note clarifying his understanding of 
essence in this text. The note gives three sequential renditions of essence: “Essence: (1) quidditas – the ‘what’ – 
χοινόν; (2) enabling – condition of possibility; (3) ground of enabling” (WW 177/136, fn. a). The first two are 
metaphysical renditions of the third: the first understands essence as an abstract universal defining beings insofar as 
they are beings and the second understands ground on the basis of the relation it has to what is grounded. Heidegger 
addresses the problems with these in Beiträge, and I address them in detail in Section 2 of this chapter. 
  125 
will claim is “the truth of being.” In other words, the being of truth is to be understood as being, 
insofar as being comes to be manifest in truth. 
As in Sein und Zeit, the movement of thought in “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” proceeds 
from more derivative to less derivative or more essential forms of truth. In each stage, the 
progression is carried forward by a question sometimes explicitly formulated, sometimes 
remaining implicit: what is the ground that makes the form currently in question possible? This 
establishes a trajectory into ground or essence, i.e., an advance of the problematic of truth along 
a diagenic axis. As in Sein und Zeit, Heidegger begins his technical analysis with the traditional 
conception of truth as adaequatio (i.e., the correctness or accordance of a statement or judgment 
with the matter it is about). Using vocabulary I will discuss in a moment, he describes the chain 
of the essay’s progression as one “…tracing the inner possibility of the correctness of statements 
back to the ek-sistent freedom of letting-be as its ‘ground,’ and likewise in pointing to the 
essential beginning of this ground in concealing and in errancy.”268 
With respect to the traditional conception of truth, “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” largely 
reiterates Sein und Zeit, though with a few important alterations stemming from its focus on the 
propositional, rather than cognitive, version of this conception. Heidegger briefly examines its 
medieval origins in the understanding of veritas as adaequatio rei et intellectus, focusing on but 
not outright mentioning Aquinas’ position, expressed particularly well in Quaestiones 
Disputatae de Veritate.269 Then he turns to the formulation of this framework as the accordance 
or adequacy and correspondence of a proposition or statement with the matter it is about. This 
presents a modified version of the problem of relationality discussed in Section 1.1: taking the 
example of a round coin lying on the table and the statement “this coin is round,” Heidegger 
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asks, “wherein are the thing and the statement supposed to be in accordance, considering that the 
relata are manifestly different in their outward appearance?”270 For, “the coin is made of metal. 
The statement is not material at all. The coin is round. The statement has nothing at all spatial 
about it.”271 As in Sein und Zeit, Heidegger’s claim is that answering this requires an analysis of 
“the kind of relation that obtains between the statement and the thing,” particularly with respect 
to the “essence” or ontological ground of that relation.272 Similarly to that text’s 
phenomenological account, this relation is one in which the statement “presents” (vor-stellt) the 
thing “and says of what is presented how, according to the particular perspective that guides it, it 
is disposed.”273 
The structure of propositional presentation found in Heidegger’s account prefigures 
structural aspects of the ontological ground of truth and, notably, replicates the basic formal 
structure of Dasein’s disclosedness (i.e., ek-sistence or transcendence). In turn, it prefigures 
structural aspects of being that come into focus in Beiträge under the rubric of the event. The 
relation by which a statement presents an object, such that it might be in accordance with the 
object, is distinct from other relations of accordance, for instance between two objects. If two 
coins are on the table, an accordance between them holds insofar as both are round, metal, etc. 
But the presence of one coin has little to do with the presentation of the other. In contrast, in a 
statement a relation is constituted to something else, such that the other thing comes to be 
phenomenally presented (i.e., in Heidegger’s preferred language uncovered or unconcealed). As 
mentioned, I take Heidegger’s ontology to entail that statements, like thought, are not ephemeral 
but have their own positive ontological status (grounded in the element of Dasein’s existence 
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Heidegger referred to in Sein und Zeit as “Rede”). Consequently, the relation between statement 
and thing must be understood most basically as ontological-structural, not in terms of abstract 
categorial relations. In line with this and setting aside complexities involved in a statement about 
itself or about another statement, the statement is required to be different from its object while 
simultaneously corresponding to it. This might seem like an obvious point, but one must only 
recall the problem of access found in the Cartesian predicament (discussed in Chapter I) to see its 
fundamentality: how might a mind, absolutely distinct or distinct in substance from an extended 
object, encounter and comprehend that object at all? More than just an epistemological problem, 
what is at stake is the dilemma between ontological pluralism and continuity, equivocity and 
univocity, Leibniz and Spinoza. If one thing is really different from another, how is any relation 
possible, other than perhaps one of pure exteriority? If not, what structural operations generate 
their difference, i.e., constitute them? 
One might approach the problem as posed by Heidegger by first entertaining an 
obviously faulty scenario: perhaps for an accordant correspondence the statement must become 
something round and metal like the coin, or at the limit, identical to the coin itself. However, in 
that case the statement ceases to be a statement. Instead, the possibility of an accordance of 
statement to coin requires that a difference hold between the two. In fact, I would suggest that 
Heidegger can be said to offer here a proto-differential account of this relation insofar as a 
statement about a coin can only be what it is in its difference from the coin. That is to say, the 
statement’s constitution is partially differential in nature. 
Likewise, the object-pole of the presentative relation is dependent upon this difference. 
But it is also informed by aspects of the object that withhold from or withstand this or that 
phenomenal presentation. Heidegger capitalizes on the terminology of Gegenstand (object) to 
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emphasize this point, though he continues to disavow theories of consciousness, psychologies, 
and epistemologies entailing the Cartesian predicament. “To present,” he writes, “means to let 
the thing stand opposed [das Entgegenstehenlassen] as object [Gegenstand].”274 Lest the thing 
and statement collapse into one another, the thing “must maintain its stand as a thing and show 
itself as something withstanding [ein Ständiges].”275 
However, this difference cannot be an absolute discontinuity: to be presented via a 
statement, the object must also “traverse an open field of opposedness [Entgegen],” which 
tentatively can be figured as the field of difference between statement and thing.276 For the 
statement must have a continuity with and insistence or co-inherence in the object, through 
which it gains access to the object and comes to present it. Structurally speaking, then, the 
relation of accordance entails a simultaneous differentiation of and continuity between statement 
and thing. Because of the simultaneity or reciprocal ontological co-determination of these 
aspects, I understand this to mean that there is a structural tension constitutive of this relation and 
thus of the possibility of accordance in propositional truth. 
Heidegger is convinced that the constitutive field of opposedness or tension entailed in 
this relation is not first generated by the production of a statement. “The appearing of the thing in 
traversing a field of opposedness takes place within an open region [Offenen], the openness of 
which is not first created by the presenting but rather is only entered into and taken over as a 
domain of relatedness.”277 This open region renders presentational statements, which can occupy 
it, possible. Justification for this claim is not explicated well in the text, but given the convictions 
of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, his rationale is evident. Presentational statements don’t 
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just happen; they are made by Dasein. Ontologically prior to Dasein’s ability to thematize 
something in a statement is its pre-thematic openness to beings, its disclosedness via which it is 
being-in-the-world and able to comport itself amongst beings therein. Richardson translates this 
into the language of the proposition: here, as elsewhere, Heidegger maintains the “thesis that the 
truth of judgments (therefore predicative) supposes a pre-predicative truth”; namely, “the Open,” 
which “must be conceived as a matrix of relationships (Verhältnis) which constitute the sphere of 
potentialities of There-being [Dasein], one of which potentialities is exploited when an actual 
contact [with a being or object of a proposition] takes place.”278 Stated concisely, the open region 
is what in Sein und Zeit Heidegger referred to as a “world,” while “that which is opened up” in a 
world refers to beings. On this basis, the now familiar conclusion can be reiterated: the essence 
of truth is not the correctness, adequation, or accordance of the proposition with the thing, since  
these can only be explained by more originary structures entailed in pre-predicative, pre-thematic 
openness to a world. In other words, it must be grounded by “the openness of [Dasein’s] 
comportment [Verhaltens]” – the structural disclosedness belonging to Dasein in which a world 
is phenomenally presented or unconcealed.279 
It is tempting to allow this conclusion to close the inquiry into the essence of truth, for the 
position of Sein und Zeit seems to have been confirmed. However, the ontological status of the 
open region or world remains problematic. As in Sein und Zeit, the first several sections of “Vom 
Wesen der Wahrheit” maintain that structurally a world is held open by Dasein’s openness to and 
insistence in the beings it encounters (which are in turn open to it) and its simultaneous 
difference or structural distance from them (Dasein’s ontic distinction in being ontological; but 
also the factical elements constituting its “Jemeinigkeit” or “mineness”). Dasein is the Da of 
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Sein, but its temporal structure entails that a dimension of its Sein is withheld from the Da; in 
this sense Dasein is a smear or tension spanning the ontological difference. The openness of a 
world is understood as the field of this ontological tension, particularly insofar as constituted by 
Dasein’s “ek-sistent insistence” in beings, and, it should be added, the temporal dynamics 
belonging to this.  
The problem, however, is whether Dasein’s disclosedness can sufficiently explain the 
open or, rather, whether Dasein must be understood to occupy the open in a way similar to a 
presentative statement’s occupation of what was earlier described as an open field of 
opposedness. More pointedly, can the origination of the open region be explained by Dasein’s 
disclosedness? Whence the open? Though Heidegger doesn’t construct an argument in these 
terms, answering in terms of Dasein’s disclosedness doesn’t get us anywhere, since Dasein is 
always already open. There is no Dasein that is not open, Dasein is its disclosedness (ek-sistent 
insistent thrown-projection, temporality, etc.). Explaining the open realm requires explaining the 
origination of Dasein’s open character, which must in some way entail operations ontologically 
prior Dasein. It follows from this that the origination of the open is either the origination of 
Dasein or of an open region ontologically prior to Dasein. In either case, Dasein’s existence 
cannot explain this origination. For ease of reference, I will refer to this as “the argument for the 
derivative character of Dasein’s openness.” 
Heidegger’s treatment of the status of the open drives the analysis in “Vom Wesen der 
Wahrheit” to a new stage. In his words, this is prompted by “the question … as to the ground of 
the inner possibility of the open comportment that pregives [vorgebenden] a standard.”280 By 
posing the issue with an eye to the “pregiving of a standard,” Heidegger approaches it in an 
oblique manner different from the way I just framed it. He proceeds from the earlier conclusion 
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that the ground enabling propositional accordance is Dasein’s disclosedness. But as he is 
distinctly aware, it is one thing to show that this is the case, and quite another to demonstrate 
how some proposition might actually establish an accordance with a thing. Nevertheless, this 
demonstration is not Heidegger’s main objective in “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” and detailing it 
is not necessary for explaining the relation the problematic of truth has to the event. I will limit 
my commentary on this to drawing out a related point that contributes significantly to his 
reasoning about the status of the open region. Namely, a proposition’s accordance with a thing is 
gained by being informed or bound (Heidegger describes this with the verb “binden”) by it, not 
simply by occupying the open region. Though “a statement is invested with its correctness by the 
openness of comportment,” it is so only insofar as “through the latter” “what is opened up [can] 
really become the standard for the presentative correspondence.”281 Dasein’s disclosedness is not 
isolated or one-sided, but co-constituted by the openness of the beings in which it insists or is 
enmeshed. Further, the possibility of propositional accordance requires that when Dasein makes 
a statement, it can actually be informed by the thing it is about. But what enables openness to be 
such that this kind of binding or informing can occur? This brings us back to the issue of the 
status of openness. 
Heidegger’s answer to this, and to the question of the ground of the openness of 
comportment, seems a bit strange: “freedom.”282 Freedom is conceived in a technical manner and 
must be distinguished from “human caprice,” “absence of constraint with respect to what we can 
or cannot do,” free will, or any other “property of the human being.”283 In short, freedom is not 
human freedom. Rather, to begin with, the term operates as a placeholder in Heidegger’s 
argument, simply designating whatever it is that enables the openness involved in Dasein’s 
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comportment to be bound or determined by beings, such that that comportment is directed in a 
pre-thematic, pre-predicative manner and might on that basis formulate thematic or predicative 
statements correctly presenting those beings. Defining freedom is defining what enables Dasein’s 
absorption in worlds of beings that bind and direct its comportment. Thus freedom, in a sense, is 
Dasein’s ability to be informed by the world, not merely project upon it. Hence, in Heidegger’s 
words, it is a “freedom for what is opened up in an open region.”284 But it seems that in this 
definition “freedom” is merely shorthand for what still must be explained, otherwise his use of 
the term to explain the ground enabling openness and binding would be circular. What is the 
explanation? 
According to Heidegger, freedom “lets beings be the beings they are” and consequently, 
in a tentative formulation, “reveals itself as letting beings be [das Seinlassen von Seiendem].”285 
Freedom, as letting beings be, will have two distinct senses: first, as a manner of comportment 
for Dasein; second, as an ontological structure enabling beings to be. With respect to the first, it 
clearly cannot be a domination or bending of beings to accord with Dasein’s “will,” for then it 
would be meaningless to say Dasein’s comportment is bound, directed, or informed by beings. 
Freedom entails a reticence or restraint on Dasein’s part: Dasein “withdraws in the face of beings 
in order that they might reveal themselves with respect to what and how they are.”286 Yet this 
also cannot be a disengagement from beings, since that would again preclude the possibility of 
Dasein’s being informed by them and, consequently, of propositional adaequatio. Instead, letting 
beings be is “to engage oneself with beings” in a particular way.287 Namely, it is an attentiveness 
to the ontological ground enabling beings to be (i.e., to come into and recede from presence) 
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insofar as this or that distinctive set of beings is in fact in this process, and a preserving of the 
experience of those beings as grounded in this way. In other words, it is an attentiveness to the 
being of those beings. The ontological ground at issue is not abstract, but operative in the 
manifestation of concrete beings populating the world “right now.” Thus far, it has been 
articulated in terms of openness, and so Heidegger writes that to let beings be is “to engage 
oneself with the open region and its openness into which every being comes to stand, bringing 
that openness, as it were, along with itself.”288 Since openness is an ontologically constitutive 
aspect of concrete beings, attentiveness to it is attentiveness to that which makes them what they 
are; that on the basis of which their character might be articulated in a presentative statement.289 
In its second sense, freedom as letting beings be is not an engagement on the part of 
human existence. The first sense of freedom (and for that matter any comportment) is possible 
only on the basis of an ontological structure of disclosedness more originary than that of Dasein. 
“Freedom” names this structure and I will also refer to it as “originary openness” or “originary 
disclosedness.” More precisely, “freedom” or “letting-be” in this primary sense denotes the way 
beings are enabled to be on the ground of such openness. Thus Heidegger’s reasoning about it 
contains an answer to the dilemma about the ontological status of openness itself. 
It is only after the first few sections of “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” that Heidegger 
introduces the idea that freedom has this sort of ontological priority, writing, for instance, that 
“ek-sistent freedom as the essence of truth is not a property of human beings; … on the contrary 
humans ek-sist and so become capable of history only as the property [Eigentum] of this 
freedom.”290 His justification for this is sparse in the text. I am able to identify two lines of 
                                                 
288 WW 188/144. 
289 “As this letting-be it exposes itself to beings as such and transposes all comportment into the open region.  
Letting-be, i.e., freedom, is intrinsically exposing, ek-sistent” (WW 189/144). 
290 WW 191/146. 
  134 
support. The first, which I outlined as the argument for the derivative character of Dasein’s 
openness, is not found in the text, but seems implied by it. It eliminates the possibility that 
Dasein can sufficiently explain openness, i.e., that Dasein is the ground whence openness is. This 
places that ground ontologically prior to Dasein and leaves two possibilities for the status of 
openness itself: either the openness generated is simply the openness of Dasein or it is 
ontologically prior to Dasein. The third argument is associated with “untruth” and I will return to 
it when I take up that theme in a moment. 
The second argument eliminates the possibility that the ontological status of openness is 
simply that belonging to Dasein and leaves the other option – that openness is prior to Dasein. 
Dasein (human existence) is such that on the basis of its circumspective openness to and 
understanding of beings, it is able to track different paths through the world, which in differing 
ways contend with the tasks it has a hand. But those paths – or possibilities of comportment – are 
constrained by the nature and range of beings currently disclosed, the same constraint that must 
bind Dasein’s presentative statements. That constraint, or the parameters of possible 
comportment it defines, cannot be reducible to Dasein’s disclosedness (i.e., the openness of 
Dasein’s comportment), since then they would not be imposed upon Dasein – the “thrown” 
character of Dasein’s finitude would dissolve and Heidegger would be a vulgar idealist. The 
structural openness of other beings is not simply the openness of Dasein’s existence. Now, it 
might be tempting to conclude that openness is derived from the structure of beings (and thus 
that Heidegger is offering merely an ontic realism). However, that would put the cart before the 
horse: just as Dasein’s ek-sistence presupposes the field of relationality bound by those beings, 
the openness of those beings to anything else presupposes such a field of relationality. To be a 
being encounterable by anything else means to populate a field of relationality. Though that field 
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might always exist only in the contours of concrete beings, it nonetheless must not be reducible 
to a conglomeration of the structures of these or those beings, since no structurally open being 
could have ever come to be except by coming to populate such a field. Though not abstractable 
from the contours of concrete beings, such a field must be ontologically prior to them, i.e., form 
part of the ground enabling them to be. “Freedom” or “openness” (originary openness, the 
openness of the open region) is Heidegger’s name for this field of relationality, and “open 
region” or “world” names this field as bound by the contours of concrete beings. In alternative 
terminology, freedom is an originary disclosedness, which Heidegger also designates as “Da-
sein” (as opposed to “Dasein” or human existence). With respect to human existence, he outlines 
an argument along these lines as follows: 
 
If ek-sistent Da-sein, which lets beings be, sets the human free for his “freedom” 
by first offering to his choice something possible (a being) and by imposing on 
him something necessary (a being), human caprice does not then have freedom at 
its disposal. The human being does not “possess” [besitzt … nicht] freedom as a 
property [Eigenschaft]. At best, the converse holds: freedom, ek-sistent, 
disclosive Da-sein, possesses [besitzt] the human being – so originarily that only 
it secures for humanity that distinctive relatedness to beings as a whole as such 
which first founds all history.291 
 
Freedom, originary openness, originary disclosedness, Da-sein is the ground that enables 
the openness of Dasein’s comportment and enables beings to become manifest at all. Heidegger 
sometimes describes it as openness as such or “the openness of the open region.”292 That is, 
freedom is the openness on the basis of which the world is, and the world is the “open region”: 
that “into which every being comes to stand,” i.e., “τὰ ἀληθέα, the unconcealed.”293 Freedom 
grounds the disclosedness through which Dasein ek-sists, i.e., through which it is “intrinsically” 
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“expos[ed] to the disclosedness of beings as such.”294 Consequently, it is the basis on which 
Dasein engages with the world and the beings that populate it. Since freedom is an ontological 
structure more originary on the diagenic axis than Dasein and not dependent upon Dasein’s 
existence to be, I will say that here Heidegger offers not just a form of ontic, but of ontological 
realism. In Heidegger’s ontology a position is maintained in which at least some feature of being 
is regardless of whether human beings exist; and by the performance of Heidegger’s text, he 
maintains that at least some account of it can be given.295 
“Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” clearly has now moved beyond Sein und Zeit. Its decisive 
departure can be summarized as follows. If freedom, in its most originary sense, is the openness 
of the open region, that is, the ground enabling beings to be, then human existence – which is a 
being – cannot be identified with freedom. Originary disclosedness or openness is no longer 
grounded in human existence, as it was in Sein und Zeit. Heidegger’s use of the term “Da-sein” 
marks this shift. Da-sein is not the human being (Dasein), but the more originary ontological 
structure of disclosedness that grounds the human being, or makes the structure of human 
existence possible. Dasein is grounded in Da-sein. Human existence and the world in which it 
exists are structured by this more originary freedom or Da-sein. 
The essence of truth, then, can no longer be equated with Dasein’s disclosure of beings, 
for Dasein’s disclosure of beings operates only on the basis of originary freedom or Da-sein. The 
human being is absorbed in the terrain of beings or meaning articulated by that freedom. If the 
world or open region is τὰ ἀληθέα or the unconcealed, then “ἀλήθεια” comes to signify 
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unconcealment, where this is not simply the phenomenological disclosure of beings to Dasein, 
but the originary openness whereby beings are enabled to come into and recede from 
manifestation. Ἀλήθεια as part of the essence of truth articulates part of the ontological structure 
or genetic ground whereby worlds of beings are enabled to be, while “truth is disclosure of 
beings through which [that] openness essentially unfolds [west].”296 Thus, Heidegger’s a-lēthic 
account of the essence of truth has moved to a second stage, beyond the purely 
phenomenological version found in Sein und Zeit. 
After introducing this transformed position, Heidegger spends much of the rest of the 
essay rethinking the relation between the essence of truth and Dasein. I will bypass much of this 
to keep focus on the structural elements of the essence of truth. Recall that in Sein und Zeit 
untruth or λήθη (concealment/coveredness) was not a privation or negation of truth, but equally 
essential and structurally correlated with ἀλήθεια. It was the semblance or occlusion involved in 
(human) Dasein’s fallenness. In light of the transformation found in “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit,” 
what is the status of λήθη? Since the essence of truth is more originary than the ek-sistent 
human, untruth cannot be simply a characteristic of the human being. Freshly addressing the 
nature of untruth drives Heidegger’s account to a yet more originary ground. 
Freedom, the disclosedness of Da-sein, lets beings be, that is, it lets them become present 
in unconcealment. But this occurs in a way always oriented in a particular, “attuned” 
comportment.297 What can “comportment” mean here and how can an ontological structure – 
freedom as Da-sein – be attuned? Answering this leads to an answer to the question regarding the 
status of λήθη. 
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It is clear that freedom in the first, derivative sense is always attuned, like all of Dasein’s 
comportment. That is, the concrete meanings and possibilities offered by a world of beings to 
Dasein’s comportment define or provide a distinct factical character to that comportment, and 
Dasein’s futurally oriented circumspective concern is embedded in and guided by them. The 
factical possibilities of the kind of comportment described by the first sense of freedom are 
defined by the world of beings in which Dasein’s ek-sistence insists. And the closedness or 
concealment belonging to beings is equally essential to this world. Beings cannot be completely 
open, because then they would not be delimited at all, they would not be. Similarly, without the 
finitude this provides, Dasein’s possibilities of comportment would evaporate.  
At the more fundamental level of freedom, Dasein’s existence is structured or attuned by 
the originary openness enabling it to engage beings at all. In Heidegger’s words, “as letting 
beings be, freedom [in the second sense] is intrinsically the resolutely open bearing that does not 
close up in itself. All comportment is grounded in this bearing and receives from it directedness 
toward beings and disclosure of them.”298 Beings (aside from Dasein) are also structured or 
attuned by that openness. Yet openness always is in the contours of a concrete world of beings. 
Whence does the character of that contour arise such that openness is openness of a factically 
concrete world? With respect to the beings populating such a world, it is codetermined by the 
λήθη co-constitutive of them. At a yet more fundamental level, originary openness itself cannot 
be absolute or total, for then there would be no delimitation, no finitude at all. For the same 
reason, the closedness, concealment, or withdrawal co-constitutive of beings cannot be explained 
by originary openness alone. Ἀλήθεια, originary openness, originary unconcealment can gain 
delimitation only in correlation with what limits or makes openness finite: an originary 
closedness, concealment, withdrawal, or λήθη. This cannot be reduced to the ontic λήθη 
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belonging to beings for the same reason openness cannot be reduced to the openness of beings: 
all beings are finite; finitude cannot be the result of beings, for they could not be without a 
delimitation ontologically prior to them. Correlative with originary ἀλήθεια is originary λήθη, 
ontologically prior to worlds of concrete beings, even if always existing only in their contours.  
Heidegger uses the concept of history to discuss the way originary λήθη delimits or 
configures a world in this or that factically distinctive manner. The series of distinctive instances 
of ontological withdrawal or concealment are “epochal” configurations. There is no intelligent 
design behind this, it is entirely aleatory. To return to the question posed a moment ago, I take 
Heidegger’s notion of attunement at the level of Da-sein to designate the particular historical or 
epochal configuration determining the disclosure of concrete, finite worlds of beings. Such 
disclosure or unconcealment is always shaped in a finite, factical manner. This means 
unconcealment can never be total: no totality of being or beings can be disclosed. To disclose 
some concrete range of beings, “beings as a whole” must withdraw into concealment.299 The 
disclosure of a concrete range of beings is only possible on the basis of this withdrawal: only by 
the concealment that withdraws beings-as-a-whole from disclosedness, i.e., the concealment that 
refuses the possibility of total disclosure, is finite disclosure possible. 
 
Precisely because letting-be always lets beings be in a particular comportment 
that relates to them and thus discloses them, it conceals beings as a whole. 
Letting-be is intrinsically at the same time a concealing. In the ek-sistent freedom 
of Da-sein a concealing of beings as a whole comes to pass [ereignet sich].300 
 
Heidegger’s point is not that concealment is an inevitable consequence of the 
unconcealment of beings/meaning, but that unconcealment is possible only on the basis of 
originary concealment. The finitude of concrete comportment enables that comportment to be at 
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all. And that finitude is grounded precisely in a withdrawal from or refusal of openness. And this 
is originary, not derivative.301 
 
Considered with respect to truth as disclosedness, concealment is… the un-truth 
that is most proper to the essence of truth. The concealment of beings as a whole 
does not first show up subsequently as a consequence of the fact that knowledge 
of beings is always fragmentary. The concealment of beings as a whole, un-truth 
proper, is older than every openness of this or that being. It is older than letting be 
itself.302 
 
Concealment is an irreducible structure of the dynamic of truth; indeed, the one most 
proper to it. As should be clear, it is not simply an epistemological limit, but a positive 
ontological structure partially constituting the essence of truth. Τὰ ἀληθέα is the articulated 
terrain of beings or meaning that is enabled by originary ἀλήθεια or openness and λήθη or 
concealment. Meanwhile, concealment is not merely semblance and occlusion but a dynamic 
structure in the heart of truth diagenically prior to beings or meaning and which, as such, holds 
no meaning. 
Contrary to Sheehan’s claim that for Heidegger Sein is really Sinn or meaning, under the 
rubric of truth it is clear that a key feature of being – λήθη – is prior to and irreducible to 
meaning, and is in fact distinctively devoid of meaning. This aligns Heidegger with Althusser’s 
insistence on the “non-anteriority of Meaning,” that is, the claim that there is no meaning 
inscribed in being prior to or guiding the advent of the world.303 Since λήθη is the ground 
enabling the disclosure of any meaning, meaning itself cannot be attributed to originary λήθη. 
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Otherwise, meaning would be ontologically prior to itself. Thus, from the perspective of the 
world, λήθη figures a rupture in the terrain of meaning.  
Moreover, Sheehan’s claim that being as meaning is always correlative with human 
existence must be false. Ἀλήθεια and λήθη are what they are prior (on a diagenic axis) to the 
worlds of beings or meaning they enable to be. In fact, precisely because originary concealment 
is a refusal of disclosure, it cannot have any relation of dependence upon that which is disclosed. 
It (and perhaps even originary openness) is an ontological structure not dependent upon any 
relation to beings or meaning, while beings and meaning are dependent upon it. There is 
consequently a one-way direction of dependence here which shows that Sheehan’s rubric of 
reciprocity between being and human existence does not match up to Heidegger’s account. 
Heidegger explicates untruth further within the human context in terms of “mystery” and 
“errancy,” which I can set aside for the purposes of this project. What will be crucial in Section 2 
of this chapter is having established the ontological-structural elements of the essence of truth in 
“Vom Wesen der Wahrheit”: 1) truth as the freedom or originary openness through which the 
movement of unconcealment, the disclosure of beings, or generation of a meaningful world are 
enabled, and 2) untruth as originary concealment, the ground enabling unconcealment, or the 
λήθη of which ἀλήθεια is the alpha-privative. The essence of truth, then, is the ἀλήθεια/λήθη 
dynamic in which worlds of beings or meaning come to be. In Heidegger’s account of the 
essence of truth in Beiträge, ἀλήθεια and λήθη prefigure the dynamic structure of the event, and 
it is through a transformation of those concepts that a grounded account of the event is 
developed. 
Though the account I have reconstructed might seem like metaphysical 
transcendentalism, for reasons I will detail in Section 2.2.1 of this chapter, it is not. The main 
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points are: 1) Ἀλήθεια and λήθη are not reducible to conditions of possibility for experience, and 
their function is not simply epistemological. They are structures or operations of being necessary 
for the determination of any beings or worlds of beings, regardless of their accessibility to human 
understanding. This point will be made decisively in Beiträge. 2) Though, again, Heidegger does 
not clarify this in “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit,” he is clear by the time of Beiträge that the 
priority of the structures of the essence of truth is not that of conditions of possibility. These 
structures are necessary for the origination of worlds of beings, but this status must be 
understood in terms of “ground” not “conditionality.” The framework of conditionality, he will 
argue, is metaphysical and faulty. 3) The framework of transcendentality is a byproduct of 
metaphysics, which is fundamentally oriented by the question of Seiendheit, the beingness of 
beings. There, fundamental ontological categories are derived, for instance, by abstracting 
universals or generalities from a set of particulars (beings in this case). This fails to register the 
ontological difference. In contrast, Heidegger’s account of the essence of truth aims to step 
outside the range of Seiendheit. Though he is still struggling to accomplish this in “Vom Wesen 
der Wahrheit,” he seems to find greater success in Beiträge.  For Heidegger, the structures of 
truth are not generalities abstracted from beings, defined by universal characteristics of beings 
insofar as they are beings. They are non-generic dynamic structures whence worlds of beings are 
originated. 
 
2: Truth and Event in Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis) 
 
In Beiträge, Heidegger argues that his treatment of the ontological problematic in earlier works 
like Sein und Zeit and “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” was ultimately inadequate. As I will discuss, 
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Heidegger holds that his earlier positions remain determined by the conceptual framework of 
metaphysics, which he takes to prevent a sufficiently originary account of being. In an effort to 
rectify this, Heidegger recasts the most fundamental terms of his ontology. “Being” he argues, 
must be rethought in terms of “the event” (das Ereignis). In other words, being – or rather, beyng 
(Seyn) – is evental in nature.304 A central task of Beiträge, then, is to work out what exactly the 
evental nature of beyng is. The problematic of the essence of truth plays a key role in this. 
I will return to truth shortly. To make sense of the transformation in Heidegger’s account 
of truth in Beiträge (and, consequently, to make sense of the text’s account of the event), it is 
necessary to outline some major ontological shifts present in Beiträge. First, I will examine a 
problem Heidegger identifies in the history of ontology and his own previous efforts at 
addressing the question of being: that of thinking being within the framework of Seiendheit or 
beingness. In Beiträge, he aims to rectify this via a major philosophical shift advancing the 
independence of being from beings. I will clarify this by attending to the shift of his focal term 
from Sein to Seyn and the correlated shift from the Leitfrage to the Grundfrage. This look at the 
problem of Seiendheit is necessary for making sense of a parallel shift he advances regarding the 
essence of truth: the essence of truth must be detached from or independent of what is true. I then 
briefly return to comment on Sheehan/Meillassoux’s and Capobianco/Polt’s interpretations of the 
event, showing where I take each to go off track. 
On the basis of this frame, I then pick up the problematic of truth and detail the way it 
opens up proper access to the event. As discussed earlier, the problematic of truth plays a key 
role in the problematic of being: “beyng qua event essentially occurs [west] as truth.”305 
Explicating the essence of truth drives thought into a position from which it can give a first 
                                                 
304 I differentiate Heidegger’s technical terms “being”/“Sein” and “beyng”/“Seyn” in Section 2.1.1. 
305 GA65 348/275. 
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properly grounded account of the nature of the event itself. This will serve as a basis for 
elaborating this account further via the problematics of ground and time-space in Chapter III. In 
my analysis, I draw from the text as a whole, but focus especially on the “Gründung” division 
(§§168-247). 
 
2.1: Outline of Some Major Ontological Developments Situating the Event in Beiträge 
 
2.1.1: The Problem of Seiendheit and the Shift from Sein to Seyn 
 
In Beiträge, Heidegger advances a major ontological shift that sets the stage for his account of 
the event in that text, namely, a shift in how he understands being with respect to beings. Recall 
that in Sein und Zeit, being was always framed as “the being of beings.”306 There, Dasein or 
human existence – a being – can work toward developing an authentic understanding of being by 
developing an authentic understanding of its own existence. In other words, I can come to 
understand being on the basis of the relation being has to a being – Dasein, my own existence. In 
Beiträge, Heidegger makes a radical shift: he disassociates being from beings.307 In other words, 
being is now to be thought independently of any relation it has to beings: “beyng can no longer 
be thought on the basis of beings but must be inventively thought from itself.”308 This shift is 
signified terminologically by rewriting “Sein” (“being”) in the archaic form “Seyn” (“beyng”).309 
“Sein” signifies being, understood as codetermined by a relation to beings. Its conceptual 
                                                 
306 SZ 6/26. 
307 In Beiträge, Heidegger explains what he means by beings as follows: “‘Beings’ – this term names not only the 
actual (and certainly not if this is taken as the present at hand and the latter merely as the object of knowledge), not 
only the actual of any sort, but at the same time the possible, the necessary, and the accidental, everything that 
stands in beyng in any way whatever, even including negativity [Nichtige] and nothingness [Nichts]” (GA65 74/59).  
308 GA65 7/8. 
309 It should be noted, though, that Heidegger is not entirely consistent with the use of this convention in Beiträge. 
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successor, “Seyn,” on the other hand, signifies being as thought independently of any relation it 
has to beings.310 The following passage crystallizes Heidegger’s point and indicates its 
implications for the related themes of metaphysics and the ontological difference. I will refer 
back to it again later. 
 
There is no immediate difference between beyng [Seyn] and beings, because there 
is altogether no immediate relation between them. Even though beings as such 
oscillate only in the appropriation [Ereignung], beyng remains abyssally far from 
all beings. The attempts to represent both together, already in the very manner of 
naming them, stem from metaphysics.311 
 
As I hope to make clear, this independence does not mean beyng is transcendent or 
ultimately discrete from beings, but that beyng is not dependent upon beings or its relations to 
beings. Beyng is, to borrow a phrase Capobianco uses, “structurally prior” to beings.312 Of 
course, Heidegger also details codependent or reciprocal relations between being and beings, as 
in the co-appropriation of Dasein and being that enables the constitution of meaningful worlds. 
Indeed, much of Beiträge is devoted to themes within this register. However, I take this to be a 
derivative relationship consequent upon the more originary, and independent, operations of 
beyng as event. 
                                                 
310 A later clarification of the sense in which beyng is separated from beings is offered in the lecture record 
composed by Dr. Alfred Guzzoni, “Summary of a Seminar on the Lecture ‘Time and Being,’” published in On Time 
and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 33: “Then the phrase ‘to think 
Being without beings’ was discussed. Along with the expression… ‘without regard to the relation of Being to 
beings,’ this phrase is the abbreviated formulation of: ‘to think Being without regard to grounding Being in terms of 
beings.’ ‘To think Being without beings’ thus does not mean that the relation to beings is inessential to Being, that 
we should disregard this relation. Rather, it means that Being is not to be thought in the manner of metaphysics, 
which consists in the fact that the summum ens as causa sui accomplishes the grounding of all beings as such (cf. 
Leibniz’s so-called twenty-four metaphysical theses in Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol. II, pp. 454 ff.). But we mean 
more than this. Above all, we are thinking of the metaphysical character of the ontological difference according to 
which Being is thought and conceived for the sake of beings, so that Being, regardless of being the ground, is 
subjugated to beings.” 
311 GA65 477/375. 
312 Capobianco, HWB 11; also see his “Coda on Being is (not) meaning,” Heidegger Circle Forum Post, August 30, 
2013, 8:18 AM, https://groups.google.com/forum/#!searchin/heideggercircle/coda%7Csort:relevance/ 
heideggercircle/eqHSh01v9kY/6dqtJmTIuroJ, italics removed. 
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Though Heidegger’s accounts of both the primal independence of beyng from beings and 
consequent relations of reciprocity between the two are quite complex, and I will not treat them 
fully here, I take his basic logic to be straightforward. It operates at a first order and then a 
second order level. At the first order level: as a child’s existence is dependent upon the donors of 
its genetic material, beings are dependent upon beyng. “If beings are, then beyng must occur 
essentially [wesen].”313 But, as the donors are not dependent upon the child, beyng is not 
dependent upon beings. The child might cease to exist while the donors remain. This is a one-
directional dependence. At the second order level, the donors might indeed become reciprocally 
determined by the child, but only insofar as they become mother or father. “Mother” or “father” 
is a secondary determination of the donor that only arises insofar as it enters into a certain 
correlation with the child and becomes partially defined in terms of that correlation. The primal 
independence and consequent correlation of beyng and beings is the same: beyng is independent 
of beings, while beings are dependent upon beyng. It is only insofar as worlds of beings are 
meaningfully disclosed by Dasein – a consequent structure – that beyng becomes reciprocally 
determined by beings (namely Dasein). Yet this remains at a second order level. The one-
directional relation of dependence is consequently supplemented with a reciprocal 
codetermination. 
The term “Sein”/“being” applies in the register of this reciprocal codetermination, while 
the term “Seyn”/“beyng” applies in the more originary register independent of it. Marking this 
distinction is essential to making sense of Beiträge. Without it, Heidegger’s statements clarifying 
each become conflated and make a difficult text nonsensical. With it, seemingly enigmatic 
                                                 
313 GA65 7/8. Though this analogy uses a relation of efficient causality, which is a decisively ontic relation, I 
certainly do not mean to suggest beyng is a cause of beings. Rather, I mean to illustrate that there is a relation of 
dependence, where, if beyng did not “occur essentially,” beings would not be. Thus, I intend this to be a structural 
analogy, not an example. 
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statements like the following become clear: “The question of being is the question of the truth of 
beyng.”314 For, truth is the determination of beyng in worlds of beings or meaning. Heidegger 
makes the point distinguishing being and beyng again, while also emphasizing the difference of 
beyng from the metaphysical concepts of actuality and possibility, as follows: “‘Beyng’ [Seyn] 
does not simply mean the actuality of the actual, and not simply the possibility of the possible, 
and in general not simply being [Sein] understood on the basis of particular beings; instead, it 
means beyng out of its original essential occurrence in the full fissure.”315 
The reason for Heidegger’s shift is that thinking being on the basis of its relation to 
beings forces a determination of the concept of being on the basis of the concept of beings, i.e., 
the conceptualization of what beings are as beings (ὂν ᾗ ὄν), which Heidegger terms 
“Seiendheit” (“beingness”).316 A series of related faults are involved with understanding being in 
the framework of Seiendheit. First, it leads to an abstract or generic account of being. 
Historically, a dominant procedure for deriving Seiendheit is the examination of a set of beings 
with an eye toward what is identical in all of them. In other words, the derivation of an essence 
by means of abstraction of a universal from a set of particulars, which might be accomplished by 
a variety of a priori or a posteriori methods. Seiendheit, in such cases, is that which most 
universally belongs to beings. For Heidegger, the paradigm case is Platonism’s derivation of 
abstract universals or ideas.317 The Aristotelian analogue is found in his account of “οὐσία as the 
                                                 
314 GA65 6/8. 
315 GA65 75/60. 
316 GA65 75/60. For more on Heidegger’s understanding of Seiendheit, see Polt, Emergency 55-56 and 63-64. 
317 Heidegger makes this point particularly well in Nietzsche vol. IV, ed. David Farrell Krell, trans. Joan Stambaugh, 
David Farrell Krell, and Frank A. Capuzzi (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1991). “Plato interpreted the beingness 
of beings as idea” (Heidegger, Nietzsche vol. IVe 194). “In the question ‘What is the being as such?’ we are thinking 
of being, and specifically of the being of beings, that is to say, of what beings are. What they are – namely, the 
beings – is answered by their what-being [Was-sein], to ti estin. Plato defines the whatness of a being as idea (see 
Plato’s Doctrine of Truth). The whatness of being, the essentia of ens, we also call ‘the essence’” (Heidegger, 
Nietzsche vol. IVe 206). Heidegger’s essay, Plato’s Doctrine of Truth, is found in Wegmarken 203-238/Pathmarks 
155-181. For more of Heidegger’s comments on Aristotle, Kant, and Nietzsche, see Nietzsche vol. IV 41. 
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beingness of beings,” which replicates the problem: “despite [Aristotle’s] denial that being has 
the character of a genus, nevertheless being (as beingness) is always and only meant as the 
κοινόν, the common and thus what is common to every being.”318 A second problem is that 
within the framework of Seiendheit, “nothing is said about the inner content of the essence of 
being.”319 That is, the characterization of being is donated only from the character of beings, not 
arrived at on the basis of being itself. In Heidegger’s analysis, thinking being on the basis of 
beings prioritizes beings over being by making the conceptualization of beings as such 
determinative for the conceptualization of being. Third, moreover, extant conceptions of beings 
as such are not “innocent.” They are determined within faulty metaphysical historical and 
conceptual configurations. Characterizations of being drawn from beings carry this fault. Fourth, 
moreover, characteristics of beings are characteristics of beings, not being. Failing to register this 
means failing to register the ontological difference between being and beings.320 
It is tempting to understand the priority involved in beyng’s independence in terms of a 
relation of conditionality. However, Heidegger is careful to point out that this would be 
mistaken. Showing why will help clarify the status of beyng’s independence. In his view, if we 
take beyng as a condition for beings we continue to determine beyng on the basis of a relation 
between it and beings, i.e., as Seiendheit.321 The problem here is in the application of the very 
framework of conditionality to beyng. Concepts of condition must be distinguished from 
Heidegger’s concepts of ground in Beiträge, which constitute an essential register of beyng itself 
                                                 
318 GA65 75/60. 
319 Nietzsche vol. IV 156. 
320 While Heidegger critiques the ontological difference in Beiträge, attaining the conceptual and methodological 
position from which that critique can be made is itself dependent upon having previously marked the ontological 
difference and worked through the ontological problematic it opens up. 
321 For instance (keeping attentive to the terminological distinction between Sein and Seyn), see the passage from 
GA65 478/376 block quoted below. Similarly, in GA66 Heidegger writes: “Das Seyn als Er-eignis des ab-gründigen 
Austrags der Kreuzung von Entgegnung und Streit ist weder vom Seienden her als dessen Abhub und Nachtrag, 
noch auf das Seiende zu als dessen Ursache und Bedingung er-dacht” (GA66 93/78). 
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as event: namely, “Grund der Möglichkeit” (“ground of possibility”) or the more developed 
ground as “das Sichverbergen im tragenden Durchragen” (“self-concealing in a protrusion that 
bears”).322 This is differentiated into “Er-gründen” (“creative grounding” or “fathoming the 
ground”) and “das ursprüngliche Gründen des Grundes” (“The original grounding of the 
ground”) or “gründende Grund” (“grounding ground”).323 We can set aside the more derivative 
fathoming the ground for now, which articulates ways alienated human existence grounds itself. 
Grounding ground, on the other hand, articulates the originary grounding dynamic inherent to 
beyng itself as event. Grounding ground is necessary for beings to be, but is not to be determined 
as a condition. Casting something as a condition always means understanding it as a condition 
for something: a condition for a being or for experience, for instance. The strange consequence 
Heidegger recognizes, in other words, is that casting something as a condition always subjects it 
to a co-determination by what it is a condition for, insofar as the condition is defined in terms of 
the relation it has to the conditioned. Although we seem to have good concepts for conditions 
that are independent of what is conditioned, his point is that applying the very framework of 
conditionality to something means understanding it in terms of the relation of condition to 
conditioned, and vice versa. In this way, thinking being as a condition for beings generates an 
account in which being is structurally conditioned by beings, not independent of them: "If beyng 
is understood as a condition in any sense whatever, it is already degraded into something in the 
service of beings and supervenient to them."324 In Beiträge, on the other hand, grounding ground 
enables what is grounded on it to be, but is not itself essentially determined by what is grounded. 
In other words, it is conceived on the basis of the inherent grounding character of the event, not 
                                                 
322 GA65 297/234 and 379/300. Recall that in “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” a version of the “ground of possibility” 
appears as “Grund der Ermöglichung” [“ground of enabling”] (WW 177/136 fn. a). 
323 GA65 307/243. 
324 GA65 479/377. 
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the relation it has to what is grounded.325 How this works can be seen in §242, where the 
originary structures or dynamics of ground – Ab-grund, Ur-grund, and Un-grund – are unfolded 
immanently as part of the originary dynamics of the event, not derived from what is consequent 
upon them. 
It will be worth noting that for Heidegger, “the original grounding of the ground … is the 
essential occurrence of the truth of beyng; truth is a ground in the original sense.”326 This, as will 
be seen, means the essential occurrence of the truth of beyng must not be thought in terms of any 
relation to what is consequent upon it (beings), but likewise unfolded immanently as part of the 
originary dynamics of the event. 
These distinctions allow me to further clarify how I understand the structural priority of 
beyng in Beiträge. It will be helpful to mark my agreement and disagreement with Capobianco’s 
recent interpretation of this matter. As he writes: “Heidegger’s mature position, in my 
formulation of the matter, is that Being is structurally prior to and a condition of meaning. That 
is, only insofar as there is Being is there meaning.”327 I take him to understand “meaning” here 
as shorthand for “the meaningful disclosure of a world of beings” or “the disclosure of a world of 
beings in their meaningful relations with human existence.” I agree that without beyng, meaning 
or worlds of beings would be impossible. In contrast to Capobianco, though, my understanding is 
that, at least in Beiträge, being (as beyng, as Ereignis) is structurally prior to, but not a condition 
of meaning or worlds of beings. For, casting this structural priority in terms of conditionality 
                                                 
325 Ground is also that which is most proper to what is grounded; it bears the gravity of essence. Recall that in “Vom 
Wesen Der Wahrheit,” “essence” was provisionally understood to mean “ground of enabling” or “ground of the 
inner possibility” (WW 178/136 and 186/143). 
326 GA65 307/243. 
327 Richard Capobianco, “Coda on Being is (not) meaning,” Heidegger Circle Forum Post, August 30, 2013, 8:18 
AM. Again: “Being qua manifestation is structurally prior to, and the ontological condition of, any ‘constitution’ of 
meaning” (Capobianco, HWB 11). 
  151 
inadvertently reinstitutes the dependence of beyng upon beings.328 In my view, to say beyng is 
structurally prior to meaning is to say beyng is prior on the diagenic axis or axis of ground, 
where “ground” must not be conflated with “condition.” This results in a different formulation: 
in Beiträge, beyng is structurally prior, prior on the diagenic axis, to meaning or beings. 
Metaphysics, in Beiträge, is characterized by its essential orientation to think the 
beingness of beings: “all metaphysics” is “founded on the leading question [Leitfrage]: what are 
beings?” (cf. Aristotle’s τί τὸ ὄν).329 This is a central reason why it is insufficient for ontology. 
“‘Metaphysics’ asks about beingness on the basis of beings (within the inceptual – i.e., definitive 
– interpretation of φύσις) and necessarily leaves unasked the question of the truth of beingness 
and thus the question of the truth of beyng.”330 Heidegger’s shift to thinking beyng 
independently of beings aims to recast the problematic of being in a way liberated from 
metaphysical determination by the problematic of Seiendheit. This point allows a further 
clarification of Heidegger’s terminological distinction between “Sein”/“being” and 
“Seyn”/“beyng.” “Sein”/”being” signifies being as understood within the framework of 
Seiendheit: 
 
Being [Sein] is the condition for beings, which are thereby already established in 
advance as things [Dinge] (the objectively present at hand). Being conditions [be-
dingt] beings either as their cause [summum ens – δημιουργός (‘craftsman’)] or as 
the ground of the objectivity of the thing in representation (condition of the 
possibility of experience or in some way as the ‘earlier,’ which it is in virtue of its 
higher constancy and presence, as accords with its generality).331 
 
                                                 
328 Moreover, according to Heidegger, the very framework of conditionality remains within the transcendental mode 
of thinking that he disavows both in Beiträge and later works like GA77: Feldweg-Gespräche. 
329 GA65 12/12. 
330 GA65 297/235, my italics on “truth.” 
331 GA65 478/376. 
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Hence, “Sein”/“being” remains metaphysical in its signification. “Seyn”/“beyng” does 
not. Recall the point made in the passage cited above on page 24: “The attempts to represent both 
[beyng and beings] together, already in the very manner of naming them, stem from 
metaphysics.”332 Consequently, beyng cannot be “the being of beings.” It must not be understood 
on the basis of beings, in any way codetermined by a relation to them as its counterpart. 
Importantly, however, Heidegger is not claiming beyng has no relation to beings, but that beyng 
has no immediate relation to beings. Beyng is related to beings only mediately through what he 
calls “the strife of world and earth.”333 
 
2.1.2: The Shift from the Leitfrage to the Grundfrage 
 
As a consequence of these shifts, the question of beyng cannot be oriented by that of the being of 
beings. The distinction between being and beyng correlates with a distinction between two 
configurations of the question about being (or beyng): the “Leitfrage” (“guiding question”) and 
the “Grundfrage” (“basic question”).334 The Leitfrage is governed by the question “about beings 
as beings (ὂν ᾗ ὄν).”335 For Heidegger, Aristotle’s “τί τὸ ὄν” “(What are beings?)” renders its 
“most general form.”336 Since it has this “approach and directionality,” when it comes to ask 
about being, it asks “the question of the being of beings.”337 The meaning of the term 
“Sein”/“being” ultimately remains determined by the framework of the Leitfrage. Thus, 
Heidegger argues the Leitfrage must be supplanted. It is so by the Grundfrage, for which “the 
                                                 
332 GA65 477/375. 
333 GA65 477/375. Again: “As a consequence of its solitude, beyng essentially occurs in relation to ‘beings’ always 
only mediately, through the strife of world and earth” (GA65: 471/371). 
334 GA65 75-76/60. 
335 GA65 75/60. 
336 GA65 75/60. 
337 GA65 75/60. 
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starting point is not beings, i.e., this or that given being, nor is it beings as such and as a 
whole.”338 It is “the question of the essential occurrence [Wesung] of beyng” which interrogates 
“the openness for essential occurrence [Offenheit für Wesung] as such, i.e., truth.”339 Here, truth 
“essentially occurs in advance [Voraus-wesende]” of (i.e., is structurally prior or prior on the 
diagenic axis to) the determination of 1) beings, 2) the Leitfrage, and 3) the historical epoch of 
metaphysics.340 In other words, the Grundfrage inquires into the ground of these grounded terms, 
but not on the basis of any relation this ground has to what is grounded. Rather, it asks about this 
ground independently of any such relation.341 
Making a fatal error shaping his interpretation of Heidegger and his relation to Deleuze, 
Gavin Rae’s Ontology in Heidegger and Deleuze: A Comparative Analysis frames Heidegger’s 
ontology as one defined by a “wholesale abandonment” of metaphysics: “For Heidegger, 
philosophy is so irreparably damaged by metaphysics that nothing other than its wholesale 
abandonment will rejuvenate thinking to being’s becoming.”342 Translated into the language I 
have just been using, this would mean that in the shift from the Leitfrage to the Grundfrage, the 
framework of the former is cast entirely to the flames. This is false and expresses a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the structure of Heidegger’s ontology. It fails to register the dimension of 
what I have described in terms of radical critique that Heidegger recognizes as essential to a 
sufficient ontology. If metaphysics constitutes a distorted ontology, a sufficient ontology must 
include within it an explanation on more appropriate bases of the genesis of that distortion. In 
other words, it must not abandon the framework of that distortion, but offer the possibility to 
                                                 
338 GA65 75-76/60. 
339 GA65 76/60. 
340 GA65 76/60. 
341 For more on the Grundfrage vs. the Leitfrage see GA65 §85, §91, and §172. 
342 Gavin Rae, Ontology in Heidegger and Deleuze: A Comparative Analysis (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2014) 3. This is one of three book length studies of the relation of Heidegger and Deleuze currently available. 
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rethink it on proper grounds. In Deleuze, this move is found in his commitment not only to 
showing the error of the regime of representation, but also the genesis of representation as part of 
a broader ontology. Describing the shift here in terms of “übergängliche Denken” or “transitional 
thinking,” Heidegger emphasizes the point as follows:  
 
For transitional thinking, however, what matters is not an ‘opposition’ to 
‘metaphysics,’ since that would simply bring metaphysics back into play; rather, 
the task is an overcoming of metaphysics out of its ground. …[T]ransitional 
thinking must not succumb to the temptation to simply leave behind what it 
grasped as the end and at the end; instead, this thinking must put behind itself 
what it has grasped, i.e., now for the first time comprehend it in its essence and 
allow it to be integrated in altered form into the truth of beyng.343 
 
Heidegger’s concern with this issue is seen clearly in the way he casts the transition from 
the Leitfrage to the Grundfrage. This transition is neither a simple switch from one orientation to 
another nor a seamless progression. The framework of the Leitfrage defines metaphysics, and its 
crystallization by the ancient Greeks marks what Heidegger calls the “first beginning” for 
thought. The shift toward the Grundfrage marks a shift toward an “other beginning.” In this way, 
it is an essential part of what I have described as the event in its historical sense. But as I 
explained in Chapter I, the event in the historical sense would be impossible without an 
ontological element that drives or draws thought beyond the framework of the first beginning; 
namely, what Heidegger elaborates as the evental character of beyng (the event in the ontological 
sense). In the shift from the Leitfrage to the Grundfrage, we see part of this broader 
transformation taking place. 
The overcoming of the first beginning and its Leitfrage cannot be accomplished by 
simple negation. It cannot be “a counter-movement; for all counter-movements and counter-
                                                 
343 GA65 172-173/136. 
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forces are essentially codetermined by that which they are counter to.”344 Any attempt to 
overcome by way of a counter-movement remains reactionary or, as Heidegger puts it, “re-aktiv” 
(re-active).345 “A counter-movement never suffices for an essential transformation of history” – 
it never escapes the determinative force of that to which it is counter.346 Rather, “the task is an 
overcoming of metaphysics out of its ground.”347  
Insofar as the historical and conceptual apparatus of the Leitfrage is grounded in the 
subject matter of the Grundfrage, even if this fact is obscured, the Grundfrage “lies hidden in” 
the Leitfrage.348 When the insufficiencies of the Leitfrage become apparent, so does the necessity 
of a rupture and another beginning for thought (“something utterly different must 
commence”).349 The conceptual apparatus of the Leitfrage is unable to establish this because of 
the determinative force of the historical and conceptual foundations defining it. Instead, a 
preparatory project that fractures or deconstructs those foundations is necessary (as found, for 
instance, in Heidegger’s work from the 1920s and early 1930s). One can imagine, as much 
Continental philosophy did during the 1990s and early 2000s, that the deconstructive project 
might potentially be carried on indefinitely and come to define the project of philosophy. 
Ultimately, however, that would perpetuate the error belonging to the Leitfrage, since philosophy 
would be defined in relation to the Leitfrage’s remnant inscriptions. From a perspective within 
the horizon of this deconstructive project, then, resolving the Leitfrage’s error requires a rupture 
and radical shift – a so called “leap” – initiating another beginning. According to Heidegger, this 
can be accomplished via the problematic of truth: “what is carried out is a leap into the truth 
                                                 
344 GA65 186/146. 
345 GA65 173/136, italics modified. 
346 GA65 186/146. 
347 GA65 173/136. 
348 GA65 76/60. 
349 GA65 186/146. 
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(clearing and concealing) of beyng itself.”350 In the language of the event, this means that a 
historical event must take place accomplishing a radical reconfiguration of the terrain of thought. 
Nevertheless, the historical and conceptual configuration of the Leitfrage is not suddenly 
annihilated. Instead, the shift establishes the possibility that it be re-apppropriated or grounded in 
a more originary way. “Although no progression is ever possible from the guiding question to the 
basic question, yet, conversely, the unfolding of the basic question does at the same time provide 
the ground for taking back up into a more original possession the entire history of the guiding 
question rather than simply repudiating it as something past and gone.”351 Overcoming 
metaphysics out of its ground entails that the transition through the Grundfrage to another 
beginning “free[s] up a creative ground” and offers the possibility of re-appropriating the 
apparatus of metaphysics and mobilizing it in a non-reactive way.352 This, however, would entail 
a fundamental transformation of the terms of the Leitfrage, of metaphysics, and of the way we 
understand the nature of beings. It should be emphasized, however, that Heidegger’s primary 
concern was with rethinking the nature of being in terms of the event, not the re-appropriation of 
metaphysics. 
 
2.1.3: The Ontological Difference 
 
The shift from being to its conceptual successor, beyng, also leads to an important shift in how 
Heidegger understands difference. I will address this briefly here and return to it in Sections 
2.2.2-2.2.7. In Sein und Zeit, the Seinsfrage was oriented by the ontological difference or 
                                                 
350 GA65 76/60. 
351 GA65 77/61. 
352 GA65 186/146. For more of Heidegger’s comments on the non-reactive nature of this shift see §§85 and 92. For 
more on the Leitfrage vs. the Grundfrage see §§85, 91, and 172. 
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difference between being and beings.353 In Beiträge, the question of beyng cannot be oriented by 
the ontological difference because in that configuration being remains codetermined by the 
differential relation between it and its counterpart – beings. This shift is not meant to abandon or 
reject the ontological difference. Rather, Heidegger aims to give an account of the ground 
whence this very difference is possible. As I hope to show, through the problematic of the 
essence of truth in Beiträge, Heidegger shifts the key differential relationship from one between 
being and beings to a self-differential operation “internal” to beyng itself. Recall the passage 
cited on page 155 again, this time with respect to the ontological difference: “There is no 
immediate difference between beyng and beings, because there is altogether no immediate 
relation between them. Even though beings as such oscillate only in the appropriation 
[Ereignung], beyng remains abyssally far from all beings.”354 
 
2.1.4: An Error in Sheehan and Meillassoux’s Correlationist Interpretation of Heidegger 
 
On the basis of these distinctions, it is easy to demonstrate that Heidegger is not a correlationist 
of the sort Meillassoux and Sheehan make him out to be. A central tenet of Heidegger’s account 
in Beiträge is that being itself (as beyng) is dependent neither upon any relation with human 
existence nor any other beings. Rather, as I have emphasized, it becomes a central task to think 
beyng in light of just this independence, which Heidegger does in terms of Ereignis. Sheehan 
and Meillassoux’s failure to recognize this shift means that they define Heidegger’s project 
within the framework of the Leitfrage and reduce his core subject of inquiry to Seiendheit. 
                                                 
353 For a more detailed discussion of the ontological difference and the ambivalent meanings of the Greek “ὄν,” see 
TPT 10-15. 
354 GA65 477/375. 
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It is important that I clarify my point to avoid a misunderstanding. Against my 
interpretation, it might be objected that several of Heidegger’s texts after the early 1930s do in 
fact argue that the disclosure of a world of meaning requires that being is locked into a 
codependent correlation with human existence – as in the account of Ereignis as a reciprocal 
need and mutual appropriation of human existence and being. How, then, could my point be 
correct? My response is that I agree with this… but only as far as it goes: insofar as Heidegger 
gives an account of meaning or of being insofar as being is involved in the constitution of 
meaning, that account involves a codependent correlation of being and human existence, or at the 
very least being with beings. This ‘giving an account of meaning’, however, does not exhaust 
Heidegger’s project: he articulates this and more. For Heidegger, essential aspects of being 
exceed that correlation and are independent of it. Thus, the correlationist interpretation is 
inadequate to Heidegger’s account. 
 
2.1.5: Some Related Errors in Capobianco and Polt’s Interpretations of Heidegger 
 
Recall Capobianco and Polt’s shared interpretation that “Ereignis” is simply an alternative name 
for “anwesen” (presencing) or “das Anwesen des Anwesenden” (the presencing of what is 
present), “ἀλήθεια,” “φύσις,” or “the giving of the given” (cf. Heidegger’s formulation, “es 
gibt”). Both authors agree that these terms indicate not only the manifestation of worlds of 
beings or meaning, but what enables such manifestation at all. I would like to respond to this 
with two critical points. 
First, the Capobianco/Polt interpretation conceives Ereignis on the basis of a relation to 
that which comes to presence, is unconcealed, or is given, i.e., to beings. As I have argued, this is 
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clearly a mistake: it determines the conception of being in terms of characteristics of beings. In 
fact, this interpretation replicates the problem with conceiving being as a condition of possibility 
for beings. Even if aspects of ἀλήθεια, for instance, are taken to be structurally prior to beings or 
meaning, so long as ἀλήθεια is defined in terms of the unconcealment of beings or of meaning, 
that definition is derived in terms of a relation to them. Likewise, if beyng as Ereignis is 
understood as the giving of the given, it is conceptually defined in terms of a relation to what is 
given. 
It should be said that Polt walks a fine line with respect to this issue. He affirms that Seyn 
must be thought purely on its own terms, although he frequently addresses Seyn in terms of the 
giving of the given or meaning of beings and the mutual appropriation of human existence to 
Seyn and Seyn to human existence.355 As he formulates it, “the question of be-ing [Seyn] does not 
begin with particular beings, or with beings as such and as a whole, but with a leap into be-ing 
itself. We must experience beings as pointing to be-ing as ‘their other,’ which must be 
approached purely on its own terms.”356 This statement, however, harbors the crucial error: if 
Seyn remains conceived as the “other” of beings, then it is still conceived on the basis of a 
relation to them. The concept of Seyn is determined by a differential correlation with that of 
which it is the other. Thus, a defining relation to beings remains inscribed in Polt’s conception of 
Seyn. 
                                                 
355 See, for instance, Polt’s characterization of Ereignis as follows: “imagine the ultimate reinterpretive event, or 
rather interpretive event – an event that makes possible interpretation and meaning themselves, that allows the 
hermeneutic ‘as’ to come forth, not just for an individual but for a community and for an age. Such an event would 
be the emergency in which this shared being-there and the ‘there’ itself first emerged” (Polt, Emergency 79). I don’t 
think such a characterization is false, but it does not get to the heart of Heidegger’s characterization of Ereignis, 
which is prior to its role in making possible interpretation and meaning. For more on Polt’s concept of 
“reinterpretive event,” see Emergency 78-79. As an example of Polt’s occasional correlationism, he writes “be-ing 
needs us, and cannot occur at all without involving us in some way” (Polt, Emergency 68). 
356 Polt, Emergency 62. 
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My second critical point is that by failing properly to mark the distinction between being 
and beyng, and beyng’s independence from beings, Capobianco’s interpretation conflates 
Ereignis with being. Capobianco lists citations from Beiträge, Besinnung (GA66), Die 
Überwindung der Metaphysik (GA67), Die Geschichte des Seyns (GA69), and Über den Anfang 
(GA70) that rightly substantiate that for Heidegger Ereignis is Seyn, or Seyn is Ereignis.357 This 
also rightly establishes that for Heidegger the question of Seyn and the question of Ereignis are 
not two different or inconsistent philosophical questions, but one and the same. Capobianco then 
goes on to distinguish between Seyn and Sein, but fails to register the full significance of this 
distinction established in Heidegger’s recasting of his problematic, which is seen particularly 
well in Beiträge.358 The problem, then, is that by identifying Ereignis with Seyn and Seyn with 
Sein, he mistakenly identifies Ereignis with Sein. This lays the (false) foundation for 
Capobianco’s claims that “Ereignis” is just a different name for ἀλήθεια, φύσις, etc., and that, in 
turn, “Ereignis” was not intended to name something more originary than being.359 It was 
intended precisely to name something more originary than being, namely beyng. 
 
2.2: The Event and the Essence of Truth 
 
With the programmatic and conceptual transformations I have already outlined in mind, let us 
return to the question of truth and its role in explicating beyng as event. As I will show, 
Heidegger’s move to think beyng independently from beings has important consequences for his 
treatment of the problematic of truth. As a point of emphasis, the problematic of truth is an 
                                                 
357 EH, 39-43. 
358 EH 44. 
359 As Capobianco states his view, “there is neither sufficient nor convincing textual evidence to maintain that 
[Heidegger] ever considered Ereignis as a more fundamental matter for thought than das Sein” (EH 34). 
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essentially ontological problematic.360 It is an epistemological or logical problematic only in 
derivative forms. 
For a number of reasons, Heidegger’s account of truth in Beiträge is crucial for working 
the evental nature of beyng. Paramount is that the question of truth provides the primary 
conceptual pathway by which thought can gain a first, grounded stance within the event. The 
essence of truth, moreover, constitutes certain essential structures and dynamic operations of the 
event itself. Indeed, it is through Heidegger’s account of truth that he is able to begin developing 
a properly grounded account of the event, or of beyng as event. To these points, he writes, “The 
precursory question [Vor-frage] of truth is simultaneously the basic question [Grund-frage] of 
beyng; and beyng qua event essentially occurs [west] as truth.”361 Consequently, the way the 
essence of truth is understood here directly impacts the way the evental nature of beyng is 
understood. 
 In a number of other texts from the early-mid 1930s, like “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit,” 
Heidegger maintains the account of the essence of truth given in terms of the dual, correlative 
structures of ἀλήθεια (originary unconcealment or openness) and λήθη (originary concealment or 
withdrawal), as discussed earlier.362 Much available scholarship on Beiträge assumes that 
Heidegger’s account of truth in this text should be understood through this originary a-lēthic 
schema.363 In this section, I argue such an interpretation falls short of the account of truth 
Heidegger gives in this text. Of course, the structures of ἀλήθεια and λήθη remain crucial. 
However, by inquiring into the ground whence these very structures are originated, Beiträge 
                                                 
360 I mean “ontological” here simply as pertaining to the problematic of being (or beyng), not the sense of 
Heidegger’s technical use in this text. 
361 GA65 348/275. 
362 For other instances, see: Einführung in die Metaphysik (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1983) and “Der 
Ursprung der Kunstwerkes,” in Holzwege (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2003). 
363 As a general statement of such a position: “For Heidegger, the essence of truth is always understood in terms of 
unconcealment” (Mark A. Wrathall, “Unconcealment,” in A Companion to Heidegger, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and 
Mark A. Wrathall [Malden: Blackwell, 2005], 337). 
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argues for an account of the essence of truth more primal than the a-lēthic schema. Ἀλήθεια and 
λήθη are grounded in an originary difference or self-differentiation [Unterschied or 
Entscheidung], which constitutes an essential aspect of beyng as event itself. In other words, 
Heidegger’s concept of truth in Beiträge is most primally differential, not a-lēthic. 
Demonstrating this establishes a differential logic belonging to the event, which can then be 
developed to explain a number of related aspects of the event. 
My earlier examination of the problem of Seiendheit was necessary for making sense of a 
parallel shift Heidegger advances regarding the essence of truth: the essence of truth must be 
detached from or independent of what is true. Explaining this will frame my account of his 
reformulation of the essence of truth as “die Lichtung für das Sichverbergen” (“the clearing for 
self-concealing”) or “Lichtung des Sichverbergens” (“the clearing of self-concealing”) (which I 
condense as “the clearing for/of self-concealing”), together with a discussion of his conception of 
difference in Beiträge.364 Though these formulations are recognizably related to the a-lēthic 
formulation of truth found in “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit,” they in fact articulate a fundamental 
transformation. “The clearing for/of self-concealing” is a differential formulation, that is, it 
articulates the differential dynamic that constitutes the essence of truth. To be clear, Beiträge 
contains no overt assertion that the essence of truth is differential in nature. Rather, this position 
becomes evident by tracking the specifics of Heidegger’s treatment of the problematic of truth, 
which drive thought beyond the a-lēthic account into a differential account entailed in its logic 
and confirmed in his thinking of “the decisional essence [Entscheidungswesen] of beyng.”365 It 
                                                 
364 GA65 348/275, italics removed, and 329/261. The connection of this with beyng is again highlighted in the 
alternative formulation: the essence of truth is “die lichtende Verbergung des Seyns” (“the clearing concealment of 
beyng”) (GA 380/300). 
365 GA65 455/359, italics removed. Heidegger’s movement toward an account in which a differential operation is at 
the heart of beyng as event is verified by statements regarding difference in Das Ereignis, composed in 1941-42. 
GA71: Das Ereignis (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2009); English: The Event, trans. Richard Rojcewicz 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana Univ. Press, 2013). 
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seems to me that Beiträge is richer in this respect than its author likely recognized. Yet despite 
the major development that the differential conception of truth in Beiträge constitutes in 
Heidegger’s program, I take Beiträge to lack a satisfactorily explicit elaboration of how originary 
difference originates the a-lēthic structures, even though the differential concept of truth is 
poised to do just that. Thus, I offer a proposal as to how Heidegger’s concept might be developed 
in this way. One consequence of this account of the essence of truth and, subsequently, the event, 
that I will only partially address here, is that it provides a basis for rethinking the nature of 
worlds of beings. This is because the processes involved in the manifestation of worlds of beings 
are originated by the dynamics of the event. The analysis of these processes entails that the 
beings grounded upon them are of a very different nature than in the pictures provided by the 
tradition of metaphysics. 
  
2.2.1: The Originary Grounding of Heidegger’s A-lēthic Framework: The Essence of Truth as the 
Clearing for/of Self-Concealing 
 
The core discussion of the essence of truth in Beiträge opens by posing an alternative 
formulation of the question of truth as one “about the truth of the truth.”366 Heidegger is well 
aware this is likely to draw charges of circularity or “vacuity.”367 It escapes this because “truth” 
is used in two different senses, one of which signifies the ground or essence of the other. 
Heidegger’s distinction between these two senses aligns his analysis of truth with the shifts I 
have already discussed (Sein/Seyn; Leitfrage/Grundfrage). “Truth,” here, signifies on the one 
                                                 
366 GA65 327/359: “nach der Wahrheit der Wahrheit.” The core discussion of truth in Beiträge is found in §§ 204-
237 or division V, part C: Das Wesen der Wahrheit. 
367 GA65 327/259. 
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hand “die Wahrheit selbst” (“truth itself”) and on the other “das Wahre” (“what is true”).368 By 
“what is true” Heidegger means the world of disclosed beings or meaning, the domain of the 
“Da,” or the “Entwurfsbereichs” (“domain of projection”).369 “Truth itself” is prior to what is 
true on the diagenic axis and is the essence of truth or the ground enabling what is true to be or 
come to presence. In other words, truth itself “is the original [ursprüngliche] truth of beyng 
(event).”370 The question of the truth of the truth inquires into truth itself, not what is true. Thus, 
we are no longer asking about the domain of projection itself as, for instance, in Sein und Zeit, 
where the existential analytic operated within the bounds of the horizon of temporality 
constituted by Dasein as thrown projection. Rather, “what counts here is the projection [den 
Wurf] of the very domain of projection [Entwurfsbereichs].”371 
 For Heidegger, the immediate upshot is that truth – that is, truth itself – is “definitively 
detached [abgelöst] from all beings.”372 Stated more poetically, “truth is the great disdainer of all 
that is ‘true.’”373 Truth itself is an operation of the event prior to and independent of that which it 
enables to become manifest. This is a structural priority, that is, a priority on the axis of ground.  
This independence is, again, one-directional, for the manifestation of what is true is dependent 
upon truth itself. Conceptually separating these casts the disassociation of beyng from beings in 
terms of the problematic of truth. It is evident why Heidegger would want to make this rather 
striking move: if to think being on the basis of a relation to beings produces an account that 
remains metaphysical, and truth is an essential dimension or process of beyng itself, then truth 
                                                 
368 GA65 345/273. 
369 GA65 327/259. 
370 GA65 329/261. 
371 GA65 327/259, my italics. 
372 GA65 329/261. 
373 GA65 331/262, italics removed. 
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itself must be accounted for independently of any relation it has to beings, lest the account of it 
remain metaphysical or re-inscribe beyng with metaphysical content. 
Let us briefly reconstruct a line of reasoning in the text that supports this detachment of 
the essence of truth from what is true. It is drawn primarily from Heidegger’s analysis of 
“Offenheit” (“openness”) in Beiträge §204-207 and employs some conceptual language absent 
from “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit.” Heidegger initially situates this analysis in a critique of the 
confusion of truth with its derivative form, “Richtigkeit” (“correctness”).374 Correctness operates 
on the level of a disclosed world of beings or meaning. Schematically, correctness can be taken 
as a syngenic equivalent to such a world, cast in a traditional, representational model of truth. In 
contrast, on the diagenic axis, correctness is consequent upon truth’s essential structure of 
openness. Since openness is the ground enabling truth as correctness, truth as correctness always 
bears inherent reference to openness. Now, if we aim to give an account of openness itself – as 
part of our account of the essence of truth – it is tempting to do so in terms of its relation to 
correctness, that is, to understand openness “as a condition” for correctness.375 However, this 
would replicate the metaphysical folly of the Leitfrage and its orientation to Seiendheit. Instead, 
Heidegger recognizes that if openness is an ontological structure diagenically antecedent to 
correctness, and if correctness is thus produced only diagenically consequent upon openness, 
then openness is not dependent upon any relation it has to its consequent. Openness could be cast 
as a condition only if misunderstood on the basis of its relation to correctness, such that openness 
would be conditioned by correctness. Heidegger’s position, rather, is that openness must be 
articulated independently. Heidegger begins to offer an account of this independence on the basis 
                                                 
374 GA65 327/259, italics removed. 
375 GA65 328/260. 
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of what he calls “das wesentliche Ausmaß” (“the essential extent”) of truth.376 Here, structurally 
prior (i.e., prior on the axis of ground) to the breaching or inception of openness, there is no 
extended dimension whatsoever. The essential extent of truth is the originary clearing or 
breaching of a place or an extended dimension, yet undetermined with respect to any finite 
world.377 Openness is this cleared realm or “amidst” in which beings come to stand.378 As 
Heidegger writes: “the essential extent itself determines the ‘place’ (time-space) of openness: the 
cleared ‘amidst’ of beings.”379 We should recall that concealment plays a key role in the 
origination of the essential extent of openness, which I will return to shortly. In part, then, truth 
itself consists in these essential structures and processes, which are the ground enabling the 
origination of any world of beings (and, thus, correctness), but which are not themselves 
determined on the basis of any relation they have to those beings (i.e., not conditioned by 
beings). 
The decisive point is that since truth’s essential structures are the ground enabling the 
determination of any world of beings, beings are dependent on truth itself but truth itself is not 
dependent on beings, i.e., what is true. There is, again, a one-directional dependence. Truth itself 
must be thought as independent or “detached” from any relation to beings. Daniela Vallega-Neu 
puts the point nicely in the register of beyng and its lēthic dimension as follows: “there is no 
immediate relation between be-ing [Seyn] as enowning withdrawal and beings, even if a being 
shelters the truth of be-ing [Seyn]. …Why not? Because the essential swaying [Wesen] of be-ing 
                                                 
376 GA65 329/261. 
377 It would be mistaken to take this to mean truth is originally infinite. There is no infinite–finite dichotomy at play 
here, according to which truth could fall on the side opposed to the finite. Rather, the originary clearing or breaching 
of openness arises from the differential operation constituting the essence of truth, where that differential operation 
is precisely the mechanism of the event’s self-coagulation or intensification, distension, and elaboration in the more 
derivative a-lēthic structures of truth. 
378 GA65 329/261. 
379 GA65 329/261. 
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[Seyn] occurs in (but not only in) the ‘not’ of beings, because the withdrawal of be-ing [Seyn] is 
precisely what withdraws in the concealing-sheltering [verbergen] of truth.”380 
The danger, it seems, is that this independence of truth (and for that matter of beyng) 
from beings might mean Heidegger reinstates a metaphysical transcendence into his ontology, 
that is, a vertical arrangement of different levels of reality.381 I don’t think he does.382 I would 
like to suggest truth itself, while structurally prior to worlds of beings, is simultaneously 
immanent to them, while enabling them to be. By “immanent” here, I do not mean that truth 
itself is on the same syngenic or equiprimordial plane of ground as worlds of beings, which 
would render Heidegger’s ontology a thoroughly “flat ontology.”383 Rather, I mean truth itself 
(as the truth of the event) is implicated within beings or worlds of beings, without any real 
distinction (Descartes) between them and without positing any hierarchy of substantialized 
planes of reality that would make truth or the event transcendent to this plane. This renders 
Heidegger’s ontology a “curved” ontology. He nicely allegorizes the immanence of truth’s 
dimension of openness, for instance, as follows: 
 
The open realm, which conceals itself at the same time that beings come to stand 
in it…, is …something like an inner recess [hohle Mitte], e.g., that of a jug. Yet 
… the inner recess is not just a haphazard emptiness which arises purely on 
account of the surrounding walls and which happens not to be full of ‘things.’ It is 
just the opposite: the inner recess itself is what determines, shapes, and bears the 
walling action of the walls and of their surfaces. The walls and surfaces are 
merely what is radiated out by that original open realm which allows its openness 
to come into play by summoning up, round about itself and toward itself, such-
                                                 
380 HCP 112. 
381 See GA65 §152. For another short discussion on the non-transcendent nature of beyng, see Walter Brogan, “Da-
sein and the Leap of Being,” in Companion to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, eds. Charles E. Scott, 
Susan M. Schoenbohm, Daniella Vallega-Neu, and Alejandro Vallega (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 2001), 176-178. I abbreviate this volume as CHCP. 
382 In fact, Heidegger argues the concept of transcendence belongs to the derivative configuration of truth as 
correctness and of beings as objectively present (See GA65 §7 and §227). 
383 Cf. Manuel DeLanda, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy (London: Continuum, 2002). 
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and-such walls (the particular form of the vessel). That is how the essential 
occurrence of the open realm radiates back from and in the embracing walls.384 
 
 
This allegory offers a way to reconcile the independence of truth itself with Heidegger’s 
commitment that neither truth nor beyng is metaphysically transcendent. For Heidegger the 
essence of truth is not dependent upon any relation to beings, while remaining immanent to 
them. From the standpoint of beings, we can understand the openness of truth as structurally 
prior on the diagenic axis, and yet as an immanent structure through which the singular, finite 
contours of their being are determined and given the space to be differentiated from one another: 
“Truth, as the event of what is true, is the abyssal fissure [abgründige Zerklüftung] in which 
beings are divided [zur Entzweiung kommt] and must stand in the strife.”385 Truth itself, though, 
does not arise on account of beings. The openness of truth is a structure of the essence of truth; 
that is, it is a structure of the event as it occurs in and through truth.386 
Here, a few outlines of the structure of the event can be discerned. The openness of truth 
is not dependent upon any relation with beings. It is an aspect of the event that originates worlds 
of beings, such that beings cannot be without them. Beyng as event “summons up” beings, 
“round about itself and toward itself,” in the sense that beings bear a structural reference to the 
event which constitutes their ground, enables their manifestation, differentiation, temporality, 
and spatiality. Yet the event in its own right does not bear a constitutive structural reference to 
beings that would make it dependent upon them. Clarifying this is essential to a clear account of 
Heidegger’s approach to the core topic of Beiträge and other post-Kehre texts: working out the 
evental nature of beyng. 
                                                 
384 GA65 338-339/268. 
385 GA65 331/263. 
386 It would be an interesting project to compare this with Spinoza’s distinction between Natura naturans and 
Natura naturata (E1P29S). 
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 What, then, are we to make of the formulation of the essence of truth as the clearing 
for/of self-concealing? To explain this, Heidegger follows the question of ground, driving 
thought into a terrain more originary than that articulated by the a-lēthic account. If the major 
dimensions of the a-lēthic account are originary openness (unconcealment, disclosedness) and 
concealment (closedness, withdrawal), which co-determine each other and operate in a dynamic 
that, while independent of any relation to beings, enables any world of beings to become 
manifest, the question Heidegger raises is: whence and wherefore concealment and openness? 
That is, what is the origin of and reason explaining these two primordial moments of the 
essential structure of truth? This question marks a major development in Heidegger’s ontology. 
It is important to point out that Heidegger poses this questions as: “whence and wherefore 
concealment and unconcealment?” (“woher und weshalb Verbergung und Entbergung?”).387 
Though he uses the term “Entbergung” here, he quickly makes it clear that the question at hand 
does not take this in the derivative sense of the unconcealment of beings, nor even as the more 
originary “openness of beings as a whole”; it is to be understood in its essence, as “the openness 
of self-concealing (being),” that is, the openness of the essence of truth.388 This crucial question 
about the origin of the a-lēthic structures is easily overlooked. It is posed parenthetically in §207 
and, though Heidegger returns to the task it poses in a number of places, the question itself is not 
emphasized prominently in the text elsewhere. However, it is key for making sense of the 
distinction drawn in Beiträge between truth as ἀλήθεια and truth as clearing for/of self-
concealing: as Heidegger writes, “truth as the clearing for self-concealing is… an essentially 
different projection (Entwurf) than is ἀλήθεια.”389 Of central concern, he argues, is that the 
interpretation of concealment in terms of the a-lēthic framework is ultimately insufficient: “Ἀ-
                                                 
387 GA65 330/261. 
388 GA65 335/266. 
389 GA65 350/277. For more, see GA65 §226. 
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λήθεια means un-concealment and the un-concealed itself,” but in that case “concealment itself 
is experienced only as what is to be cleared away, what is to be removed (a-).”390 Arguably, this 
definition of ἀλήθεια does not express the richest account of the concept in his work.391 Yet the 
point is that accounting for the structures of truth within the a-lēthic framework misses the 
important question: it “does not address concealment itself and its ground.”392 It consequently 
fails to rethink these structures within the framework of the Grundfrage, that is, on the basis of 
their immanent ground in the event rather than their role as ground for worlds of beings. 
Heidegger’s point is not simply that concealment is neglected when we formulate truth as ἀ-
λήθεια, and that we must rectify this neglect. Rather, it is that we must press beyond concealment 
on the diagenic axis, to a ground from out of which concealment and openness are themselves 
originated. Casting the essence of truth in terms of the a-lēthic framework fails to do this. The 
difference between the a-lēthic account of the essence of truth and the account as clearing for/of 
self-concealing is established precisely in the moment of asking about the originary ground of 
concealment and openness.393 It is important to be clear what this does not mean: it does not 
mean Heidegger disavows his earlier accounts of truth as ἀλήθεια. Rather, it means the a-lēthic 
framework must be understood as grounded by a more originary essence of truth: the clearing 
for/of self-concealing. 
In “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit,” the withdrawing action of originary concealment both 
opened up the primal opening (Da-sein as the ground via which beings are disclosed) and refused 
the possibility of total disclosure, thus enabling the finite disclosure of a world of beings. In this 
arrangement concealment is arguably more originary than openness on the diagenic axis. 
                                                 
390 GA65 350/277. 
391 An instance of a richer account, ἀλήθεια is frequently understood as the structure of openness serving as part of 
the ground for unconcealment, as I have discussed. 
392 GA65 350/277, my italics. 
393 GA65 350/277. 
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Moreover, these were the most primordial ontological structures thinkable – they formed the 
limit or horizon of thought’s ability to articulate the nature of truth, ground, and being. 
In Beiträge, after disassociating the structures of originary concealment and openness 
from beings and affirming the consequent necessity of rethinking them, their basic arrangement 
is reconfigured via the question of the ground whence they are originated. Here, Heidegger 
rotates them onto a syngenic, equiprimordial axis with respect to one another, then questions 
along the diagenic axis into the ground enabling the origination of these structures themselves. 
This is structurally akin to Hegel reframing Kant by arguing that the very differentiation between 
the phenomenal and noumenal is itself a moment in the absolute. 
We gain a sense of how radical this question is by isolating one dimension for a moment 
and asking: whence and wherefore concealment? What is the genesis or origin of concealment 
itself? Such a question was unthinkable via the conceptual structure available in “Vom Wesen 
der Wahrheit” because its problematic horizon was still determined by thinking the essence of 
truth as that which enables the manifestation of beings. To ask “whence and wherefore 
concealment?” is to investigate the origination of the most originary ontological structure 
thinkable prior to this point. 
Nevertheless, Heidegger’s question is not just about concealment. Concealment and 
openness are correlative; they always go hand in hand. Concealment is a withdrawal from or 
refusal of openness and openness is a breaching of concealment. Like the apparent “two sides” of 
a Möbius strip, they present themselves as irreconcilably conflictual or in strife, yet an 
“ursprüngliche Innigkeit” (“original intimacy”) must hold for them to correlate at all.394 
Otherwise, there would be a real or substantial difference between them preventing any relation 
whatsoever. Thus, the question, whence and wherefore concealment and openness? inquires into 
                                                 
394 Möbius strips have only one side. GA65 345/275. 
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the intimacy that itself differentiates and generates these two, into the very fabric that distends 
into them, or into the curve that traverses the difference between them. This question asks how 
these very structures are originated. 
The formulation “the clearing for/of self-concealing” is meant to articulate the answer to 
this question. How, then, are we to understand this such that it grounds and originates 
concealment and openness? The key, I think, is in Heidegger’s concept of decision, difference, or 
self-differentiation. It is important to emphasis here that how one understands Heidegger’s 
account of the essence of truth directly impacts how one understands his account of the event. 
Understanding the essence of truth to be most fundamentally a-lēthic leads to an account of the 
evental nature of beyng in terms of the a-lēthic framework. That, however, is not the full picture. 
As I shall continue to argue, Heidegger’s account of the essence of truth in Beiträge moves to a 
ground more originary than that of the a-lēthic framework. Namely, it moves to an account of 
originary difference constituting the essence of truth, the dynamics of which originate the a-
lēthic structures. Thus, a differential account of the essence of truth establishes a more originary 
account of the evental nature of beyng. I turn to this now. 
 
2.2.2: Difference and Decision 
 
As mentioned, Heidegger’s account of difference undergoes a major reconfiguration in Beiträge. 
Under the rubrics of Unterschied and Entscheidung, we see a concept of originary difference or 
self-differentiation being developed, which constitutes an essential operation of beyng as event. 
This idea can be developed via two more local tacks: one oriented by the problematic of the 
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“ontological difference” (ontologischen Differenz) and the other by the problematic of historical 
“decision” (Entscheidung).395 
 
2.2.3: The Ontological Difference 
 
The ontological difference is the difference between being and beings so crucial to Heidegger’s 
earlier work. In Beiträge, this is seen as a transitional concept to be replaced by an account of the 
more originary ground enabling that difference to be conceived at all. This is necessary because 
the concept of the ontological difference is insufficient for the program of inquiring into the 
nature of beyng as event – it remains fundamentally structured by the problematic of the 
Leitfrage and thus carries the inscription of metaphysics. Namely, on the basis of the ontological 
difference between being and beings: 1) being is understood in a way codetermined by its 
counterpart – beings, 2) being is understood as the being of beings, and thus 3) the question of 
being is oriented by the question of the being of beings. In Heidegger’s words: “as necessary as 
the distinction [between being and beings] is and even if it must be thought in terms of the 
tradition in order to create a very first horizon for the question of beyng, it is just as fatal – since 
it indeed arises precisely from an inquiry into beings as such (beingness).”396 
Yet the concept of the ontological difference is not simply discarded. Rather, “The 
question of beyng, as the basic question [Grundfrage],” is “driven immediately to the question of 
the origin [Ursprung] of the ‘ontological difference.’”397 Through this second question 
Heidegger arrives at a more originary conception of difference that operates at the heart of the 
                                                 
395 GA65 465/366 and 87/70. 
396 GA65 250/197. Or again: “The ‘ontological difference’ is a passageway which becomes unavoidable if the 
necessity of asking the basic question is to be made visible on the basis of the guiding question” (GA65 467/367). 
397 GA65 465/366. 
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essence of truth and, in turn, beyng as event. The conceptual difference between being and 
beings is possible, Heidegger argues, only because beyng is of such a nature that it “sets itself off 
in relief [abhebt] over and against beings.”398 In other words, this setting itself off in relief is the 
mechanism by which beyng is structurally able to crystallize in the conception of the difference 
between being and beings. Yet it “can originate only in the essential occurrence [Wesung] of 
beyng.”399 Why, then, is beyng such that it sets itself off in relief over and against beings? In 
Heidegger’s words, it is because: 
 
Beyng, as the “between” which clears, moves itself into this clearing and 
therefore, though never recognized or surmised as appropriation [Ereignung], is 
for representational thinking something generally differentiable, and 
differentiated, as being. This applies already to the way beyng essentially occurs 
in the first beginning, namely, as φύσις, which comes forth as ἀλήθεια but which 
is at once forgotten in favor of beings (ones that are perceivable only as such only 
in virtue of ἀλήθεια) and is reinterpreted as a being that is most eminently, i.e., as 
a mode of being and specifically the highest mode.400 
 
 
In other words, because beyng brings itself to determination (in part) in the operation of 
truth, the possibility is established for thought to account for beyng in terms of that determinate 
dimension, and to distinguish that dimension in terms of a co-determinate differential relation 
with beings. Certainly, one might deny (as Heidegger does in Sein und Zeit) that being, thus 
differentiated from beings, must be a being that is most eminently. Yet the ontological difference 
remains structurally determined as a difference between two “things.” Framing the problematic 
of beyng in terms of the ontological difference ‘captures’ beyng in this differential relation with 
beings. It casts beyng in terms of a difference from beings. The crucial point Heidegger 
recognizes in Beiträge is that this difference points to a character of beyng more originary than 
                                                 
398 GA65 465/366. 
399 GA65 465/366. 
400 GA65 466/366-367. 
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itself. The ontological mechanism required for determining the ontological difference at all must 
be prior to that difference. For Heidegger, here, the ontological difference is exhibited as “the 
merely metaphysically conceived, and thus already misinterpreted, foreground [Vordergrund] of 
a de-cision [Ent-scheidung] which is beyng itself.”401 The clearing operation – to which we first 
gain access as the essence of truth – belongs to the essential occurrence of beyng as event. This 
clearing, furthermore, operates precisely as a de-cision or differentiation – which is not a 
difference between two beings, but, rather, is difference itself. That is, this clearing is an 
operation of self-differentiation that originates things that have differences between them, but is 
not to be understood on the basis of those things or their differences. It is more originary. In part, 
the heart of beyng as event is self-differentiation. “The event of ap-propriation includes the de-
cision: the fact that freedom, as the abyssal ground, lets arise a need [Not] out of which, as the 
excess of the ground, the gods and humans come forth in their separateness.”402 This originary 
self-differential operation of the event Heidegger calls the “Entscheidungswesen des Seyns” 
(“decisional essence of beyng”).403 
 
                                                 
401 GA65 474/373. 
402 GA65 470/370. 
403 GA65 455/359. Beistegui’s Truth and Genesis: Philosophy as Differential Ontology provides one of the most 
sustained examinations of difference in Beiträge available. He rightly recognizes that difference plays a key role in 
Heidegger’s shift to thinking beyng as Ereignis; and he shows this has important implications for how we 
understand Heidegger’s ontology, for which previous scholarship did not fully account. However, his analysis falls 
short of registering the extent to which Heidegger rethinks difference: it fails to register the move to a concept of 
difference more originary than the ontological difference. Just when his analysis is on the brink of Heidegger’s 
concept of primal difference and the logic of self-differentiation entailed by it, he slips back into the vestiges of the 
framework of Seiendheit. In Beistegui’s words: for Heidegger, “the sense of being… with which being comes to be 
identified, is that of difference. But… the sense of difference itself has shifted, and radically so, freeing being of 
ontotautology altogether. By difference, we must now understand the originary event in the unfolding of which the 
world takes place. The sense of being that is at issue here is entirely contained within the space of the ontological 
difference” (Beistegui, Truth and Genesis 109).  The point is made again: “Being is only in and through its 
difference from beings” (ibid. 111). Note that in these passages Beistegui uses “being” to name the central theme of 
Heidegger’s inquiry; he is not using the term in the technical sense described in Section 2.1.1 and distinguished from 
“beyng.” 
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2.2.4: Decision 
 
Heidegger articulates this self-differentiation or clearing earlier in Beiträge (division 1: Prospect) 
as the ground of historical “decision” (Entscheidung) or “de-cision” (Ent-scheidung).404 Again, 
decision is meant here in the sense of separating or, as Vallega-Neu describes, “partedness” or 
“parting.”405 As should be clear, it is in no way “a human act,” “choice, resolution, the preferring 
of one thing and the setting aside of another.”406 Such a mistake would fall under “the 
‘existentiell’ misinterpretation of ‘decision,’” which is indeed an “existentiell-anthropological” 
misinterpretation: it takes the human being as a subject making this decision, whereas for 
Heidegger the human being is subject to or structured by the dimensions of truth generated in 
originary decision.407 It should be noted that, certainly, the notion of decision comes into play 
heavily in Heidegger’s account of history and the role of the human being in establishing another 
beginning for thought (see GA65 §43-49). But those issues address consequent structures based 
on this antecedent, more primal ground: “What is here called de-cision… proceeds to the 
innermost center of the essence of beyng itself.”408 William McNeill nicely calls this the “event 
of differentiation.”409 Vallega-Neu understands it as “a differencing which occurs within the 
essential swaying (Wesen) of be-ing (Seyn).”410 Decision should be understood in the current 
context as this separating, differentiation, or differencing occurring in the essence of truth, that 
is, it should be understood as the event insofar as it occurs in and through the essence of truth. As 
Heidegger writes: “de-cision refers to the sundering [Auseinandertreten] itself, which separates 
                                                 
404 GA65 87/69. 
405 HCP 109. 
406 GA65 87/69. 
407 GA65 88, 87/70, my italics. 
408 GA65 88/70. 
409 William McNeill, “The Time of Contributions to Philosophy,” in CHCP, 138. 
410 HCP 111. 
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[scheidet] and in separating lets come into play for the first time the ap-propriation [Er-eignung] 
of precisely this sundered open realm [Offenen] as the clearing for the self-concealing.”411 
Heidegger’s movement toward an account with a differential operation at the heart of 
beyng as event – as we see opened up in Beiträge by the problematic of truth – is verified by 
statements regarding difference in GA71 Das Ereignis, where he addresses “der Unterschied als 
das Sichunterscheiden (Ereignis)” [“the difference as self-differentiating (event)”].412 I cite the 
following passages to support this key point: 
 
 “Inasmuch as nothingness is beyng, beyng is essentially the difference (Unterschied) as 
the inceptually concealed and refusing departure (Ab-schied).”413 
 “The difference is a matter of the event (the resonating of the turning).”414 
 “The difference… which first allows beings to arise as beings, and separates (scheidet) 
them to themselves, is the ground of all separations (Scheidungen) in which beings can 
first ‘be’ these respective individuals.”415 
 “Beyng as the difference – essentially occurring as the departure (Abschied).”416 
 “The difference, as beyng itself, appropriates (er-eignet) the differentiation 
(Unterscheidung) in which at any time obedience is involved.”417 
 “The difference (Unterscheidung) as the essential occurrence of beyng itself, which 
differentiates itself (sich unterscheidet) and in that way lets beings arise in emergence 
                                                 
411 GA65 88/70. 
412 GA71 122/104. 
413 GA71 124/106. 
414 GA71 123/105. 
415 GA71 125/106, italics removed. 
416 GA71 126/107. 
417 GA71 126/108. 
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(Aufgang). The differentiation is inceptually the difference” (“Die Unterscheidung ist 
anfänglich der Unterschied”).418 
 “Without having experienced the truth of beyng as event, we will be unable to know the 
difference and, thereby, the differentiation.”419 
 “The difference, in which the differentiation essentially occurs, is the departure as the 
downgoing of the event into the beginning.”420 
 
The essence of beyng – the most originary element of the evental structure – is 
difference, or, avoiding the substantive, differentiation. To emphasize a couple of points I made 
earlier, this is not a difference relegated to marking a distinction between two “things.” Further, 
it is in no way dependent upon an identity prior to it, which it would differentiate (as, for 
instance, in the case of Aristotle’s specific difference, which can be marked only on the basis of 
the identity of a common genus). Consequently, this originary difference cannot be defined by 
derivative or external terms. Instead, it must be pure self-differentiation, that is, difference 
differing from itself. This is the operation of beyng as event by which it self-coagulates or 
intensifies, distends, and becomes elaborated in distinct structures and dynamics; that is, it is the 
origination of the “Da” expressed in the term “Da-sein.” Heidegger understands the concept of 
truth (along with those of ground and time-space) to articulate just this elaboration. 
Consequently, the essence of truth must be differential, that is, the clearing for/of self-concealing 
must be defined by a differential logic, part of which it articulates. Indeed, as I indicated, 
clearing is the decision or self-differentiation of difference. But what is this differential logic? 
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Furthermore, returning to my earlier question posed, how must it be, such that it originates the a-
lēthic structures of truth? 
 With this we run up against a limit of Heidegger’s ability to articulate his problematic. He 
claims that difference or self-differentiation must be the originary character of beyng as event. 
He articulates this in terms of evental structures originated by difference (truth, ground, time-
space). But he is unable to present explicitly a unified logic of difference explaining the 
origination of these structures, and thereby rigorously defining them. This, however, does not 
deny that such a logic underwrites them and constitutes their consistency. Indeed, it must. In 
what follows, I go beyond Heidegger’s text to develop a few moments of the logic of self-
differentiation that I understand to perform this function. I maintain that this logic is not only 
consistent with, but required by and entailed in Heidegger’s ontology. To be clear, by “logic” 
here, I do not mean the structure or formal relations of propositions, but the structure of beyng, 
how parts of that structure relate, and how some lead into others. The logic of difference is the 
dynamics of difference insofar as it constitutes and generates the evental structures of beyng. 
Such a logic might sound abstract, but I think it is actually quite straightforward. I also think it is 
able to explain the more derivative terms of Heidegger’s ontology without recourse to mysticism. 
 
2.2.5: The Originary, Differential Grounding of Concealment and Openness  
 
The essence of truth as the clearing for/of self-concealing is differential in the sense I have 
indicated. As I have said, Heidegger stops short of developing a full account of the operations 
through which this originary difference generates the a-lēthic structures. I nevertheless think the 
resources for doing so are present in Beiträge, even if its author did not recognize this. In the 
  180 
terms used earlier (Section 2.2.3), self-differentiation is the way beyng “moves itself into the 
clearing.” For reasons I shall explain shortly, I hold that this movement can be accurately 
described as a self-intensification or distension, although I am not aware of Heidegger using this 
language often. “The clearing for/of self-concealing” articulates this differential self-
intensification in the terms of the register of truth. In Heidegger’s words: “Inasmuch as truth 
essentially occurs, comes to be [wird], the event becomes [wird] truth. The event eventuates [das 
Ereignis ereignet], which means nothing else but that it and only it becomes truth, becomes that 
which belongs to the event, so that truth is precisely and essentially the truth of beyng.”421 
Openness and concealment are two structures in which the event elaborates itself. It is worth 
noting that since two key structural aspects of the relation between openness and concealment 
are their simultaneous strife and intimacy, any account of the origination of these structures 
should be able to account for these relations in a rigorous way. Though this is not the primary 
focus of the following account, it can serve as a partial gauge of its success. On the basis of 
Heidegger’s terms, I propose the following genetic account of concealment and openness. 
If beyng as event is originary difference or the differentiation of difference from itself, 
then derivative terms cannot be imported to describe this without first defining them in 
differential terms. The genesis of openness and concealment has to be explained in terms of 
originary difference, even if the structures of openness and concealment methodologically pre-
figure its logic. But how? Originary difference can differ only from itself. Yet precisely in so 
doing, a determination occurs, that is, a set of correlated structures are originated. On the one 
hand, there is what could be called the “field” of difference insofar as difference is differentiated 
from itself. What else could the a-lēthic structure of openness be at this most originary level but 
this field? On the other hand, a correlated structure must arise simultaneously. For it is difference 
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differing from itself that originates this field; difference originates this field by differentiating 
itself from it. Thus, this correlated structure is that of difference that differentiates itself from 
what it originates. What else could concealment here be but this “withdrawal” or “refusal” of 
difference from itself, the refusal of difference to be identical with itself and that which it 
originates?422 
Now, since originary differentiation does not occur in any ontologically prior medium but 
through difference itself, the aspects of difference that are differentiated – the field and the 
difference differing or withdrawing from that field – bear structural reference to one another. 
Both are constituted by precisely the same operation of difference and each has its determination 
by its contrast or difference from the other. Because these aspects are simultaneously constituted 
by their difference from and structural reference to one another, I take them to constitute a field 
of ontological tension. That is, the differentiation of difference from itself entails the generation 
of an immanent field of tension, i.e., the self-intensification of beyng. But since difference and 
difference alone accomplishes this, it equally can be called self-distension, or just distension. 
 Bringing this together, I propose the following differential, genetic definition of the 
essence of truth. Concealment and openness are or rather essentially occur (west) in their 
differentiation from one another. As a point is extended into a line, openness is breached or 
generated as the distention of differentiation differing from itself. As the limits of a line recede, 
drawing it out, difference refuses to be that which it generates; concealment is or essentially 
occurs as this refusal, generated as differentiation differing from itself. 
                                                 
422 I do not use “refusal” here in a voluntarist sense. In the context of the relation of concealment to openness, I use 
“refusal” to describe the fact that what withdraws from openness is inherently not open: it “refuses” to be 
assimilated to openness. I argue that this situation should be explained in terms of originary difference. In that 
context, “refusal” should be understood to describe the movement of difference insofar as difference differs or repels 
from itself (if it did not do this, it would not be originary difference of the type Heidegger suggests at all). 
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I will clarify this logic or ontological dynamic by highlighting each aspect of the 
formulation of the essence of truth as the clearing for/of self-concealing: 1) the clearing for/of 
self-concealing, 2) the clearing for/of self-concealing, 3) the clearing for/of self-concealing, and 
4) the clearing for/of self-concealing. 
First, the famous Lichtung or clearing for/of self-concealing is originary differentiation. 
It is a clearing in the sense of a distancing or a “sundering” (“Auseinandertreten”): as two 
passing ships are said to “clear” one another, concealment clears openness and openness clears 
concealment.423 Since this sundering originates and grounds the structures of openness and 
concealment, which in turn ground worlds of beings, this sundering cannot take place between 
two already established “things.” Clearing is an operation of self-differentiation prior to and 
originary of any such things and the differences between them. Clearing is difference differing 
from itself such that a sundering of openness and concealment is originated. Yet openness and 
concealment remain correlative, for this sundering or distancing is itself the breaching open of 
openness, the breaching of the “essential extent” (the most originary extended dimension or 
place) mentioned earlier. Clearing is the breaching of a space “between” or, rather, a distension 
that itself constitutes openness and concealment by constituting their difference. In this sense, 
with respect to concealment, for instance, Heidegger writes: “That a clearing might ground what 
is self-concealing – that is the meaning of the dictum that truth is primarily clearing-
concealing.”424 Here, the clearing for/of self-concealing cannot be one or the other, concealment 
or openness. As Heidegger points out, to think the essence of truth is to think that which 
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originates concealment and openness; namely, pure difference.425 This exhibits the fault in the 
common interpretation that the essence of truth (and in turn of the event) in Beiträge is self-
concealment.426 It is not. Such a mistake misses the critical question: whence and wherefore 
concealment and openness? Self-concealment is a moment of the evental dynamic. The essence 
of truth is difference differing from itself, self-distending in the manner of clearing for/of self-
concealing. 
Second, this dynamic of the essence of truth is clearing for self-concealing because 
differentiation both generates concealment and clears or sunders it from openness. Concealment 
owes its distinctness from openness to clearing (differentiation), without which it could not occur 
at all. That is, the differentiation of difference from itself enables concealment to occur – where 
concealment is difference’s refusal to be the openness or distention it generates – while that very 
operation of differentiation is also the sundering of concealment from openness. 
Third, this dynamic is a clearing of self-concealing because concealment itself takes part 
in generating the clearing of openness. Concealment plays a constitutive role in the originary 
determination of the structure of openness. That is, without concealment, the differentiation or 
clearing of concealment from openness could not occur. Openness could be granted no 
determinateness and no distinctness from concealment, i.e., it could not occur at all. 
Finally, the clearing for/of self-concealing involves self-concealing because it is 
differentiation itself that withdraws from its own clearing: concealment is the self-refusal enacted 
by differentiation. 
                                                 
425 It is worth pointing out that such difference is the Heideggerian version of what Meillassoux refers to as “hyper-
Chaos” in After Finitude. Likewise, the origination of the structures of truth articulates the origination of what 
Meillassoux refers to as “contingency.”  
426 Another version of the a-lēthic interpretation. 
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It is important to emphasize that openness and concealment must be originated 
simultaneously by the operation of difference differing from itself. That is, the same operation 
constitutes the two by constituting their difference. It cannot be the case that one is logically 
prior to the other, because each gains structural determination only in its correlation with the 
other. For the same reason, it also cannot be that they are ultimately discrete. In that case, they 
could have no correlation. Using my earlier geometrical imagery, that would amount to placing 
concealment at one end of a line and openness at the other, with the line marking their absolute 
divorce. Rather, the account of originary difference allows us to understand openness as the 
distension of difference differing from itself, i.e., in the position of the line itself, and 
concealment as the self-refusal simultaneously enacted by difference differing from itself, i.e., in 
the place of the receding limit by which the line is drawn out. 
On the basis of all this, I return to the problem of evaluation mentioned above. As a 
criterion of this differential account’s success, it should be able to ground what Heidegger calls 
the simultaneous strife and originary intimacy structurally characterizing the relation between 
openness and concealment and explain the logic of this relation with conceptual precision. I 
think it can. That which is in strife must be characterized by a simultaneous intimacy, since 
without intimacy there could be no relation. Likewise, that which is intimate must be 
characterized by a simultaneous strife, since it must be distinguished from that to which it is 
related (otherwise intimacy would simply be identity). The challenge is to provide an account of 
the simultaneous strife and intimacy of openness and concealment, rather than simply asserting it 
(as Heidegger sometimes seems to do). 
The intimacy of openness and concealment consists in each being grounded in and 
originated by precisely the same operation of originary difference: the differentiation of 
  185 
difference from itself. Here, difference differs from itself, simultaneously drawing itself out or 
breaching open openness and differing from or refusing to be that openness, i.e., originating 
concealment. Though sundered, openness and concealment each are constituted by the same 
differential operation and bear a structural reference to it.  
However, they are originated by that operation only insofar as it originates their 
difference. The strife of openness and concealment consists in the differentiation of difference 
from itself, insofar as this originates a clearing or sundering of each from the other whereby each 
gains structural determination. That is, this strife is the differentiation of difference from itself by 
which it simultaneously draws itself out (breaching openness) and withdraws from that openness 
(originating concealment). Moreover, openness and concealment each require the 
contradistinction this establishes from the other. Openness is structurally determined by its 
contrast with concealment and concealment by its contrast with openness. Their strife lies in this 
constitutive contradistinction and the differentiation by which it is originated.  
Yet this also means the structure of each bears constitutive reference to the other, both at 
the level of contradistinction and of originary difference. In this relation, intimacy is structurally 
implied in strife and strife in intimacy.  
As I believe this shows, the account of originary differentiation does in fact satisfy the 
evaluative criterion noted above: it explains the origination and logic of the strife and intimacy 
Heidegger claims belong to the essence of truth. Moreover, I take this account to imply that 
Heidegger’s terminology of strife and intimacy is one of ontological intensity. The differential 
logic at the heart of Heidegger’s understanding of beyng as event and the essence of truth, 
generating the determinateness required for anything to be, entails that his ontology is an 
intensive ontology. 
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2.2.6: A Recapitulation and Clarification of the Status of Originary Difference 
 
As indicated earlier, the problematic of the essence of truth is crucial in Beiträge because it is the 
problematic preliminary to that of beyng as event. That is, thought first gains a properly 
grounded stance within the event by way of the problematic of truth. We can now specify that it 
accomplishes this by opening up access to the logic of originary differentiation articulating both 
the essence of truth and the structure and dynamics of the “decisional essence of beyng,” i.e., the 
event. Here, “the clearing for/of self-concealing” articulates originary differentiation and its logic 
in the register of truth. It allows us to unfold this in the terms of its problematic: clearing, 
concealing, openness, and so on. And exactly this provides a foothold in this logic. Even if 
Heidegger insufficiently elaborates originary differentiation, it is, in his account, prior on the 
diagenic axis to the a-lēthic structures. Thus, Heidegger’s account of the essence of truth in 
Beiträge is most primally differential, not a-lēthic. Interpretations of truth in Beiträge that 
remain within the a-lēthic framework are unable to access the differential logic and consequently 
botch Heidegger’s account of the event. 
The notion of originary difference might understandably seem abstract. Its status, and that 
of its logic, can be clarified briefly by recalling that, in Beiträge, the problematic of the essence 
of truth is directly related not only to that of the event, but also to those of ground and time-
space. Truth, ground, and time-space are three key registers in terms of which the evental nature 
of beyng is worked out.427 Each of these three coincides with the others in important ways. But 
they are not reducible to each other. Rather, Heidegger elaborates an account of the event by 
articulating it in the terms of these different registers. 
                                                 
427 For Heidegger’s discussion of ground and time-space in Beiträge, see especially §238-242. 
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In this way, differentiation is not indexed solely to the register of truth. The structures 
and dynamics of time-space and ground are originated by the differential operations of the event 
as well. As in the account of truth, those of time-space and ground articulate the evental nature of 
beyng and its differential logic in the terms of their respective registers. Thus, we must not 
mistakenly take originary difference to be within time or space, since it is originary of time-
space. Likewise, it is not consequent upon the structures of ground, because it is originary of 
those very structures. It would be equally inaccurate to take difference as eternal or as 
transcendent to the domain of ground. No dichotomies according to which difference could fall 
on the side of the transcendent are at play here. Rather, time-space and the structures of ground 
arise from the operation of originary differentiation, which is immanent to them and which is 
precisely the mechanism of the event by which it self-intensifies, distends, and becomes 
elaborated. I turn to these topics in Chapter III. 
 
2.2.7: The Event 
 
As I have argued, the problematic of the essence of truth has provided a first properly grounded 
stance for thought in the evental structure of beyng, that is, in the logic of difference at the heart 
of the event, which is the logic whereby further evental structures are generated. Beyng is the 
event, that is, it is the differentiation of difference from itself together with the ontological 
structures of the essence of truth, ground, and time-space thereby generated. The origination of 
these structures is the generation of the Da. Da-sein is the event’s self-determination in those 
structures. 
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The stance provided by the problematic of truth enables further elaboration and definition 
of the structure of the event in the terminology of the event itself. As modulations of “Ereignis” 
the following terms are of particular importance: “Er-eignis” (appropriating-event) or “Er-
eignung” (appropriating eventuation or ap-propriation) and “Enteignis” (expropriation) or 
cognates thereof. These terms must be defined by the differential logic constituting the essence 
of beyng as event (Ereignis). In part they articulate differently the same movement of 
intensification and distension seen in terms of the clearing for/of self-concealing. But 
Heidegger’s properly evental terminology entails further elaborations of the logic of difference, 
aspects of which are irreducible to the framework of truth. 
In order to define these terms, it is first necessary to make a few remarks about the role of 
Enteignis in Beiträge. In other texts from Heidegger’s later period (the 1969 Zur Sache des 
Denkens, for example) the word “Enteignis” appears as an essential correlate of “Ereignis.” In 
Beiträge the term does not appear in its substantive form, but only the cognate “enteignet,” and 
that quite rarely.428 Rojcewicz and Vallega-Neu translate “enteignet” as “disappropriated.” 
Stambaugh translates “Enteignis” as “expropriation,” which would suggest rendering “enteignet” 
as “expropriated.” I prefer the latter translation because it better conveys the “out of” sense of the 
German prefix “ent-” and because the alternative, “disappropriation,” more strongly suggests 
that what it describes was previously proper, belonged as proper, or was appropriated, which 
would make Enteignis secondary to or derivative of Ereignis (or more accurately, of Er-eignis). 
In Heidegger’s account, appropriation and expropriation are equiprimordial. Now, in Beiträge, 
both uses of “enteignet” describe the forgetting or abandonment of beyng characteristic of 
human existence. Yet, this human or historical errancy is generated on the basis of or as a 
derivative configuration of the ontological distention constituted by appropriation and 
                                                 
428 It is found once at the end of §57 and again at the end of §118. 
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expropriation. As I will argue in Section 2.2.8, this distension entails a distortion, which 
Heidegger addresses in terms of the “Unwesen” or “distorted essence” of truth. It is this 
Unwesen that leads to human or historical errancy. Despite the rarity of the term “enteignet” in 
Beiträge, the elaboration of the structure of the event I offer here gives it a central role. This is 
justified because the structure Heidegger elsewhere describes in terms of “Enteignis” is very 
much present in Beiträge, but simply addressed in other terms: along with Unwesen are, for 
example, “Verlassenheit ” (abandonment), “Weg-sein” (being-away), “Befremdung” 
(alienation), “Un-grund” (distorted ground), self-concealing, etc.429 Using “Enteignis” or 
“expropriation” here allows me to keep focus on the most originary sense of what these describe 
and save treating each in particular for another time. Here, expropriation designates constitutive 
alienation from propriety, which I will explain momentarily. 
 Beyng is Ereignis, the event, which at the most originary level occurs essentially (west) 
as the differentiation of difference from itself. As seen in terms of the essence of truth, the logic 
of difference entails the event’s self-determination or intensification, which is precisely the 
origination of the Da, the structural distension captured in the term “Da-sein.” In the language of 
the event, Heidegger articulates this intensification as an appropriation accomplished by beyng: 
“the ‘there’ is appropriated [ereignet] by beyng itself.”430 In contrast to earlier texts like “Vom 
Wesen der Wahrheit,” which understood Da-sein in relation to human existence, in Beiträge 
“Da-sein moves (though not localizable anywhere) away from the relation to the human being 
and reveals itself as the ‘between’ [Zwischen] which is developed [entfaltet] by beyng itself so as 
to become the open domain for beings that protrude into it.”431 For Heidegger, the intensification 
of the event or origination of the Da is an appropriation, and one occurring at the most originary 
                                                 
429 GA65 310/246 italics removed, 324/256, 347/275, and 380/300.  
430 GA65 299/236. 
431 GA65 299/236. 
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level of beyng. But what sense can there be in calling this an appropriation? According to 
Heidegger, what occurs is the origination of “das Eigentum” or the “domain of what is proper,” 
which I will suggest is a structure of propriety and the most basic form of ontological 
determinateness described in his system. As he puts it, 
 
Da-sein is the axis [Wendungspunkt] in the turning of the event, the self-opening 
center of the counterplay between call [Zuruf] and belonging [Zugehörigkeit]. Da-
sein is the ‘domain of what is proper’ [Eigentum], understood in analogy with the 
‘domain of a prince’ [Fürsten-tum], the sovereign center of the appropriating 
eventuation [Er-eignung] as the assignment [Zueignung], of the ones who belong 
[Zu-gehörigen], to the event and at the same time to themselves: becoming a 
self.432 
 
 
Clearly, we should not confuse “becoming a self” at this level with the origination of a 
cogito, human self, or any other self ascribed to a being (“Selfhood is more originary than any I 
or thou or we”).433 For what is at stake is the generation of the ontological structures without 
which beings could not be at all, the origination of finitude. Appropriation is an operation of the 
event whereby an ontological structure of propriety is originated, a structure such that all that 
falls within its range (des Zu-gehörigen) bears an assignment (Zueignung) to that structure or, in 
the case of that structure itself, to that whereby propriety is originated. And this is all that 
“becoming a self” refers to at this level. Though Heidegger is vague about what he means by 
“Zueignung,” I take this to designate a structural reference constitutive of all that falls within the 
range of propriety, including the basic structure of propriety itself. To be clear, then, propriety at 
this most originary level is an ontological structure such that all its aspects are constituted by 
structural reference to some other aspect, namely, to that ontological operation whereby they are 
originated. 
                                                 
432 GA65 311/246-247, italics removed. 
433 GA65 320/253, italics removed. 
  191 
Similarly, all that is secondarily constituted on the basis of propriety (beings) bears such 
reference both to that structure and, in turn to the ontological operation of appropriation. To help 
make sense of this last point, it can be translated into the terminology of truth by recalling that 
beings like humans, pine trees, and rocks are constituted on the basis of openness (together with 
concealment), while openness is constituted on the basis of the differential operation of clearing. 
Thus, such beings bear constitutive structural reference both to openness and in turn to the 
differential operation of clearing. Here we see the elaboration of a diagenic axis. 
For the sake of clarity, it will be useful to answer the following question: at the most 
fundamental level of the event, what is required for there to be a domain of propriety at all? First 
there must be the origination of a structural distension of the event. Without a distension 
differentiating one part from another, there could be no constitutive reference, but only simple 
identity, or, since Heidegger’s ontology does not maintain an ontological priority of identity, 
utter indeterminateness or lack of finitude. Second, or rather equiprimordially, for there to be a 
domain of propriety, the parts differentiated in distension must bear constitutive reference to the 
operation of the event whereby distension is enabled to occur, i.e., whereby appropriation is 
accomplished. These two characteristics – distension and constitutive reference – are genetically 
inseparable and articulate the most basic determinateness of beyng. Their origination marks the 
logical transition of indeterminate difference to determinate difference. 
I would like to make two quick asides here on the basis of these requirements. First, if 
there is no structure of constitutive reference ontologically prior to appropriation while at the 
same time an operation of the event originates such a structure, this means that that operation is 
liminal – it is simultaneously intrinsic to and in excess of appropriation. That is, an operation of 
the event is ontologically prior to, irreducible to, and yet constitutive of appropriation. I return in 
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a moment to a more precise account of the excess involved here. Second, regarding Heidegger’s 
concepts of essence and ground, recall that he understands essence as that which is most proper 
to something or that which enables it to be whatever it is, i.e., its ontologically constitutive 
ground. For the terminology of essence to make sense, there has to be a distension or disjoint 
inherent to whatever it is applied to whereby more essential aspects are differentiated from less 
essential or more derivative ones. This is seen, for example, in the relation between “that which 
is true” and “the essence of truth.” Accordingly, the framework of essence can be established 
only through the origination of something a) differentiated from the operation whereby it was 
originated, but b) bearing constitutive reference to that operation (to that which enables it to be). 
Likewise, recall that Heidegger understands something’s ground to be the ontological structures 
enabling it to be whatever it is. The relation between ground and that which is grounded can be 
established only in the same manner as the framework of essence. This means that as an 
articulation of the origination of constitutive structural distension and reference, Heidegger’s 
concept of appropriation describes the origination of the very frameworks of essence and ground. 
 Returning to Heidegger’s concept of appropriation, it is one thing to state that it is an 
operation of the event whereby propriety is originated, and it is another to explain how this 
occurs, i.e., to give a genetic account of appropriation. So, how does it occur? Just as should be 
expected given the differential conception of beyng already discussed, Heidegger claims that as 
event, “the essence of beyng essentially occurs in the ap-propriation [Er-eignung] of de-cision 
[Ent-scheidung].”434 That is, appropriation is accomplished by and as decision – the 
differentiation of difference from itself. As Vallega-Neu puts it, this operation is “the 
differencing, i.e., the de-cision in which en-owning [Er-eignis/appropriating event] occurs.”435 
                                                 
434 GA65 95/75. 
435 HCP 113. 
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This position assumes greater conceptual precision when understood through Heidegger’s 
logic of difference. Beyng as event is the differentiation of difference from itself. Difference 
refuses to become identical with itself, that is, it differs from itself. By differing from itself, 
difference distends. This was articulated by the concept of clearing in the register of truth. This 
distension is the origination of a field such that some aspect of difference is differentiated from 
some other aspect. That is, rather than pure indeterminateness, difference generates 
determinateness or finitude by generating aspects of itself defined in their difference from one 
another: this distended dimension of difference is difference that comes to be defined via the 
origination of contrast from that difference that refuses to be it. But with this we find exactly the 
structural elements that go into a domain of propriety: 1) distension or the distinction of aspects 
of a structure and 2) constitutive reference. There is the origination of an aspect of difference that 
is distended from another aspect of difference, while the self-differentiation of one aspect from 
“itself” and in turn from the other aspect is exactly that origination. Thus, each aspect is also 
determined by the other, such that it bears a structural, constitutive reference to the other, i.e., to 
that which enables it to be. 
Thus, we have a genetic explanation of the domain of propriety on the basis of the logic 
of difference constituting the heart of beyng as event. Moreover, the differentiation of difference 
from itself can be said to enact appropriation in two essentially correlated senses: 1) it is the 
origination of a domain of propriety, and 2) since that domain is constituted by nothing other 
than determinate difference, it is the appropriation – in the sense of taking over – of difference in 
a determinate, intensive structure. Appropriation is the self-determination of beyng. It is worth 
keeping in mind that this is the same movement articulated in terms of the problematic of truth. 
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In that context, the structure of distension is articulated as the field of openness. The origination 
of openness is the event’s self-appropriation or origination of a domain of propriety. 
 What, then, of Enteignis or expropriation – the event’s origination of a structural 
alienation from propriety? To make sense (genetically) of this, we can begin by recalling that 
concealment is correlative with the origination of openness. Not only are concealment and 
openness generated by the same operation of the event, but each is structurally dependent upon 
the other, from which it gains contrast. On the one hand, concealment is the event’s self-refusal 
from the openness that it originates, and therefore it is defined in contradistinction from 
openness. On the other, openness is the field of the event’s distension, but it is originated by the 
event’s refusal, in contradistinction from which openness gains determinacy. In terms of the 
framework of truth, if openness is a domain of propriety, then concealment (the event’s refusal 
or withdrawal from that propriety) is expropriation – the origination of a constitutive alienation 
from propriety. In this case, the event’s self-appropriation as openness entails its simultaneous 
self-expropriation as concealment. In other words, precisely the same operation by which the 
event self-determines in the structure of appropriation/openness entails the self-determination of 
the event in the structure of expropriation/concealment. Each is genetically bound to the other. 
This arrangement provides an initial account of expropriation. 
 But beyng as event is not reducible to the framework of truth. So expropriation, like 
appropriation, must be given a systematic definition in terms of the logic of difference rather 
than merely being cast as concealment. Beyng as event is the differentiation of difference from 
itself. By differing from itself, difference distends. This distension is the origination of a domain 
of propriety, i.e., distention is appropriation. But appropriation is accomplished only by the 
refusal or withdrawal of difference from itself. Expropriation is exactly this differentiation of 
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difference from itself (as appropriation). But in expropriation, that dimension of difference that 
differs from appropriation becomes determined since it becomes endowed with a structural 
reference to appropriation, namely, one precisely of alienation from or not being proper to 
appropriation. Expropriation is difference that repels or withdraws from the appropriation of the 
domain of propriety, thereby enacting the distension of difference that constitutes that 
appropriation, but also gaining a determinateness of its own, namely as bearing a constitutive 
reference to that which it refuses to be (propriety). It is the origination of structural alienation 
from propriety. 
 
* 
The concepts of appropriation and expropriation, as defined by the logic of difference, supply a 
precise account of the basic structure of the event in Heidegger’s ontology, and specifically of 
the way the event self-intensifies or originates determinateness or finitude. But there is another 
crucial point that must be made with respect to this arrangement. As noted, the event’s 
differential logic must include an aspect that is irreducible to or in excess over the logic of 
appropriation and expropriation (i.e., over the logic of determination) and this renders evental 
differentiation liminal in character. In Beiträge, Heidegger refers to this in the terminology of the 
Abgrund or abyss, which I will return to in my discussion of the problematic of ground in 
Chapter III. For now, it is sufficient to see why this excess is necessary and how it fits into the 
logic already articulated. I will make the point first in the terminology of truth, where it is more 
easily recognizable, and then in the terminology of the event itself. 
 Though I have looked at appropriation and expropriation sequentially, to make sense of 
the excess involved in the event it is necessary to keep in mind that they are structurally 
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equiprimordial. They must be simultaneously generated by the differentiation of difference from 
itself, each forming a portion of the logic that unfolds from it. Each is partially defined in 
contradistinction from the other, that is, each is constitutively codependent upon the other. This 
means that appropriation and expropriation are structurally continuous with one another; the 
logic of one can be traced seamlessly to that of the other, via both their constitutive 
codependence and their shared genesis. Taken together, their origination is the origination of a 
logic of determinateness. 
 In terms of the problematic of truth, the shared genesis of appropriation and expropriation 
is articulated as the clearing for/of self-concealing. The clearing for/of self-concealing is the 
articulation of evental differentiation insofar as it originates the a-lēthic structures of openness 
and concealment. But since these structures are generated by pure difference, such difference has 
to be ontologically prior and irreducible to them. It is only as a consequence of difference 
differing from itself that the clearing for/of self-concealing is enacted at all. As prior, this primal 
difference can have no character of openness or concealment. The origination of determinateness 
in those structures relies upon difference that differs from or is deferred beyond even its own 
logic of self-determination, that is, difference that is necessarily in excess over the clearing for/of 
self-concealing. 
 In the terminology of the event, the differentiation of difference from itself is the shared 
genesis of appropriation and expropriation. But this genesis is possible only because beyng as 
event is most primally pure difference or differentiation. The operation by which the event self-
determines is consequent upon difference that is ontologically prior to that operation and that 
must exceed it for it to occur. In expropriation, for instance, the determination of difference in a 
structural contrast from propriety is dependent upon the fact that beyng is difference. Only 
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because of that does it self-differ from propriety. Such difference, ontologically prior to 
determination in appropriation and expropriation, can have none of the determinate structures 
characteristic of them (distension and constitutive reference). The origination of determinateness 
in those structures relies upon difference that differs or is deferred beyond even its own logic of 
self-determination, that is, difference that is necessarily in excess over the logic of appropriation 
and expropriation. 
Thus, though appropriation and expropriation are essential dimensions of the event, the 
event appropriates and expropriates only by a differing of difference that is in excess over those 
very processes. The event’s origination of a logic of determinateness entails an emission of 
difference from that logic. For terminological clarity, I will call this excess “primal difference.” 
Since primal difference is not the property of the logic of determinateness (the reverse being the 
case), I will call the differentiation characteristic of primal difference anterior to that logic 
“primal expropriation.” After Beiträge, this is what I take Heidegger to designate with the term 
“Abschied.” Primal difference and primal expropriation should be distinguished from what I 
have called “originary” difference and “originary expropriation” or just “expropriation.” These 
refer to the most primordial aspects of difference or the event insofar as it is involved in the 
origination of the logic of determinateness, i.e., of the Da. As noted, the interminable, 
inexhaustible primal expropriation of difference can alternatively be called “the abyss.” The 
event, then, must be said to include not only the logic of appropriation and expropriation, but 
also the abyss of differentiation exceeding even the structures it differentiates and thereby 
generating them. 
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2.2.8: Complication in the Structure of the Event: The Distorted Essence of Truth 
 
Sections 2.2-2.2.6 worked out how Heidegger’s treatment of the problematic of truth enables a 
first properly grounded stance for thought in the logic of the event. Sections 2.2.5-2.2.6, in 
particular, worked out a portion of this logic in the terms of the problematic of truth, or as it 
pertains to the differential essence of truth and the origination of the a-lēthic structures. Section 
2.2.7 further developed the logic of the event in the terminology of the event itself. But there is 
something important that I have thus far set aside. 
In Heidegger’s account, the structure of the event entails self-distortion. He designates 
this the “Un-wesen” or “distorted essence” of beyng, and elaborates on it especially in terms of 
the “distorted essence” of truth, or “Un-wahrheit” (un-truth), and “Machenschaft” 
(machination).436 
Given Deleuze’s later critique of representation, it is worth mentioning that Heidegger 
sometimes equates machination with “that interpretation of beings as representable and 
represented” or the view that “beings as such are the represented, and only the represented is a 
being.”437 The distortion involved here is a crucial part of the ground whence the historical and 
conceptual distortion constituting metaphysics is generated. Consequently its analysis forms an 
essential element of a Heideggerian radical critique of metaphysics, though I will not complete 
this here. At the level of the dynamics of the event, this distortion describes the curvature of 
beyng that makes Heidegger’s ontology a curved ontology, not a flat one or one vertically 
organized by metaphysical transcendence. This curvature results in structures of folding or 
                                                 
436 GA65 107/85, 347/274, 356/281, and 126/99. To avoid a common confusion: “in the context of the question of 
being, it [machination] does not name a kind of human conduct but a mode of the essential occurrence of being” 
(GA65 126/99). 
437 GA65 108-109/86. 
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complication generated by the event. Since I have focused on articulating the event in terms of 
truth in this chapter, I will limit myself to addressing this distortion in terms of the distorted 
essence of truth. I believe I have established that the structures of the essence of truth are, for 
Heidegger, structures of the event. I also take it that since the differential logic of the event 
defines the structures of truth, it must equally define the structures of the distorted essence of 
truth. Thus, I reconstruct the distorted essence of truth in terms of the logic of difference, even 
though Heidegger does not explicitly connect the two here. 
Heidegger’s account of the distorted essence of truth articulates an originary “Irre” 
(errancy), “Anschein” (semblance), or “Verstellung” (distortion) and forms the basic structure on 
which human and historical errancy takes hold.438 While these are generally undesirable and 
often quite harmful, the originary distortion of the essence of truth is not a failure of beyng and 
must not be taken as pejorative. It need not and cannot be eradicated or excised. Distortion is a 
structurally essential aspect of the event and is “proper” to its logic of determinateness. In 
Heidegger’s words, “the distorted essence belongs intrinsically to the essence [of truth].”439 How 
so? As I shall argue, truth distorts itself. It does so on at least two levels, so there is a “double 
meaning” of the distorted essence of truth.440 The second pertains to the alienation of human 
existence from beyng, which I will not treat in detail here. My focus is on a first, originary level 
of distortion. 
Heidegger offers little direct explanation of this, though I think a good account can be 
pieced together. If the distorted essence belongs intrinsically to the essence of truth, this means 
that the essence of truth intrinsically entails its own distortion. And distortion must arise as a 
constitutive aspect of the essence of truth, not from extrinsic factors. But the essence of truth is 
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439 GA65 347/274. 
440 GA65 348/275. 
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the event as articulated in the register of truth, i.e., originary difference as elaborated in the 
clearing for/of self-concealing. Since the structures of the essence of truth are generated through 
the evental logic of difference, the same logic must simultaneously generate distortion. But in 
what sense? Since the structures in question are ontologically prior to the regime of 
representation or even of thinking beings, this distortion cannot be an error in representation, 
judgment, or any other epistemological function. And since it is likewise prior to the 
determination of distinctive beings in a world, it similarly must not be reducible to any distortion 
operating in that domain. At the most originary level, it must be a distortion characterizing beyng 
as articulated in the ontological structures of the essence of truth itself, the differential clearing 
for/of self-concealing. 
Heidegger associates the originary level of distortion characterizing the essence of truth 
with the essential “negativity [Nichtigkeit] of being,” or more precisely, with the “negativity 
[Nichtung] of the ‘there’ [Da]” since truth is beyng insofar as beyng is projected into the 
“there.”441 Most scholarship on Heidegger has understood the negativity of being (and of beyng) 
in terms of λήθη. If beyng as event is interpreted within the a-lēthic framework rather than the 
differential one, that makes good sense, for in that view λήθη is an irreducible character of beyng 
(perhaps the most originary one). In that case, since λήθη presents itself as a withdrawal, self-
concealment, or lack, beyng can be said to have an essentially negative character. However, if, as 
I have argued, the a-lēthic structures must be grounded by the logic of difference, it can no 
longer be maintained that that negativity is an irreducible character of beyng. Beyng cannot be 
characterized primally in terms of that negativity. Consistent with this, Heidegger claims that the 
negativity involved in the distorted essence of truth is “by no means a sheer lack” but a 
                                                 
441 GA65 347/274 and 348/275, correction of translators’ omission of italics on “there.” 
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“resistance” (“Widerständiges”).442 I take this to challenge many dominant interpretations of 
Heidegger. Indeed, the a-lēthic interpretation is unable to support consistency between such a 
claim and Heidegger’s association of originary distortion with ontological negativity, since 
resistance is not λήθη. In contrast, the differential interpretation of the essence of truth I have 
advanced supports this and, in fact, offer an explanation of resistance. To show this, it must first 
be demonstrated how the differential account explains the originary level of distortion. 
To begin, in the differential logic of appropriation and expropriation (or, in the terms of 
truth, of openness and concealment), each of these two moments entails contrast from the other. 
Stated genetically, the origination of each entails the dynamic expulsion of the other. More 
precisely, this expulsion should be called an expropriation, though this new use of the term 
requires the following clarification. From the perspective of the domain of propriety or openness, 
the origination of that domain is dependent upon the expulsion or expropriation of difference. 
The difference expropriated gains determinateness as a structure of alienation from propriety. I 
discussed this in detail in section 2.2.7. From the perspective of the domain of expropriety or 
concealment, the origination of that domain is likewise dependent upon the expulsion of 
difference, but here insofar as difference is determined in the structure of propriety or openness. 
The domains of propriety and expropriety are equiprimordial and so the logic of one should not 
be given determinative priority in comparison with the other. This means that expropriety must 
be no more consequent upon propriety than propriety upon it. In fact, since the structural 
elements of expropriety are what is proper to it, expropriety has in its own terms a certain 
propriety. Yet the genesis of this structure (in its own propriety) entails the expulsion of 
difference determined as openness/propriety, in other words, an expropriation of just such 
                                                 
442 GA65 356/281. Heidegger clarifies this to a certain degree here by interpreting resistance “as that self-concealing 
which comes into the clearing as such.” Since this articulates the implication of self-concealing in clearing, which in 
turn, implies in openness, this interpretation is consistent with the one I develop. 
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difference. Thus, in the origination of the logic of determinateness, i.e., of appropriation and 
expropriation, each of these structures becomes what it is by way of an expropriation of the 
other. Stated in terms of truth, the generation of openness entails an expropriation of 
concealment and the generation of concealment entails an expropriation of openness. Stated in 
terms of the logic of difference, originary difference self-appropriates as each moment – 
openness and concealment – in a way codetermined by the expropriation of the other. 
How, though, does this help explain distortion? The answer is that each moment – 
appropriation/openness and expropriation/concealment – entails the structural obfuscation of the 
other. That is, it constitutes a form of semblance. From its own perspective, the logic of the one 
seems to exclude the logic of the other and vice versa. In terms of truth, neither openness nor 
concealment is adequate to the essence of truth; each entails a blind spot with respect to the 
other. This constitutes a structural distortion: from any point within the logic of determinateness 
some aspect of that logic is obfuscated. This obfuscation or distortion is an inescapable aspect of 
the constitution of each moment of that logic; each moment gains its structural determinateness 
in contrast with the other. 
Due to this essential correlation between moments and because appropriation/openness 
and expropriation/concealment are generated by one and the same logic of difference, there is, in 
fact, continuity throughout their logics: together they form a continuous logic of determinateness. 
Yet each obfuscates not only the other but, by that very fact, aspects of the logic of difference 
whereby it is originated. This means that structural distortion is proper, i.e. essential, to the logic 
of determinateness. The logic of determinateness cannot be originated except in such a way that 
entails distortion. I take this to be the sense of Heidegger’s claim that the distorted essence of 
truth belongs intrinsically to the essence of truth. 
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This also means that the genesis of the logic of determinateness through the evental logic 
of difference entails that all aspects of the determinateness generated bear a structural alienation 
from evental difference, i.e., from what enables them to be, their essence, or their ground. It is 
because of the distorted essence of truth or of the event that a distinction arises between the more 
and the less essential, that is, between the ground and the grounded. This is the distinction that 
supports Heidegger’s whole program up to the point of articulating the evental nature of beyng. 
Now, if the essential negativity of beyng is resistance, what else could this resistance be 
but the tension held in the logic of determinateness, the tension held between moments of 
appropriation and expropriation, simultaneously consistent and inconsistent with one another? 
This is what Heidegger means when referring to the “intimately conflictual essence of truth.”443 
Here, negativity is not an irreducible character of beyng, but generated by the excess of 
difference. This is a crucial point that, I believe, places Heidegger closer to Spinoza and Deleuze 
and moves him further from Hegel, Derrida, and the “deconstructive” interpretations of 
Heidegger dominant since the mid-1980s. The famous “not” or negativity characterizing 
Heidegger’s thought is ultimately derived from an excess of difference. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In Chapter I, I proposed a methodology for reconstructing Heidegger’s account of beyng as event 
based upon the complex evolution of his concepts along diagenic axes. I gave an overview of his 
concept of event and outlined some of the central issues that are debated in relation to it. I then 
gave an analysis of the framework of Heidegger’s project, showing how he argues that 
                                                 
443 GA65 348/275. 
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fundamental ontology must be pursued by way of the existential analysis of Dasein. This set up 
the work to be done in Chapter II. 
 Here, I focused on Heidegger’s claim that the question of the essence of truth is the 
question that is preliminary (Vorfrage) to the basic question (Grundfrage) of philosophy: how 
does being essentially occur (west)? Heidegger’s answer to the latter in Beiträge is that beyng 
essentially occurs as event. I applied the methodology developed in Chapter I by tracking the 
evolution of Heidegger’s conception of truth along a diagenic axis. As I argued, for Heidegger it 
is by pursuing the question of the essence of truth that thought is able to gain a properly 
grounded stance in the logic of the event. I began showing how this functions by analyzing the 
way the problematic of truth is grounded in that of Dasein in Sein und Zeit. This showed the 
connection of the problematic of truth with that of being and allowed an explanation of the first, 
phenomenological stage of Heidegger’s a-lēthic account of truth. I then turned to “Vom Wesen 
der Wahrheit,” where Heidegger advances along a diagenic axis and argues that truth is not 
grounded in Dasein, but that Dasein is grounded in the a-lēthic structures of truth. These 
structures are taken to be ontological structures prior to and grounding not only Dasein, but the 
manifestation of beings in a meaningful world. This constitutes a second stage in Heidegger’s a-
lēthic account of truth and implies a movement in his work toward a version of ontological 
realism. This has a particular importance for my project because it shows Heidegger challenging 
the horizons for philosophical thought maintained by Kant and phenomenology. Insofar as the 
critique of these horizons is also a central task of Deleuze’s Différence et répétition, this places 
Heidegger and Deleuze into direct contact. 
 Most interpreters take Heidegger’s conception of truth in Beiträge to remain within the 
framework of the second stage of the a-lēthic account. Since it is by way of the problematic of 
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the essence of truth that an account of the evental nature of beyng is to be developed, this leads 
to an understanding of the event within the a-lēthic framework. This, however, is a fundamental 
mistake and results in disjointed or mystical accounts of Heidegger’s evental concepts. In 
contrast, as I have argued, Heidegger advances again along a diagenic axis by inquiring into the 
ground whence the a-lēthic structures of truth are generated. This ground is understood in terms 
of originary difference and the dynamics or logic of that difference. “The clearing for/of self-
concealing” articulates the logic of difference insofar as difference originates the a-lēthic 
structures. Consequently, Heidegger’s account of the essence of truth in Beiträge is not most 
fundamentally a-lēthic but differential. By pursuing the problematic of truth, thought gains a 
grounded stance in the differential logic of the event, which enables an elaboration of that logic, 
first in the terminology of truth and then in that of the event.  
According to the logic of difference underwriting Heidegger’s ontology in Beiträge, 
beyng as event is the differentiation of difference from itself, together with the logic of 
determinateness this originates. The logic of determinateness is the logic of beyng’s self-
intensification, distension, and elaboration, i.e., the origination of the Da expressed in the term 
“Da-sein.” This logic is articulated not only in terms of truth, but also in the properly evental 
terminology of appropriation and expropriation. Yet the logic of the event includes an excess of 
difference over the logic of determinateness, which makes the event liminal with respect to 
determination. As such, beyng as event is irreducible to appropriation and expropriation. This is 
a point most interpretations of Heidegger’s concept of event fail to discern. Additionally, the 
event’s self-determination entails structural distortion, which is the basis for human and 
historical errancy, the metaphysical regime of representation, and the famous “forgetting” of 
beyng these involve. This account of the genesis of distortion is important for my overall project 
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because it parallels Deleuze’s treatment of repetition, where repetition in part figures the 
ontological operation whereby distortion is generated, particularly as manifest in the framework 
of representation. As a consequence, for both philosophers the theory of distortion is crucial for 
the project of radical critique, i.e., the project of demonstrating not only the shortcomings of 
metaphysics or representation, but the genesis of the distortions they manifest. In Deleuze’s 
ontology, two central claims are that being is difference and that the “different/ciation” of 
difference whereby worlds of quasi-stable beings are generated is evental.444 My analysis of the 
differential logic of the event in Heidegger’s ontology shows that he is much closer to Deleuze in 
this regard than is recognized in available scholarship. I return to these comparative points in 
greater detail in Chapters IV and V. 
In this chapter, my focus has been on how truth forms a key register in terms of which the 
evental structure of beyng is articulated in Heidegger’s ontology. However, in Beiträge the 
evental structure must also be articulated in terms of the problematics of ground and time-space. 
These three – truth, ground, and time-space – form interrelated registers of the event. The 
account of the differential logic worked out here in Chapter II provides the basis for elaborating 
the structure of the event further in terms of ground and time-space, which shall be my task in 
Chapter III. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
444 I discuss different/ciation in detail in Chapters IV and V. 
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Chapter III 
 
Heidegger: Event, Ground, and Time-Space 
 
Chapter Overview 
 
In this chapter I build upon the reconstruction of Heidegger’s ontology of the event given in 
Chapter II in order to establish the event’s connection with the problematics of ground and time-
space. In Chapter II, I focused on 1) how the problematic of truth provided a grounded stance 
within the logic of beyng as event, 2) the differential formulation of the essence of truth as the 
clearing for/of self-concealing, 3) the differential logic of the event elaborated in terms of the 
structures of the essence of truth and the structures of appropriation and expropriation, i.e., what 
I have called “the logic of determinateness”, and 4) the structural distortion entailed in the logic 
of determinateness. In Chapter III, I begin by showing that the problematics of ground and time-
space articulate the problematic of the event in a way structurally parallel to that of truth and 
provide additional fundamental registers for elaborating the logic of the event. I then reconstruct 
the two main senses of “ground” in Beiträge: 1) “Ergründen” or “fathoming”/“fathoming the 
ground” which describes the ways alienated human existence re-grounds itself in the event, and 
2) “gründende Grund” or “grounding ground,” which describes the inherent grounding character 
of the event.445 I focus particularly on gründende Grund, which has three main modalities: “Ab-
grund” or “abyssal ground,” “Ur-grund” or “primordial ground,” and “Un-grund” or “distorted 
ground.” I then turn to the problematic of time-space. First, I look at a problem Heidegger 
                                                 
445 Unless otherwise indicated, all translations of Heidegger’s terms in Beiträge are those provided in Martin 
Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniella Vallega-Neu 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2012). Rojcewicz and Vallega-Neu sometimes translate “Ergründen” as 
“fathoming” and sometimes as “fathoming the ground.” 
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locates in traditional representations of time and space, which prompts his analysis of time-
space. I then provide a basic definition of time-space in terms of the differential logic of the 
event. This enables me to reconstruct a number of cryptic technical terms that Heidegger uses to 
articulate time-space, ultimately leading to an account of what he calls “Entrückung” or 
“transporting” and “Berückung” or “captivation,” which are terms for the event’s origination of 
temporality and spatiality. Taken together, the different structures involved in the problematics 
of ground and time-space contribute to a fuller definition of beyng as event in Heidegger’s 
ontology. 
 
1: Introduction: Event, Ground, and Time-Space 
Time-space is the abyss [Abgrund] of the ground – i.e., the abyss of the truth of 
being.446 
 
Truth, ground, and time-space are three key registers in terms of which Heidegger works out the 
evental nature of beyng in Beiträge. Each of these three overlaps the others in important ways, 
yet none is reducible to the others. As I discussed in Chapter II, the problematic of the essence of 
truth is crucial because 1) it is the problematic preliminary to that of beyng as event and 2) the 
structure of truth is part of the structure of the event. In Chapter II, I reconstructed Heidegger’s 
account of the event in terms of truth. I argued that the way Heidegger’s account of truth evolves 
from the time of Sein und Zeit to that of Beiträge – advancing along a diagenic axis – provides a 
first properly grounded stance within the event. I showed that the problematic of truth 
accomplishes this by opening up access to the logic of originary differentiation articulating both 
the essence of truth and the structure and dynamics of the “decisional essence of beyng,” i.e., the 
event. The essence of truth formulated as “the clearing for/of self-concealing” articulates 
                                                 
446 GA65 35/28.  
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originary differentiation and its logic in the register of truth. This formulation allows this logic to 
be unfolded in the terms of the problematic of truth: clearing, concealing, openness, etc.  
As defined in my reconstruction of Heidegger’s account of beyng as event in Chapter II, 
the heart of the event is pure difference that is prior to and originary of any determinate “things” 
that have a difference between them. In particular, this difference is diagenically prior to the 
ontological difference between being and beings. This diagenically prior difference, according to 
Heidegger, is that which originates the ontological difference, which is thus a derivative 
difference. The event is the differentiation of pure difference from itself together with the 
ontological structures originated thereby (the essence of truth, ground, and time-space) and the 
primal difference that exceeds those structures. I alternatively describe the origination of these 
structures on the basis of the logic of evental difference as the origination of a “logic of 
determinateness.” In the terminology of the event, the logic of determinateness is articulated as 
originary appropriation and expropriation. The origination of the logic of determinateness in 
appropriation and expropriation (and in the structures of truth, ground, and time-space) is the 
generation of the “Da” expressed in the term “Da-sein.” Da-sein is the event’s self-determination 
in those structures. I have argued that this self-determination can be described as the event’s self-
intensification or distention and elaboration, forming the basic ontological structures enabling 
worlds of beings to be. Further, an essential aspect of the event’s logic of determinateness is 
structural distortion. Distention and distortion explain the negativity of beyng, which Heidegger 
argues is not an absolute character of beyng because it is originated by the excess of difference. 
Instead, the negativity involved in the event is the “resistance” held in distension and distortion.  
Though in Chapter II I focused on the relation of the problematic of truth to the event, it 
should be clear by now that the event and its logic of difference are not indexed solely to the 
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register of truth. As I will show in Chapter III, the structures and dynamics of time-space and 
ground are originated by the differential operations of the event as well. As with the account of 
truth elaborated in Chapter II, Heidegger’s accounts of time-space and ground articulate the 
evental nature of beyng and its differential logic. As I will show, time-space and the structures of 
ground arise from the operation of originary differentiation, which is immanent to them and is 
the mechanism by which the event self-intensifies, distends, and becomes elaborated. In other 
words, time-space and the structures of ground form additional aspects of the logic of 
determinateness whereby the event constitutes the Da of Da-sein. In the present chapter, I 
continue to reconstruct the account of the evental nature of beyng found in Beiträge, but now in 
terms of the problematics of ground and time-space. The structures of ground and time-space are 
“grounded” in the differential logic of the event, while that logic is elaborated in terms of ground 
and time-space. Heidegger’s accounts of ground and (especially) time-space are very condensed 
and often opaque, employing formulations that contain a number of unusual technical terms. 
Explaining ground and time-space, and thereby developing a fuller account of the event in 
Heidegger’s ontology, will require a highly technical analysis of these passages, particularly 
when it comes to time-space. Accomplishing this will take up the main body of this chapter. As I 
bring my analysis of Heidegger’s evental ontology to a close, in my conclusion I will also recall 
some of the main points I have made over the past three chapters that will form points of contact 
with Deleuze’s ontology of the event in Différence et répétition. It is my view that Heidegger 
and Deleuze’s mutual concern with the concept of event and the key role it plays in their 
philosophical systems requires that they be taken as intersecting thinkers. The ontological 
problematic of the event is a basis on which conversation between these two may be developed 
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in a concrete and rigorous way. In my analysis of Deleuze in Chapters IV and V, I will develop 
several of these points of contact.  
 
2: The Event and Ground 
The more originarily we master the essence of truth, the more pressing the 
problem of ground must become.447 
 
 
In Beiträge, “ground” is one of the essential registers of the event. The structures and operations 
of ground compose aspects of the structures and operations of the event. Sometimes Heidegger 
makes this point by saying that, as with truth, one of the ways the event essentially occurs (west) 
is as ground. In fact, some of the evental structures composing the essence of truth also compose 
the structures of ground – “ground” and “truth” both articulate the event, but in different 
conceptual registers. Heidegger doesn’t always keep these registers strictly parsed. Sometimes he 
describes grounding characteristics of truth and sometimes aspects of the essence of truth that 
belong to ground. The overarching reason for this is that at the level of the logic of the event, 
both truth and ground articulate the event’s origination of the Da, or what I have called the logic 
of determinateness, and some of the most fundamental structures of that logic. As I will discuss 
in Section 3 of this chapter, the same is the case with time-space. One of the reasons I find the 
concept of ground so fascinating in Heidegger’s work is its role in the logic of determinateness: 
not only is “ground” one of the concepts in terms of which Heidegger tries to explain how one 
thing supports, leads to, or constitutes another, but in a broader sense it is also a concept he uses 
to explain why beyng is such that it enables the resistance, thickness, or viscosity of the world. In 
terms I used in Chapter II, the concept of ground contributes to Heidegger’s account of the 
event’s self-intensification or coagulation and distention. 
                                                 
447 WG 130/102. 
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At a cursory level, the relation of the evental structures of the essence of truth (the 
clearing for/of self-concealing) to those of ground can be specified in three ways: 1) The essence 
of truth grounds what is true: “truth itself is that wherein what is true has its ground.”448 In other 
words, the essence of truth serves as a ground enabling worlds of beings to be. 2) Consequently, 
an aspect of the essence of truth is a ground. That is, the character of grounding is proper to the 
essence of truth. Stated in the register of ground, part of the structure of ground involves or is 
coextensive with the structure of the essence of truth. 3) Even though truth and ground are what 
they are partially in and through each other, neither is a subset of the other. Truth has its 
character of ground on the basis of “that whereby the ground is a ground, i.e. …the event,” not 
on the basis of truth.449 Ground and truth are partially coextensive because they are both 
originated through the same operations of the event. 
In what follows, I elaborate on Heidegger’s account of beyng as event in Beiträge 
through an analysis and interpretation of his account of ground.450 As I discussed in Chapter II, 
the conceptual framework of truth articulates a variety of structures and operates at more than 
one level in Heidegger’s ontology (as seen, for instance, in the distinction between the 
unconcealment of beings in a world and the ontological structures of openness and concealment 
that enable that unconcealment to occur). The case is similar with ground. 
Despite Heidegger’s widespread use of the concept of ground, some scholars are hesitant 
to associate it too closely with his ontology. The fear seems to be that the terminology of ground 
is metaphysical and thus cannot properly be used in Heidegger’s core problematic. The 
suggestion is that his discussions of the concept of ground are contained in historical 
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450 Note that Heidegger’s treatment of ground in Beiträge is informed by earlier projects addressing the same topic, 
especially WG (1929) and Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (1929). 
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commentary (on Leibniz, for example) or are the subject of deconstructive analysis. I believe that 
I have shown (in Chapter I) that this is mistaken. It will be useful, though, to briefly summarize 
what ground is not for Heidegger, i.e., how his concept of ground is distinguished from a 
metaphysical one. First, Heidegger clarifies that the grounding character of beyng is neither a 
ὑπόθεσις nor a condition of possibility, and thus neither a κοινόν nor ὑποκείμενον.451 In other 
words, ground is not a fully determinate substratum, foundation, substance, or principle 
conceived on the basis of the time determination of presence. I discussed the reasons why ground 
is not a condition of possibility in Chapter II: defining ground as a condition of possibility would 
limit it to the relation between condition and conditioned (where beings are the conditioned), 
thus defining ground within the framework of Seiendheit and rendering it metaphysical.452  
 Heidegger distinguishes between two main registers of ground in Beiträge and these 
mirror the two major movements coursing through the text.453 The first movement is that of 
regrounding human existence insofar as it has become alienated from beyng. Methodologically 
speaking, in the context of Heidegger’s project this is the movement of Grundlegung involved in 
radical science. It is as a part of this movement that I defined the historical sense of the event in 
Chapter I. In Beiträge, the register of ground that Heidegger calls “Ergründen” 
(“fathoming”/“fathoming the ground”) correlates with this movement. The second major 
movement aims to work out the nature of beyng as event independently of any relation it has to 
beings. In other words, this second movement aims to think the event on its own terms. The 
register of ground that Heidegger calls “das ursprüngliche Gründen des Grundes” (“the original 
grounding of the ground”) or simply “gründende Grund” (“grounding ground”) correlates with 
                                                 
451 GA65 183/144. Here, Rojcewicz and Vallega-Neu translate the Greek term ὑπόθεσις as “what is laid down 
underneath” and ὑποκείμενον as “what lies underneath.” 
452 See Chapter II, Section 2.1.1. 
453 GA65 §187 outlines these two registers of ground. 
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this second movement.454 It is as a part of this second movement that I defined the ontological 
sense of the event in Chapter I.455 Heidegger develops a technical formulation for grounding 
ground as “das Sichverbergen im tragenden Durchragen” (“self-concealing in a protrusion that 
bears”).456 Determining what this means will rest upon my analysis in Section 2.2 of the nature 
and relation of a set of different modalities of gründende Grund. Though I treat both Ergründen 
and gründende Grund, my focus will be on the latter. 
 
2.1: Ergründen (Fathoming the Ground) 
 
Ergründen operates at the level of human existence or, more properly, the relation of human 
existence to the event, particularly as the event is articulated in the registers of truth, ground 
(gründende Grund), and time-space. It describes ways in which “grounding ground, as such, is 
attained and taken up” by human existence.457 
Heidegger provides a broad definition of Ergründen as “den Grund als gründenden wesen 
lassen” (“to let the ground essentially occur as grounding”).458 This designates a set of five 
related ways human existence can comport itself: 1) carrying out the methodological movement 
                                                 
454 GA65 307/243. 
455 See Chapter I, Section 2.2. 
456 GA65 379/300. 
457 GA65 307/243. Heidegger also discusses a narrower form of Ergünden, using the hyphenated Er-gründen to 
express a sense of creative grounding. He connects this to “building” (“bauen”), in the sense of building on a ground 
or “bring[ing] something to the ground,” and sees it exemplified in works of art and poetry (GA65 307/243). Er-
gründen is the operation through which human existence builds a work that preserves the essence of truth and nature 
of the event in a way exposed in the world, such that “Art is that process by which the truth of beings sets-itself-to-
work, comes-to-pass in a work, the work of art” (TPT 405). Since this sense of grounding is not essential to the logic 
of the event, I focus exclusively on the “fathoming” sense of Ergründen. Two of Heidegger’s main published texts 
that address “bauen” are 1) “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes,” in GA5: Holzwege (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 2003); English: “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in Off the Beaten Track, ed. and trans. by Julian 
Young and Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) and 2) “Bauen Wohnen Denken” in 
GA7: Vorträge und Aufsätze (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2000); English: “Building Dwelling Thinking,” in 
Poetry Language Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York, NY: Perennial Classics, HarperCollins, 2001). 
458 GA65 307/243. 
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of Grundlegung, 2) uncovering its own ground and recovering ownership of itself, 3) disclosing 
the truth of beyng, 4) grounding Da-sein, and 5) contributing to the transition to a new beginning 
for thought and history. 
The first of these senses of Ergründen (which enables the others) is that of carrying out 
the methodological movement of Grundlegung that I described in Chapter I. This is the way in 
which human existence engages in radical science and inquires into the nature of being, 
progressing along a series of renditions of the ontological problematic arrayed along a diagenic 
axis. Each rendition is generated by problematizing the Grundbegriffe of a previous rendition 
(for example, those of the a-lēthic account of the essence of truth provided in “Vom Wesen der 
Wahrheit”). One tracks the implicit but previously unrecognized logic entailed in the ontological 
features articulated by those Grundbegriffe (but that exceeds the account they offer) to a more 
originary and appropriate standpoint (for example, to the conception of originary difference). 
One then recasts Grundbegriffe to articulate the subject matter of being in a more originary and 
appropriate way, that is, one lays new grounds for the ontological problematic (for example, 
unfolding the differential logic of the event in terms of the clearing for/of self-concealing). The 
account constituted by laying these grounds enables a reconfiguration of the problematic field at 
hand. This sense of fathoming the ground describes precisely the evolution of Heidegger’s 
ontology that I reconstructed in Chapters I and II by setting the problematic of fundamental 
ontology as the existential analysis of Dasein in Sein und Zeit, demonstrating the essential 
connection of the problematic of truth to that of being, tracking the evolution of the ontological 
problematic of truth through its two a-lēthic stages and into its differential stage in Beiträge, and 
then developing a concept of the event through the logic of difference that the problematic of 
truth rendered accessible. 
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In a second but closely related sense, Ergründen names the way human existence 
uncovers its own ground, recovering ownership of itself from the alienation involved in 
inauthenticity, machination, representation, and the broader historical framework of metaphysics. 
Heidegger describes this sense of Ergründen by saying that from the human perspective, 
grounding is a matter of “letting the ground be” (Grund-sein-lassen) whereby “humans once 
again come to themselves and win back selfhood.”459 The wesen lassen or sein lassen involved 
here should be understood in a way similar to the mode of comportment defining freedom in 
“Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” (discussed in Chapter II).460 There, freedom as letting beings be 
(das Seinlassen von Seiendem) was defined as being attentive to the ontological ground enabling 
beings to be (i.e., to come into and recede from presence) insofar as this or that distinctive set of 
beings is in fact in this process, and preserving the experience of those beings as grounded in this 
way. In Beiträge’s discussion of Ergründen as a mode of human comportment, Heidegger is 
focused on the way human existence is attentive to its own ground. Here, the ground of human 
existence is Da-sein, i.e., the event, insofar as it originates the logic of determinateness defined in 
terms of the structures of truth and the operations of appropriation and expropriation. The “self” 
that human existence might win back by Ergründen is, of course, not a soul, psyche, subject, or 
any other principle of personal identity (“selfhood is more originary than any I or thou or 
we”).461 It is the kind of self that I earlier described as an ontological structure arising on the 
basis of the event’s domain of propriety (Eigentum).462 Winning back selfhood refers to the way 
alienated human existence might gravitate toward being properly grounded and away from 
alienation (the analogues in Sein und Zeit would be Dasein’s gravitation toward authenticity and 
                                                 
459 GA65 31/27, italics removed. 
460 See Chapter II, Section 1.2. 
461 GA65 320/253, italics removed. 
462 See Chapter II, Section 2.2.7. 
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away from inauthenticity). As Heidegger puts it, “the relation back [Rückbezug] which is named 
in terms of ‘self,’ to ‘itself,’ with ‘itself,’ and for ‘itself’ has its essence in appropriation 
[Eignung].”463 And “the domain of what is proper [Eigentum]” is “the ground of selfhood.”464 In 
this sense of “letting the ground essentially occur as grounding,” human existence rethinks and 
transforms itself on the basis of the dynamics of the event, in a way analogous to the 
transformation of the problematic of being described in terms of the movement of Grundlegung. 
 These first two senses of Ergründen cannot be separated from a third: human existence 
disclosing the truth of beyng, rather than eclipsing and forgetting it. In contrast to the first, 
methodological sense of Ergründen and the second sense focused on a transformation of human 
existence, this third sense designates the disclosure of beyng and attentiveness involved in 
maintaining that disclosure.  
A fourth sense of Ergründen designates something that sounds quite strange: the way 
humans “place themselves back into Da-sein, thereby grounding Da-sein, in order thus to place 
themselves out into the truth of beyng.”465 If Da-sein is the ground of human existence, how can 
human existence ground Da-sein? Since Da-sein is the ground enabling the human being to exist, 
when human existence forgets or covers over its ground, it becomes alienated or expropriated 
from that ground and seems unconnected to it. In terms of Da-sein, this alienation means that Da-
sein has expropriated or alienated part of itself from itself via human errancy. Thus, when the 
human being uncovers the ground of its existence in Da-sein and rethinks itself on that basis, Da-
sein re-appropriates itself: it is re-grounded. Human existence grounds Da-sein. 
In a fifth and final sense, Ergründen names the way that, by disclosing the truth of beyng, 
human existence is involved in the transition from the first beginning of thought or history to a 
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new beginning; in other words, the way human existence is involved in the event in its historical 
sense. This is to be accomplished precisely through the first four senses. 
 
2.2: Das Ursprüngliche Gründen des Grundes (The Original Grounding of the Ground) or 
Gründende Grund (Grounding Ground) 
 
The different modes of Ergründen are enabled by the structures of ground essential to the event. 
That is, the modes of Ergründen (fathoming the ground) are themselves grounded in a more 
originary gründende Grund (grounding ground). In a preliminary way, Heidegger understands 
“gründende Grund” to be that which enables what is grounded on it to be (in the sense I 
discussed in Chapters I and II). Recall that in “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” he casts ground as 
“Grund der Ermöglichung” (ground of enabling). In Beiträge, this is sometimes carried over in 
the tentative formulation, “Grund der Möglichkeit” (ground of possibility).466 The notion of 
Grund der Möglichkeit in Beiträge, however, is understood within the framework of the 
Grundfrage (How does beyng essentially occur?), while the earlier notion of the Grund der 
Ermöglichung was tied to the Leitfrage (What is the being of beings?) and thus defined ground 
on the basis of its relation to beings. Although Heidegger holds that “ground of possibility” “is 
still a metaphysical expression,” it is modified insofar as “it is thought out of the abyssal and 
steadfast belongingness [Zugehörigkeit]” characteristic of beyng.467 In Chapter II, I demonstrated 
that Heidegger defines Zugehörigkeit (belongingness) in terms of the way the event generates a 
domain of propriety (Eigentum) such that all that falls within the range of that domain bears a 
constitutive structural reference or assignment (Zueignung) to that domain. Or, in the case of the 
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structures of the domain of propriety itself, belongingness describes the constitutive structural 
reference they bear to that whereby propriety is originated (the evental logic of difference). In 
other words, “ground of possibility” is conceived on the basis of the genetic logic of structural 
reference or the inherent grounding character of the event, and not derived on the basis of a 
relation between that character and what is grounded. Nonetheless, it is true that ground is also 
that which is most proper to what is grounded. In this sense, ground is tied to Heidegger’s notion 
of essence (recall that in “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit,” “essence” was understood to mean 
“ground of enabling” or “ground of the inner possibility”). The essence of something is the 
ground enabling it to be. This is not to resort to a circular definition of ground in terms of 
essence and essence in terms of ground, but to indicate that the terminologies of “ground” and 
“essence” are both used to describe aspects of the same thing. As I showed in Chapter II, this 
same thing is the relation whereby one thing is generated by and bears constitutive structural 
reference to another thing, while this type of relation is established most fundamentally by the 
event’s structure of propriety.468 
Heidegger’s technical formulation of ground in Beiträge as “self-concealing in a 
protrusion that bears” applies at the level of gründende Grund. There are three main modes of 
this register of ground, and they articulate different dimensions of the event and its essential 
unfolding via the structures of truth and time-space. These modes are “Ab-grund” (“abyssal 
ground”), “Ur-grund” (“primordial ground”), and “Un-grund” (“distorted ground”).469 In the core 
discussion of these terms (which closely ties them to time-space), Heidegger provides a 
condensed statement of the relations between these modes of ground and their relation to truth: 
“Truth grounds as the truth of the event. The event, grasped from the perspective of truth as 
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ground, is therefore the primordial ground. The primordial ground opens itself up, as what is 
self-concealing, only in the abyssal ground. Yet the abyss is completely disguised through the 
distorted ground.”470 In what follows, I unpack these terms and relations, defining them in terms 
of the differential logic of the event. I begin with Ab-grund, then turn to Ur-grund, and finally 
move to Un-grund. In brief, Heidegger characterizes Ab-grund as the “the staying away [Weg-
bleiben] of ground,” which gives rise to Ur-grund.471 Ur-grund is ground insofar as it is 
determinate and thus able to “bear” or function as a support (i.e., as “ein Tragen”).472 Un-grund 
is Ur-grund that manifests distortion by occluding Ab-grund. 
 
2.2.1: Ab-grund (Abyssal Ground) 
 
Heidegger defines Ab-grund as “the originary essential occurrence of the ground [ursprüngliche 
Wesung des Grundes].”473 As “originary,” Ab-grund is the most primal of the three modes of 
gründende Grund; it is that dimension of the event whence the other modes of ground are 
originated and gain their grounding characteristics. For Heidegger, “the ground [Grund] is the 
essence of truth,” i.e., it is the clearing for/of self-concealing.474 Describing the essence of truth 
as ground makes sense because the structures of the essence of truth manifest tension or 
resistance capable of bearing more derivative structures. In Chapter II, I showed that the clearing 
for/of self-concealing is the event, insofar at the event originates the structures of truth (clearing, 
concealing, openness, etc.). I also showed that the event is the differentiation of pure difference 
from itself, together with the logic of determinateness this originates, and that “the clearing for/of 
                                                 
470 GA65 380/300. 
471 GA65 379/299. 
472 GA65 379/300. 
473 GA65 379/299. 
474 GA65 379/299. 
  221 
self-concealing” articulates this logic of determinateness in the register of truth. In terms of the 
logic of the event, difference differs from itself, simultaneously drawing itself out or breaching 
open openness and differing from or refusing to be that openness, i.e., originating concealment. 
The origination of the determinate logic of openness and concealment can be defined 
alternatively as the origination of domains of propriety (appropriation) and alienation from 
propriety (expropriation). Together these form a seamless (though structurally distorted) logic of 
determinateness. For Heidegger, to say that “abyssal ground is… the originary essence of the 
ground, of its grounding” means that Ab-grund is the originary essence “of the essence of 
truth.”475 In other words, Ab-grund is that which originates the structures of the essence of truth. 
As such, Ab-grund can be defined in terms of the event. 
Ab-grund has two main aspects. If Ab-grund is that which originates the essential 
structures of truth, one of its aspects is originary difference, insofar as originary difference 
differs from itself (breaching open openness) and simultaneously differs from or withdraws from 
openness (originating concealment). In this aspect, Ab-grund is the track of evental difference 
differing from itself, specifically insofar as this difference withdraws from the structures of the 
essence of truth that it originates. Heidegger describes this as follows: “the abyssal ground, as the 
staying away of the ground…, is the first clearing of the open as ‘emptiness’ [Lichtung des 
Offnen als der ‘Leere’].”476 He then specifies that emptiness here should not be taken “in the 
sense that space and time, as forms of ordering and as frameworks for calculable and objectively 
present things, are simply vacant, i.e., not in the sense of the sheer absence of such things 
therein, but, rather, in the sense of a temporal-spatial emptiness, an originary yawning open in 
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hesitant self-withholding.”477 I understand this to mean that “emptiness” describes the field of 
originary openness as this is generated by the evental dynamics of difference.478 
Yet Ab-grund cannot be defined solely in terms of difference’s role in originating the 
logic of determinateness: the logic of determinateness is originated because beyng as event is at 
its heart pure difference. This difference differs from itself and thereby distends into the logic of 
determinateness. This means that an aspect of beyng as difference is prior to and in excess over 
the logic of determinateness. In Chapter II, I called this excess of difference “primal difference,” 
as opposed to “originary difference,” which is difference insofar as it is involved in the 
origination of the logic of determinateness. Ab-grund in its first aspect as originary difference is 
originary by reason of primal difference. Consequently, Ab-grund is most fundamentally the 
event’s excess of primal difference: difference that exceeds the logic of determinateness. Stated 
differently, this second part of the Ab-grund is the event’s primal self-expropriation or the excess 
of difference differing from itself; it is the abyss of the event’s self-differentiation. 
Though Heidegger does a poor job of distinguishing these two aspects, Ab-grund must 
include both: primal difference and originary difference. Ab-grund is the event insofar as the 
event is primal difference and primal difference gives rise to the originary differentiation of the 
determinate structures of propriety, alienation from propriety, truth, and ground. If the 
origination of the logic of determinateness is the event’s self-intensification, Ab-grund is the 
curve between the intensive structures originated and the difference that differs from them, 
where this curve tends toward primal difference, which has an intensity of zero. 
Ground, insofar as it is determinate and thus able to “bear” or function as a supportive 
ground, is Ur-grund (primordial ground). In contrast to the bearing character of Ur-grund that I 
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will discuss shortly, Heidegger claims that the “mode of grounding” belonging to Ab-grund is 
the staying away (Weg-bleiben) of ground. Yet he also insists that the abyssal staying away of 
ground “is not sheer self-withholding in the sense of sense of simple withdrawal and going 
away” or absence of ground: “the lack of the ground is the lack of the ground” (“der Ab-grund ist 
Ab-grund”).479 Though Heidegger’s limited explanation of these claims is unsatisfying, my 
explanation of Ab-grund in terms of the differential logic of the event can illuminate them. Ab-
grund is the staying away or lack of ground because it is that dimension of evental difference 
that withdraws from the structures of the logic of determinateness. “Ab-grund” designates the 
event’s self-concealing or withdrawal from openness and, exceeding even this, the event’s 
dimension of primal difference. But it is precisely these aspects of Ab-grund that give rise to 
grounding. Thus, the Ab-grund’s mode of grounding is the staying away of ground. As 
Heidegger puts the point, to say that Ab-grund is a staying away of ground means that it is 
“ground in self-concealing, as self-concealing in the mode of the withholding of the ground. Yet 
withholding is not nothing; instead, it is a preeminent and originary kind of leaving unfulfilled, 
leaving empty. It is thereby a preeminent kind of opening up.”480 Ab-grund originates or grounds 
Ur-grund, but it does so precisely insofar as it is an abyss of difference. 
At the same time, from the perspective of Ur-grund, Ab-grund is the lack of the ground, 
i.e., it is the lack of ground inherent to ground. That is, Ur-grund bears an inherent and structural 
reference to this lack or staying away. It does so because Ab-grund is that whence Ur-grund is 
originated. Ab-grund enables Ur-grund to be a ground. 
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Before moving on to define Ur-grund, a final characteristic of Ab-grund must be defined. 
Heidegger uses an opaque term to describe it: “Zögerung” or “hesitancy.”481 Ab-grund “abides in 
hesitancy,” he says.482 The notion of hesitancy becomes particularly important in his account of 
time-space, so it will be helpful to define it here in terms of ground. Heidegger offers a limited 
explanation of hesitancy as follows: “inasmuch as the ground, even and precisely as abyss, still 
grounds and yet does not properly ground, it abides in hesitancy.”483 This sounds rather 
mysterious when read outside of the context of the differential account of the event that I have 
argued for. However, I believe that that account can provide “hesitancy” with a rigorous 
definition. I take the Ab-grund’s hesitancy to be its simultaneous inclination to stay away from 
ground and to ground. In other words, the Ab-grund is hesitant because it is both primal and 
originary difference. Hesitancy describes the liminal character of the event in the register of 
ground. 
 
2.2.2: Ur-grund (Primordial Ground) and Un-grund (Distorted Ground) 
 
The second mode of grounding ground, which I have already begun to define, is Ur-grund or 
primordial ground. If Ab-grund is the event’s abyss of difference or the staying away of the 
ground, then Ur-grund grounds. In and through Ur-grund the event becomes able to bear 
(tragen) what it bears; namely, more derivative ontological structures, worlds of beings, and 
human existence. Ur-grund is the Da of Seyn, or, more precisely, the most originary structures of 
Da-sein. Heidegger elaborates this in terms of the essence of truth and time-space; I will discuss 
the former here and take up its relation to time-space in Section 3. 
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For Heidegger, “the primordial ground (Ur-grund), the one that grounds, is beyng, but in 
each case as essentially occurring in its truth.”484 That is, Ur-grund is the event insofar as the 
event self-intensifies, self-determines, or self-appropriates through the clearing for/of self-
concealing, unfolding the structures of truth. This definition enables a precise reconstruction of 
Heidegger’s concept of Ur-grund in terms of the account of the logic of the event, particularly 
with respect to the origination of the logic of determinateness in terms of the essence of truth. 
This reconstruction requires two things: first, a genetic definition of Ur-grund, i.e., an 
explanation of its origination in terms of the logic of the event; second it requires an explanation 
of the basic mechanism of bearing or grounding that characterizes Ur-grund. 
A genetic definition of Ur-grund can be given fairly straightforwardly, since in Chapter II 
I worked this out in terms of the event’s origination of truth and the domains of propriety and 
alienation from propriety. Stated in terms of truth, evental difference differs from itself 
(abysally), simultaneously drawing itself out or breaching open openness and differing from or 
refusing to be that openness, i.e., originating concealment. As I have shown, Heidegger 
incorporates the terminology of Ab-grund in his explanation of the origination of Ur-grund in a 
way that fits this genetic definition. In this sense, the staying away of Ab-grund (i.e., the event’s 
abyss of difference) originates the Ur-grund (in the guise of the structures of truth): 
 
The staying away of ground – is that not the absence of truth? Yet the hesitant 
self-withholding [of the Ab-grund] is precisely the clearing for concealment and is 
thus the presencing of truth. Certainly, ‘presencing,’ but not in the way something 
objectively present has come to presence; instead, the essential occurrence of 
what first founds [begründet] the presence and absence of beings.485 
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“Ur-grund” names “what first founds the presence and absence of beings,” which 
Heidegger frequently explains in terms of truth. This defines an essential aspect of the event: 
“the event, grasped from the perspective of truth as ground, is … the primordial ground [Ur-
grund].”486 
While these passages define Ur-grund in the terminology of truth, Ur-grund can also be 
given a genetic definition in terms of the event’s operations of appropriation and expropriation 
(as I defined them in Chapter II).487 In the logic of the event, difference differs from itself and by 
doing so distends. This distension is the origination of a field such that some aspect of difference 
is differentiated from some other aspect. Rather than there being pure indeterminateness, 
difference generates determinateness or finitude by generating aspects of itself defined in their 
difference from one another: this distended dimension of difference is difference that comes to 
be defined via the origination of contrast from that difference that refuses to be it. This distention 
is the origination of both a domain of propriety (appropriation) and a domain of alienation from 
propriety (expropriation). A domain of propriety is originated because 1) in the distention of 
difference, aspects of difference become structurally distinguished or determinate and 2) those 
aspects bear constitutive reference to the operation of the event whereby distension is enabled to 
occur, i.e., whereby appropriation is accomplished. It should be added that each aspect is also 
determined by the other, and so each also bears a structural, constitutive reference to the other. 
The distention of difference whereby a domain of propriety is originated simultaneously 
originates a domain of alienation from propriety, for appropriation is accomplished only by the 
refusal or withdrawal of difference from itself. Expropriation is this differentiation of difference 
from itself (as appropriation). In expropriation, that dimension of difference that differs from 
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appropriation becomes determined since it becomes endowed with a structural reference to 
appropriation, namely, one of alienation from or not being proper to appropriation. Expropriation 
is difference that repels or withdraws from the appropriation of the domain of propriety, thereby 
enacting the distension of difference that constitutes that appropriation, but also gaining a 
determinateness of its own, namely as bearing a constitutive reference to that which it refuses to 
be (propriety). The event self-intensifies through the dynamics of appropriation and 
expropriation. In other words, the event originates the Da expressed in the term “Da-sein.” Ur-
grund is constituted by the evental structures of propriety and alienation from propriety. 
The second task required for reconstructing Heidegger’s concept of Ur-grund is to 
explain the basic mechanism of bearing or grounding that characterizes it. This, in turn will 
entail an explanation of the third mode of gründende Grund: Un-grund (distorted ground). At 
one level, Ur-grund is a ground that bears in the same sense that openness and concealment 
ground worlds of beings (in Heidegger’s account prior to Beiträge). I discussed this in Chapter II 
and will not return to it again here since there is a more originary sense of bearing at stake in Ur-
grund. 
At this more originary level, Ur-grund is a ground that bears because it manifests the 
distinction of ontological structures from each other, where those structures are endowed with 
constitutive reference both to their counterpart and to the Ab-grund whence they are originated. 
The origination of these structures is the differentiation between something grounded and 
something serving as the ground enabling it to be or bearing it. The domain of propriety, for 
instance, is borne by the domain of alienation from propriety together with the abyss of 
difference. The domain of alienation is borne by that of propriety and the abyss of difference. In 
the register of truth, openness is borne by originary concealment and the abyss of difference, 
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while originary concealment is born by openness and the abyss of difference. Yet as described in 
terms of the Ab-grund, the whole logic of determinateness that these structures comprise is 
originated by the abyss of difference. 
My hypothesis is that Ur-grund is able to bear derivative ontological structures and 
beings because in it is constituted the structural tension or resistance described in Chapter II.488 
In both structural couplings, “openness and concealment” and “propriety and alienation from 
propriety,” each term is constitutively bound to its counterpart, while also being what it is only 
by being differentiated from that counterpart. I described this in terms of what Heidegger calls 
the simultaneous “strife” and “intimacy” characterizing openness and concealment, which, I 
argued, constitutes a structural tension. The origination of the structures involved in 
simultaneous relations of strife and intimacy is the event’s self-intensification or coagulation, 
i.e., the projection of the Da.  
This intensification also involves the origination of structural distortion, described by 
Heidegger in terms of the distorted essence of truth, the distorted essence of beyng, and, now, the 
distorted ground or Un-grund. Un-grund is the grounding character of the event insofar as the 
event constitutes distortion. As I discussed with respect to the distorted essence of truth in 
Chapter II, the distortion at stake at this level of the event is structural and not to be taken in a 
pejorative sense. Yet it is the ground enabling historical and human errancy, which are to be 
taken in a pejorative sense. In historical and human errancy, distortion is manifested in the 
historical framework of metaphysics, the forgottenness of being, representationalism, 
calculation, machination, etc. Though Un-grund is not the same thing as these distortions, it is 
the ground enabling them and enabling the broader tendency of human existence to become 
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estranged from gründende Grund. Un-grund thus leads to the need for Ergründen or fathoming 
the ground. 
The distortion involved here is the curvature of the event whereby the abyssal logic of 
difference is eclipsed. Vallega-Neu describes this as follows: “When the truth of be-ing [Seyn] 
remains hidden in its occurrence as abyss and in its occurrence as enowning [Ereignis], be-ing 
refuses its essential occurrence and, therefore, sways as unessential ground [Un-grund].”489 This 
account organizes Heidegger’s concepts correctly, but my account of the structural distortion 
belonging to the essence of truth explains evental distortion, rather than just describing it in 
Heidegger’s terms. More precisely, I claim that Un-grund involves two closely related senses of 
structural obscurement: as I defined them in Chapter II, each term of the couplings “openness 
and concealment” and “propriety and alienation from propriety” entails 1) the obscurement of 
the other and 2) the obscurement of aspects of the evental logic of difference whereby the term is 
originated. From its own perspective, the logic of each term of each coupling seems to exclude 
the logic of the other term and vice versa. In terms of truth, neither openness nor concealment is 
adequate to the essence of truth; each entails a blind spot with respect to the other. This 
constitutes a structural distortion: from any point within the logic of determinateness some aspect 
of that logic is obscured. Yet because appropriation/openness and expropriation/concealment are 
generated by one and the same logic of difference, there is, in fact, continuity throughout their 
logics: together they form a continuous logic of determinateness. Additionally, because each 
term entails a structural obscuration of the other, from any position within the logic of 
determinateness aspects of the event whereby the terms of that logic are originated are obscured. 
That is, from within the logic of determinateness aspects of the logic of difference that are 
essential to the event are obscured. These two aspects of structural obscurement constitute what 
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Heidegger calls “resistance” (Widerstand), which he understands to be the most basic negativity 
belonging to beyng as event. A consequence of this (as I highlighted earlier) is that the genesis of 
the logic of determinateness entails that all aspects of the determinateness generated bear a 
structural alienation from evental difference, i.e., from what enables them to be: the Ab-grund.  
The tension and resistance constituted in Ur-grund and Un-grund enable beyng as event 
to bear (that is, to support) more derivative structures and ultimately worlds of beings. Such 
tension and resistance constitute an ontological viscosity or Heideggerian version of inertia. The 
derivative structures borne are folds and complications of this tension. Their genesis should in 
principle be traceable from out of the logic of the event. It is in this sense that Heidegger 
describes the grounding character of ground as a protruding (Durchragen): “And what is the 
ground? It is that which veils itself and also takes up [Sichverhüllende-Aufnehmen], because it 
bears [weil ein Tragen] and does so as the protruding [Durchragen] of what is to be 
grounded.”490 This protruding is the self-intensification of the event, a crystal growing out of 
pure difference. The grounding function of the event, i.e., the way it enables something more 
derivative to be, is the track of the logic of tension whereby that thing is generated. Since that 
tension is itself partially generated by the event’s dimension of self-concealing and also 
essentially includes structural distortion, gründende Grund essentially includes modes of self-
concealing. Thus, in Heidegger’s condensed technical formulation, ground is “das Sichverbergen 
im tragenden Durchragen” or “self-concealing in a protrusion that bears.”491 
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3: The Event and Time-Space (Zeit-Raum) 
 
As is well known, Heidegger consistently argues that the problematic of time is essential to the 
problematic of being.492 In Beiträge he posits that space is equiprimordial to time and that both 
are originated by an ontological process that is neither properly temporal nor spatial. He 
designates this process “Zeit-Raum” or “time-space.”493 As I have argued, the more prominent 
components of Heidegger’s ontology in Beiträge are underwritten by the differential logic of the 
event. The event is the differentiation of difference from itself together with the ontological 
structures originated thereby and the primal difference that exceeds those structures. By 
engaging the notions of truth and ground, I have analyzed two of the three core registers in terms 
of which those structures are articulated. Time-space is the third. The ontological structures 
composing truth, ground, and time-space are all originated by the same evental factor: the abyss 
of difference or the differentiation of difference from itself. Stated more precisely, the essence of 
these ontological structures is the abyss of difference, particularly insofar as that difference 
originates the logic of determinateness or the Da expressed in the term “Da-sein.” In the register 
of truth, this essence is named “Lichtung” or “clearing,” in that of ground, it is named “Ab-
grund” or “abyssal ground,” and in that of temporality and spatiality, it is named “Zeit-Raum” or 
“time-space.”  
Heidegger’s discussion of time-space is framed by a brief and condensed summary of the 
failings he finds in the historical treatment of time and space. This summary is discontinuous, 
incomplete, and contains several statements that are not well explained in the text. For my 
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purposes of explicating time-space in relation to the event, these shortcomings of the text are not 
detrimental. In order to move to Heidegger’s direct treatment of time-space, I need only 
summarize the problem he sees in traditional accounts of time and space and establish how time-
space is grounded in the structure of the event. 
 
3.1: A Problem with Traditional Accounts of Time and Space 
 
Heidegger sees the central problem with the historical treatment of space and time as the ways in 
which they are represented as categorically distinct schemata or forms of order. Such a 
representation, Heidegger argues, rests upon certain mistaken historical and metaphysical 
presuppositions. To elaborate this, he engages a large number of canonical figures, but comments 
most extensively on three: Aristotle, Descartes (under the rubric of “the modern era” as a whole), 
and Kant. In brief, these presuppositions are rooted in Aristotle’s interpretation of being as οὐσία 
and thereby in terms of the time determination of presence. Here, “posited along with presence is 
the πέρας [‘limit’], the περιέχον [‘that which encloses’].”494 The result, Heidegger states, is that 
“for Aristotle… the ποῦ [‘where’] and the ποτέ [‘when’] are categories, determinations of 
beingness, of οὐσία.”495 In the modern era, space and time become represented as schemata for 
mathematical calculation. This is exemplified by the Cartesian coordinate system used for 
plotting mathematical points in three-dimensional space. Adding a fourth, temporal dimension 
here adds another order, one in which changes in position or changes in the values of a function 
can be plotted over time. With Kant, the positions of space and time shift: they become part of 
the subject’s cognitive apparatus, rather than objective milieux within which the subject is 
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located. As is well known, Kant argues that space and time are the forms of outer and inner 
intuition. All three of these examples share the conviction that time and space are entirely 
distinct forms of order. 
The representation of space and time as categorically distinct forms of order fails in each 
instance, Heidegger suggests, because in such a representation the concept of space entails 
temporal determinations and the concept of time entails spatial determinations. In other words, 
the absolute categorical distinction can never be established because spatiality and temporality 
are intrinsically intertwined. The temporal order is represented in one way or another as a “space 
of time” (Zeitraum): the span between  and , for instance.496 Likewise, space, having no 
duration in itself, is purely present. As Heidegger makes the point, “in a particular respect, space 
can be represented as an ordo and as the sphere for things conjointly at hand, which indicates 
that space, as so represented, is representable in terms of a presencing (a determinate mode of 
temporality).”497 In fact, Heidegger emphasizes, “space and time… [have been] thought together 
since antiquity.”498 Despite the best efforts of the tradition to represent space and time as purely 
distinct orders, this codetermination remains and indicates to Heidegger that space and time are 
ontologically entwined in some manner. 
This does not mean that Heidegger collapses space and time into one order. He does not 
hold, for example, that time-space is a four-dimensional fabric of reality. Instead, he maintains 
that time and space are radically distinct, but that their distinction is generated by a shared 
process of origination. Their entwinement is found in this origin. 
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Space and time are not only different in the number of “dimensions” they are 
ordinarily thought to possess but are also radically different, different in their 
most proper essence, and only in virtue of this extreme difference do they point 
back to their origin, time-space. The more purely the proper essence of each is 
preserved and the deeper their origin is placed, so much more readily is their 
essence grasped as time-space in its belonging to the essence of truth as clearing 
ground for concealment.499 
 
The question, then, becomes how to understand spatiality and temporality, both with 
respect to their radical distinctness and their entwinement in a shared ontological origin. For 
when we inquire into the essence of either space or time, the concept of the one implicates the 
other; yet space and time are not one and the same thing. Obviously, Heidegger put a great deal 
of effort into rethinking the nature of time and space in the years prior to Beiträge.500 In 
Beiträge, Heidegger advances his account to a position on the diagenic axis more originary than 
the one given in Sein und Zeit, for example: rather than understanding time to be the ecstatic 
structure of human Dasein’s existence and the horizon for the understanding of being, time and 
space are grounded in time-space, which is a process of the event and as such is diagenically 
prior to human existence and the constitution of worlds of beings. It is important to emphasize 
that this undermines the tradition’s representations of time and space because it undermines the 
whole machinery of representation. It does so by moving to a ground that is more originary than 
representation: “the issue here is not at all the mere modification of representation and of the 
directionality of representation; rather, what is called for is a dislodging of the essence of the 
human being into Da-sein.”501 Heidegger rethinks temporality and spatiality on the basis of time-
space, defining them with the technical terms “Entrückung” or “transporting” and “Berückung” 
or “captivation.” I return to these terms shortly. 
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3.3: Preliminary Clarification of Time-Space 
 
Heidegger writes, “Time and space, as belonging to the essence of truth, are originally united in 
time-space and are the abyssal grounding of the ‘there’; through the ‘there,’ selfhood and what is 
true of beings first come to be grounded.”502 In the following sections of this chapter, I use my 
earlier reconstruction of Heidegger’s account of the event, truth, and ground to explicate his 
understanding of time-space. This, in turn, will offer a more detailed picture of the structure of 
the event. 
First, a few preliminary clarifications and terminological distinctions must be made. As 
indicated above, for Heidegger time-space is not the same as time and space. It is the ground 
enabling time and space to be. That is, time and space are generated by or unfold from time-
space: “space and time, each represented for itself and in their usual conjunction, arise out of 
time-space, which is more originary than they themselves and than their calculatively 
represented conjunction.”503 In Beiträge §§238-242, Heidegger’s use of the terms “space” and 
“time” often signify the spatial and temporal dimensions of the event insofar as these dimensions 
are governed by the historical determination and conceptual structure of metaphysics. For the 
sake of consistency in my analysis, I will reserve this sense for the terms “space” and “time.” In 
contrast, the terms “spatiality” and “temporality” will designate the spatial and temporal 
dimensions generated by the event and understood on the basis of the event. These terms 
designate space and time as properly grounded, not metaphysically represented. Within this 
context, “Räumung” or “spatialization” and “Zeitigung” or “temporalization” name the 
operations of time-space by which the event becomes spatial and temporal, that is, generates 
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spatiality and temporality. “Time-space” designates the operation of the event by which the event 
spatializes and temporalizes itself, together with that spatialization and temporalization. My main 
goal will be to reconstruct Heidegger’s account of time-space, its processes of temporalization 
and spatialization, and the connection of all this to the event. 
Heidegger begins his account of time-space by orienting time-space in relation to the 
essence of truth and the event. Time-space and truth, Heidegger argues, have a co-determinative 
relationship. In one sense, time-space belongs to the essence of truth: “time-space belongs to 
truth in the sense of the originating essential occurrence of being as event.”504 In another sense, a 
full understanding of truth requires elaborating it in terms of time-space: “what truth itself is 
cannot be immediately and sufficiently said in itself, but only in grasping time-space.”505 That is, 
explaining time-space offers a more detailed account of the essence of truth and the event. “The 
question,” though, “is how and in what guise time-space belongs to truth.”506 I take the basic 
answer to be that truth is a primary conceptual register for articulating the Da in “Da-sein,” while 
time-space does the same thing in a different register. Working out the nature of time-space 
provides greater elaboration of the ontological origination and structure of the Da. Heidegger 
makes this point as follows: we must understand “time-space as arising out of, and belonging to, 
the essence of truth and as the thereby grounded structure (joining) of the ‘there,’ a structure of 
transport-captivation [Entrückungs-Berückungsgefüge].”507 Here, the concept of “transport” 
articulates the structure of temporalization, while the concept of “captivation” does the same for 
spatialization. Temporality and spatiality are two structures of the Da. 
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3.4: Time-Space, Temporality, and Spatiality as Defined by the Logic of the Event 
 
Heidegger offers two working definitions of time-space, the first focused on a notion of 
“sundering” and the second on “gathering:” 
 
Time-space is the appropriated sundering [Erklüftung] of the turning paths 
[Kehrungsbahnen] of the event, the sundering of the turning between belonging 
[Zugehörigkeit] and call [Zuruf], between abandonment by being 
[Seinsverlassenheit] and beckoning intimation [Erwinkung].508 
 
Time-space is the gathering [sammelnde] embrace [Umhalt] that captivates and 
transports at once; it is the abyssal ground which is structured [gefügte] in this 
way, which disposes [stimmende] accordingly, and whose essential occurrence 
becomes historical [geschichtlich] in the grounding of the ‘there’ by Da-sein (by 
its essential paths of sheltering [Bergung] the truth).509 
 
 
While their cryptic terminology in these passages is off-putting, the text offers a key for 
deciphering them: 
 
Even in their unity, space and time have nothing in common; instead, what unifies 
them, what allows them to emerge in [an] … inseparable referentiality, is time-
space, the abyssal grounding of the ground: the essential occurrence of truth. This 
e-mergence [Ent-springen], however, is not a tearing off [Losriß]; just the 
opposite: time-space is merely the unfolding of the essence of the essential 
occurrence of truth [Wesensentfaltung der Wesung der Wahrheit].510 
 
 
This allows us to see that time-space is the abyssal grounding of the ground. It is the 
essential occurrence of truth or, rather, the unfolding of the essence of the essence of truth. My 
previous analysis of these aspects of the event and the differential logic defining them provides a 
basis for defining the terminology in these passages and, in turn, reconstructing Heidegger’s 
account of time-space itself. In the differential logic of the event, the abyss is originary 
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difference together with the track of primal difference that exceeds the logic of determination. In 
the register of truth, the abyssal differentiation of difference from itself is the clearing or 
sundering whereby openness and concealment are originated. The “unfolding of the essence of 
the essence of truth” is the clearing or sundering of difference into the co-determinate structures 
of openness and concealment. In the register of ground, the “abyssal grounding of the ground” is 
the liminal differentiation of difference from itself, or the staying away of ground whereby Ur-
grund and Un-grund are originated. In terms of the event itself, the genetic operation described is 
that by which the event self-determines (appropriates and expropriates) in structures of propriety 
and alienation from propriety, while this operation is enabled by the primal expropriation of 
difference that exceeds those structures. Consequently, given Heidegger’s definitions, time-space 
is at root this same evental process, the abyssal differentiation of difference from itself whereby 
the event originates a logic of determinateness. But here, that logic of determinateness is the 
logic of temporality and spatiality. Time-space is the event insofar as the event temporalizes and 
spatializes itself (i.e., originates temporality and spatiality) by the abyssal differentiation of 
difference from itself. It is the operation of the event by which the event becomes temporal and 
spatial. 
 Even if all this is accepted, a major question is still on the table: how, exactly, does the 
event’s differential logic temporalize and spatialize? Answering this requires defining the key 
terms used in the passages cited above, as well as a few additional terms. This will ultimately 
lead to a definition of transporting or temporalization and captivation or spatialization as 
structures unfolded from the event. 
To begin, I return to the partial definition of time-space in the first passage just cited (the 
“sundering” definition of time-space) and its claim that “appropriated sundering of the turning 
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paths of the event.” Good sense can be made of this because these terms have been defined 
already in the terminologies of truth and the event itself. “Sundering” occurs at two essentially 
related levels here. At the first level, in the terminology of truth, the sundering of the turning 
paths of the event is the clearing of openness from concealment and concealment from openness, 
i.e., the differentiation of difference from itself such that it simultaneously modulates into these 
counter-posed but co-determinative structures. Likewise, in the terminology of the event itself, 
the sundering is the twisting apart or splitting accomplished in difference’s simultaneous self-
appropriation and -expropriation in the structures of propriety and alienation from propriety. At 
the second, most fundamental level, sundering must also refer to the simultaneous, dual 
inclinations of the event toward the logic of determinateness and toward the abyss of primal 
difference. In both the terminology of truth and that of the event itself, the “turning paths of the 
event” are the tracks of the event’s self-determination into the counter-posed moments of the 
logic of determinateness and, more fundamentally, the tracks of the event insofar as it inclines 
toward both determinateness and the abyss. Consequently, if time-space is the appropriated 
sundering of the turning paths of the event, this should be taken to mean that time-space is the 
evental differentiation of difference from itself insofar as this originates (or appropriates itself in) 
a logic of determinateness comprised of counter-posed structures of spatiality and temporality. 
The turning paths here are the event’s logics of spatialization and temporalization.  
 We shouldn’t be thrown off by Heidegger’s specification of the sundering involved in 
time-space as a “sundering of the turning between belonging [Zugehörigkeit] and call [Zuruf], 
between abandonment by being [Seinsverlassenheit] and beckoning intimation [Erwinkung].” 
Rather, this confirms the account I have just given. Within the context of the event, belonging or 
Zugehörigkeit is exactly the constitutive structural reference that (together with the 
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differentiation of distinct aspects of a structure) defines the domain of propriety.511 Call or Zuruf 
is the constitutive structural reference characterizing the domain of alienation from propriety 
insofar as that reference is one by which that domain is defined in its withdrawal or contrast from 
the domain of propriety, i.e., from that from which it is alienated. The structural reference to the 
domain of propriety that is inscribed in the domain of alienation constitutes a drag within or 
“call” to the domain of alienation. Likewise, at the more fundamental level, Erwinkung or 
beckoning intimation is the recession of the abyss of difference insofar as this draws the event 
into determinate structures like openness and concealment, propriety and alienation from 
propriety. Heidegger uses the notion of Seinsverlassenheit or abandonment by being frequently 
to describe the state of human existence and its alienation from being. At the level of the event, 
however, the abandonment by being cannot be defined in terms of human existence, since what 
is at stake is the structural ground enabling human beings to be at all. Instead it must articulate a 
structural aspect of the event. At the level of the event, the abandonment by being is the 
alienation from the event’s abyssal dimension that is necessarily constituted in the logic of 
determinateness insofar as that logic entails structural distortion (in the distorted essence of truth, 
distorted ground, etc.). In other words, and for that reason, the logic of determinateness is 
characterized by an abandonment by being. What remains to be seen is how these characteristics 
become manifested by the spatialization and temporalization of the event. 
 Before turning to the terminology presented in the second definition of time-space quoted 
at the start of this section (the one focused on “gathering”), it is necessary to elaborate on some 
of the terms I have just defined. This will allow the definition of a set of additional terms that are 
needed to make sense of the “gathering” definition. I return first to intimation. “Intimation” is a 
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term Heidegger uses to describe an aspect of the event’s genetic operation. It plays an important 
role in his explanation of transporting and captivation. Heidegger writes: 
 
The intimation [Wink] is the hesitant self-withholding. The self-withholding 
creates not only the emptiness of privation and austerity but also, along with 
these, an emptiness as one that is in itself transporting, i.e., transporting into the 
‘to come’ [Künftigkeit] and thereby simultaneously bursting open what has been 
[Gewesendes]. The latter, by making an impact together with what is to come, 
constitutes the present [Gegenwart] as a move into [Einrückung] the abandonment 
that remembers and expects [erinnernd-erharrende].512 
 
As with Ab-grund, time-space’s intimation entails a character of hesitancy. Earlier in this 
chapter I defined hesitancy within the register of ground. There, hesitancy describes Ab-grund’s 
liminal status. In other words, Ab-grund’s character of hesitancy is its simultaneous inclination to 
stay away from ground and to ground via it’s origination of the structures of primordial ground. 
This is not simply to say that the abyss performs two different actions, but that it is 
simultaneously inclined in these two ways. This character of Ab-grund is also found in the 
structure of the event more generally. In Chapter II, I explained that evental differentiation is 
liminal in character because it simultaneously includes both an aspect determined in the logic of 
appropriation and expropriation and an aspect exceeding that logic (primal difference).513 The 
event has a character of hesitancy because its differential logic is simultaneously inclined in both 
of these ways. The abyss’ hesitancy is its simultaneous inclination to determine or intensify itself 
and refuse itself from determination or to tend toward an intensity of zero. The same thing 
applies to abyssal difference rendered as time-space. Time-space is hesitant because it is liminal 
with respect to temporality and spatiality: time-space is the abyss of difference that exceeds the 
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logic of spatiality and temporality, but simultaneously originates and becomes determined in that 
logic. Hesitancy is a tension held between the dual inclinations of the event. 
To see what hesitancy has to do with temporality and spatiality, it will be helpful to jump 
ahead for a moment. As I will show, temporality is the entirety of the logic of the event, run 
through in the direction of one of these inclinations, while spatiality is the entirety of the logic of 
the event run through in the other direction. The “to come” or futural aspect of temporality is 
primal difference, insofar as this exceeds the logic of determinateness and intimates its self-
distention, i.e., originates that logic. “What has been” or the “past” aspect of temporality is the 
logic of determinateness, insofar as this trails behind the “to come” or abyssal recession of 
difference. In the concept of hesitancy, the inclination toward the abyss of difference prefigures 
transporting or the temporalization of the event, while the inclination toward determinateness 
prefigures captivation or the spatialization of the event.  
Returning to hesitancy for a moment, if the hesitancy of the event is its dual inclination to 
determine itself and to withdraw or withhold itself from that determination, Heidegger uses the 
phrase “hesitant self-withholding” to designate the latter of these inclinations – the inclination of 
evental difference to withdraw or withhold itself from self-determination. But the abyss’ hesitant 
self-withholding (the recession of difference from itself) generates the distention constituting the 
Da or the logic of determinateness. This is the sense of Heidegger’s claim that “the hesitant 
withholding is the intimation that beckons Da-sein.”514 That is, the abyss withdraws and thereby 
beckons or calls and originates Da-sein.  
As I have discussed in other contexts, one of the primary structures of the Da “intimated” 
or generated here is originary “Leere” or “emptiness.” In the logic of the event, difference differs 
from itself and by doing so distends. This distension is the clearing or breaching open of 
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originary openness, “the first clearing of the open as ‘emptiness.’”515 Originary openness is a 
basic structure of the Da that is diagenically prior to more derivative ontological structures and 
worlds of beings, which it will help ground. In this sense, originary openness is not populated by 
anything, it is empty. Originary openness is an originary emptiness, not in the sense of an empty 
vessel, but (as I discussed when I was treating the notion of ground), “in the sense of a temporal-
spatial emptiness, an originary yawning open in hesitant self-withholding.”516 Here, emptiness 
should not be confused with the abyss. Since emptiness is a structure of the Da, its origination is 
a coagulation, intensification, or “protrusion” of the event. Since Da-sein is the event insofar as it 
determines itself through self-appropriation or, in terms of truth, the clearing of/for self-
concealment, emptiness is in fact a surging forth or self-protrusion of the event. Heidegger’s 
account of the intimation of emptiness is important here because it prefigures his account of 
spatialization. The logic of the event running from the abyss of primal difference to the breaching 
open of originary emptiness or openness (and the other structures of the Da) is one way of 
describing the spatialization of the event. The breaching open of openness is the origination of a 
distended field or space. 
 Heidegger’s concept of hesitancy prefigures his concepts of transporting or 
temporalization and captivation or spatialization. The evental structure of hesitancy is elaborated 
in terms of “Verlassenheit” or “abandonment.” As is well known, Heidegger usually uses the 
term “abandonment” to describe the alienation of human existence from being. However, as with 
the other terms used in the context of his account of time-space, here “abandonment” names a 
complex structure of the event. It has two essential dimensions: it “originally occurs as 
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remembering and expecting [erinnernd-erwartend].”517 An account of these structures of 
remembering and expecting comprising abandonment can bring us a step closer to Heidegger’s 
account of transporting and captivation. 
Remembering and expecting are usually taken to be cognitive behaviors attributed to 
human beings and other animals. What sense can these terms have in the present context, dealing 
with structures of the event that are ontologically prior to the constitution of any beings? 
Heidegger clarifies their sense in a parenthetical remark: what remembering remembers is “a 
hidden belonging to beyng” and what expecting expects is the “call of beyng.”518 Generally 
speaking, something does not bear the character of abandonment without bearing the trace of 
what it was abandoned by, i.e., without bearing a “remembrance” or inscription referring to what 
it was abandoned by. Without such a reference to that from which the alien is alienated, it is not 
alienated. Without that trace, the abandoned would not be abandoned, it would just be. It is this 
trace structure that remembering and expecting. 
As I have established, the event’s self-determination in the structures of the Da is enabled 
by the recession of abyssal difference. Additionally, the structures of the Da necessarily entail 
the distortion described by distorted ground and the distorted essence of truth. In that distortion, 
the structures of the Da obscure parts of other structures of the Da and, most importantly, 
obscure the abyssal dimension of the event whence they are originated. In this sense, the 
structures of the Da are characterized by an “abandonment” by or alienation from beyng. In this 
setting, if “remembering” remembers a hidden belonging to beyng, that belonging is the 
constitutive structural reference of the Da to that whence it is originated: the event’s abyss of 
difference. This belonging is hidden on account of the obscuration involved in distortion. In 
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contrast, if “expecting” expects the call of beyng, that call is the exact same constitutive 
structural reference of the Da to the abyss of difference, but with respect to the possibility that 
what has become alienated can turn back toward the abyss and be articulated in terms of the 
abyssal logic. Remembering and expecting, taken together, form a temporal loop in the logic of 
the event. Remembering traces the logic of the event in the sequence of the origination of the Da 
out of the abyss and into the structures of distortion. On the other hand, expecting traces the logic 
of the event in the sequence from the Da’s structures of distortion into the abyss. This loop is not 
a duration, but a movement of the genetic “temporality” of the event. Abandonment can be 
characterized by remembering and expecting only because the trace of what has abandoned 
remains essentially determinative of the structure of what has been abandoned.  
This brings us to a point where Heidegger’s account of the processes of temporalization 
and spatialization can be defined. Again, Heidegger uses the technical term “Entrückung” or 
“transporting” to articulate the temporalization of the event. Transporting is the originary essence 
of temporality. The event’s abyssal dimension is the differentiation of difference from itself, 
such that difference distends and originates the logic of determinateness or structures of the Da 
(openness and concealment, primordial ground, temporality and spatiality, and the distortion 
entailed in these). The logic of the event is “hesitant” insofar as it simultaneously inclines both 
toward self-intensification in the Da and toward the abyss of primal difference, which has an 
intensity of zero. The event’s hesitancy, moreover, bears the trace structure described by 
abandonment and its modes of remembering and expecting. Transporting or the temporalization 
of the event is the event insofar as it constitutes a genetic sequence or an order of origination and 
structures originated, i.e., an order of grounding and structures grounded. In other words, 
transporting is the event insofar as the event originates diagenic axes. Here, that which comes 
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first and gives rise to what comes after is the futural dimension of the event, or what Heidegger 
refers to as the “to come.” The “to come” is the abyss of difference differing from itself. In 
contrast, “what has been” is that which the abyss has given rise to: the structures of the logic of 
determinacy and their unfolding in more derivative structures of finitude. Transporting or 
temporalization is the logic of the event insofar as it is oriented toward the abyss. In other words, 
“transporting” is the event insofar as the structures of the Da are originated (“intimated” or 
“beckoned”) by the abyss as it withdraws. Temporally speaking, the structures of the Da are the 
wake of the abyss. Yet by reason of the withdrawal of abyssal difference, the event is 
simultaneously the origination of the logic of determinateness or “what has been,” and this 
comprises part of the structure of temporality as well. Taking this into account, transporting must 
be said to be the structure of the event insofar as it simultaneously develops into what has been 
and what is to come, while both of these temporal dimensions are oriented by their structural 
reference to the abyss’ withdrawal.  
If transporting is the technical term Heidegger uses for temporalization, “Berückung” or 
“captivation” is what he uses for spatialization: “captivation is the spatialization of the event.”519 
Captivation is the origination of a structural distention. Such distention is the constitution or 
determination of differentiated structures of the event. I have defined core parts of this process 
already in terms of the event’s origination of “emptiness” or breaching open of openness, 
together with self-concealment. Here, difference differs from itself and distends, opening up a 
field of constitutive referentiality. The same operation is articulated by the origination of a 
domain of propriety. Moreover, the spatiality originated here includes the differential “distance” 
or distention between openness and concealment, the domain of propriety and that of alienation 
from propriety. Captivation, as the spatialization of the event, articulates exactly the same logic 
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of the event as temporalization, but in the opposite direction. Captivation is the event’s 
inclination toward self-determination in the structures of the Da. It is the logic of the event run in 
a trajectory from the abyss of difference to the logic of determinateness. Captivation names the 
clearing of the abyss of difference from itself, the distention that generates, and the breaching 
open of an open realm that this enables.  
To draw these core concepts together, in Heidegger’s ontology, time-space is the abyssal 
dimension of the event insofar as this self-temporalizes (transporting) and self-spatializes 
(captivation). Spatialization and temporalization are each the entirety of the logic of the event 
(the logic of determinateness together with the abyss of primal difference), but in inverted orders. 
Time-space is thus both 1) the shared origin of the temporalization and spatialization of the event 
and 2) that which constitutes their radical distinction in two different orders.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In Chapter I of this dissertation, I proposed an interpretive methodology for making sense of the 
development of Heidegger’s ontology over his career and, in particular, for making sense of his 
concept of event within that development. That methodology is organized around the relation 
between grounded and grounding terms and the distinction between syngenic axes (or axes of the 
grounded) and diagenic axes (or axes of ground) in Heidegger’s work. Rather than a 
chronological interpretation of Heidegger’s concepts, they should be interpreted in terms of their 
positions on these axes, i.e., their positions in Heidegger’s ontology as it advances along a 
diagenic axis. My position is that Heidegger’s account of the event in Beiträge and the related 
private manuscripts represents the rendition of his ontology in its state most advanced along a 
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diagenic axis. In Chapter I, I also established the basic philosophical framework in Sein und Zeit 
from which the evolution in his later work proceeded. Of particular importance was the 
formulation of the project of fundamental ontology in terms of the existential analysis of Dasein.  
In Beiträge, Heidegger argues that the problematic of the essence of truth is the 
problematic preliminary to that of beyng as event. In Chapter II, I began by working through the 
problematic of truth, proceeding from Sein und Zeit to “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” and finally to 
Beiträge. In Sein und Zeit, truth is grounded in the structure of the human being’s or Dasein’s 
existence and is manifest in the unconcealment and concealment of beings. This forms the first 
of two stages in Heidegger’s a-lēthic account of truth. In “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit,” the 
essence of truth moves to a position more originary on the diagenic axis than human existence. 
In that text, the problematic of being is cast in terms of the structures of ἀλήθεια or originary 
openness and λήθη or originary concealment, which enable human existence to be. This forms 
the second stage in Heidegger’s a-lēthic account of truth. Most Heidegger scholars hold that the 
treatment of the essence of truth in Beiträge remains within the scope of the second a-lēthic 
account. Since the problematic of truth prefigures that of beyng as event, this directly shapes the 
way these scholars understand Heidegger’s concept of event. In this case, the event is cast in 
terms of ἀλήθεια and λήθη or other concepts syngenically related to these. As I argued, however, 
this is a mistake that results in botching Heidegger’s ontology of the event. In Beiträge, 
Heidegger inquires into the ground whence ἀλήθεια and λήθη are generated, a ground prior on 
the diagenic axis to those structures. This ground is the pure difference or differentiation of 
difference from itself that Heidegger holds characterizes beyng as event at the most fundamental 
level. Consequently, Heidegger’s account of the essence of truth in Beiträge does not remain 
within the second a-lēthic stage, but moves to a third, differential one. Establishing this provided 
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me the basis for elaborating the logic of the differential heart of the event in terms of the 
structures of the essence of truth and then in terms of appropriation and expropriation, i.e., for 
providing a partial definition of the event in Beiträge. In Chapter III, I rounded out this definition 
by reconstructing Heidegger’s account of ground and time-space as further essential registers in 
which the structure of the event is elaborated. 
On the basis of my analyses of the problematics of truth, ground, and time-space in their 
relation to the event, a detailed definition of Heidegger’s conception of the event can now be 
given. In Heidegger’s ontology, beyng as event is the differentiation of difference from itself, 
together with the structures of the Da or the logic of determinateness thereby originated and the 
abyss of primal difference that is irreducible to that logic. The structures of the Da, and thereby 
of the event, are articulated in a set of correlated registers: truth, ground, time-space, and the 
event’s logic of appropriation and expropriation. In terms of truth, the event’s differentiation of 
difference originates the determinate structures of openness, self-concealing, and the distorted 
essence of truth. In terms of ground, the event’s abyss of difference operates as Ab-grund, 
originating the structures of Ur-grund and Un-grund. It is on the basis of these ontological 
structures that historical human existence both becomes alienated from beyng and has the ability 
to re-ground itself in the logic of the event by way of fathoming the ground. In terms of space-
time, space-time is the abyssal dimension of the event insofar as this is hesitant or 
simultaneously inclines toward both the primal excess of difference and the logic of 
determinateness. Space-time originates both spatiality and temporality via the processes of 
captivation (the becoming spatial of the event) and transporting (the becoming temporal of the 
event). Captivation and transporting are each the entirety of the logic of the event, but run 
through in inverted orders.  
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 In the final two chapters of this dissertation, I turn to Deleuze’s ontology of the event as 
presented in Différence et répétition. I spend a good deal of time analyzing Deleuze’s ontology 
on its own terms, but one of my fundamental claims is that to come to grips with the full 
significance of the concept of event in Deleuze’s thought, its significance for Heidegger must be 
taken into account. Throughout my analysis of Deleuze, I highlight points of comparison and 
avenues of direct and indirect Heideggerian influence on Deleuze’s ontology. Of particular note 
are the two philosophers’ shared commitment to the critique of representationalism and of 
ontologies of substance in the Aristotelian tradition, Deleuze’s engagement with Heidegger’s 
ontological difference, the role in each ontology of a conception of difference more fundamental 
than the ontological difference, overlaps in Heidegger and Deleuze’s conceptions of ground and 
time, and Heidegger and Deleuze’s shared commitment to developing versions of what I have 
called “ontological realism” or accounts of ontological structures that are prior to and generative 
of human existence. In Chapter V, I examine in detail an avenue of Heideggerian influence on 
Deleuze via the twentieth century French mathematician and philosopher, Albert Lautman, 
which has until now been largely unexplored. Lautman developed a metamathematics or 
metaphysics of mathematics that drew heavily on Heidegger, particularly in order to construct a 
theory of non-mathematical dialectical Ideas or problems and their relation to mathematical 
theoretical solution fields. Deleuze’s ontology in Différence et répétition adopts much of this 
theory directly, which supplies the overall structure of his ontology and shapes the context in 
which his concept of event must be defined. 
Furthermore, the key role the concept of event plays in both Heidegger and Deleuze’s 
ontologies sets a framework for direct systematic comparison between the two. As I will show in 
Chapter V, points for such comparison are found in 1) the status of determinate and 
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indeterminate difference within the logic of the event, 2) the nature of differential relations 
within that logic, 3) the presence of completely determined coordinates or what Deleuze calls 
“singularities” in the logic of determinateness, 4) the genetic progression unfolding from the 
event, i.e., the way an event composes or changes the field of determinate ontological structures 
and worlds of beings, and 5) ways in which an event can and cannot interrupt the logic of 
determinateness and fundamentally reconfigure it. 
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Part Two: Deleuze’s Evental Ontology 
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Chapter IV 
 
Deleuze: Difference and the Theory of Systems of Simulacra 
 
Chapter Overview 
 
A set of crucial links exist between Heidegger and Deleuze’s ontologies of the event. I discuss 
several of these in the following two chapters, yet two are of distinctive importance. First, 
Heidegger’s ontology of the event specifically grounds the logic of beyng as event in a concept 
of pure difference. As I have argued, the logic of the event can be unfolded in terms of that 
difference, even though Heidegger developed this logic explicitly only to a degree. Deleuze 
picks up the project of working out a differential ontology and this becomes a core focus of his 
1968 Différence et répétition. There, he provides a much more detailed analysis of difference 
than Heidegger and on this basis proposes a transformed ontology of the event. Through these 
innovations, Deleuze’s ontology follows through with the Heideggerian project, but surpasses it 
in a number of ways. Second, Deleuze’s ontology was profoundly influenced by Heideggerian, 
both directly and indirectly. Yet Deleuze rarely flagged his engagements with Heidegger. 
Consequently, they have been regularly overlooked in scholarship. Of particular importance is an 
indirect line of influence via Deleuze’s engagement with Albert Lautman’s metamathematical 
theory, which supplied much of the structure for Deleuze’s ontology. Understanding Deleuze’s 
theory of events requires understanding their ontological status and roles as part of that structure. 
Lautman developed his metamathematical theory in large part through an extensive engagement 
with Heidegger. Consequently, as I shall argue in Chapter V, registering the indirect influence of 
Heidegger on Deleuze via Lautman is crucial for making sense of Deleuze’s account of events.  
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In Chapter IV and especially Chapter V I address the influence of Heidegger on Deleuze 
extensively. I also reconstruct Deleuze’s ontology of events on his own terms. Making sense of 
this ontology requires making sense of the conceptual framework in which he understands events 
to operate, a framework that in comparison with the tradition of philosophy presents a radically 
revised vision of the world. Deleuze’s world is not one of self-identical beings enduring through 
time, but of a roiling entanglement of simulacra. Though I will provide a preliminary analysis of 
Deleuze’s concept of event in terms of his third synthesis of time, my primary goal in this 
chapter (which focuses on Différence et répétition, Chapter I) is to set the proper conceptual 
frame within which I can provide an analysis of Deleuze’s ontology of events in Chapter V 
(which focuses on Différence et répétition, Chapter IV). For Deleuze, being is difference, but 
difference different/ciates by way of events. Different/ciation describes the processes of 
determination through which simulacra are individuated. Explaining this requires a series of 
steps, each of which I will justify in what follows. In Section 1 of this chapter I begin by 
outlining the basic concerns of Deleuze’s project in Différence et répétition and a set of the most 
important points of contact with Heidegger (including the two just mentioned). These points 
show both the consonance of Heidegger and Deleuze’s ontologies and frame ways in which the 
latter ultimately goes beyond the former. That section provides an introduction to both this 
chapter and Part Two of the dissertation more broadly. Section 2 analyzes the core problems that 
organize Deleuze’s ontology: the subjection of difference to identity, the reduction of repetition 
to generality, and the perpetuation of the conceptual framework of representation. Here, I focus 
on Deleuze’s engagement with Aristotle, whose equivocal categorial system Deleuze finds to 
exemplify these problems. In Section 3, I turn to Deleuze’s analysis of ontological univocity. 
Arguing that being is univocal, rather than equivocal, forms a key step in Deleuze’s project of 
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developing affirmative concepts of difference and repetition liberated from identity, generality, 
and representation. Of particular importance here is Deleuze’s use of Nietzsche’s eternal return 
as a figure for univocity and a test or practical selection of difference enacted in the eternal 
return. I then reconstruct the basic logic of Deleuze’s three syntheses of time, which 
accomplishes two main goals: 1) it provides a register for clarifying the structure of the genetic 
flow of univocal being and 2) it provides a first account of the event in Deleuze’s ontology, since 
he gives a preliminary definition of the event in terms of the future as the eternal return or the 
pure and empty form of time in the third synthesis. In Section 4 of this chapter, I turn to 
Deleuze’s analysis of the Platonic dialectic, which leads to his conception of systems of 
simulacra. In effect Deleuze submits the Platonic dialectic to the test of the eternal return and 
thereby isolates certain elements of the dialectic that contribute to an affirmative ontology of 
difference and repetition, even though he does not describe his engagement with Plato in this 
way. These elements are simulacra and what Deleuze calls “question-problem complexes.” 
Affirming the being of these elements through the test of the eternal return produces a Deleuzian 
overturning of Platonism and the basic contours of an ontology of the world as systems of 
simulacra. Establishing this allows me in Chapter V to detail Deleuze’s ontology of dialectical 
Ideas or problems, which structure or determine simulacra. Deleuze’s theory of events is a theory 
of the ontological, differential processes involved in dialectical Ideas and their actualization in 
systems of simulacra. 
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1: Difference and Event: Introduction to Chapter IV and Part Two  
 
In the realm of the guiding question, the understanding of the essence is determined on the basis of 
beingness (οὐσία–κοινόν ["beingness–common"]), and the essentiality of the essence consists in 
the greatest possible generality of the essence. This means, conversely, that the particular and 
manifold, which fall under the concept of the essence and from which this concept is established, 
are arbitrary; indeed, what is essential is the arbitrariness of beings, which nevertheless is precisely 
what the belonging to the essence indicates. 
 On the other hand, where beyng is conceived as event, essentiality is determined out of 
the originality and uniqueness of beyng itself. There the essence is not the general but is the 
essential occurrence precisely of what is unique in each case and of what constitutes the rank of 
the being. 
   -Heidegger, GA65 66/53 
 
 
In contrast to Heidegger’s Beiträge and Deleuze’s own Logique du sens, in which are found 
extensive discussions of the concept of event, Différence et répétition directly addresses the 
event at a theoretical level only sparsely.520 Yet, when Deleuze does take up the concept, it is at 
key points of the text. Most notable are a cluster of uses in his account of the third synthesis of 
time in Chapter II: La répétition pour elle-même (Repetition for Itself) and then a more 
developed discussion at the heart of Chapter IV: Synthèse idéelle de la différence (Ideas and the 
Synthesis of Difference).521 I discuss both of these in the following two chapters, but focus 
especially on the second since it addresses the event in much greater detail than the first. After 
Deleuze outlines a history of error regarding the concepts of difference and repetition and 
establishes parts of a system rectifying those errors (his theories of difference, repetition, time, 
psycho-genesis, and the starting point for first philosophy) in the Introduction and Chapters I-III 
of Différence et répétition, in Chapter IV he presents his system in a more unified fashion. The 
role of the concept of event there endows it with a fundamental importance for the overall 
ontology advanced. It is there that Deleuze works out his account of the virtual and actual, within 
                                                 
520 Since Logique du sens builds upon the work done in Différence et répétition, which is quite complex, I shall 
focus on the latter. 
521 Deleuze also makes use of the term without reflecting upon it in a number of additional instances throughout the 
text. 
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the framework of his theory of difference and dialectical Ideas or problems and corresponding 
solutions. “Ideal events” at the level of the Idea/problem/virtual and “real events on the level of 
engendered solutions” or the actual enable communication or movement between these levels 
and thus are the guarantors of the coherence of the system as a whole.522 My aim in the following 
two chapters is to explain this, the main relation of the concept of event to Deleuze’s theories of 
difference and repetition, and several important points of Heideggerian influence on Deleuze’s 
ontology of events. This will also enable me to draw a set of systematic comparisons to 
Heidegger’s ontology of the event, thereby forming a systematic ground for further comparative 
analysis of their accounts in the future. 
 Making sense of Deleuze’s concept of event in Différence et répétition requires 
explaining the particular conceptual context in terms of which it is defined and the broader shifts 
Deleuze’s system makes relative to a core set of positions commonly maintained by thinkers in 
the history of metaphysics and ontology. More specifically, Deleuze’s concept of event must be 
defined in terms of his theory of virtual dialectical Ideas and their actualization in systems of 
simulacra. Deleuze’s theory of Ideas and their actualization would be entirely misconstrued 
without establishing the ontological status of the systems in which they operate, i.e., of systems 
of simulacra. Both Ideal and actual events are ontological factors the effect of which is to 
determine the distinctive existence of simulacra. Thus, explaining the ontological status of 
systems of simulacra is a necessary step in explaining Deleuze’s theory of events. The 
ontological status of simulacra can be best explained in terms of Deleuze’s engagement with 
Platonism and the role that engagement plays relative to one of his core ontological claims: that 
being is univocal. The univocity of being for Deleuze is a univocity of difference and repetition, 
where difference and repetition are ontologically prior to identity, generality, and the regime of 
                                                 
522 DR 244/189.  
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representation. Rather than understanding the determination of beings in terms of a systematic 
priority of identity, generality, and representation, Deleuze’s univocal ontology enables an 
account of such determination on the basis of difference and repetition. Events are the moments 
of different/ciation defining the way determination occurs. Thus, explaining Deleuze’s theory of 
events also requires distinguishing his approach to the theory of difference from that of his 
philosophical predecessors. Deleuze critiques several historical accounts of difference and 
repetition (those provided by Aristotle, Leibniz, and Hegel, for example). Addressing the entirety 
of these engagements would go far beyond the scope of this dissertation. I shall focus 
particularly upon Deleuze’s engagement with Aristotle, since Aristotle’s system provides an 
excellent example of several of the characteristics of historical philosophies of difference that 
Deleuze critiques. I will set up my discussion of Deleuze’s engagement with Aristotle by looking 
at some of the broader reasons that Deleuze finds the problems of difference and repetition to be 
so important.  
In Différence et répétition, Deleuze presents an ontology that appears radically different 
from Heidegger’s. Indeed it is different, particularly from versions of Heidegger advanced by 
many dominant scholars of his work. Deleuze’s rhetoric is different from Heidegger’s, many of 
his points of historical reference are different (the big exceptions are Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and 
Nietzsche), and so is the technical terminology he draws from those references. Nonetheless, as I 
hope my analyses of Beiträge demonstrate, much Heidegger scholarship has overlooked major 
elements of his ontology and the logic underwriting it. Attention to this shows an ontology more 
consonant with Deleuze’s than commonly recognized. Despite the rarity of Deleuze’s explicit 
references to Heidegger, close attention to the text reveals an extensive engagement with 
Heidegger within its pages. This engagement informed the problems, positions, and language 
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Deleuze took up in important ways. I discuss several instances of this influence in the following 
two chapters, especially in Chapter V. Of particular importance for me are ways that Heidegger’s 
influence on Deleuze (both directly and indirectly via Albert Lautman) informed Deleuze’s 
concept of event. 
To begin with, though, it will be helpful to point out at a cursory level several important 
consonances between Heidegger and Deleuze that are related to their shared position that being 
is in one way or another evental in nature. 1) Perhaps most centrally, the concept of difference 
found in Heidegger’s Beiträge is remarkably close to that developed by Deleuze in Différence et 
répétition, as is its use in characterizing being. Specifically, like Heidegger, Deleuze contends 
that difference is understood only in a derivative sense if cast as the difference between two 
things: “The difference ‘between’ two things is only empirical, and the corresponding 
determinations are only extrinsic.”523 Taking difference in such a way makes the identity 
belonging to each of the two things primary and the difference between them secondary, whereas 
Deleuze claims difference is ontologically prior to identity. As I emphasized in Chapter II, 
Heidegger is sensitive to this point to such a degree that he demands the ontological difference 
between being and beings be rethought on the basis of a more originary difference that is not 
misconstrued as a “difference between.” This originary difference forms an essential aspect of 
beyng’s evental character. 2) Deleuze and Heidegger’s respective theories of time have certain 
structural and ontological similarities. Ontologically, both Heidegger’s account of time-space in 
Beiträge and the three syntheses in terms of which Deleuze explains time in Différence et 
répétition maintain that time is originated through differential processes, that it is in certain ways 
a ground – even if ultimately an abyssal ground, and that it plays a crucial role in originating and 
constituting beings. Structurally, Heidegger’s distinction between the time and space of the 
                                                 
523 DR 43/28. 
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world and time-space as the evental production of such time and space is paralleled by Deleuze’s 
distinction between the temporality of the actual, which he explains in terms of duration in the 
first synthesis, and that at the level of the virtual, which he explains in terms of a pure past and 
caesural future in the second and third syntheses. 3) Both Heidegger and Deleuze hold that 
producing a sufficient ontology requires undermining the orientation of philosophy by the 
Aristotelian question τί τὸ ὄν and the understanding of being in terms of οὐσία or substance. 4) 
Both Heidegger and Deleuze are committed to a radical critique of representation. 5) Both 
Heidegger and Deleuze undermine the subject-centered horizon for philosophy set in place by 
Kant and advance accounts of ontological structures that are prior to human existence. 6) The 
paradox formalized by Frege and the abyssal logic it figures plays an important role in both 
Heidegger and Deleuze’s work at methodological and ontological levels, even if Heidegger did 
not recognize this fact. 
 Deleuze’s Différence et répétition draws on two decades of work engaging the history of 
philosophy and literature, which produced a series of remarkable monographs. Yet reflecting 
upon his career in the 1993 preface to the English translation of the text, he famously wrote: 
Différence et répétition was “the first book in which I tried to ‘do philosophy.’”524 Its pages 
synthesize an alternative lineage or “minor history” of philosophy that challenges the canon by 
reconstructing the history of certain neglected problems and showing how these problems have 
been important factors organizing the history of philosophical systems and debates. Most 
prominent are the problems of the subordination of difference to identity and the reduction of 
repetition to generality. Together, these perpetuate the dominance of the conceptual framework 
of representation, which he argues has determined much of the history of philosophical 
discourse. The subordination of difference to identity, the reduction of repetition to generality, 
                                                 
524 DRe xv (1993 Preface to the English Edition). 
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and the framework of representation form three logically and conceptually intertwined nodes of 
the problem complex Deleuze engages, with each becoming the point of focus in different parts 
of the text. Since the critique of representation plays such an extensive role in Différence et 
répétition, it is worth emphasizing the direct overlap this has with Heidegger’s target of critique. 
For Heidegger, representation is an essential dimension of the modern edifice of metaphysics: 
“The modern concept of the beingness of beings [is] (representedness [Vorgestelltheit]).”525 
Though I treat each of these three nodes in this chapter, my primary interest will be in 
difference. This is because the problematic of difference directly connects Heidegger and 
Deleuze’s ontologies at a systematic level. Both take the problematic of difference to be one of – 
if not the – most essential problematics for working out the nature of being. And for both 
philosophers the concept of event is defined at the most fundamental level in terms of the logic 
of difference. For the Heidegger of Beiträge and the related private manuscripts, beyng as event 
is the differentiation of pure difference from itself, together with the logic of determinateness this 
generates and the abyss of primal difference that exceeds that determinateness. Though 
difference has this key role in Heidegger’s ontology, Deleuze provides a much more extensive 
analysis of the concept of difference. This leads to a more developed theory of difference and a 
transformed concept of event. 
The problem on which Deleuze focuses regarding difference, stated more precisely, is 
that in the history of philosophy difference has been understood on the basis of identity, 
mediated by representation, and reduced to conceptual difference. No adequate concept of 
difference in itself has been produced. In Deleuze’s words, “the majority of philosophers … 
subordinated difference to identity or to the Same, to the Similar, to the Opposed or to the 
Analogous: they … introduced difference into the identity of the concept, they … put difference 
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in the concept itself, thereby reaching a conceptual difference, but not a concept of 
difference.”526 I will explain these claims in Section 2 of this chapter. Deleuze sees his task as 
thinking difference “in itself” or “pure difference,” which entails developing “a concept of 
difference without negation” or “independent of the negative” and “liberated from the 
identical.”527 The subordination of difference to identity prevents the production of a concept of 
difference in itself. One reason Deleuze takes this to be a problem is that ontologies lacking a 
concept of difference in itself are insufficient; they are unable to account for the singular or 
absolutely unique. At best, they are able to account for particularity, where particularity is 
understood in terms of particular/universal or particular/general dichotomies. Correlatively, 
repetition is understood in terms of generality: this thing and that thing repeat each other insofar 
as both are particular instantiations of the same universal or general type. Fluffy and Mittens 
repeat each other because they are both instances of “cat.” This allows for numerical distinction 
between individuals, but not an account of the factors that make this individual singular. 
Consequently, the projects of producing concepts of difference in itself and repetition for itself 
inform one another in reciprocal fashion. In fact, Deleuze argues that each articulates different 
aspects of the same “thing”: being. In Chapter II of Différence et répétition, Deleuze writes: 
“repetition is, for itself, difference in itself.”528 I return to these points in detail below, with focus 
on the concept of difference. 
Deleuze’s historical engagement plays a double role in Différence et répétition.529 On the 
one hand, it allows him to cast a history of error, in contrast to which he locates his own project. 
On the other, this history is simultaneously one of success. Despite their shortcomings, each 
                                                 
526 DR English xv (1993 Preface to the English Edition). 
527 DR 43/28 and 2/xx, italics removed. 
528 DR 126/94. 
529 For commentary on Deleuze’s use of free indirect discourse, see Joe Hughes, Deleuze’s “Difference and 
Repetition” (London: Continuum 2009), 14-17. 
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figure he engages harbors an exposure to the power of difference or repetition and something 
significant to contribute to the philosophy of difference, of repetition, or the critique of 
representation. Deleuze draws these elements together as he develops his system.  
With this problematic frame, Deleuze’s main aims in Différence et répétition can be 
stated more precisely: 1) to analyze the history of the subjection of difference to identity, such 
that he might produce a concept of pure difference, or difference in itself, 2) to analyze the 
history of the reduction of repetition to generality, such that he might produce a concept of 
repetition for itself, 3) to carry out a radical critique of representation, and 4) to produce a 
sufficient ontology, which incorporates these concepts of difference and repetition, shows the 
insufficiency of representation, and explains the genesis of representation within the broader 
ontological system. 1, 2, and 3 are fundamentally interrelated and form necessary components of 
4. Deleuze’s ontology of events forms an essential part of that broader system. 
By way of addressing these points, Deleuze presents a highly complex philosophical 
system. Since this system claims both to give an account of the nature of being and beings writ 
large and to do so in a way not grounded in the epistemological conditions constituted by a 
experiencing subject, it might be accused of failing to take into account the Kantian critical 
revolution. Yet, Deleuze’s ontology is not a new dogmatism. Understanding why is necessary for 
understanding the interrelation of the four tasks enumerated above. Deleuze has grand ambitions. 
As Joe Hughes emphasizes, Différence et répétition is in part an attempt to rewrite Kant’s Kritik 
der reinen Vernunft.530 Deleuze aims not only to recast the transcendental conditions for the 
possibility of experience, but, following Maimon’s critique of Kant, the ontological genesis of 
the subject, its faculties, and, in particular, the function of representation bound up with it. In 
Deleuze’s argument, derivative forms of difference and repetition (rendered on the basis of 
                                                 
530 Hughes, Deleuze’s “Difference and Repetition” 1-5. 
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identity and generality) form the superstructure of representation. However, the genesis of this 
superstructure can only be accounted for on the basis of originary concepts of difference and 
repetition. These form its transcendental conditions: the processes of originary difference and 
repetition are ontologically prior to representation and provide the sufficient explanation for the 
actual genesis and existence of representation.531 Thus, Deleuze’s analyses of difference and 
repetition are fundamentally bound up with the critical operation of his project. Deleuze’s radical 
critique of representation moves well beyond the scope of the subject to prior ontological 
features generative of the subject. Consequently, it doesn’t constitute merely an epistemology or 
reduce ontology to epistemology, à la Kant. It integrates Kant’s critical revolution into the 
development of a full ontological system, in the sense of an account of being and the nature and 
genesis of beings. In short, Deleuze aims to work out the ground of the error constituting 
representationalism, rectify that error by reconstructing its ontological genesis, and supply a 
genetic ontology in its place. His concepts of difference and repetition enable him to do this. 
In contrast to interpreters like Henry Sommers-Hall who take Deleuze’s project in 
Différence et répétition to be “giving us an account of the nature of the world, broadly 
construed,” Hughes makes a controversial claim.532 Namely, he argues that the story told in 
Différence et répétition is that of the genesis of the subject. I find Deleuze’s account of the 
genesis of the subject to be a crucial dimension of the text, however I also find it necessary to 
temper Hughes’ claim. This will be evident in my analysis throughout Chapters IV and V. The 
two central points I find should be made are: 1) Through Deleuze’s radical critique, the story of 
the genesis of the subject is rendered on the basis of a broader ontology, the core features of 
                                                 
531 As I will discuss in Chapter V, Deleuze’s conception of the transcendental is also distinctively indebted to 
Heidegger’s conception of the transcendental as that which constitutively belongs to transcendence, i.e., to the 
dynamic of Dasein’s existence whereby it continually surpasses itself both A) temporally and B) along a diagenic 
axis when engaged in the project of fundamental ontology. 
532 Henry Sommers-Hall, Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 1. 
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which are not essentially indexed onto the constitution of well-defined subjects. In other words, 
Deleuze’s ontology applies to worlds of beings independently of the role of well-defined subjects 
in those worlds. 2) The well-defined subject does not survive Deleuze’s radical critique. Rather, 
the subject arises through certain ontological processes which, when understood as essentially 
indexed to it are rendered processes by which distortion is generated. As Deleuze writes: “The 
modern world is one of simulacra. Man did not survive God, nor did the identity of the subject 
survive that of substance. All identities are only simulated.”533 Again: “What this book should 
therefore have made apparent is the advent of a coherence which is no more our own, that of 
mankind, than that of God or the world. In this sense, it should have been an apocalyptic book 
(the third time in the series of times).”534 Deleuze’s system is not organized by the matrix of the 
three Kantian transcendent ideas. He does adapt Kant’s theory of ideas, but in a way that 
eliminates the subjective necessity that we must think the ideas of God, man, and world in 
particular.535 Instead, as I will discuss at length in Chapter V, Deleuze focuses on the inherently 
problematic character of ideas and advances an account in which they are understood as 
modulating systems of virtual multiplicity. As I shall show, ideal events are differential elements 
that determine the structure and character of these ideas or multiplicities. 
For Deleuze, an ontology capable of thinking the singular must think the singular in 
movement, not in an artificial stasis.536 In part, this involves thinking the time in which the 
movement of the singular occurs, or rather, the time constituted by the singular in its movement. 
Deleuze’s recasting of repetition is key in accomplishing this. The theory of repetition constitutes 
                                                 
533 DR 1/xix. 
534 DR 4/xxi. 
535 As is well known, Kant maintains that though there is a subjective necessity to think these three ideas, we slip 
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an account of the movement of being (becoming), i.e., a theory of genesis and distortion. Yet 
showing how this operates requires his theory of difference. Difference is the dynamic 
ontological engine of the movement of repetition; it simultaneously structures reality and 
exceeds the structures generated.  
In what follows in this chapter, I begin by reconstructing the problems motivating 
Deleuze’s ontology in more detail. Then, I turn to the way he begins to answer to these problems 
by arguing for a univocal ontology. I then reconstruct the basic logic of the three syntheses 
composing Deleuze’s theory of time, since they provide a register for specifying particular 
mechanisms involved in the univocal genetic flow of difference and repetition in his ontology 
and since his initial conception of the event is given in terms of the third synthesis. Finally, I 
examine Deleuze’s overturning of Platonism and the way this supplies him with an affirmative 
conception of systems of simulacra. This allows for a concise analysis of Deleuze’s 
understanding of ground and a comparison with that of Heidegger. In Chapter V, I detail the 
virtual register of systems of simulacra, which Deleuze understands in terms of dialectical Ideas. 
According to Deleuze, systems of simulacra are sites for the actualization of dialectical Ideas. 
Deleuze’s theory of events is a theory of the way difference differentiates itself and generates 
individuated simulacra. As I will show, Deleuze’s theory of Ideas is profoundly influenced by 
that of Lautman, while Lautman developed his theory of Ideas in a way drawing heavily upon 
Heidegger. Thus, in Chapter V, I will show an extensive, but covert, Heideggerian influence on 
Deleuze’s theory of Ideas and, consequently, on his ontology of events.  
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2: The Problem Motivating Deleuze’s Ontology: Difference, Repetition, and Representation 
 
“Difference is monstrous.”537 Such is the history of thought’s predominant judgment, be it 
implicit or explicit. Difference is built into systems of legitimate categories while simultaneously 
exceeding them and drawing them into the illegitimate. Difference is experienced as a deviation 
from the norm or as the radically other, the wolves against which philosophical dogs must guard. 
Though a bit hyperbolic, Deleuze writes that difference has been historically seen as “accursed, 
…error, sin or the figure of evil for which there must be expiation.”538 Difference is expiated by 
subsuming it within identity and mediating it in representation “by relating it to the requirements 
of the concept in general.”539 The impression of difference as monstrous, together with its 
expiation, begins in a “propitious moment” or kairos in Greek thought that Deleuze locates 
particularly in Plato and Aristotle.540 On the one hand, this moment marks the taming of 
difference within the framework of identity and representation. On the other, it inaugurates a 
history of philosophies contending with difference in interesting ways, ways on which Deleuze 
draws to develop a concept of pure difference or difference in itself. The expiation of difference 
correlates with the reduction of repetition to generality. When repetition is reduced to generality 
it takes the form of “difference without a concept.”541 I will expand upon this shortly, but the 
core idea is that in this reduction “repetition is attributed to elements which are really distinct but 
nevertheless share strictly the same concept.”542 Socrates and Plato are really distinct and 
numerically distinct beings, but they share the same concept: they are each rational animals. In 
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other words, there is a difference between them, but this difference has no concept. Socrates and 
Plato repeat each other. 
In the following section, I focus on Deleuze’s engagement with Aristotle as a historically 
foundational figure in the tradition of thinkers who tame difference within frameworks of 
identity and representation. Ultimately, Deleuze traces the inclination to expiate difference in this 
way back to Plato. However, he also finds in Plato a simultaneous inclination toward an 
affirmative ontology of difference. In Section 4 of this chapter, I discuss Deleuze’s engagement 
with Plato at length, since the ambiguousness in the latter’s system enables a Deleuzian 
“overturning” of a certain standard Platonism through which an affirmative ontology of 
difference can be developed in terms of systems of simulacra.543 In Différence et répétition, 
Deleuze aims to countermand the history of error initiated by the Greek propitious moment. 
Along with Plato and Aristotle (and the scholastic appropriation of Aristotle), the central figures 
of this history on whom Deleuze comments are Leibniz and Hegel. Nietzsche and Heidegger 
should be included in this list, though under different capacities. As I will show in Section 3, 
Nietzsche’s eternal return contributes prominently to Deleuze’s affirmative concept of 
difference. And as I will continue to discuss throughout Chapters IV and V, Deleuze finds 
several aspects of Heidegger’s philosophy of difference to be consonant with his own, though he 
also indicates points of criticism showing where he takes their views to diverge.544 Deleuze 
designates the Aristotelian mode of representation “organic representation,” since it is defined by 
the categorial system in Aristotle’s Organon.545 Organic representation is finite because it 
defines an object in terms of a general concept of its essence, i.e., a concept with a finite 
comprehension of the predicates belonging to the object. Supposedly inessential predicates that 
                                                 
543 DR 83/59. 
544 Deleuze’s main direct discussion of this is found in a lengthy footnote found on DR 89/64. 
545 DR 44/29. 
  269 
are nonetheless necessary for defining the object as an individual are unaccounted for in the 
concept. Such a finite representation is able to extend or range over several objects for which it is 
a definition, but is unable to define any individual object with infinite comprehension. I shall 
explain this character of Aristotelian organic representation in greater detail below. In the 
modern era, finite organic representation is replaced by what Deleuze calls “orgiastic 
representation.”546 The two main thinkers of orgiastic representation are Leibniz and Hegel. 
Orgiastic representation is infinite representation, since it “discovers the infinite within itself.”547 
More specifically, “Leibniz introduces the infinite into the finite …in the form of the infinitely 
small,” that is, in the form of the infinite series of properties and affections defining monads.548 
For Leibniz, a concept sufficient for defining an individual object must thus have an infinite 
comprehension of the object’s predicates. Conversely, difference in Hegel’s system appears as 
the “infinitely large” difference of contradiction, i.e., of the counter-posed moments of the 
dialectic defining the whole of reality.549 Despite the profound shift from systems of organic to 
orgiastic representation, Deleuze argues that the latter also remain bound within the framework 
of identity and are thus unable to provide a sufficient ontology of difference. Though I will 
return to Leibniz for a moment below, explaining Deleuze’s account of orgiastic representation 
in much more detail than this would go beyond the scope of this dissertation. For my purposes, 
which are to clarify Deleuze’s motivation and terms with respect to the production of an 
affirmative concept of pure difference or difference in itself, it will be sufficient to examine 
organic representation in Aristotle’s system and the manner in which it tames difference within a 
framework of identity and representation. Along with clarifying the problem Deleuze finds in the 
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history of the philosophy of difference, this will also allow me to point out a few central 
problems with the understanding of repetition in terms of generality or difference without 
concept that will be important later. This is a necessary step in clarifying Deleuze’s concept of 
event because it is within his positive account of difference that he uses the concept of event in 
the way most technically developed in this text. Since for Deleuze difference differentiates via 
events, this examination of organic representation sets the stage for clarifying his concept of 
event later. 
To be sure, “the project of the philosophy of difference,” for Deleuze, is “to rescue 
difference from its maledictory state.”550 Yet, this does not mean he aims to eliminate identity or 
representation from his ontology. Just as Heidegger’s evental ontology is not meant to eliminate 
metaphysics, but, in one dimension, to offer resources able to account for the genesis of 
metaphysics, Deleuze’s aims to account for the genesis of identity and representation. This is a 
dimension of the radical critique essential to both thinkers’ methodologies. Recall that according 
to Heidegger’s critique, the historical and conceptual framework of metaphysics is derivative in 
relation to the more originary ontological features of beyng as event. Deleuze’s stance is similar: 
for him, identity and representation are derivative of being as difference, time as repetition, and 
their evental articulation. As Heidegger’s evental ontology supplies the genetic ground for 
rethinking the domain of metaphysics in an appropriate way, Deleuze’s supplies that for 
rethinking identity and representation. If identity has been given a position more primal than 
difference in the history of thought, Deleuze inverts this such that difference is primary and 
identity generated as derivative. Consequently, though identity is not eliminated in Deleuze’s 
system, it is rendered an unstable effect of difference. Likewise, if representation has been the 
frame in which difference is understood, Deleuze inverts this such that difference is primary and 
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representation generated as derivative. Representation is not eliminated in Deleuze’s system, but 
rendered a limited dimension of reality dependent upon operations of difference that exceed and 
ontologically precede it. 
There are two principle registers in which Deleuze treats the expiation of difference. One 
is properly ontological, that is, it pertains to the ontological status of difference and identity 
themselves. The other is epistemological, pertaining to the subsumption of difference within the 
identity of the concept and the mediation of difference by representation. At first impression, the 
ontological register seems fairly straight forward. Deleuze’s position is that being is difference 
and identity is generated as a derivative effect of difference. We have been mistaken in assigning 
identity primacy over difference, either as a characteristic of being, of being’s most basic 
categories, or of the beings from which we extract universal types. 
The basic sense of the epistemological register is more complex. In the expiation of 
difference, “difference is… reconciled with the concept.”551 But what does it mean to reconcile 
difference with the concept? Difference is defined as an element within the confines of the 
concept, while identity is an essential dimension or character of the concept itself. More 
specifically, Deleuze identifies four “requirements of the concept in general” or the “four 
principle aspects to ‘reason’ insofar as it is the medium of representation.”552 Deleuze’s initial 
critique of these four aspects focuses on Aristotle’s categorial system and its method of 
conceptual definition in terms of proximate genus and specific difference. However, Deleuze 
holds that they reappear in transformed manners in all later philosophies of representation, 
including those advanced by Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel. Since identity is a principle character of 
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the four requirements of the concept, defining difference within the framework of the concept 
renders difference secondary to identity. How, exactly, does this work in Aristotle? 
The first requirement of the concept is “identity, in the form of the undetermined 
concept.”553 In Aristotle’s system, the undetermined concept is the proximate genus. It 
constitutes the substantial identity of which a specific difference is predicated. Since a genus 
isn’t something on its own, i.e., it is existentially indeterminate, it requires a specific difference 
be applied to it in order to gain determinate existence (the genus “animal” does not itself exist, 
only human and non-human animals). Thus, the genus is identity, in the form of the 
undetermined concept. The second requirement of the concept is “analogy, in the relation 
between determinable concepts.”554 Determinable concepts are genera. Genera, at the broadest 
level (categories), do not agree in a third term constituting their identity (i.e., there is no genus of 
the genera or categories). Such genera are equivocal. For Aristotle, their relations are that of pros 
hen equivocation. In the scholastic interpretation of Aristotle, they are that of analogy. This is the 
sense on which Deleuze focuses. Hence, the relation between determinable concepts is thought 
as analogy. The third requirement of the concept is “opposition, in the relation between 
determinations within concepts.”555 Determination within a concept is predication of the genus, 
i.e., the application of a specific difference to it (the genus “animal” is determined by applying 
the specific difference “rational” to it, resulting in the predications “rational” and “non-rational” 
of “animal”). The specific difference differentiates predicates in which the genus is determined. 
Those determinations agree in the genus or third term, but are opposed in their predicate. Thus, 
the relation between determinations within concepts is opposition. The fourth requirement of the 
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concept is “resemblance, in the determined object of the concept itself.”556 The determined 
object of the concept is the individual being that belongs to the kind that the concept defines. 
Since the concept has a degree of generality, it is the concept for a range of objects (actually or 
potentially). Such objects are numerically distinct, but share the same concept. If we take this 
relation from the top down, with objects understood as instantiations of the concept, the 
individuating differences of the objects are thought in relation to their conceptual identity: 
Socrates and Plato differ in height, but since they are identical in concept, that difference is read 
as a deviation from what is in common. They are not individually the same, but there is a degree 
of resemblance between the two which is grounded in their common concept. If the relation of 
concept and object is thought in the opposite direction, from the bottom up, and the concept is 
taken as a universal derived from a set of individuals, empirical resemblance between the objects 
is the basis for the generality of the concept. Dan Smith puts this point as follows: “At the lower 
end, a plurality of different individuals can be placed under a single concept only on the 
condition that a sensible resemblance between the individuals can be perceived.”557 Either way, 
the determined objects of the concept fall on a spectrum of resemblance to one another. 
Deleuze’s point is that Aristotle’s system tames or mediates difference by reconciling it 
with these requirements of the concept. The same goes for the systems proposed by other 
thinkers in the history of the regime of representation, even if each adjusts the nature of the four 
requirements in their own way. Any difference that falls outside these requirements is rendered 
conceptually illegitimate. However, since in these conditions difference is recognized only on the 
basis of the identity in the concept (and the correlated versions of that identity: analogy, 
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opposition, and resemblance), it is rendered derivative of identity. The consequence is that a 
concept of pure difference in itself is blocked by rendering difference as conceptual difference. 
Each philosopher of difference Deleuze discusses reduces difference to conceptual 
difference in a distinct way. As noted earlier, for instance, Hegel’s dialectic of determinate 
negation gives a greater role to difference as opposition. Deleuze proposes that a test of “the 
Large and the Small” can be applied to clarify the specifics of each case.558 Though a reference 
to Plato (Republic 523-524; Parmenides 149-150), Deleuze has in mind large and small 
differences: “the question arises… how far the difference can extend – how large? how small? – 
in order to remain within the limits of the concept.”559 The test allows the limits of any 
philosophical system to be shown with respect to its ability to tame difference within the bounds 
of conceptual difference. It helps to show where difference might escape those bounds or how 
the system comes short of supporting a concept of difference not subject to prior identity.560 
Examining Deleuze’s analysis of small and large difference in Aristotle will help clarify the type 
of ontological and epistemological insufficiencies exhibited by philosophical systems that 
perpetuate the regime of representation, even if in transformed manners. 
Deleuze grants Aristotle’s system genuine force. Difference (as specific and generic 
difference) has a prominent role in organizing it and the system is able to articulate important 
aspects of reality. However, the system is unable to think the singular or the individual without 
reducing it to a particular instantiation of a generic identity. Aristotle’s system also requires an 
equivocity of genera or categories, which Deleuze argues makes it untenable as a framework for 
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producing an affirmative concept of difference in itself. As I will discuss, Deleuze argues instead 
for an ontological univocity. 
As indicated above, in Aristotle’s metaphysics the conceptual definition of a thing is 
composed of its specific difference together with the proximate genus to which that difference is 
applied. “Human,” for example, is defined by the proximate genus “animal” marked by the 
specific difference “rational.” Above that, “animal” is defined by the proximate genus “living” 
marked by the specific difference “sensitive.” Aristotle offers a hierarchical system of 
progressively broader genera when moving “up” the system and finer genera when moving 
“down.” “Small” difference at the bottom is specific difference, together with the numerical 
difference that specific difference founds. “Large” difference is that between categories or 
genera themselves, i.e., generic difference. Respectively, the character of the difference 
belonging to specific difference is contrariety, whereas that of generic difference is 
contradiction. 
Simply speaking, Aristotle’s specific difference accounts for the presence of contrariety 
between two things, predicates, or terms: two terms are contrary to one another (thus differing 
from one another) if each disagrees with the other in itself while agreeing with one another in a 
third (or middle) term. It is the middle term that allows a comparison between contrary terms to 
hold at all, while at the same time bearing the mark of their specific difference. 
Specific difference is distinguished into two types. Deleuze is primarily concerned with 
the second. On the one hand, accidental difference (extra quidditatem) is merely the corporeal 
contrariety of things held in the middle term of matter; on the other hand, essential specific 
difference (differentia essentialis aut propriissima) is “the perfect and maximal difference” of 
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“contrariety in the genus.”561 Since contrariety in matter can offer a concept of difference only as 
accidental or “extrinsic,” Aristotle’s most essential concept(s) of difference must be sought 
elsewhere.562 Essential specific difference is more promising. After distinguishing these two, 
Deleuze reserves the term “specific difference” for it. With essential specific difference, 
“contraries… are modifications which affect a subject with regard to its genus. Genera are in 
effect divided by differences in essence which take the form of contraries.”563 The contraries 
“human” and “non-human” are held together in the genus “animal,” while distinguished by the 
specific difference of “rationality.” 
There are two dimensions to the problem Deleuze sees with this part of Aristotle’s 
system. First, the contrariety of specific difference refers its terms to the identity of a middle 
term, thus reconciling their difference with that identity. Two terms may be different in a specific 
way, but this difference is grounded in the way they are the same – in their common proximate 
genus. Thus, the concept of specific difference is not a concept of difference as such at all. 
Rather, “the determination of the concept of difference is confused with the inscription of 
difference in the identity of an undetermined concept,” a genus (third term).564 Difference is 
grounded in a prior identity. 
A correlated second dimension of the problem here arises because of the way conceptual 
determination by specific difference accounts for (or fails to account for) singular or individual 
things. What is Socrates? Socrates is a human, a rational animal. So are Plato, Aristotle, and 
Alexander. Within this system, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Alexander are numerically distinct, 
but identical in concept. However, singular differences individuate these four and make them 
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unique. The generality of the concept correlates with the reduction of what is singular or 
individual to a particular instantiation of a universal form. It effectuates a sanitization of 
singularity or individuating differences. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Alexander repeat the 
concept and are substitutable for one another. However, since this system cannot account for the 
differences individuating each, it is insufficient. This type of repetition of the same concept 
exemplifies what Deleuze refers to as derivative, uncovered, or bare repetition, in distinction 
from originary, clothed, or masked repetition which is liminal with respect to the structure of the 
concept. 
It is worth returning for a moment to the passage cited at the beginning of this chapter in 
which Heidegger is concerned with precisely the same problem. 
 
In the realm of the guiding question [Leitfrage], the understanding of the essence is determined on 
the basis of beingness (οὐσία–κοινόν ["beingness–common"]), and the essentiality of the essence 
consists in the greatest possible generality of the essence. This means, conversely, that the 
particular [Einzelne] and manifold [Mannigfaltige], which fall under the concept of the essence 
and from which this concept is established, are arbitrary; indeed, what is essential is the 
arbitrariness of beings, which nevertheless is precisely what the belonging to the essence 
indicates.565 
 
 
 The problem of being unable to account for singularity or individuating difference is a 
correlate of the defining question (τί τὸ ὄν) and orientation of metaphysics toward the Seiendheit 
or beingness of beings as beings (ὂν ᾗ ὄν), rendered as οὐσία in Aristotle. Though for Aristotle 
οὐσία is not a genus, Heidegger, as seen earlier in Chapter II, argues that its character remains 
that of what is common among that which is. Since the beingness of beings is taken to define 
their essence, and is derived as a generality or as what is held in common, beings are arbitrary, 
that is, numerically distinct, conceptually substitutable, repetitions of a same essence. Within the 
framework of the Leitfrage, the concept of beings is irreducibly correlated with the arbitrariness 
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of beings and the sanitization of the singular differences characterizing each. Essentiality, the 
nature of being, and the nature of beings must be rethought, as seen in Chapter II in terms of the 
question of the essence of truth, within the framework of the Grundfrage. This task is central in 
the development of Heidegger’s ontology into an evental ontology. With respect to this point, he 
writes: 
 
On the other hand, where beyng is conceived as event, essentiality is determined out of the 
originality [Ursprünglichkeit] and uniqueness [Einzigkeit] of beyng itself. There the essence is not 
the general but is the essential occurrence precisely of what is unique in each case and of what 
constitutes the rank of the being.566 
 
The problem Heidegger and Deleuze both home in on here can be clarified by looking at 
the latter’s discussion of a “vulgarized Leibnizianism” early in the “Introduction” to Différence 
et répétition.567 This shows the intrinsic relation between the problem of difference and that of 
repetition. Deleuze’s account of how vulgarized Leibnizianism mistakenly understands repetition 
in terms of generality allows him a foil against which to contrast his concept of originary or 
masked repetition. The reduction of repetition to generality is conceptually correlated with the 
reduction of difference to conceptual difference. Vulgarized Leibnizianism is organized by three 
principles which together “expound a theory of difference as conceptual difference, or develop 
the account of representation as mediation.”568 These three principles are at work in a less formal 
way in Section 8 of Leibniz’s “Discourse on Metaphysics.”569 
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First is “a principle of difference” according to which “every determination is conceptual 
in the last instance, or actually belongs to the comprehension of the concept.”570 As in the four 
requirements of the Aristotelian concept, determination here is the predication of a subject. The 
comprehension of a concept is the extent to which it accurately represents its object, that is, the 
exhaustiveness of its predicates in matching up with the predicates belonging to its object. 
Correlated to a concept’s comprehension is its extension, i.e., the range of objects for which it is 
a concept. The important move this principle of difference makes is to collapse the distinction 
between epistemological predication (predication of a concept mimicking its object) and 
ontological predication (the determination of the object itself in its predicates). Thus, all 
differences individuating the object are understood to be conceptual differences, i.e., 
determinations of the concept. 
This leads to the reciprocal second and third principles: the principle of sufficient reason, 
according to which “there is always one concept per particular thing,” and the “principle of the 
identity of indiscernibles,” according to which “there is one and only one thing per concept.”571 
For a conceptual determination to be adequate to its object, it must have infinite comprehension, 
that is, it must contain all the object’s predicates (in the right order). Since two things between 
which no difference can be discerned are in fact one and the same thing, such a concept applies 
to one and only one thing. Infinite comprehension correlates with an extension equal to one. In 
contrast, if a concept has a finite comprehension, i.e., if it does not contain all its object’s 
predicates, its extension increases (in principle indefinitely, even if not in fact). The concept is no 
longer adequate to its object, since there are determinations in the object that are not accounted 
for in the concept. Any concept with an extension greater than one constitutes a generality: it 
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ranges over any object bearing the concept’s predicates. But it is inadequate to any of them. The 
objects ranged over can be distinguished numerically as particular instances of the concept, but 
not adequately, since the concept fails precisely with respect to their individuating differences.  
Returning to Aristotle, the insufficiency of definition by proximate genus and specific 
difference for defining singular or individual things can now be stated more precisely. Socrates, 
Plato, Aristotle, and Alexander are distinct beings. They are distinguished by the predicates 
determining each, respectively. For the concept of Socrates to be sufficient, it must have an 
infinite comprehension and, in turn, an extension equal to one. However, the concept “rational 
animal” has a finite comprehension and an indefinite extension. It ranges over Socrates, Plato, 
Aristotle, and Alexander but can’t account for the singular or individual differences 
differentiating them. Instead, it renders the three only numerically distinct particulars, bare 
repetitions or repetitions of the same general concept. 
Testing Aristotle’s system in this way at the level of “small” differences reveals that it 
subsumes such differences within the identity of the concept. Thus, it offers conceptual 
difference, but no concept of difference in itself. The test also shows that his system is 
inadequate, for there exist differences that exceed its conceptual limits; namely, the differences 
individuating Socrates from the others or constituting his singularity. How, though, does 
Aristotle’s system fare at the level of “large” differences? 
If specific difference operates within genera, while the identity of each genus provides the 
foundation on which its contraries may be supported, “generic or categorial difference” names 
the very “difference between genera as ultimate determinable concepts (categories).”572 This is 
the kind of difference found at the “top” of Aristotle’s system. Generic difference is not 
established by reference to the identity of a shared third term (there is no genus of genera). 
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Rather, an irreducible equivocity of maximal genera or categories exists. This, in turn, entails a 
fundamental equivocity of being. As Deleuze writes: for Aristotle, “because differences are,” 
“Being itself is not a genus.”573 “If being were a genus, its differences would be assimilable to 
specific differences, but then one could no longer say that they ‘are’, since a genus is not itself 
attributed to its differences.”574 Because generic differences really exist, while essentially 
existing between, not within, genera, being cannot be a genus. As Aristotle puts the point: 
 
But it is not possible that either unity or being should be a genus of things; for the differentiae of 
any genus must each of them both have being and be one, but it is not possible for the genus to be 
predicated of the differentiae taken apart from the species (any more than for the species of the 
genus to be predicated of the proper differentiae of the genus); so that if unity or being is a genus, 
no differentia will either be one or have being.575 
 
The existence of generic difference tells us that there are different types of being: being is 
said in many ways or “the term ‘being’ is used in many senses.”576 These are not distinguished 
by the mere contrariety seen in specific difference, genera are contradictorily different: they exist 
with an irreducible difference between them which is not inscribed in a third, founding term. 
Aristotle’s equivocity of being does not, however, constitute a liberation of difference 
from identity. While generic difference is a “larger difference” than specific difference, it 
nonetheless fails to supply the pure, affirmative concept of difference in itself Deleuze seeks.577 
The equivocity of being implied by generic difference preserves a primacy of identity. Echoing 
Heidegger’s point above regarding the κοινόν, Deleuze argues that “an identical or common 
concept… still subsists” to which generic differences are subordinated, even though this does not 
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take the form of a middle term.578 The problem is that though being is said in the many ways of 
equivocal genera, that equivocity is for Aristotle pros hen. Alternatively, for the scholastic 
Aristotelians it is analogical. Deleuze’s analysis consciously melds these together.579 However, 
briefly parsing them will help illuminate the argument. 
In Aristotelian pros hen equivocity, the genera or categories are all “related to one central 
point, one definite kind of thing,” namely, “substance” (οὐσία).580 Being is said in many ways, 
but these ways are all said pros hen of substance. “An identical or common concept thus still 
subsists,” though “this concept of Being is not collective, like a genus in relation to its species, 
but only distributive and hierarchical: it has no content in itself, only a content in proportion to 
the formally different terms of which it is predicated,” i.e., the genera or categories.581 What this 
means for Deleuze is that though categories or genera are really, contradictorily different from 
one another, it remains the case that generic difference is systemically coherent only on the basis 
of the identity or unity of substance. Thus, it gets us no closer to a concept of pure difference in 
itself. 
The scholastic interpretation of Aristotle’s equivocity of being manages no better. Rather 
than pros hen equivocity providing the priority of identity, this priority is established through the 
analogical relation of different creatures to God. In the hierarchy of being, an “internal” 
analogical relation among created beings holds, preserving God’s perfection in greater or lesser 
proportion.582 Throughout this analogical system, God’s identity and unity ontologically precede 
and found the existence of created beings. As with pros hen equivocity, the analogical version of 
Aristotelianism requires the equivocity found in generic difference in order to remain coherent: 
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“analogy, as we have seen, rests essentially upon a certain complicity between generic and 
specific differences (despite their difference in kind): being cannot be supposed a common genus 
without destroying the reason for which it was supposed thus; that is, the possibility of being for 
specific differences.”583 In order for being to be said of specific differences, being must not be a 
genus, that is, it must be equivocal. 
In summary, Deleuze’s critique of Aristotelianism shows that this metaphysical system 
can account for difference only in terms of specific difference or generic difference. In the 
former case, that which differs is merely contrary, all the while grounded in the prior identity of 
a proximate genus; in the latter, an equivocity of being is established, which is underwritten by 
the prior identity of substance or of God. Neither suffices for an affirmative concept of pure 
difference, or difference in itself. Instead, Aristotle’s system exemplifies the historical expiation 
of difference in which difference is captured within the confines of the concept and rendered 
derivative of identity. 
Smith nicely connects this back to Deleuze’s engagement with Heidegger by putting the 
point as follows: “What is wrong with Aristotle’s analogical vision of the world? Put simply, it 
provides an inadequate solution to the Heideggerian problematic of ontological difference.”584 
Though ultimately Heidegger does not think the frame of the ontological difference goes far 
enough (a more originary articulation of difference is required for an evental conception of 
beyng), Aristotelian ontology falls short even of the terms of that frame. It fails to differentiate 
the being of beings from the beingness of beings. Likewise, for Deleuze the finite, organic 
representation found in Aristotle’s system cannot sufficiently think difference, and so it cannot 
offer a sufficient account of being.  
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3: Deleuze’s Univocity of Being and Preliminary Conception of Difference In Itself 
 
Late in Différence et répétition, Deleuze clarifies a distinction used throughout the text between 
two kinds of terms: on the one hand are the categories of representation and the notions grounded 
therein; on the other are “phantastical” notions.585 Despite the awkwardness of the latter term, it 
is used in a precise technical sense: phantastical notions describe aspects, processes, or relations 
of reality that are not subsumable within the regime of representation or its categorial systems. 
Using terminology that I will discuss later, these notions “apply to phantasms and simulacra,” or 
more specifically “describe actual series, or virtual Ideas, or indeed the groundlessness from 
which everything comes: intensity-linkage-resonance-forced movement; differential and 
singularity; complication-implication-explication; differentiation-individuation-differenciation; 
question-problem-solution, etc.”586 Deleuze uses these different sets of terms to describe the pre-
representational differential processes that define individual simulacra and systems of simulacra. 
As I will show especially in Chapter V, events are distinctive moments in these processes. If for 
Deleuze being is difference that is differentiated by events, the pre-representational differential 
processes involved describe the “distribution” of being among beings, i.e., the genetic, 
differential ontological flow by which beings are constituted. More generally, though, Deleuze 
applies the term “distribution” to the partitioning of being in beings that any ontological system 
describes. In contrast to Deleuze’s phantastical or pre-representational account of the distribution 
of being, he understands categories to “belong to the world of representation, where they 
constitute forms of distribution according to which Being is repartitioned among beings 
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following the rules of sedentary proportionality.”587 In short, being is distributed according to 
sedentary proportionality when it is understood to be subject to such “pre-existing categorical 
rules” that determine the proportion of being that each being or series of beings shall have (for 
instance, in the Thomistic analogy of being).588 These categorical rules presuppose a subjection 
of difference to identity. Deleuze’s phantastical notions, then, do not compose “a list of 
categories.”589 His use of these notions marks a fundamental contrast between his system and 
those of Aristotle (and scholastic Aristotelianism) and Kant, for instance. Namely, for Deleuze 
there are extra-propositional and sub-representative aspects of reality that must be taken 
epistemologically and ontologically seriously. In Chapter V, I will look at a particular set of 
these by analyzing Deleuze’s theory of problems or Ideas and the events they involve. In 
Deleuze’s reasoning, the fact that there are such aspects of reality that require phantastical 
notions (i.e., the fact that the regime of representation cannot provide a sufficient ontology) 
poses a fundamental problem for philosophy: “A whole problem of Being is brought into play by 
these differences between categories and the nomadic or phantastical notions, the problem of the 
manner in which being is distributed among beings: is it, in the last instance, by analogy [i.e., by 
equivocity] or univocality?”590 Equivocal ontologies claim that being is said or distributed 
among beings in many different senses, as exemplified by the different ways being is said in 
Aristotle’s equivocity of genera. Univocal ontologies, on the other hand, claim that being is said 
or distributed among beings in only one sense. Since, according to Deleuze, equivocal systems 
subject difference to identity and are unable to account for phantastical aspects of reality, he 
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holds that “Being is univocal.”591 I shall turn to Deleuze’s univocity of being now. In Deleuze’s 
account of univocity he outlines the basic ontological position that enables his overturning of 
Platonism and production of an ontology of systems of simulacra. As I have indicated, 
explaining the ontological status of systems of simulacra is necessary for explaining Deleuze’s 
theory of events, since the most fundamental differential processes through which simulacra are 
determined are precisely events. 
Deleuze’s argument for univocity marks a largely covert engagement with Heidegger.592  
If the domain of representation is conceptually grounded in identity, and the subsistence of 
identity is asserted in response to the question, “What are beings as beings?,” i.e., the framework 
which Heidegger argues reduces being to beingness or Seiendheit, then the distinction of 
phantastical notions from the regime of representation constitutes a Deleuzian version of 
Heidegger’s ontological difference between being and beings. For, it is precisely in the register 
of simulacra that the problematic of being is properly unlocked. Embedded in the problem of 
deciding between equivocity and univocity as Deleuze frames it is the problem framed by the 
ontological difference: the problem of being, insofar as being must be differentiated from 
Seiendheit. Smith connects that Heideggerian problem to Deleuze’s concern with univocity by 
posing the problem as follows: “What is the difference between Being and beings? Or more 
precisely, How is Being distributed among beings?”593 While Heidegger might not like this 
formulation since it makes being sound like a resource held in reserve to be divvied up, Smith is 
right to make the connection it expresses. For, the questions posed by Deleuze’s language of 
distribution are those of how ontological genesis operates and what its structure is. That is, 
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592 As Smith puts it, “univocity must be seen as one of the concepts Deleuze uses in order to state and resolve 
Heidegger’s ontological problematic in his own manner” (Essays 29). 
593 Essays 29. 
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Deleuze’s question about the distribution of being asks: What is the nature of being, such that 
being enables beings to be? And, what are the ontological structures and processes via which this 
occurs? These questions are directly consonant with Heidegger’s (even though Heidegger’s 
evental ontology in Beiträge ultimately problematizes the question of such distribution if that 
question casts being on the basis of a relation to beings, i.e., remains within the framework of 
Seiendheit). To see how Deleuze’s question about distribution continues to be paralleled in 
Heidegger’s evental ontology, one must only remember the genetic character entailed in 
Heidegger’s account of beyng as event insofar as the event generates the various structures 
belonging to the logic of determination or to the Da expressed in the term “Da-sein.” 
Heidegger’s ontological difference enables the science of being to be reestablished at 
what he considers the end of the history of metaphysics. Deleuze picks up the science of being, 
but suggests that Heidegger’s ontology ultimately falls short because it fails to put difference in 
the place of being itself. As Smith suggests, Deleuze’s dissatisfaction with Heidegger revolves 
around Heidegger’s failure “to push the problematic of ontological difference to its necessary 
conclusion,” that is, to think being as difference.594 Smith puts the point well again as follows: 
“although Heidegger revived the question of ontology and gave ‘renewed splendor to the 
univocity of Being,’ he did not effect the necessary conversion according to which ‘univocal 
Being belongs only to difference’ (that is, the term ‘Being’ has one and only one sense, which is 
‘difference’).”595 Différence et répétition in a certain sense is Deleuze’s attempt to do just this, 
and arguing that being is univocal is a necessary step. It should be emphasized here that though 
Smith is right about Deleuze’s dissatisfaction with Heidegger’s philosophy of difference, 
Deleuze was wrong about Heidegger. This is no fault of Deleuze’s since he did not have access 
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to Beiträge or the related private manuscripts. As I have argued, in those texts Heidegger 
develops a conception of difference that goes beyond that presented in the published works that 
were available to Deleuze. In Beiträge, Heidegger’s account of beyng as event operates precisely 
by the purely differential logic I explained in Chapters II and III. This places Heidegger closer to 
Deleuze than Deleuze recognized. 
Deleuze’s arguments for the univocity of being set the theoretical frame in which he 
developed his affirmative conception of pure difference, or difference in itself. In his view, the 
univocity of being is a necessary condition for the viability of such a concept, since equivocity 
necessarily inscribes identity in being. His commitment to univocity sets his ontology in 
opposition to Aristotelian equivocity and its analogical scholastic interpretation. It also 
establishes a conceptual point in reference to which he casts a tradition (forming part of the 
minor history) in which he explicitly designates Heidegger his immediate predecessor: “from 
Parmenides to Heidegger it is the same voice of being which is taken up, in an echo which itself 
forms the whole deployment of the univocal. A single voice raises the clamour of being.”596 Yet 
as mentioned, Deleuze does not make explicit the details of his engagement with Heidegger 
during his analysis of univocity. For Deleuze, Duns Scotus, Spinoza, and Nietzsche are the 
“three principal moments in the history of the philosophical elaboration of the univocity of 
being.”597 Though to me it seems correct to think of Heidegger’s ontology itself as one of 
univocity, I am unaware of anywhere in which he claimed this directly. It is worth pointing out 
that, given the second major moment in the history of univocity (Spinoza), Deleuze’s work on 
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this topic establishes a linkage that is of central importance in late twentieth century philosophy: 
that of Heidegger and Spinoza, or of French post-rationalism (Cavaillès, Canguilhem, Bachelard, 
etc.) with the Heideggerian phenomenological and post-phenomenological tradition.598 
If the metaphor used in univocity to characterize the structure of being is voice, what 
does this voice say? It says “the ontological proposition.”599 In contrast, particularly in the 
modern era, the ontological structure of representational systems is understood on the “model of 
judgment” or, synonymously, of “propositions of consciousness.” Propositions of consciousness 
are propositions grounded in the identity of the thinking subject, such that that identity is the 
guarantor of the identity of the subject of the proposition and thus of the stability of the 
proposition as a whole. In Deleuze’s words: “For Kant as for Descartes, it is the identity of the 
Self in the ‘I think’ which grounds the harmony of all the faculties and their agreement on the 
form of a supposed same object.”600 The subject of the proposition can either be the thinking 
subject itself, in which case predication is the determination of that subject in its predicates or 
attributes, or it can be something else, in which case the proposition represents the predicated 
subject, while the adequation of the proposition is grounded in the cognitive apparatus of the 
thinking subject. In that case, the proposition is a judgment made by the thinking subject. Within 
the Cartesian framework, for instance, Deleuze identifies “Cogito” as the “first proposition of 
consciousness” (first in the order of Descartes’ system).601 Here, the subject “I” is determined in 
the predicate “think.” Structurally, this replicates the case discussed above in which an 
Aristotelian category is determined by predicating it via the application of a specific difference. 
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This finds its extreme form with Leibniz, where the concept of an individual is one with infinite 
comprehension and extension equal to one, while the individual’s infinite series of predicates are 
arrayed in the right order and articulate the changes the individual undergoes through time. 
Correlated with this is the Leibnizian aspiration to infinite representation. Within the Kantian 
framework, determination is the determination of the manifold in the outer and inner forms of 
sensibility – space and time – together with the application of the categories in formulating a 
judgment. The equation of the judgment and proposition can be easily seen in the two types of 
judgment that Kant distinguished: analytic judgments, in which the predicate is contained in the 
essence of the subject, and synthetic judgments, in which it is not. With Kant, propositions of 
consciousness are the determinations or judgments rendered by one’s cognitive apparatus, the 
coherence and functionality of which is grounded in the transcendental unity of apperception. In 
each of these cases, the figure of the proposition models determinations of the thinking subject or 
representations of the world, such that they are grounded in the identity of that subject. This 
condemns propositions of consciousness to the insufficiencies involved in systems asserting the 
ultimate priority of identity over difference. In contrast, the model of the ontological proposition 
that Deleuze uses to characterize distribution within his univocal system does not presuppose 
such an identity. 
Within his univocal ontology, Deleuze undermines the stability of the well-constituted, 
identical subject, displacing the subject in favor of systems of difference that take ontological 
priority over it. This simultaneously undermines the viability of the model of judgment or of 
propositions of consciousness for articulating 1) the basic structure of reality and 2) the limits of 
critical epistemology. Most of Deleuze’s arguments developing this shift are presented later in 
the text than his main discussion of univocity. However, univocity is crucial in offering a basic 
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ontological structure supporting this shift and avoiding the insufficiencies of the model of 
judgment. Rather than discarding the model of the proposition in total, Deleuze appropriates and 
recasts it such that it offers a register for articulating the structure of univocity, which he then 
elaborated in various ways. Broadly speaking, this model is not grounded in the identity of the 
subject, it requires no metaphysically transcendent features of reality, no absolute chasm of real 
or substantial difference between equivocal categories of reality that must be bridged in order for 
any relation between them to be possible, and, in turn, no “Cartesian predicament” or extrinsic 
relation between thought and it’s object. For Deleuze, à la Heidegger, doing ontology does not 
require representing being in adequate judgments, but articulating being via thought’s intrinsic 
relation to being (though this relation must be distinguished from that supposed in what Deleuze 
calls “good sense” and “common sense”). Needless to say, and in contrast to Logique du sens, 
Deleuze’s intention here is not to work out a theory of language. It is to use the metaphor of the 
proposition to highlight key structural features entailed in the univocity of being. The ontological 
proposition does not represent being, but articulates being and its constitutive structure with 
respect to individual beings or worlds of beings. In Heideggerian terms, the ontological 
proposition figures the structure of the event’s self-determination or intensification and 
constitution of worlds of beings through the appropriation and expropriation of originary 
difference and the different aspects of truth, ground, and time-space. Alternatively, the parallel of 
the ontological proposition in early Heidegger is Dasein’s projection of a world or the temporal 
structure of being as accessed through the existential analysis of Dasein and manifest in the 
disclosure of worlds of beings. 
Before reconstructing the basic moments of the ontological proposition and Deleuze’s 
theory of univocity, four points important for understanding why Deleuze takes univocity to be 
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so crucial should be highlighted. First, univocity entails an immanence of being and beings. 
Second, univocity offers a model of distribution and hiererchization different from that of 
analogy. Third, univocity allows individuating differences more originary than specific 
difference to be distinguished and dealt with systematically. Fourth, according to Deleuze, 
univocity is consistent with or perhaps even requires a conception of being as difference, in 
contrast to equivocity, which requires the priority of identity. These together help establish a 
framework for thinking pure difference in itself and the genetic process by which difference 
constitutes the kind of world of quasi-stable beings we are used to. As part of this differential 
process, masked or clothed repetition figures temporality and the constitution of distortion within 
the univocal ontological framework. 
Deleuze sees the proposition, as employed in his univocal ontology, to be composed of 
three main dimensions: 1) “the sense, or what is expressed in the proposition,” 2) “the designated 
(what expresses itself in the proposition),” and 3) “the expressors or designators, which are 
numerical modes – that is to say, differential factors characterizing the elements endowed with 
sense and designation.”602 Linking the structure of the proposition directly to the problematic of 
ontology, Deleuze calls the expressors or designators involved being’s “intrinsic modes or 
individuating factors.”603 Intrinsic modes or individuating factors are Deleuzian parallels to 
Heideggerian beings and the ontological structures constituting those beings. Deleuze is 
particularly interested in cases where the designated is the same for more than one proposition, 
while the sense and designators or expressors are different. This is because he is concerned with 
the way univocal being can be distributed in radically different ways, i.e., is manifested or 
expressed in radically different beings. Take the propositions, “The morning star is beautiful” 
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and “The evening star is beautiful.” In both instances, the designated is Venus. However, the 
sense expressed in each proposition is different, as are the expressors or designators endowing 
that sense. Here, “what is important is that we can conceive of several formally distinct senses 
which none the less refer to being as if to a single designated entity, ontologically one.”604  
Deleuze identifies two fundamental theses maintained by the univocal account of being. 
Keeping track of the second in particular through the following discussion will help show the 
importance of univocity in framing his ontology of events. The first thesis is that, as with 
categorial equivocity “there are indeed forms of being, but contrary to what is suggested by the 
categories, these forms involve no division within being or plurality of ontological senses.”605 
This thesis is straight forward, though seeing how exactly the distinction of forms of being in 
univocity is defined will require Scotus and Spinoza’s technical language. The thesis simply 
marks the fundamental difference between univocal and equivocal ontologies: in equivocal 
ontologies, being is divided in a plurality of different forms, each of which constitutes a different 
sense of being; in univocal ontologies, there might be different forms of being, but being has one 
sense for all of them. The second thesis is that “that of which being is said is repartitioned 
according to essentially mobile individuating differences which necessarily endow ‘each one’ 
with a plurality of modal significations.”606 Whatever the nature of different forms of being 
might be, they are not partitioned by extrinsic predication, but by immanent individuating 
differences. These immanent individuating differences do not establish general types of beings 
(e.g., rational animals vs. non-rational animals), but instead determine the existence of individual 
beings or modes (e.g., Socrates). As I will show through his engagement with Platonism, 
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Deleuze ultimately casts beings or modes as simulacra. Events are precisely the immanent 
individuating differences that determine the existence of individual beings, modes, or simulacra. 
These differences or events are mobile in the sense that when new events are introduced into 
their system, the extant ones are reconfigured, along with the beings they individuate. Deleuze’s 
engagement with Scotus, Spinoza, and Nietzsche on univocity traces an evolution of these 
theses. I shall turn to this now. 
 
3.1: Deleuze’s Engagement with Scotus and Spinoza on Univocity 
 
Deleuze’s main use of the metaphor of the ontological proposition in the context of univocity 
appears in his engagement with Spinoza. There, the ontological proposition is used to describe 
the distribution of being (as substance or God or nature – Deus sive Natura) in attributes and 
modes (beings other than God). I shall return to this in a moment. In his discussion of Spinoza, 
Deleuze uses a set of technical distinctions developed by Scotus. It will be helpful to summarize 
these briefly before turning to Spinoza. Together, Scotus and Spinoza offer Deleuze a set of 
conceptual resources for modeling the nature of immanent individuating differences, i.e., how 
individual beings, modes, or simulacra are determined in a univocal ontology without relying on 
an equivocal categorial system. This is necessary since equivocal systems entail a subjection of 
difference to identity and are insufficient for accounting for individual beings. Yet, Deleuze does 
not think Scotus or Spinoza provide a satisfactory univocity. Scotus’ system renders being 
neutral (rather than productive or genetic) and Spinoza’s seems to maintain a separation between 
being and beings that Deleuze finds problematic. Deleuze’s subsequent engagement with 
Nietzsche’s eternal return as a figure for univocity provides a way to move beyond Scotus and 
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Spinoza by eliminating these problems. In turn, it helps Deleuze establish an account of the 
determination of individuals on the basis of genetic operations of difference and repetition 
(operations which are evental in nature). 
In scholastic thought, a mainstay of Christianized Aristotelianism was its ability to 
maintain a difference in kind between God’s being and that of creatures. Being is said in many 
ways, and though both creatures and God are, the being of creatures is proportionately less 
perfect than that of God. Being is said of creatures in a different way than of God. Scotus 
challenged this by arguing that being is univocal. Scotus’ univocity placed him on a 
philosophical tightrope: on the one hand, it allowed him to deny both pros hen equivocity and 
the scholastic analogy of being; on the other, it brought him dangerously close to pantheism (a 
position he opposed) since it maintained that being is said of creatures in the same way as of 
God. To navigate this, Scotus “neutralized being itself in an abstract concept,” that is, he 
understood univocal being “as neutral, neuter, indifferent to the distinction between the finite and 
the infinite, the singular and the universal, the created and the uncreated.”607 Neutralizing being 
meant that though God and creatures have being in the same sense, this fact does not diminish 
the absolute superiority or perfection belonging to God. For Deleuze, neutralizing being was not 
Scotus’ high point. Rather, within a univocal system his key accomplishment was defining “two 
types of distinction which relate that indifferent, neutral being to difference,” that is, relate it to 
that the differentiation of which in reality is accounted for within his system: formal distinction 
and modal distinction.608 
Aristotelian genera are forms that are really distinct, i.e., they are forms of different kinds 
of reality. Their equivocity means that their real distinction is also a numerical distinction, that is, 
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each genus is ontologically unitary and can be counted as one among several other genera. In 
contrast, for Scotus formal distinction is real, but since being is univocal formal distinction is not 
a numerical distinction. Here, Deleuze’s first fundamental thesis of univocity – that different 
forms of being involve no division within being or plurality of ontological senses – is rendered in 
Scotist terms. 
 
Formal distinction is, in effect, a real distinction, since is it grounded in being or in the object; but 
it is not necessarily a numerical distinction because it is established between essences or senses, 
between ‘formal reasons’ which may allow the persistence of the unity of the subject to which 
they are attributed. In this manner, not only is the univocity of being (in relation to God and to 
creatures) extended in the univocity of its ‘attributes’, but, given his infinity, God can possess his 
formally distinct univocal attributes without losing anything of his unity.609 
 
In contrast, with respect to the second fundamental thesis of univocity, modal distinctions 
or differences individuating modes are distinctions constituted by variations of intensity 
immanent to God’s being or his formally different attributes. Modal distinction is modulation of 
being or an attribute according to its own immanent character. Since a univocal ontology 
precludes the modification of something by extrinsic attribution, modification must occur solely 
by ontologically intrinsic differences, that is, by differential tensions immanent to being or to an 
attribute. In other words, modal distinction occurs by intensive difference. Since for Scotus 
intensive difference always entails reference to a maximum of intensity (a maximum of heat, of 
perfection, or of color, for example), modal distinction entails not only the intensive distinction 
between modes, but also that between modes and the absolute maximum, God. 
Spinoza’s ontology of substance/God/nature, attributes, and modes appropriates the 
Scotist formal and modal distinctions without neutralize being. Instead, being becomes 
affirmative, i.e., genetic, productive, or, in the language of the proposition, expressive: “with 
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Spinoza, univocal being ceases to be neutralized and becomes expressive, it becomes a truly 
expressive and affirmative proposition.”610 Here, “univocal being becomes identical with unique, 
universal, and infinite substance” and substance is formally distinguished in infinitely many 
attributes, though we have access to only two (thought and extension).611 Retaining the first 
fundamental thesis of univocity, attributes are really or qualitatively distinct while real 
distinction is formal and not numerical. Numerical distinction is found only among modes or 
beings, each of which populates every attribute. Causality flows from substance to modes and 
also between modes, with every effect expressed in every attribute, but never from one attribute 
to another. 
 How can we make better sense, though, of what it means to shift to an affirmative 
conception of univocal being? Deleuze’s passages in Différence et répétition on Spinoza’s 
univocity explain this primarily in two correlative terminologies: as already indicated, that of 
expression (which binds univocity again to the model of the ontological proposition) and that of 
power. The couplet of power and affirmation also link Spinoza directly to the Nietzschean world 
of will to power and fröhliche Wissenschaft. Spinoza’s univocity of being is affirmative because 
substance is expressive, productive (of modes or beings), and in itself bears no structural 
principle of negation (in contrast, for example, to Hegel’s dialectic of determinate negation). 
Spinoza’s ontology is one of power because substance can be understood as a pure power to exist 
and to cause or produce, while the world of modes produced is one of conative drive (“the actual 
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essence of [a] … thing itself” is “the conatus with which [it] … endeavors to persist in its own 
being”).612 “Expression” and the other terms of the ontological proposition provide a way for 
understanding the structure and relations of this system. On the one hand, “the attributes behave 
like real qualitatively different senses which relate to substance as if to a single and same 
designated.”613 Just as “the morning star” and “the evening star” express different senses, but 
designate one and the same object, the attributes are formally distinct senses of univocal being 
(substance), which they designate. On the other hand, “substance in turn behaves like an 
ontologically unique sense in relation to the modes which express it, and inhabit it like 
individuating factors or intrinsic and intense degrees.”614  
 As with Scotist univocity, this model precludes the determination or individuation of 
modes by means of the attribution of ontologically extrinsic predicates. Once again, the question 
becomes: How can the determination of modes be accounted for? The answer comes again in 
terms of intensive difference and forms a Spinozist version of the second fundamental thesis of 
univocity. Namely, insofar as Spinoza’s world of modes is one of conative drive, while 
substance is pure power to act and exist, intensive difference is difference between intensive 
degrees of such power. Modes or beings are determined by differential relations of power, or, as 
Smith puts it, “the power or intensity of a being is its relation to Being.”615 The differential 
points distinguishing between intensive degrees of power prefigure the events that determine the 
individual beings or simulacra in Deleuze’s ontology. 
Despite these advances in Spinoza’s version of univocity, Deleuze identifies a 
shortcoming: “there still remains a difference between substance and the modes: Spinoza’s 
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substance appears independent of the modes, while the modes are dependent on substance, but as 
though on something other than themselves.”616 It is true that being is said of substance and of 
modes in the same way, and yet substance has being in se, while modes have being in alio. This 
marks the difference between the two Spinozist registers of reality: Natura naturans and Natura 
naturata. Though Deleuze is a bit vague about why exactly this difference is a problem, the idea 
seems to be that substance maintains a character of identity, even if this identity takes the form of 
indivisibility or unity.617 Substance is formally, but not numerically, differentiated in the 
attributes (the attributes relate to substance as if to a single and same designated). And at the 
level of modes, difference appears as intensive and numerical difference, while substance’s 
alterity and priority with respect to modes means that the intensive differences that individuate 
modes are thought as derivative of identity. 
The fix Deleuze suggests is an elimination of this difference between substance and 
modes: in Spinoza’s language, “substance must itself be said of the modes and only of the 
modes.”618 Eliminating this difference is possible, Deleuze argues, only via a “categorical 
reversal” accomplished in Nietzsche’s eternal return.619 Stated rather simplistically, this 
categorical reversal will be one “according to which being is said of becoming, identity of that 
which is different, the one of the multiple, etc.”620 Key here is the repositioning of difference and 
repetition as the ontological bases for the production of identity and similarity, rather than 
difference and repetition being ontologically secondary to identity and similarity. To accomplish 
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this categorical reversal, Deleuze argues that we must “realize univocity in the form of repetition 
in the eternal return.”621 This is quite complex. 
 
3.2: Deleuze’s Use of Nietzsche’s Eternal Return as a Figure of Univocity 
 
Deleuze adopts Nietzsche’s eternal return and employs it primarily in two related senses. First, it 
is the univocal ontological movement by which difference generates repetition and repetition 
generates difference, or, more precisely, the genetic flow of being or becoming insofar as 
difference and repetition together constitute that flow. This conception of univocity establishes 
the conceptual reversal called for at the end of his discussion of Spinoza. In a second sense, 
“eternal return” is one of the names Deleuze gives to his third synthesis of time – the pure and 
empty form of time (future) that enables the other two syntheses to occur. Deleuze’s preliminary 
definition of the event is given precisely in terms of this third synthesis. Thus, in the eternal 
return’s second sense, it is a figure for the evental structure of time. In Section 3.2 of this 
chapter, I shall explain the first of these senses. In Section 3.3, I shall turn to a brief 
reconstruction of Deleuze’s three syntheses of time, which provide more conceptual detail for the 
genetic movement of univocal being. More importantly, this leads to an explanation of the 
second sense of the eternal return and a preliminary definition of Deleuze’s concept of event. 
In its first sense, the eternal return has both an ontological and methodological role for 
Deleuze, and the latter is grounded in the former. Ontologically, the eternal return is a figure for 
articulating the relation between being as difference and the genetic and temporal characters of 
repetition. Methodologically, it supplies thought with a means of “practical selection among 
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differences according to their capacity to produce.”622 The confluence of these can be expressed 
well in terms of Deleuze’s use of the phrase, “make the difference” (faire la différence).623 As I 
will show, at the ontological level the eternal return makes the difference because in it 
differences are generated. At the methodological level, it makes the difference in the sense that 
1) it allows for conceptual distinctions to be made between ontologically originary, affirmative, 
or pure forms of difference and forms derived from identity or principles of negativity and 2) by 
that very act, difference in the originary ontological sense is generated. In other words, as I shall 
show, the eternal return supplies a test to be used by accounts of the ontological problematic 
produced in thought or text – a test for separating out pure difference from expiated difference, 
for discerning pure difference as intrinsic to the constitution of the account itself, thus for 
attaining an articulation of the differential structure of being, and for generating difference in the 
ontological sense. Thus, the selection carried out in the eternal return is not simply 
methodological but also a basic element of the ontological operation of eternal return.624  
For Deleuze, as I will show, realizing univocity in the form of repetition in the eternal 
return contributes substantially to the categorical reversal of difference and identity, repetition 
and generality. It thereby collapses the Spinozist registers of substance and modes into a single 
register of churning, differentially individuated modes, which Deleuze will come to designate as 
simulacra. As I have indicated, simulacra themselves do have two registers, which Deleuze 
describes in terms of the virtual and actual or dialectical Ideas/problems and solutions. But these 
registers no longer carry Spinoza’s sense of being in se versus being in alio. Detailing the virtual 
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register of dialectical Ideas/problems and the role of events in it will be my primary goal in 
Chapter V. To accomplish Deleuze’s categorical reversal, the univocity of being must not only 
be thought in terms of eternal return, the ontology of the eternal return must pass through 
Platonism. More specifically, the test of the eternal return must be applied to the Platonic 
dialectic, distinguishing the elements of the dialectic complicit to the expiation of difference 
from the affirmative differential elements or phantastical elements lurking in their ground (fond), 
the “Heraclitan world” that Deleuze believes “still growls in Platonism.”625 This results in a 
Deleuzian overturning of Platonism, which is not a negation or dismissal of Platonism, but a 
radical transformation of it. This transformation entails undermining the coordinates of the 
“grounding test” (l’epreuve du fondement) that the Platonic dialectic is designed to implement – 
the test to distinguish proper claimants or participants in an Idea from false claimants or 
simulacra – and the production of an ontology of simulacra constituted by the processes involved 
in difference and repetition.626 I turn to this in Section 4 of this chapter. 
 How, though, does Deleuze’s conception of the eternal return in its first sense lead to a 
categorical reversal of identity and difference, generality and repetition? In early Nietzsche 
scholarship, it was a common view that the eternal return is a return of the identical: given a 
universe with a finite and determinate set of components (for instance, atoms) and an infinite 
span of time, it is inevitable that the combination or arrangement of components making up our 
world today will be replicated in the distant future again and again, even if only after myriad 
other arrangements have come and gone.627 In this scenario, the eternal return is a return of the 
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same world, and that return of the same is guaranteed by the identity through time of the 
components of the universe. However, as Deleuze rightly points out, Nietzsche’s world is not 
one reducible to identities of any kind. Instead, eternal return “presupposes a world (that of the 
will to power) in which all previous identities have been abolished and dissolved.”628 Will to 
power always drives beyond itself, transforming itself or differing from itself. There is no 
identity conserved in principle in these transformations. Consequently, “eternal return cannot 
mean the return of the Identical.”629 In Deleuze’s ontological interpretation, in eternal return 
“returning is being, but only the being of becoming.”630 That is, being is inscribed with no 
principle of identity, being is transformation or differing: being is the being of becoming. Thus, 
there is no same or identical to return, other than transformation or differing itself: “the eternal 
return does not bring back ‘the same’, but returning constitutes the only Same of that which 
becomes.”631 This transformation or differentiation and that one can be said to be the same only 
insofar as both are transformations or differentiations. And this transformation or differentiation 
repeats only insofar as with it differentiation occurs again. Thus, the concept of the eternal return 
entails a priority of difference over identity and a movement of repetition that is built into that 
difference. The concept of the eternal return is the categorical reversal that Deleuze sought. The 
returning of difference is the production of the only identity possible, but this identity is no more 
than a sheen on difference.  
 
Returning is the becoming-identical of becoming itself. Returning is thus the only identity, but 
identity as a secondary power; the identity of difference, the identical which belongs to the 
different, or turns around the different. Such an identity, produced by difference, is determined as 
‘repetition.’632 
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 This provides us with a preliminary definition of Deleuze’s concept of repetition within 
his univocal ontology: repetition is the return of difference, or difference becoming-identical 
insofar as difference differentiates again. In this originary sense, repetition is not a repetition of 
any thing that persists with identity through time, for there are no metaphysically stable 
identities: being something means being something that transforms or differs. Neither is 
repetition generality, since being is not a substance or subject guaranteeing the identity of 
categorical types that might be instantiated in individuals. The only thing that can be repeated at 
this level of Deleuze’s ontology is transformation or differentiation itself, which is precisely 
never a substantial identity. The only way that identity can be spoken of sensibly here is as 
describing the fact that it is difference that is repeated in the process of becoming. Additionally, 
this arrangement provides a preliminary sense of how Deleuze’s theory of repetition is a theory 
of time. Even though his theory of time is extremely complex, a basic logic of time is present 
even in this definition of repetition: repetition is the productive transformation enacted by 
difference, but this entails a sequence of ontological genesis, i.e., a certain sequence of time. 
Clearly, this is not a duration through which an identity persists, but the unfolding or movement 
of differentiation. In the Introduction to Différence et répétition, Deleuze draws on Nietzsche and 
Kierkegaard’s respective conceptions of theatre to characterize this movement. I bring this up 
because Deleuze’s emphasis there is on distinguishing a type of movement that is not mediated 
by the framework of representation and identity. Deleuze’s movement of differentiation is not 
subject to the framework of representation. Neither is it locomotion. Following Nietzsche and 
Kierkegaard, Deleuze is concerned primarily with the movement of reality itself, that is, the 
movement of becoming or of the ongoing sequence of ontological genesis. Repetition – masked 
or clothed repetition – is this movement: “theatre is real movement,” “this movement, the 
  305 
essence and the interiority of movement, is not opposition [à la Hegel], not mediation, but 
repetition.”633 This movement is one in which “repetition is woven from one distinctive point to 
another.”634 In other words, it is the immanent flow of reality as it transforms. I will continue to 
come back to these themes as they come up in Deleuze’s work. 
 When Deleuze engages Nietzsche in relation to univocity, the language of the ontological 
proposition drops out. Yet the same ontological operation figured by the ontological proposition 
is found in the eternal return. Deleuze used the notion of the ontological proposition in the 
context of Scotus and Spinoza to describe univocal being in its constitutive structure with respect 
to individual beings or worlds of beings. Included in the ontological proposition are the genetic 
movements of being. In the context of Nietzsche, these movements are figured by the eternal 
return, and particularly by the test or selection enacted by the eternal return. Like an extreme 
form of the principle of sufficient reason, the selection performed in the eternal return is between 
what can and cannot be, or rather between what can and cannot prolong becoming. In this 
selection: 
 
It is not the Whole, the Same or the prior identity which returns. Nor is it the small or the large, 
either as parts of the whole or as elements of the same. Only the extreme forms [of difference] 
return – those which, large or small, are deployed within the limit and extend to the limit of their 
power, transforming themselves and changing one into another. Only the extreme, the excessive, 
returns; that which passes into something else and becomes identical.635 
 
 
At the ontological level, what passes the test of the eternal return is what is able to be or 
to become, to differ and transform beyond what came before. The test is of whether something 
can persist in its being. But since being is difference, persisting in being does not mean 
remaining identical or the same. The test, then, is of whether something can produce a 
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transformation, go beyond itself, create something new, or continue a differential series. That 
which is able to pass exceeds identity and with it the shackles of conceptual difference.  
 As an aspect of the eternal return’s genetic selection of what exists, affirmative forms of 
being as difference are distilled from forms determined by the negative. Deleuze finds Hegel’s 
dialectic of determinate negation to exemplify forms of difference that are determined by the 
negative. In such systems, “negation is the motor and driving force [puissance]” of the 
modulations of being.636 According to Deleuze, in Hegel’s system “difference implies the 
negative, and allows itself to lead to contradiction, only to the extent that its subordination to the 
identical is maintained.”637 Though Deleuze does not mention it directly, interpretations of 
Heidegger’s middle and late ontology that maintain his account of being to be a-lēthic should be 
included here. In such interpretations, λήθη (concealment, withdrawal, negativity) is taken to be 
a structurally irreducible aspect of being. As I argued in Chapter II, however, this is a mistaken 
reading of Heidegger, or at least of Heidegger’s middle period. In Beiträge, Heidegger’s account 
of the a-lēthic structures is underwritten by a logic of difference defining beyng or the event. The 
structural negativity involved in λήθη is generated by the differentiation of originary difference 
from itself, and is thus consequent upon that difference. For this reason, I hold that Heidegger’s 
evental ontology in fact passes the test of the eternal return as Deleuze conceives it. 
 In systems driven by a negative principle in being, affirmation has to be a secondary 
force. That is, affirmation is generated only on the basis of primary ontological negation. 
Deleuze uses Zarathustra’s Ass to illustrate this. The Ass is the slave, the bearer of reactive 
values. He is able to say yes, “but for him to affirm is to bear, to assume or to shoulder a 
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burden.”638 The Ass affirms, but its affirmation is always a retroactive affirmation of what is 
already negative in principle. In contrast, Deleuze uses Dionysus-Zarathustra to illustrate 
systems in which affirmation is primary and negation produced only secondary. Dionysus-
Zarathustra’s affirmation is that of creation, he creates new values. Here, the negative can follow 
only in response to creative affirmation: 
 
It is no longer the negative which produces a phantom of affirmation like an ersatz, but rather a No 
which results from affirmation … The negative is an epiphenomenon. Negation, like the ripples in 
a pond, is the effect of an affirmation which is too strong or too different.639 
 
 In Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche, the test enacted by the eternal return, selecting which 
forms of being or difference shall be, entails selecting between forms that are in principle subject 
to identity or determined by negation and ones in which affirmation – as a genetic or creative 
power – is primary, with negation and identity following only secondarily. More specifically, 
this distinguishes between ontological forms of difference that are primarily negative and ones 
that are primarily affirmative or creative. Following Nietzsche, Deleuze calls what is affirmative 
or creative “superior,” in contrast to what is “average.” “Eternal return alone effects the true 
selection, because it eliminates the average forms and uncovers ‘the superior form of everything 
that is.’ … Eternal return ‘makes’ the difference [‘fait’ la différence] because it creates the 
superior form.”640 The genetic operation of the eternal return does entail a function of negativity, 
but only in the sense of determining what forms of being or difference shall be. That which is 
structurally negative – average forms – are unable to prolong a series of differences; they 
eventually drop off because they are unable to continue to be or to become something new. Here, 
the negation of the negative describes the limits or the contours of reality, helping to delineate 
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what can persist in being from what cannot. In Deleuze’s words: “Eternal return employs 
negation like a Nachfolge and invents a new formula for the negation of the negation: everything 
which can be denied is and must be denied. … All that is negative and all that denies, all those 
average affirmations which bear the negative, all those pale and unwelcome ‘Yeses’ which come 
from ‘Nos’, everything which cannot pass the test of eternal return – all these must be denied.”641 
 
3.3: Eternal Return, Time, Ground, Event 
 
As noted, Deleuze’s two main uses of the concept of event in Différence et répétition are found 
first in the context of the third synthesis of time and second in his theory of dialectical Ideas and 
their actualization. Explaining the second of these is my focus in Chapter V. But as I have 
argued, doing that requires first reconstructing Deleuze’s account of the ontological status of 
systems of simulacra, i.e., of systems in which different relates to different through difference 
itself. My work so far in Chapter IV builds toward that and toward Deleuze’s first, preliminary 
definition of the event in the third synthesis of time. These two goals of Chapter IV are tightly 
related, since the simulacral account of beings relies on ontological univocity, while one register 
for defining the univocal flow of being is that of the genetic sequence of temporal syntheses. 
Thus far in this chapter I have taken a set of necessary steps toward accomplishing these goals. I 
first showed the central problems motivating Deleuze in Différence et répétition: the subjection 
of difference to identity, the reduction of repetition to generality, and the regime of 
representation. To explain why Deleuze holds these to be problems, I focused on his analysis of 
them within the context of Aristotelian equivocity. I then turned to Deleuze’s first outline of a 
solution to these problems, namely, proposing a univocal system. Deleuze engages Scotus, 
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Spinoza, and Nietzsche to draw resources for developing the general framework for his univocal 
ontology (e.g., the ideas that there is only one sense of being, that being is distributed according 
to immanent individuating differences, and that being is affirmative or productive). Deleuze’s 
conception of Nietzsche’s eternal return in its first sense was particularly important because it 
provided a way for thinking the ontological priority of difference and repetition over identity and 
generality, and for establishing a basic account of the affirmative, genetic flow of difference and 
repetition within the framework of univocity. It also supplied a simultaneously methodological 
and ontological test by which superior or originary forms of difference are distinguished from 
ones derived from identity or principles of negation. However, in the context of his discussion of 
univocity, Deleuze does not offer much more clarity about the structure of the genetic flow 
figured by the eternal return than I have discussed above. 
Deleuze’s notoriously complex theory of time supplies a register in which to give greater 
conceptual clarity to this structure and also a preliminary definition of his concept of event. I 
shall turn to a reconstruction of certain elements of this theory in this section. As expressed in 
terms of time, the order of ontological genesis deals in particular with the genesis of phantastical 
or pre-representational components of the representational subject. My focus, however, will be 
on the structure of the three syntheses of time and their relation to Deleuze’s concept of event. 
As indicated, within the context of the third synthesis of time Deleuze briefly comes back to the 
figure of the eternal return, using it in a second sense. Looking ahead, in the third synthesis he 
defines time as “a formal and empty order [ordre formel vide],” “a totality [ensemble] and a 
series,” while “the idea of a totality of time must be understood as” a caesura.642 This caesura, in 
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turn, “must be determined in the image of an action, of a unique and tremendous event, which is 
adequate to time as a whole.”643 I shall turn to this in what follows. 
Before proceeding any further, it is important to take notice of Deleuze’s terminology of 
ground, since it plays an important role in his theory of time, his engagement with Platonism, 
and his account of virtual or dialectical Ideas and the events they involve. It also connects his 
ontology to Heidegger’s at a direct conceptual level. Deleuze’s terminology of ground is made 
up of a number of different cognates of the French word “fond.” “Fond” and perhaps its most 
important cognate, “fondement,” are both regularly used to translate into French the German 
“Grund.” And both are regularly translated into English as “ground.” In addition to “fond” and 
“fondement,” of particular importance are “fondation” (“foundation”), the “sans-fond” 
(“groundless”), “effondement” (“ungrounding”), and the verb “fonder” (“to ground”).644 For 
Deleuze, “to ground [fonder] is to determine,” but this determination has different senses 
according to which modality of ground is operative.645 The two main modalities of ground are 
fond and fondement. Effondement and the sans-fond are associated with fond, while fondation is 
associated with fondement. The basic sense of fondement is that of a mediating third term (genus) 
or substantial ground, which “serves as the underpinning for the forms of representation.”646 
Deleuze distinguishes three main versions of fondement. In the first version, “the ground is the 
Same or the Identical.”647 It is exemplified by Platonism’s theory of Ideas: this ground “enjoys 
supreme identity, that which is supposed to belong to the Ideas or to the auto kath’ hauto. What 
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it is, and what it possesses, it is and it possesses primarily, in the utmost.”648 What this ground 
grounds are icons, beings that claim to possess what it possesses, but only secondarily. The 
determination enabled by this fondement is, on the one hand, that of distinguishing genuine 
claimants or icons from false ones and, on the other, the ontological determination of the 
essential nature of those genuine claimants. The second sense of fondement pertains to the goal 
of infinite or orgiastic representation. Namely, this fondement is the sufficient reason for some 
thing: it is a sufficient reason with an infinite comprehension and extension equal to one. The 
determination effectuated here is the infinite determination of the thing in its predicates, which 
are subordinated “to the identical and the other requirements of representation.”649 The third 
sense of fondement pertains specifically to Deleuze’s second synthesis of time, that of the pure or 
immemorial past. As I shall discuss, “to ground [fonder], in this third sense, is to represent the 
present – in other words, to make the present arrive and pass within representation (finite or 
infinite). The ground [fondement] then appears as an immemorial Memory or pure past, a past 
which itself was never present but which causes the present to pass, and in relation to which all 
the other presents coexist in a circle.”650 As I shall discuss, the determination effectuated here is 
the condensation of the pure past into the time of duration or the present. For Deleuze, fondation, 
which is closely related to fondement, is a foundation. In particular, this fondation is defined in 
terms of the first synthesis of time, that of the living present or duration. 
In contrast, the basic sense of fond is of a genetic or productive, non-mediated differential 
operation that is ontologically prior to any fondement or fondation. Fond provides the sufficient 
reason or explanation for the individual existence of simulacral beings, but not on the basis of 
any representational framework. Explaining the constitution of such a fond will require concepts 
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that I will not detail until Chapter V. In short, though, it is a multiplicity – or, more precisely, the 
dimension of indeterminate difference that that modulates reciprocal differential relations and 
singularities composing a multiplicity. As I will show later, in this sense the fond is the structure 
of the event. Since fond is prior to any fondation, it is not grounded, but groundless (sans-fond). 
Effondement is what occurs with the introduction of fond in the guise of a differential element or 
event into the structure of an extent fondation, insofar as this disrupts that fondation, 
reconfigures it, and shatters the illusion that it was ontologically substantial or absolute. 
Interestingly, this means that the ontological status of fondation itself is ambiguous: “the ground 
[fondement] is slightly bent: on the one hand, it leans toward what it grounds, towards the forms 
of representation; on the other hand, it turns and plunges into a groundlessness [sans-fond] 
beyond the ground [fondement] which resists all forms and cannot be represented.”651 Fond as 
sans-fond is the Deleuzian version of Heidegger’s Ab-grund. Deleuze hesitates to describe this as 
an “abyss” though, since he attributes the terminology of abyss to regimes of orgiastic 
representation: “representation, especially when it becomes infinite, is imbued with a sentiment 
of groundlessness [sans fond]. Because it has become infinite in order to include difference 
within itself, however, it represents groundlessness [sans fond] as a completely undifferentiated 
abyss, a universal lack of difference, an indifferent black nothingness.”652 Deleuze is wrong on 
this count, at least with respect to Heidegger. As I showed in Chapters II and III Heidegger’s 
conception of Ab-grund is precisely differential, it is an excess of difference not a lack, and it is 
the heart of beyng as event, not nothingness. This shows that Heidegger’s conception of ground 
is very close to Deleuze’s – more so than Deleuze recognized. The following analyses of time, 
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Deleuze’s engagement with Platonism, and (in Chapter V) his theory of dialectical Ideas and the 
events they involve will provide specific contexts in which he uses these concepts of ground. 
Deleuze presents the three syntheses of time in a sequence of logical entailment. In a way 
similar to Heidegger’s methodological movement along a diagenic axis, Deleuze progresses by 
showing that the first synthesis (time as a living present) requires the more profound second 
synthesis (time as an immemorial past), which itself requires the yet more profound third (future 
as a caesura and empty form of time). A paradox in the first synthesis logically leads to the 
second, and the incompleteness of the second logically leads to the third. Yet also like 
Heidegger, this methodological progression is the inverse of the progression of ontological 
genesis, i.e., of the ontological flow of univocal difference and repetition (for Deleuze): the first 
synthesis is enabled by the second, and both the second and first together are enabled by the 
third. In fact, Deleuze assigns distinct terms of “ground” to each synthesis. The first synthesis is 
“the foundation [fondation] of time,” the second is the “ground [fondement] of time,” and the 
third is a “groundlessness [sans-fond]” or “ungrounding [effondement]” of time.653 
Deleuze’s first synthesis of time explains the internal logic of duration or the “living 
present,” which operates at the level of actuality.654 In contrast to the early Heidegger’s account 
of ecstatic time, one of Deleuze’s central claims regarding the living present is that it does not 
have to go outside itself to pass. The living present is a present that passes, while the past and 
future belong to it, i.e., do not constitute temporal dimensions outside the present. Deleuze 
explains the duration of the living present largely in terms of Hume’s account of the formation of 
habit and the principles of association involved therein. As I shall show, of particular importance 
for Deleuze here is the fact that the time of the living present is constituted by repetition and 
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difference, where repetition is understood as the repetition of perfectly independent, 
discontinuous, instantaneous sensible elements and cases and difference is understood as the 
difference drawn from such repetition. This difference is drawn insofar as repetition produces a 
general expectation, i.e., a futural orientation. 
Deleuze builds his account of time by beginning with the Humean radical empiricist 
account of the contraction of a habit. The Humean model is attractive for Deleuze because it 
presupposes no identity in subject or object and no transcendental cognitive faculties beyond an 
imagination. Here, the imagination is defined simply as “a contractile power”: in the encounter 
with sequential sensible elements, the imagination is “like a sensitive plate, it retains one 
[sensible] case when the other appears.”655 That is, the imagination serves as a purely sensitive 
foundation bearing the traces of sensible elements and contracting habits in the form of 
associations. Take the independent sensible elements A and B, for example. When B follows A, 
the imagination contracts an association of the elements (like one contracts a cold), and in that 
association contracts the elements into the case AB (in the sense of drawing them together in an 
association). With each instance in which B follows A (AB, AB, AB), the association of the two 
elements is strengthened. As a consequence of this association, each new time A appears, B is 
expected to follow (AB, AB, AB, A…). More specifically, “when A appears, we expect B with a 
force corresponding to the qualitative impression of all the contracted ABs.”656 This expectation 
is a habit: we contract the habit of expecting B to follow if A appears. 
For Deleuze, the contraction of a habit in this manner is the synthesis of time as duration 
or the lived present. “Time is constituted only in the originary synthesis which operates on the 
repetition of instants. This synthesis contracts the successive independent instants into one 
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another, thereby constituting the lived, or living, present.”657 The past of the living present is 
formed by the retention of contracted cases in the imagination. This past is not a fading chain of 
things and events that had their moment as present and have now passed away. And it is not the 
past as accessed by a faculty of memory that calls a thing or event into the present again. The 
past of the living present is the retained trace of sensible elements and cases that exists as a 
dimension of the present itself. Similarly the future of the living present is neither a field of 
possibility nor the set of moments that have not yet become present. It is the expectation that 
what comes next will be like what came before. That expectation is constituted precisely through 
the repetition and contraction of sensible elements and cases. Thus, the past and future are both 
“dimensions of the present itself in so far as it is a contraction of instants”: “the past in so far as 
the preceding instants are retained in the contraction; the future because its expectation is 
anticipated in this same contraction.”658 This past can therefore be referred to as the “present 
past” and the future as the “present future.” 
The constitution of the present past and present future establishes a temporal asymmetry 
that describes the repetition of difference and the production of new difference through repetition 
at this level of Deleuze’s ontology of time. The movement of that production is the passing of 
the living present. On the one hand, the retention belonging to contraction is a retention of 
particular sensible elements and cases. The repetition of sensible particulars is a repetition 
subsumed within no generality. It is a repetition of difference, that is, of different elements that 
are in no way instances of a general concept. Instead, generality is produced by that repetition. 
For on the other hand, the expectation constituting the present future is generated precisely by 
drawing a general “living rule for the future” from the particulars repeated: B followed A, B 
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followed A, B followed A, thus B generally follows A and I expect that next time A occurs, B 
will follow.659 In this way the synthesis or contraction of the living present “goes from past to 
future in the present, thus from the particular to the general, thereby imparting direction to the 
arrow of time.”660 In the living present, contracting an expectation in the form of a generality is 
the production of something new and different, namely, a generality. That generality did not 
exist already in the sensible particulars. It is a new difference that has been produced, i.e., “a 
difference that the mind draws from repetition.”661 The flow of ontological genesis here is 
therefore a flow from difference and repetition to generality and the endowment of a sheen of 
identity on that difference (I expect B to follow A because I take each A and B to be identical in 
their own kind). 
The synthesis of the living present produces generality in the form of expectation, but it 
also serves as the foundation (fondation) enabling higher level, active cognitive faculties like 
memory and understanding. I will not go into detail about the production of these faculties, but 
briefly point out two related reasons that this is important: the synthesis or contraction of time as 
the living present is generative of faculties that are 1) active, therefore the synthesis is passive 
and 2) that are involved in representation, therefore the synthesis is pre-representative. Deleuze 
refers to the synthesis of the living present as a “passive synthesis” of time since it is not the 
result of any activity on the part of the mind, serving instead as the foundation for the 
constitution of active cognitive faculties: the passive synthesis of time “is not carried out by the 
mind, but occurs in the mind which contemplates, prior to all memory and all reflection.”662 The 
faculty of memory, by which one actively and reflectively reconstitutes or represents past events 
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in the mind, is possible only “on the basis of the qualitative impression[s] in the imagination” 
that are pre-reflective, non-representational, and retained in contraction. Likewise, the predictive 
activity carried out by the understanding is possible only on the basis of the generalities 
synthesized in the imagination. This activity is one by which the understanding “weights the 
expectation in the imagination in proportion to the number of distinct similar cases observed and 
recalled” and constitutes a future that “ceases to be the immediate future of anticipation in order 
to become the reflexive future of prediction.”663 Deleuze refers to the active, reflective, 
representational temporality established in memory and understanding as “active syntheses.”664 
“The active syntheses of memory and understanding are superimposed upon and supported by 
the passive synthesis of the imagination.”665 
 The internal logic of the first synthesis of time constitutes the duration of the present and, 
at the ontological level, one manner in which univocal being is developed in determinate 
structures. Yet Deleuze identifies a paradox in that logic, the consequence of which is that the 
first synthesis is insufficient for providing an account of time. This paradox drives the account of 
time to a second synthesis or “pure past” that is the ground (fundament) for the first. The paradox 
held in the first synthesis is the following: the living present constitutes time “while passing in 
the time constituted.”666 In other words, the contraction by which duration is originated is itself 
intratemporal. “Time does not escape the present, but the present does not stop moving by leaps 
and bounds which encroach upon one another.”667 The lived present passes, but doesn’t go 
outside of itself to do so. The movement of that passing could never occur if there were not 
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another time in which it can occur. This second time is that of the pure past or memory, which is 
articulated in the second synthesis. 
 The form of the pure past or memory must be distinguished from the active memory 
described in the first synthesis as a power of representing past things or events in the present. 
The second synthesis is again passive and the memory and past at stake in it are an immemorial 
memory and a past that never is present and never was present. While the duration of habit 
constitutes time at the level of actuality, the pure past is a past the reality of which is virtual. 
Deleuze’s account of this is modeled on Bergson’s cone of memory. If habit or contraction in the 
first synthesis “causes the present to pass,” memory or the pure past is “that to which the present 
and habit belong,” i.e., the time in which the present present passes.668 Deleuze describes this 
relation in terms of the distinction between fondation and fondement, though the metaphors he 
uses to clarify the distinction in this context are helpful only to a degree. “The first synthesis, that 
of habit, is truly the foundation [fondation] of time.”669 How are we to understand the nature of 
fondation here? “The foundation concerns the soil: it shows how something is established upon 
the soil, how it occupies and possesses it.”670 In contrast, memory is “the ground [fondement] of 
time.”671 If the fondation pertains to the soil, “the ground [fondement] comes rather from the sky, 
it goes from the summit to the foundations [fondations], and measures the possessor and the soil 
against one another according to a title of ownership [propriété].”672 I take these definitions to 
mean that habit is the “soil” occupied and possessed by duration or the living present, which is 
established by the contractions constituting habit. Memory or the pure past, then, measures the 
entirety of the living present from its most derived aspects (summit) to its most originary ones 
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(foundations) by constituting the transcendental condition for the distinction of these aspects at 
all. The first synthesis belongs to the second insofar as the second is the fondement enabling the 
first to occur. “Memory is the fundamental synthesis of time which constitutes the being of the 
past (that which causes the present to pass).”673 
 Showing the basic logic of the passive synthesis of memory or the pure past can best be 
done by beginning with active or representational memory. When the active memory accesses a 
past event (i.e., “former present”), it recollects or reproduces that former present in the present 
present.674 This operation implies an a priori or pure past dimension that in each case is in excess 
over the representational recollection itself. How so? The former presents that are recollected 
themselves included a dimension of representational recollection when they were present 
presents. Though Deleuze maintains that this is the case for any recollection, it can be seen 
especially well in cases in which I recollect a previous recollection: in the present present I 
recollect a former present that occurred this morning, where that former present was itself one in 
which I recollected last night’s dinner. When active memory recollects former presents, those 
former presents themselves include dimensions of recollection and this implies a compounding 
logical expansion of the past dimension. For when last night’s dinner was a present present, it 
included recollections that informed it. This means that when I now recollect this morning’s 
thoughts about dinner last night, I recollect as a part of them the recollections involved in dinner. 
And the past presents recalled during dinner themselves involved recollection. Thus, my simple 
recollection of this morning’s thoughts is not so simple: it implies a compounding network of 
recollections expanding logically from the point of the present present. This expanse of memory 
implied in each recollection is Deleuze’s version of Bergson’s cone of memory. Moreover, this 
                                                 
673 DR 109/80. 
674 DR 109/80. 
  320 
expanse is ultimately in excess over active or representational recollection. I actively recollect 
now my thoughts this morning and, in turn, dinner last night. I even represent the recollections 
involved in dinner. But at some point as this logic expands, the recollections involved in past 
presents are beyond my capacity for representation: even though the recollections involved in 
recollections of recollections of recollections, etc., are implicit, they are not explicit in my 
representation. This dimension of the past that is in excess over active representational memory 
is indeed a memory, but not one that is ever remembered: it is an immemorial memory or pure 
past that operates as a storage bank for all past presents. And it exceeds the ability of active 
memory to represent the past at all. This immemorial memory or pure past is the dimension of 
time in which the living present of the first synthesis is grounded. 
 However, if time were composed only of the living present and the pure past, a serious 
problem would arise: time would be locked into a circular repetition of the same events. Recall 
that in the living present of duration, future as expectation and past as the retention of contracted 
sensible elements are precisely moments of the present present, not a past or future that is 
beyond the present (they are the present past and present future). When a present present passes, 
it passes not into retention, but into the pure past described in the second synthesis. If there were 
only these two syntheses, this would be the end of the story of time: time would merely be the 
buildup of the pure past from passing presents. Memory, from the perspective of the present 
present, would recollect past presents, but there would be no future endowing the sequence of 
presents with novelty or fecundity. In other words, the content that memory would recollect of 
the past presents would be nothing more than that of previous recollections of past presents, 
together with their contracted habits. The repetition of the past in the present through active 
memory would be a circular repetition of the same. Deleuze allegorizes this in terms of Plato’s 
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myth of metempsychosis – the story of the soul’s migration after death to the realm of Ideas, the 
soul’s sight of those Ideas, its migration to a new birth in which it forgets the Ideas, and the 
process of recollection of the Ideas during its new life. Here the eternal Ideas take the role of the 
same that is repeated. And the lives lived, together with the recollections enacted in them, take 
the role of living present and its active memory. In this model, there is no future (other than 
present future) and time is locked into a circular repetition of the same.  
 This is clearly not the case, however, so there must be a third time that breaks the circle – 
a third synthesis that constitutes the future. If the second synthesis operates as a ground 
(fondement) for the first, but thereby locks those two syntheses into a circular time, the third 
synthesis is a sans-fond which fractures the circle and effectuates an effondement or ungrounding 
of it. In Deleuze’s account, this third synthesis is structured as a caesura: a fracture, disruption, or 
disjoint that enables the overall order of time. In its preliminary definition here in terms of time, 
the event is precisely the caesural structure of this third synthesis. The caesura of time “must be 
determined in the image of an action, of a unique and tremendous event, which is adequate to 
time as a whole.”675 More precisely, as caesural the event or third synthesis has three main 
moments: it is a “series,” a “totality [ensemble],” a “formal and empty order [ordre formel vide]” 
of time.676 
First, the series enabled by the event is the future. Instead of time being locked into a 
circular logic, the caesura of time unfolds that circle into a serial or ordinal progression. As a 
caesura, the event distributes the first and second syntheses of time (i.e., distinguishes them as 
different orders of time), and fractures their circular logic. Thus, the event “creates the possibility 
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of a temporal series” rather than merely a circular temporal repetition of the same.677 In other 
words, it opens up for time a future that is not a repetition of the same, but a flow of ontological 
creativity or genesis. In Deleuze’s second sense of the eternal return, it figures this futural series: 
“eternal return, in its esoteric truth, concerns – and can concern – only the third time of the 
series. …that is why it is properly called a belief of the future, a belief in the future” or “the 
future as such.”678 The series or future is precisely the univocal genetic flow of difference and 
repetition figured earlier by the eternal return and its selective test. But here, the eternal return is 
understood as part of the structure of the event which enables it. Second, the event as caesura is a 
totality or ensemble in the sense that in it are gathered the pure past, living present, and future 
that it distributes. The event is originary of these and constitutes them insofar as it constitutes 
their difference. But as constitutive of the pure past, living present, and future, these three are 
ontologically bound together in the event’s differentiation. Third, the event as caesura is the 
formal and empty order of time or the pure form of time insofar as it is the form in which time 
can be at all. In its caesural structure, the event distributes past, present, and future. Without this 
distribution, time would be locked into a circular logic and no serial progression would occur. 
Yet the event is prior to the temporal processes that it enables, and so is not properly in time 
itself. Rather, it constitutes the form in which time occurs. In other words, the time of the event is 
not “subordinated to movement” or change within time, instead being “the most radical form of 
change.”679 That is, the event is the form of change, but that “form of change does not 
change.”680 The event in this preliminary definition is the form in which anything that occurs in 
time can occur. In Chapter V, I will turn to an analysis of Deleuze’s more detailed account of the 
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evental operations in which things occur, which is given in terms of the differential structure of 
dialectical Ideas, problems, or multiplicities and their actualization in systems of simulacra. One 
thing remains to be established first in this chapter: a greater clarification of the ontological 
status of simulacra. In Différence et répétition, Deleuze develops his concept of simulacra by 
way of an engagement with a certain Platonism. This engagement is framed by the selective test 
operated by the eternal return as a figure of the univocal genetic flow of difference and 
repetition.   
 
4: The Platonic Dialectic and Deleuze’s Affirmative Concept of Simulacra 
 
The basic logic of the three syntheses of time provides a preliminary definition of the event in 
Deleuze’s ontology. It also offers a greater conceptual structure to the genetic sequence of 
ontological univocity than that provided in terms of Deleuze’s engagement with Scotus, Spinoza, 
and the first sense of Nietzsche’s eternal return alone. Deleuze’s account of ontological 
univocity, particularly with respect to the two senses of the eternal return, advances his project in 
significant ways. But to establish the basic form of an ontology of difference and repetition 
liberated from the shackles of identity and similarity, that univocity must pass through the 
Platonic dialectic. The Platonic dialectic introduced into philosophy a mechanism of resemblance 
between icons or well-grounded claimants and Ideas, while this required that Ideas function as 
identities grounding the system. Casting beings as icons (despite the degree of resemblance they 
carry) in this manner initiated the history of the subjection of difference to identity, reduction of 
repetition to generality, and the framework of representation: “the history of the long error is the 
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history of representation, the history of the icons.”681 In effect, Deleuze applies the test of the 
eternal return (in the first sense) to the Platonic dialectic to liberate the superior elements of 
difference entailed within the dialectic from the elements that are complicit to the expiation of 
difference, even though he never describes his engagement with Plato this way. This brings 
about a Deleuzian overturning of Platonism and generates an affirmative theory of simulacra. As 
I have mentioned, Deleuze’s theory of simulacra provides the basic ontological framework 
within which events operate in the more developed account he gives of them in his theory of 
dialectical Ideas and their actualization (upon which I focus in Chapter V).  
In the context of the interpretation of Platonism that Deleuze gives, icons or well-
grounded claimants are temporal, sensible participants in an eternal, intelligible Idea. Well-
grounded claimants are “authorized by their internal resemblance to the ideal model, 
authenticated by their close participation in the foundation.”682 An act, for instance, is just 
because it is a proper claimant of Justice itself, it genuinely participates in the Idea of Justice. 
More and less authentic claimants can be distinguished according to their degree of participation 
in or distance from the Idea. Simulacra are not simply claimants that participate very little in the 
Idea, they are counterfeits. They do not participate in the Idea at all, yet present themselves as if 
they were a proper claimant. Simulacra are “built on dissimilarity and imply[] an essential 
perversion or deviation from the Idea.”683 Fool’s gold is not a low quality of gold, it is not gold at 
all. Yet it appears as if it were. Deleuze will adopt the Platonic concept of simulacra, but 
ultimately recast it in terms of his differential ontology. As I have noted, for Deleuze simulacra 
or systems of simulacra are systems in which different relates to different by way of difference. 
The mechanisms of difference involved in simulacra are given precisely in terms of the 
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differential components of dialectical Ideas and their actualization. However, the basic 
ontological status of simulacra is established by Deleuze’s engagement with Platonism. 
Deleuze’s appropriation of the Platonic notion of simulacra is important not merely because it 
offers an account of things that do not fall within the Idea-claimant conceptual structure, but 
because it overturns that very conceptual structure: “the simulacra is not just a copy, but that 
which overturns all copies by also overturning the models.”684 This results in an account of the 
nature of beings as simulacra and of the genetic processes involved in being as genetic of nothing 
other than worlds of simulacra. The ontological status of simulacra, then, can be defined as that 
belonging to beings the constitution of which is not derived from any principles of identity, 
generality, or representation. 
In Deleuze’s reading, the primary goal of Platonic dialectic is to select between rivals 
who claim to be the genuine possessors of some quality, for instance, between a number of 
people each of whom claims to be the true lover. In brief, to accomplish this the dialectic posits 
an Idea and casts the rivals as icons claiming participation in the idea. This allows a grounding 
test (l’epreuve du fondement) to be performed in which authentic claimants or participants are 
distinguished from false claimants or simulacra. Yet this test leads Platonism to the expiation of 
difference that Deleuze finds so problematic: the “platonic wish to exorcise simulacra is what 
entails the subjection of difference. For the model can be defined only by a positing of identity as 
the essence of the Same [auto kath’ hauto], and the copy by an affection of internal resemblance, 
the quality of the Similar.”685 However, upon closer analysis of “four figures of the Platonic 
dialectic” that Deleuze identifies, he locates a rupture in the dialectic that allows the identity of 
Ideas that functions as a ground (fondement) to be dissolved and a positive ontological status to 
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be given to simulacra.686 Even though in large part these four figures contribute to the expiation 
of difference and repetition, by examining them Deleuze locates within the Platonic dialectic 
elements that pass the test of the eternal return. The figures are “the selection of difference, the 
installation of a mythic circle, the establishment of a foundation [fondation], and the position of a 
question-problem complex.”687 I reconstruct each in what follows. 
The first figure of the Platonic dialectic – the selection of difference – describes the way 
that the dialectic proceeds by a method of diairesis or division. For instance, in the Sophist the 
preliminary hunt for the authentic angler proceeds by dividing the expert from the non-expert, 
dividing expertise or art into the art of production and the art of acquisition, dividing acquisition 
into mutually willing exchange and taking possession, dividing taking possession into combat 
and hunting, and so on until the authentic angler is isolated.688 Though Plato’s tree of division 
resembles the progression of Aristotle’s system from “top” to “bottom” (i.e., the progressive 
division of each genus or middle term into contraries by a specific difference), there is an 
important distinction. Plato’s divisions are not grounded in a genus or middle term. For this 
reason, as Deleuze points out, Aristotle finds Plato’s form of division unsatisfactory: “the 
[Platonic] dialectic of difference has its own method – division – but this operates without 
mediation, without middle term or reason; it acts in the immediate and is inspired by the Ideas 
rather than by the requirements of a concept in general.”689 The problem, according to Aristotle, 
is that without a middle term there is no reason to identify something as belonging to one species 
rather than another. Assigning something a place on one side of a Platonic division seems 
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logically arbitrary (if “we divide art into arts of production and arts of acquisition,” “why is 
fishing among the arts of acquisition?”).690 
Deleuze, however, finds this character of Platonic dialectic to be advantageous. In 
contrast to Aristotle’s system, Platonic division is not yet subject to the prior identity of a genus. 
This is a problem, Deleuze argues, only if we presume that Platonic dialectic has the same goal 
as Aristotelian: dividing genera or determining species and classifying or identifying that which 
belongs to them. However, this is incorrect. Platonic “division is not the inverse of 
‘generalization,’” it is not “a method of determining species, but one of selection.”691 As 
indicated, Platonic division operates in the service of “selection among rivals, the testing of 
claimants.”692 Stated alternatively, it is a method of “authenticating” or distinguishing which of a 
set of rivals are authentically just, beautiful, wise, etc.693 Most fundamentally this selection is 
meant to distinguish the authentic claimant from the imposter, i.e., from the simulacrum of the 
authentic claimant. The sophist claims to be wise, but is he? 
If Aristotle’s middle terms offer a probative force grounding the identification of 
something as a member of one species rather than another, what fulfills the probative function in 
the Platonic dialectic such that it can distinguish authentic from false claimant? The answer 
brings us to the second figure of the Platonic dialectic: the instillation of a mythic circle. In the 
dialectic, a myth is introduced that plays the probative role. For example, in the search for the 
authentic shepherd of men, the Statesman  
 
…invokes the image of an ancient God who ruled the world and men: strictly speaking, only this 
God deserves the name of shepherd-King of mankind. None of the claimants is his equal, but there 
is a certain ‘care’ of the human community which devolves to the statesman par excellence, since 
he is closest to the model of the archaic shepherd-God. The claimants find themselves measured 
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according to an order of elective participation (according to the ontological measure afforded by 
the myth).694 
 
 
 In the Phaedrus, the myth introduced is that of “eternally recurring metempsychosis” in 
which one’s soul sees the Ideas, thus enabling knowledge of them by way of anamnesis during 
life.695 During the cycles of metempsychosis, moreover, one’s lot in life is determined. Here, not 
only is the probative force required to distinguish authentic claimants from simulacra supplied by 
the Ideas, one’s status or lot with respect to participation in some Idea is determined.  
 The invocation of myth is the establishment of a foundation (fondation) or ground 
(fondement) – the third figure of Platonic dialectic.696 In order for the method of division to have 
probative force, it demands something to serve as a ground mediating the divisions made. Such a 
ground “is constituted by the myth as a principle of a test or selection which imparts meaning to 
the method of division by fixing the degrees of an elective participation.”697 Here, we find the 
Platonic distinction between grounding and grounded terms to be inscribed with criteria of 
resemblance. The icon, which is grounded, participates in the ground to the degree that it 
resembles the ground (internally, not sensibly). But the ground possesses the quality in question 
absolutely. “To participate means to have part in, to have after, to have in second place. What 
possesses in first place is the ground [fondement] itself.”698 “The function of the ground 
[fondement] is then to allow participation, to give in second place.”699 The most authentic 
claimant participates in the ground in second place, while less authentic claimants participate in 
third, fourth, fifth place, and so on. A claimant can be considered grounded insofar as it 
                                                 
694 DR 85/60-61. This myth is found in Plato’s Statesman, in The Collected Works of Plato 269a-274e. 
695 DR 86/61. This myth is introduced in Socrates’ second speech, Phaedrus, in The Collected Works of Plato 243e-
257b. 
696 In his discussion of Platonism, Deleuze uses fondation and fondement more or less interchangeably. 
697 DR 86/62. 
698 DR 87/62. 
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participates in the ground. In contrast, simulacra are claimants that do not participate in the 
ground and are therefore groundless. The Platonic grounding test enables simulacra to be 
“denounced as groundless [sans fondement].”700 Without the mediation of the myth, the division 
Deleuze finds most important in Plato cannot be sustained – the division between icons and 
simulacra. In fact, Deleuze holds that “Plato distinguishes, and even opposes, models and copies 
only in order to obtain a selective criterion with which to separate copies and simulacra, the 
former founded upon the relation to the model while the latter are disqualified because they fail 
both the test of the copy and the requirements of the model.”701 
 The fourth and final figure of the Platonic dialectic is the position of a question-problem 
complex within it. The dialectic invokes a myth to establish a ground, but “in archaic myth, there 
is always a task to be performed, a riddle to be solved.”702 In other words, built into the mythic 
structure is something unresolved that violates the stability of myth’s function as a ground. And 
this problematic element is bound up with the question motivating the dialectic (which rival is 
genuine and which simulacra?). For instance, in the Apology, “the oracle is questioned, but the 
oracle’s response is itself a problem.”703 Socrates recounts his friend Chaerephon’s visit to the 
oracle at Delphi, where Chaerephon asked the oracle if there is anyone wiser than Socrates. The 
oracle famously answers that there is not. This confounds Socrates, since he was “only too 
conscious that” he had “no claim to wisdom, great or small.”704 How, then, could he be wisest 
when many others claimed in fact to have wisdom? Socrates is compelled to test himself against 
the other rivals in order to prove the oracle wrong. In other words, the problem or enigma 
presented by the oracle drives Socrates’ life of philosophy, as well as the dialectical 
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701 DR 340/265. 
702 Essays 19. 
703 DR 88/63. 
704 Plato, Apology, in The Collected Works of Plato 21b. 
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methodology, through which he “answers” to the problem. Likewise in the Meno, the slave is 
prompted to recollection by a geometrical problem. In this sense, Deleuze writes, “Plato defined 
the dialectic as proceeding by ‘problems’, by means of which one attains the pure grounding 
principle [principe qui fonde] – that is, the principle which measures the problems as such and 
distributes the corresponding solutions.”705 But at the same time, the mythic element of the 
dialectic disrupts that very ground. 
 On the basis of Deleuze’s analysis of these four figures of the Platonic dialectic, two 
tightly related phantastical elements of the dialectic can be identified that provide the test of the 
eternal return a foothold. First, the question-problem complex, as an essentially problematic 
dimension of the dialectic, is irreducible to the framework of identity sustained in the relation 
between Idea and icon. The question-problem complex has being in a way that is not reducible to 
identity, but generative of it: it is part of the dialectic’s mythic dimension installed in order to 
establish identity in the form of the Idea. In Deleuze’s reading, Plato’s theory of being is the 
theory of Ideas. In that case, the question-problem complex might be designated non-being. 
Adopting Plato’s language of non-being from the Sophist, Deleuze points out that in the Platonic 
dialectic being cannot be simply the Idea’s dimension of identity/ground (fondement), for “being 
is also non-being, but non-being is not the being of the negative; rather it is the being of the 
problematic, the being of the problem and question.”706 To avoid confusing non-being with the 
being of the negative, Deleuze suggests that it “should rather be written (non)-being or, better 
still, ?-being.”707 Furthermore, since the question-problem complex is internal to and originary of 
the Idea (as ground/identity), being or the Idea should not be understood primarily in terms of 
ground or identity. Instead, the concept of Idea should be flipped on its head and redefined: as 
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such, Deleuze writes, “Being (what Plato calls the Idea) ‘corresponds’ to the essence of the 
problem or the question itself.”708 With this, the Idea as the being of the problem gains the 
central sense that Deleuze will carry over into his ontology of “dialectical Ideas” or “problems” 
and “solutions” in Chapter IV of Différence et répétition. Key here is Deleuze’s claim that since 
the Idea as the being of the problematic or as (non)-being is not captured within the framework 
of identity, it is difference: heteron.709 
 The second element of the Platonic dialectic that provides a foothold for the test of the 
eternal return, and thus for the overturning of Platonism, is the simulacrum itself. The dialectic is 
implemented in order to distinguish icons from simulacra and to disqualify the very being of 
simulacra. Stated differently, the dialectic is generated in response to the problem posed by the 
existence of simulacra. The genius (or idiocy) of the dialectic is to try to solve this problem by 
introducing a metaphysics that rejects the problem as illegitimate and systematically exorcises it. 
However, the being of the dialectic itself is possible only on the basis of the problematic being of 
simulacra. Therefore, the dialectic implicitly, and despite its best efforts, entails an affirmation of 
the being of simulacra. Furthermore, since the being of simulacra is categorically not understood 
on the ground of identity established in the Idea, the ontology of simulacra is an ontology of 
beings that are consequent upon no prior identity. As Smith writes, “if the resemblance of the 
iconic copy is built upon the model of the identity of an ideal sameness, the disparity of the 
simulacrum is based upon another model, a model of difference, from which the dissimilitude or 
‘internalized difference’ of the simulacrum derives its power.”710 “Simulacra are those systems 
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in which different relates to different by means of difference itself. What is essential is that we 
find in these systems no prior identity, no internal resemblance.”711 
 The Platonic dialectic includes both 1) elements involved in the expiation of difference 
(the installation of myth as grounding identity, the interpretation of beings as icons, and the 
relations of resemblance between icons and the ground) and 2) phantastical elements that violate 
that expiation and operate outside its bounds (the being of the question-problem complex/(non)-
being and simulacra). While the former elements have historically been taken to define 
Platonism, the latter elements disrupt that definition. If on the basis of this distinction the 
dialectic is run through the test of the eternal return, the result is an affirmation of these 
phantastical elements. This affirmation is precisely what Deleuze demands in order to give 
univocal ontology concepts of difference and repetition that are liberated from identity and 
generality/resemblance. The affirmation of the being of simulacra and of the question-problem 
complex means that the ground-icon-resemblance complex does not constitute Platonism’s 
proper ontology. This affirmation uproots and overturns the traditional version of Platonism, and 
does so, moreover, on the basis of elements of the Platonic dialectic itself. Thus, as Deleuze 
suggests, the fact “that this overturning should conserve many Platonic characteristics is not only 
inevitable but desirable.”712 
 If affirming the being of simulacra and the question-problem complex undermines the 
identity of the ideal ground, it also destroys the identity of the icons. For the identity of icons is 
derived from their being well-grounded in the ideal ground. This is the meaning of the event of 
the death of God alluded to by Nietzsche in Section 343 of Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, 
something that Nietzsche expected would take a long time to comprehend, but would also be 
                                                 
711 DR 383/299, italics removed. 
712 DR 82/59. 
  333 
“the meaning of our cheerfulness.”713 It is also the meaning of Deleuze’s statement in the 1968 
Preface to Différence et répétition: “The modern world is one of simulacra. Man did not survive 
God, nor did the identity of the subject survive that of substance. All identities are only 
simulated, produced as an optical ‘effect’ by the more profound game of difference and 
repetition.”714 For Deleuze, it is only with the simultaneous ungrounding (effondement) of the 
ideal ground and the icon that difference can be “thought in itself, neither represented nor 
mediated.”715 In a world of simulacra, difference is primary and identity generated only 
secondarily as the return or repetition of difference. “Eternal return means that each thing exists 
only returning, copy of an infinity of copies which allows neither original nor origin to 
subsist.”716 
 
Conclusion 
 
In Part One of this dissertation (Chapters I-III), I reconstructed Heidegger’s account of beyng as 
event. There, the logic of the event is a logic of pure difference. The event is the differentiation 
of difference from itself, such that a logic of determinacy or of the Da of Da-sein is originated. 
The main registers of the logic of determinacy that I treated were truth, ground, and time-space. 
Working out the differential logic of the event underwriting Heidegger’s ontology in Beiträge is 
important because it transforms the way we understand that ontology. But it is also important 
because it shows that beginning in the 1930s Heidegger was philosophically much closer to 
Deleuze than is recognized in available scholarship. 
                                                 
713 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1974), 279. 
714 DR 1/xix. 
715 DR 91/66. 
716 DR 92/67. 
  334 
 Part Two of this dissertation is composed of Chapters IV and V. Here in Chapter IV, I 
began by outlining some of the major concerns of Deleuze’s ontology in Différence et répétition 
and the place of his concept of event in it. I also highlighted certain important confluences of 
Heidegger and Deleuze’s projects. Of particular importance are their shared concern with 
difference at the most fundamental levels of ontology, their challenges to the Platonic and 
Aristotelian traditions of metaphysics, their commitment to the radical critique of representation, 
the way each undermines the subject-centered horizon for philosophy set in place by Kant, and, 
above all, their shared claim that being is evental in nature. In Différence et répétition Deleuze 
offers two main accounts of the event: the first and preliminary account is given in terms of the 
third synthesis of time, which I outlined above and the second, more substantial, account is given 
in terms of the differential structure of dialectical Ideas, problems, or multiplicities and their 
actualization in systems of simulacra (my focus in Chapter V). In order to set the context 
necessary for defining Deleuze’s concept of event, I began in Section 2 of this chapter by 
providing an analysis of the central problems motivating Deleuze’s project in Différence et 
répétition: the subjection of difference to identity, the reduction of repetition to generality, and 
the perpetuation of representation. There, I focused on the way these problems are manifested in 
Aristotle’s equivocal categorial system. In Section 3, I showed how Deleuze argues for a 
univocal ontology and how this supports concepts of difference and repetition that are liberated 
from identity and generality/resemblance. To accomplish this, Deleuze draws on Scotus, 
Spinoza, and Nietzsche. Of particular importance is figuring univocal being in terms of the 
eternal return. The test or selection enacted by the eternal return has both methodological and 
ontological functions for Deleuze. Methodologically, it offers a way of distinguishing forms of 
difference reduced to conceptual difference from forms of difference contributing to the 
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production of a concept of difference in itself. Ontologically, the test of the eternal return 
describes the genetic unfolding of difference and repetition, together with the way “average” 
forms of difference or difference understood on the basis of negativity cease to be insofar as they 
cease to create, transform, or differ. In order to provide greater conceptual clarity to the structure 
of Deleuze’s univocity, I then reconstructed the basic logic of his three syntheses of time. Most 
importantly, this allowed the preliminary definition of the event in his ontology to be given. The 
event is the caesural pure and empty form of time, which enables the processes involved in the 
pure past, living present, and future. The event is the form of ontological determinability, i.e., the 
form in which anything that occurs in time occurs. Deleuze’s account of dialectical Ideas will 
allow a more precise account of the event and ontological processes by which events determine 
the structure of reality. 
The univocity of being as difference understood in terms of the eternal return and the 
syntheses of time advances Deleuze’s project. But univocity must pass through the Platonic 
dialectic. Section 4 of this chapter reconstructed Deleuze’s analysis of the Platonic dialectic, 
showed how the dialectic is subjected to the test of the eternal return, and showed how this 
provides Deleuze with a concept of beings as simulacra. The application of the test of the eternal 
return in this context distinguishes phantastical elements of the dialectic (question-problem 
complexes and simulacra) from elements complicit to the propitious moment (ideal ground, 
icons, resemblance). By affirming the being of question-problem complexes and simulacra, the 
traditional version of Platonism is overturned and the basic contours of an affirmative ontology 
of simulacra is produced. Showing how this works is crucial for setting up my analysis of 
Deleuze’s ontology of events in Chapter V. For Deleuze, simulacra have both “virtual” and 
“actual” dimensions: “It is as though everything has two odd, dissymmetrical and dissimilar 
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‘halves’, the two halves of the Symbol, each dividing itself in two: an ideal half submerged in the 
virtual and constituted on the one hand by differential relations and on the other by 
corresponding singularities; an actual half constituted on the one hand by the qualities 
actualizing those relations and on the other by the parts actualizing those singularities.”717 
Deleuze understands the structure of the virtual in terms of dialectical Ideas or problems, and the 
actual in terms of solutions to those problems. Within this framework, systems of simulacra are 
“sites for the actualization of Ideas.”718 Deleuze’s more precise ontology of events must be 
understood within this framework. Explaining Deleuze’s ontology of events within his theory of 
dialectical Ideas and their actualization in systems of simulacra is what I will turn to next. 
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Chapter V 
 
Difference and Event in Deleuze’s Theory of Dialectical Ideas 
 
Chapter Overview 
 
In Chapter IV, I reconstructed central parts of Deleuze’s treatment of the problems motivating 
Différence et répétition: the subordination of difference to identity, the reduction of repetition to 
generality, and the perpetuation of the regime of representation. This is necessary in order to 
make sense of the ontology Deleuze proposes and the nature of events in that ontology. In that 
chapter, I then turned to Deleuze’s account of ontological univocity (with special focus on the 
figure of the eternal return), time, and his overturning of Platonism. In the context of his theory 
of time, Deleuze offers a preliminary account of the event in terms of the third synthesis. There, 
the event is caesural structure of the third synthesis or the pure and empty form of time. In other 
words, the event is the form in which anything that can occur in time can occur. The different 
steps I took in Chapter IV culminate in showing that the basic framework of Deleuze’s ontology 
is one of a chaosmos of roiling simulacra. As I will show in this chapter, simulacra have two 
ontological registers: one virtual and one actual. At the virtual level, simulacra are composed of 
dialectical Ideas or problems. At the actual level, those Ideas or problems are incarnated in fields 
of solution. An ideal order of events and an actual order of events correspond to these registers. 
In this chapter, I focus on explicating Deleuze’s ontology of ideal events, though I also provide a 
schematic overview of the nature of actual events insofar as they are related to ideal events. The 
nature of ideal events must be defined within the context of Deleuze’s theory of dialectical Ideas 
or problems and their actual solutions. Deleuze appropriates much of this theory from the early 
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twentieth century French mathematician and philosopher, Albert Lautman. Lautman, in turn, 
developed his theory of dialectical Ideas/problems and solutions by way of an engagement with 
Heidegger’s early work. To explain Deleuze’s theory of Ideas and of ideal events, I begin by 
recapitulating certain elements of Heidegger’s productive logic of Grundelgung that are of direct 
relevance for Lautman. I then turn to an extensive analysis of Lautman and Lautman’s use of 
Heidegger. Within that context I clarify a set of Deleuze’s key claims that define his theory of 
Ideas. Though Deleuze adopts the overall structure of Lautman’s theory, he recasts the internal 
composition of dialectical Ideas in terms of “multiplicity.” In the final section of this chapter, I 
draw on my previous analyses in order to reconstruct Deleuze’s theory of ideal events in terms of 
dialectical Ideas or multiplicities. 
 
1: Introduction 
 
The concept of event cuts straight to the heart of the ontology Deleuze presents in Différence et 
répétition. In Chapter IV, I showed how Deleuze’s univocal ontology of difference and repetition 
led him to an overturning of Platonism, and how through that overturning he produces the basic 
contours of an ontology of systems of simulacra. In contrast to systems that maintain a priority of 
identity over difference, that reduce repetition to generality, that perpetuate the regime of 
representation, and that conceive beings as icons or claimants measured by their internal 
resemblance or participation in an ideal ground (fondation), systems of simulacra are systems 
conceived on the basis of being as difference, i.e., “systems in which different relates to different 
through difference itself.”719 As a consequence of the univocity of being, the determinations 
individuating simulacra do not arise by ontologically extrinsic predication (as in Aristotle’s 
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application of a specific difference to a genus), but by intrinsic, intensive differences: “such 
systems [of simulacra] are intensive; they rest ultimately upon the nature of intensive quantities, 
which precisely communicate through their differences.”720 Systems of simulacra have two 
ontological registers: a virtual register of dialectical Ideas/problems and an actual register of 
solutions. More precisely, simulacra are sites for the actualization of Ideas. Ideas are inherently 
problematical and their intensive structures are determined in key ways by series of ideal events. 
The actual structures of simulacra incarnate, though do not resemble, those of virtual problems or 
Ideas. At the level of the actual, a second series of events structure simulacra, defining cases of 
solution to virtual problems. As Deleuze puts it, there is “a double series of events which develop 
on two planes, echoing without resembling each other: real events on the level of the engendered 
solutions, and ideal events embedded in the conditions of the problem, like the acts – or, rather, 
the dreams – of the gods who double our history.”721 
 Using some of Deleuze’s technical language that I will define later in this chapter, his 
ontology defines the constitution of virtual problems or Ideas in terms of “multiplicity.” A 
multiplicity is composed of three things: problematic or differential elements, differential 
relations, and pre-individual singularities. Deleuze calls the differential determination of these 
elements, relations, and singularities “differentiation.” Two types of ideal events or events of 
differentiation can be distinguished within the virtual register: first are differential elements, the 
introduction of which into an extant Idea or multiplicity radically reconfigures its differential 
relations and singularities, i.e., generates a new Idea or multiplicity; second are pre-individual 
singularities or changes undergone by such singularities. Singularities are fully determinate 
coordinates or distinctive points defining how ordinary or regular series can be drawn out from 
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them. The series of ordinary points following from a singularity can either converge with or 
diverge from the series of ordinary points defined by other singularities. A singularity is an ideal 
event because it is distinctive, not regular – it does not follow the rule defining an ordinary 
series. If an ordinary series is tracked to a singularity, that singularity constitutes a change in the 
rule for how ordinary points shall be extended from it. The constitution of or change in a 
singularity is an event changing the structure of series of ordinary points within a multiplicity. 
 As indicated, systems of simulacra are sites for the actualization of virtual Ideas or 
multiplicities, i.e., for the determination of answers to the problem composed by the Idea. There 
is no relation of resemblance between the actual and virtual. In actualization, the relations and 
singularities of an Idea are “dramatized,” “incarnated,” “individuated” or “solved” by spatio-
temporal dynamisms and the qualities, extensities, species, and parts to which those dynamisms 
give rise. Deleuze calls the differencial determination of Ideas in spatio-temporal dynamisms, 
qualities, extensities, species, and parts “differenciation.” Like, ideal events, two varieties of 
actual events or events of differenciation can be distinguished: first are the radical 
reconfigurations of a solution field that are produced when an ideal event reconfigures the virtual 
Idea or problem that defines the range of potential actual solutions and that is incarnated in the 
solution field; second are similar reconfigurations of a solution that are produced when changes 
occur in the actual milieu in which the solution is immersed, forcing differenciation to occur in a 
new manner. 
 I have two primary goals and one secondary goal in this chapter. First, I aim to explicate 
Deleuze’s ontology of ideal events, particularly in terms of his theory of dialectical 
Ideas/problems and the actualization of these Ideas in systems of simulacra.722 Second, I aim to 
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reconstruct a particular Heideggerian influence in Deleuze’s theory of Ideas, which is important 
for making sense of that theory and his ontology of events. This will enable me to develop a 
number of points of comparison between the two philosophers, both broadly and at the 
fundamental level of their ontologies of the event. My secondary goal in this chapter will be to 
clarify Deleuze’s understanding of actual events. A full account of actual events would entail 
detailed analysis of Deleuze’s conception of spatio-temporal dynamisms and the production of 
qualities, extensities, species, and parts. The particulars of these concepts have little to do with 
the influence of Heideggerianism on Deleuze’s theory of events, and so explaining them falls 
outside the main scope of this dissertation. I will save that for a future project. My treatment of 
Deleuze’s theory of actual events will be limited to their broader structure as defined in relation 
to the actualization of Ideas and ideal events. 
Deleuze’s theory of Ideas/problems draws features from Plato, Kant, and classical 
calculus. But he unifies these features by adapting them to a theory of Ideas/problems developed 
by the early twentieth century mathematician and philosopher Albert Lautman (1908-1944). 
Lautman’s primary concern on this count was to explain the nature of the problems mathematics 
engages – which he also called “dialectical Ideas” – and the solutions or mathematical theories 
endeavoring to understand them.723 Though Lautman did not apply his theory to fields other than 
mathematics, he claimed that dialectical Ideas or problems and their corresponding solutions 
constituted the necessary metaphysical structure for all areas of research and, in fact, for 
ontological genesis writ large. Deleuze appropriates the Lautmanian theory of Ideas/problems 
nearly wholesale and develops it with the aim of bringing it to exactly that fruition. In other 
words, the Lautmanian theory is adapted to supply the overall structure of Deleuze’s ontology. 
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Consequently, to make sense of Deleuze’s account of events, it is necessary to specify 
their nature and roles within his Lautmanian theory of Ideas/problems. Strikingly, Lautman drew 
heavily on Heidegger when developing his theory. Despite how rarely Deleuze cites Heidegger, 
attention to the way Lautman operates as a mediator between the two shows that certain elements 
of Heidegger’s ontology indirectly shape Deleuze’s and form a point of historical reference 
important for making sense of it. Lautman forms a crucial, though neglected, link between 
Heidegger and Deleuze on both historical and systematic levels. 
Deleuze’s references to Lautman are drawn primarily from three essays: “Essay sur les 
notions de structure et d’existence en mathématiques” (1938), “Nouvelles recherches sur la 
structure dialectique des mathématiques” (1939), and the second chapter of “Symétrie et 
dissymétrie en mathématiques et en physique” (1946), which is titled “Le problème du 
temps.”724 “Nouvelles recherches,” which I will refer to as “New Research,” contains Lautman’s 
most substantial engagement with Heidegger. Between 1956-57 Deleuze taught a hypokhâgne 
course called “Qu’est-ce que fonder?” (“What is Grounding?”) at the Lycée Louis le Grand.725 
As Knox Peden indicates, the “source text” for the course was “Henry Corbin’s translation and 
presentation of Heidegger in the collection titled Qu’est-ce que la métaphysique?,” which 
includes Heidegger’s treatise “Vom Wesen des Grundes” and sections of Kant und das Problem 
der Metaphysik.726 This same volume, and especially its translation of Heidegger’s “Vom Wesen 
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des Grundes,” was the single source of Heidegger’s work referenced by Lautman in “New 
Research.” It can therefore be concluded that when Deleuze appropriated elements of Lautman’s 
theory of problems/Ideas from “New Research,” he knew exactly the Heideggerian debts present 
in it. This is remarkable given the prominence of Lautman in Différence et répétition and the 
scarcity of Deleuze’s overt references to Heidegger when treating Lautman. 
To accomplish my primary and secondary goals in this chapter, I reconstruct central 
elements of the conceptual lineage between Heidegger, Lautman, and Deleuze by following the 
thread of the nature of problems/Ideas in each ontology, which weaves the three together. This 
lineage shows an important connection in how these three thinkers understood the nature of the 
problems philosophy engages and the concepts it implements to address them. First, I outline in a 
general way the type of problems at stake in these ontologies and some of Deleuze’s terms for 
explaining them. Deleuze adopts many of these terms from Lautman, and these terms are 
essential for defining Deleuze’s ontology of events. Then, I very briefly recapitulate the central 
elements of Heidegger’s productive logic, which I discussed in Chapter I.727 This logic supplies 
the structure of the methodology by which Heidegger addresses the problematic of being and by 
which his ontology evolves throughout his career. I then turn to a detailed explanation of several 
of the core claims in Deleuze’s theory of problems/Ideas by way of an extensive reconstruction 
of their senses in Lautman’s theory. I include substantial discussion of Lautman’s use of 
Heidegger to explain key parts of his theory of problems/Ideas. It is mainly within this context 
that I clarify Deleuze’s understanding of actual events. After this, I return focus more exclusively 
to Deleuze, clarifying his theory of problems/Ideas and defining his conception of ideal events in 
a way informed by the conceptual lineage running back through Lautman and Heidegger.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Problem der Metaphysik (§ C. Die Metaphysik des Daseins als Fundamentalontologie), and Hölderlin und das 
Wesen der Dichtung. 
727 See Chapter I, Section 1. 
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2: The Ontology of Problems or Dialectical Ideas: Heidegger, Lautman, and Deleuze 
 
To begin, it will be helpful to distinguish between two types of problem, for the ones Heidegger, 
Lautman, and Deleuze are most concerned with are of a distinctive nature. On the one hand there 
are problems like: What is the sum of 2 and 2? How do we build a quantum computer? How 
might sustainable peace be achieved in the Middle East? These are the kind of problems that are 
in principle solvable, even if the solution is difficult to achieve, might never be achieved due to 
circumstance, or is currently unknown. If a solution is reached, the problem is no longer a 
problem, it is resolved and disappears. On the other hand there are problems for which there is 
no solution, or more precisely, for which any solution given does not resolve the problem. 
Instead, a problematic element exceeds or is displaced beyond the solution generated. For both 
Heidegger and the Deleuze of Logique du sens, such problems take the form of productive 
paradoxes, which in different ways manifest a genetic logic belonging to being. An example of 
such a problem is what Deleuze calls the “paradox of regress, or of infinite proliferation,” which 
he finds to be of special theoretical interest.728 As I pointed out in Chapter I, this also 
characterizes the operation of Heidegger’s methodology.729 
The basic idea of this problem can be seen in the familiar thought experiment that I 
described in Chapter I. Imagine I have been tasked with composing a catalogue of every fact 
about everything that exists. I begin by listing facts about the things I see around me (“The glass 
is on the table.” “The table is made of wood.” And so on…). Eventually, though, if my list is to 
be complete, it has to include all the facts about the list itself (for example, “The list has N 
entries.”). And this leads to an infinite proliferation. When I add a fact about the list to the list, 
                                                 
728 LS 41/28. 
729 See Chapter I, Section 1. 
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I’ve changed it, producing new facts that must in turn be listed. So, I list them. But each time I 
add another entry, I change the list again, generating new facts, and so on to infinity. 
Two things can be distinguished here. On the one hand is a properly problematic element: 
the logic by which an excess is generated over the list. On the other is the series of solutions to 
this problematic element: the entries on the list. 
 This example can serve as a rough draft structural map of the key terms involved in 
Heidegger’s problematic of being and Lautman and Deleuze’s theories of problems or dialectical 
Ideas. Of course, the situation is more complex for each for reasons that I will address in the 
remainder of this chapter. For Heidegger, a problematic dimension of being takes the position of 
what exceeds the entries on the list together with the genetic logic by which the infinite series of 
entries are produced, while the terms in which his ontology is worked out take the position of the 
entries themselves. For Lautman, dialectical Ideas or problems take the position of what exceeds, 
while mathematical theories that engage them take the position of the entries. For Deleuze, 
questions, problems, or dialectical Ideas take the position of what exceeds, while answers, 
solutions, or actualizations take the position of the series of entries on the list. In Logique du 
sens, Deleuze indicates the irreducibility of problems or questions to solutions or answers as 
follows: 
 
Just as solutions do not suppress problems, but on the contrary discover in them the subsisting 
conditions without which they would have no sense, answers do not at all suppress, nor do they 
saturate, the question, which persists in all its answers. There is therefore an aspect in which 
problems remain without a solution, and the question without an answer. It is in this sense that 
problem and question designate ideational objectivities and have their own being.730 
 
In my analysis of Lautman (and Lautman’s use of Heidegger), I will clarify five of the 
defining claims of Deleuze’s theory of problems/Ideas: 1) that problems/Ideas are different in 
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kind from solutions and do not disappear with solutions, 2) that problems/Ideas are “dialectical,” 
3) that problems/Ideas are transcendent in relation to solutions, 4) that problems/Ideas are 
simultaneously immanent in those solutions, and 5) that the relation between problems/Ideas and 
solutions is genetic, i.e., that solutions are generated on the basis of the determinant conditions of 
a problem/Idea. In the following condensed passage, Deleuze makes these five points and uses a 
number of important related terms that I will discuss. I provide this passage in full for later use as 
a point of reference. 
 
A problem does not exist, apart from its solutions. Far from disappearing in this overlay, however, 
it insists and persists in these solutions. A problem is determined at the same time as it is solved, 
but its determination is not the same as its solution: the two elements differ in kind, the 
determination amounting to the genesis of the concomitant solution. (In this manner the 
distribution of singularities belongs entirely to the conditions of the problem, while their 
specification already refers to solutions constructed under these conditions.) The problem is at 
once both transcendent and immanent in relation to its solutions. Transcendent, because it consists 
in a system of ideal liaisons or differential relations between genetic elements. Immanent, because 
these liaisons or relations are incarnated in the actual relations which do not resemble them and are 
defined by the field of solution. Nowhere better than in the admirable work of Albert Lautman has 
it been shown how problems are first Platonic Ideas or ideal liaisons between dialectical notions, 
relative to ‘eventual situations of the existent’; but also how they are realized within the real 
relations constitutive of the desired solution within a mathematical, physical or other field. In this 
sense, according to Lautman, that science always participates in a dialectic which points beyond it 
– in other words, in a meta-mathematical and extra-propositional power – even though the liaisons 
of this dialectic are incarnated only in effective scientific propositions and theories. Problems are 
always dialectical.731 
 
 As I have indicated, Deleuze distinguishes between two registers of events: ideal events 
(at the level of the virtual) and actual events, both of which are ontologically real. My focus is on 
his theory of ideal events, though explaining this requires explaining the basic relation of ideal 
events to actual events and to the register of actuality in systems of simulacra more broadly. 
Clarifying the five points listed above is necessary for making sense of Deleuze’s theory of ideal 
events because 1) ideal events are events occurring in the composition of virtual Ideas, 2) ideal 
events are simultaneously transcendent and immanent in relation to actual events, 3) ideal events 
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constitute certain of the conditions of problems/Ideas, while those conditions are actualized in 
solutions, and 4) the logic of ideal events is a logic of ontological genesis, both in respect to the 
determination of virtual Ideas and in respect to the determination of fields of solution at the level 
of the actual. 
 
2.1: Recapitulation of Heidegger’s Productive Logic of Grundlegung 
 
As I have discussed at length, Heidegger’s central problem was that of clarifying the nature of 
being. Granted, he does not characterize being as a problem. Yet, the logic of being in his 
ontology is problematic in a particular sense. I have tried to demonstrate this in both 
methodological and ontological registers – and, in fact, in their nexus. To apply Deleuze’s term, 
for Heidegger being operates as a “problematic element”: it is disclosed in an intelligible way 
within the terms of his ontology, while simultaneously exceeding those terms and driving an 
immanent evolution of that ontology. More precisely, the reflexive logic involved in the 
problematic of being entails that Heidegger’s ontology – and the concepts by which he 
articulates it – is not static, but evolves in a complex way. The efficacy of these concepts to 
articulate the problematic of being in increasingly well-grounded ways entails, in a precise 
manner, that they violate established conceptual regimes or semantic and syntactic orders. It is 
worth briefly indicating that a parallel to Deleuze’s actual events can be discerned immediately 
in Heidegger’s methodological evolution. Established conceptual regimes or semantic and 
syntactic orders exist at the level of Deleuze’s actuality. The violation and reconfiguration of 
those orders occurs as a Deleuzian actual event. 
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Recall the structure of Heidegger’s productive logic, which I discussed in Chapter I.732 
There, I framed this structure within Heidegger’s distinction between two modes of science: 
“positive” science and what I have called “radical” science. In his account, every science has a 
subject matter (Sachgebiet): either some domain of beings, in which case the science is an ontic 
science, or the being of beings, in which case it is fundamental ontology.733 I have designated a 
domain as delimited by a science a “problematic field.” Each science generates a set of 
Grundbegriffe (basic/ground concepts), which articulate the Grundverfassung (basic/ground 
constitution) of its subject matter, i.e. of its problematic field. If Grundbegriffe serve as the most 
fundamental articulation of a subject matter, they also operate as a ground for more derivative 
concepts and operations within a science. Positive science is scientific research and its practical 
application carried out when a science’s Grundbegriffe take on an axiomatic role, go 
unchallenged, and become more or less transparent to its practitioners. In positive science, 
research is conducted within the problematic field and logic delineated by a set of Grundbegriffe, 
which are not themselves in question. Positive science, in other words, operates on a syngenic 
axis. In contrast, in radical science the Grundverfassung of its subject matter is problematized, 
forcing a reevaluation of its Grundbegriffe and an operation of Grundlegung (ground-laying). 
Here, a science’s Grundbegriffe are explicitly problematized, losing their axiomatic status, and 
thus the logic they ground no longer serves as the measure of legitimate (i.e., regular) positive 
operations. This disruption can be taken as an example of an actual event in the Deleuzian sense. 
Such an event demands a revision of the science’s Grundbegriffe, such as to give a more 
appropriate (eigentliche) account of its subject matter’s Grundverfassung. In turn, this 
fundamentally reconfigures the positive scientific field built upon it. The radical scientific 
                                                 
732 See Chapter I, Section 1. 
733 SZ 9/29. 
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movement of Grundlegung enacts a productive logic, cutting into more originary ground and 
venturing new Grundbegriffe to articulate it. Importantly, the movement by which Grundlegung 
surpasses extant Grundbegriffe toward the originary ground of the subject matter at hand is an 
example of the movement Heidegger calls “transcendence,” which is crucial for Lautman. I 
return to this shortly. 
 While any science can be spurred from a positive to a radical mode, in Heidegger’s 
account no ontic science alone can provide a sufficient account of the Grundverfassung of its 
subject matter. The reason is that such an account requires an appropriate understanding of the 
being of the beings composing that subject matter, and this is the task of fundamental ontology. 
In this way, since the subject matter of fundamental ontology is being, or the being of beings, 
which is in part the ground enabling beings to be, fundamental ontology by definition 
problematizes the Grundbegriffe of all ontic sciences and calls them into a radical mode. In other 
words, in relation to the ontic sciences, fundamental ontology is essentially a radical science.  
 Fundamental ontology can easily be botched, as when rendered metaphysical, for 
instance. To avoid this, the scope and methodology of fundamental ontology must be properly 
established. As I have argued, in Sein und Zeit since Dasein constitutes the condition of 
possibility for any ontology (bearing an intrinsic relation of thought and being), and the being it 
has distinctive access to is its own, the necessary arena for fundamental ontology is that of its 
own existence. In other words, Heidegger’s fundamental ontology must be carried out as the 
existential analysis of Dasein. 
The reflexivity involved here leads to a productive paradox of regress and the abyssal 
logic belonging to the problematic of being in Heideggerian ontology. Since the existence into 
which Dasein inquires is partially constituted by the operation of questioning, each moment of 
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carrying out that operation modulates Dasein’s existence. This drives dimensions of that 
existence beyond the understanding of it rendered. In the problematic of being, framed as the 
existential analysis of Dasein, the subject matter inquired into is partially disclosed, but 
simultaneously withdraws from the account given of it. Heidegger figures this dimension of his 
problematic in terms of “Ab-grund” or “abyssal ground,” and fundamental ontology moves along 
a trajectory into this Ab-grund. 
The abyssal logic belonging to the problematic of being does not preclude the project of 
ontology. On the contrary, it makes fundamental ontology an ongoing project whereby 
increasingly better-grounded accounts of being are rendered. More precisely, Heidegger 
navigates this abyssal logic and works out a series of accounts of Dasein’s existence in terms of 
more and more originary accounts of the structures constituting that existence by way of the 
productive logic of Grundlegung. It should also be noted here that while the existential analysis 
inquires into the being of Dasein, Dasein is a being, that is, its existence includes both 
ontological and ontic registers. The ontological structures disclosed serve as the ground enabling 
the more derivative ontic aspects to be. When, in fundamental ontology, Dasein implements the 
productive logic of Grundlegung to articulate the abyssal logic belonging to the problematic of 
being, the movement of transcendence described above in terms of radical science is married 
with Dasein’s existence. In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger describes the dynamics of Dasein’s 
existence in terms of transcendence in a number of registers (in terms of the logic of being-in-the 
world or that of temporality, for instance). But Dasein’s fundamental ontological transcendence 
constitutes a particularly important register in Lautman’s analysis of Heidegger. Here, Dasein 
tracks the abyssal dimension of its being, develops Grundbegriffe to articulate it, and recasts 
extant accounts of its being on that basis, that is, recasts the full problematic field of fundamental 
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ontology. This is an ongoing radical scientific movement by which Heideggerian ontology 
evolves. 
 
2.2: Lautman’s Theory of Dialectical Ideas/Problems 
 
Recently there has been a revival of philosophical interest in the work of Albert Lautman. This 
can be traced in large part to two related causes: first, a trend of research on the role of 
mathematics in Deleuze’s ontology (Lautman was a key influence on Deleuze with regard to 
this) and, second, a renewed interest in French philosophy of science and the associated mid-
twentieth century formalisms developed in Marxist and psychoanalytic theory.734 All of the latter 
draw a theoretical lineage through the work of Jean Cavaillès, for whom Lautman was a 
significant interlocutor.735 Like Cavaillès, it should be noted, Lautman was captured and 
executed by the Nazis in 1944 (he had been captured earlier as a member of the French military, 
escaped a German prisoner-of-war camp, become extensively involved in the Resistance, and 
was then recaptured).736 
While Lautman was an important point of reference in Deleuze’s engagement with 
mathematics proper, it was Lautman’s metamathematics (his metaphysics or ontology of 
mathematics) that had the most far-reaching impact on Deleuze. Lautman’s metamathematics, 
though, adopts features of Heidegger’s early ontology to develop a theory of dialectical Ideas or 
problems and their relation to mathematical theories, which constitute solutions to those 
problems. This theory forms the central element of Lautman’s work adopted by Deleuze. 
                                                 
734 See, for instance, Simon B. Duffy, Deleuze and the History of Mathematics: In Defense of the ‘New’ (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2013), Chapter IV. 
735 See, for instance, Knox Peden, Spinoza Contra Phenomenology: French Rationalism from Cavaillès to Deleuze 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), passim. 
736 For biographical information on Albert Lautman, see Jacques Lautman, “Introduction,” in MIPR. 
  352 
However, in the portions of Différence et répétition discussing Lautman, Deleuze does not flag 
the Heideggerian import. Consequently, this line of Heideggerian influence in Deleuze’s 
ontology has been largely unrecognized and unexplored in scholarship. 
Lautman’s primary engagement with Heidegger is found in “New Research.” The text he 
focuses on there is Henry Corbin’s 1938 French translation of Heidegger’s 1928 treatise “Vom 
Wesen des Grundes,” though he mentions Sein und Zeit once in passing. As I have mentioned, 
this translation appeared in the collection of Heidegger’s texts edited by Corbin and published as 
Qu’est-ce que la métaphysique? Lautman’s Heidegger is entirely the early Heidegger, and there 
are no indications he was aware of the transformations taking place during the Kehre that 
became evident beginning in 1930. Of particular conceptual importance to him are Heidegger’s 
ontological difference between being and beings, the corresponding distinction between 
ontological and ontic truth, Heidegger’s distinctive notion of transcendence, and the 
simultaneously methodological and ontological operation of grounding. 
In the following, I reconstruct the central elements of Lautman’s metamathematical 
theory that define the context in which he makes use of Heidegger. Then, I provide analysis of 
his engagement with Heidegger, focusing specifically on the way Lautman adopts features of 
Heideggerian ontology to explain the relation of mathematical theory to dialectical Ideas, the 
operation whereby mathematical theory is generated in this relation, and what it means for 
Lautman to claim that dialectical Ideas are simultaneously transcendent and immanent to 
mathematics. In this sequence, I map onto Lautman and Heidegger the aspects of Deleuze’s 
ontology of Ideas and events that I aim to explain. 
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2.2.1: Lautman’s Distinction between Mathematical Theories and Dialectical Ideas and Notions 
 
In Lautman’s metaphysics of mathematics, two domains or registers of reality must be 
distinguished: “Mathematics” and the “Dialectic.”737 Deleuze’s distinction between the actual 
and virtual registers of reality or of systems of simulacra replicates this Lautmanian distinction. 
Lautman’s distinction, together with certain other historical points of reference, also provides the 
primary sense of Deleuze’s description of problems/Ideas as “dialectical.” 
For Lautman, “Mathematics” designates the various “effective mathematical theories” 
(e.g., set theory, arithmetic, the analytic theory of numbers, and differential calculus) and the 
application of such theories in practice (e.g., applying set theoretical definitions in translating 
one mathematical proposition into another).738 This sense of the term parallels Heidegger’s 
account of positive science, since such mathematics operates on the basis of fundamental axioms 
or definitions that it does not problematize. In a more essential sense, however, “mathematics” 
designates the way mathematical theories articulate the fundamental problems that organize 
those theories, gain insight into those problems, and become recast on the basis of that insight. 
This sense parallels Heidegger’s account of radical science.739 
The dialectic is a register of reality distinct from mathematics. To clarify Lautman’s 
understanding of the dialectic, it is necessary first to see why he believes mathematics must 
necessarily be supplemented by metamathematics (i.e., the metaphysics of mathematics), as part 
of a full ontology or system of metaphysics. In Lautman’s words, a “rapprochement of 
                                                 
737 “New Research” 197. 
738 “New Research” 197. According to Zalamea, “With the term ‘effective mathematics’, Lautman tackles the 
theories, structures and constructions conceived in the very activity of the mathematician. The term refers to the 
structure of mathematical knowledge, and what is effective refers to the concrete action of the mathematician to 
gradually build the mathematical edifice, that such action is constructivist or existential” (Fernando Zalamea, 
“Albert Lautman and the Creative Dialectic of Modern Mathematics” in MIPR xxiv). 
739 In a sense less important for my analysis, Lautman sometimes also uses “mathematics” to designate the field of 
mathematical theories taken together at any given moment in the history of its development. 
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metaphysics and mathematics is not contingent but necessary.”740 He is particularly concerned 
with Hilbert’s metamathematics and, as I discuss below, the appropriation of Heidegger’s 
ontology for metamathematical purposes. According to Lautman’s interpretation of Hilbert, 
metamathematics is necessary because any properly formalized mathematical theory “is itself 
incapable of providing proof of its internal coherence.”741 Thus, “it must be overlaid with a 
metamathematics that takes the formalized mathematics as an object and studies it from the dual 
point of view of consistency and completion” (i.e., studies a formalized mathematical system 
with respect to the way its axioms might attempt to prove that the system is internally consistent 
and able to account for all arithmetical operations).742 However, consistency and completion in 
this case are only “ideal[s] toward which this research is oriented.”743 That is, being structurally 
problematic in relation to mathematical theory, they can never be fully demonstrated within the 
theory itself. As Duffy emphasizes, Lautman’s point here “is an implicit reference to Gödel’s 
second incompleteness theorem which demonstrates that any consistent formal system cannot 
demonstrate its completeness by way of its own axioms.”744 Lautman’s metamathematical point 
is that while the ideals of consistency and completion might govern the construction of a 
formalized theory, they are not formally demonstrable in terms of that theory itself. Lautman 
                                                 
740 “New Research” 197. 
741 Lautman, “Structure and Existence” 89. 
742 Lautman, “Structure and Existence” 89-90. To expand upon this, Lautman writes: “The duality of planes that 
Hilbert thus established between the formalized mathematics and the metamathematical study of this formalism has 
as a consequence that the notions of consistency and completion govern a formalism from the interior of which they 
are not figured as notions defined in this formalism” (Lautman, “Structure and Existence” 90). In contrast, “the 
formalism of the [Vienna Circle] logicists” “considered the study of mathematical reality to consist in solely the 
demonstration of the consistency of the axioms which define it” (Duffy, Deleuze and the History of Mathematics 
119). Gödel famously proved that no formal system can prove its own completeness and consistency. 
743 Lautman, “Structure and Existence” 90 
744 Duffy, Deleuze and the History of Mathematics 12. Smith, in his discussion of axiomatics and problematics, 
includes Cohen and puts the point as follows: “Gödel and Cohen, …in their famous theorems, would eventually 
expose the internal limits of axiomatisation (incompleteness, undecidability), demonstrating that there is a variety of 
mathematical forms in ‘infinite excess’ over our ability to formalize them consistently” [Daniel W. Smith, 
“Axiomatics and problematics as two modes of formalization: Deleuze’s epistemology of mathematics,” in Virtual 
Mathematics: the logic of difference, ed. Simon Duffy (Manchester: Clinamen Press 2006) 154]. 
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takes these ideals, or rather the problem of how to construct a consistent and complete theory, to 
be an example of the kind of fundamental problems that organize mathematical theories in 
general. In his view there are numerous others, and they can change or be supplanted over time. 
Metamathematics studies mathematical theories themselves and their ability to contend with the 
fundamental problems organizing them (e.g., it might ask: How can we construct “a cube having 
double the volume of a given cube”? Or: Can set theory provide a consistent and complete 
mathematical language?).745 
In this picture, the field of mathematical theories is dynamic, fragmented but evolving in 
a perpetual effort to address the fundamental problems or abstract ideas active at a given moment 
in its history. Occasionally, these fragments together allow previously unseen connections to be 
drawn between seemingly disparate fundamental problems or theoretical constructions: “Partial 
results, comparisons stopped midway, attempts that still resemble groupings, are organized under 
the unity of the same theme, and in their movement allow a connection to be seen which takes 
shape between certain abstract ideas, that we propose to call dialectical.”746 
An important point follows from the fact that metamathematics is a necessary addition to 
mathematics: any mathematical theory bears an inherent structural reference to aspects of reality 
that exceed what is articulable in its terms. In Lautman’s words, “in the development of 
mathematics, [such] a reality is affirmed that mathematical philosophy has as its function to 
recognize and to describe.”747 For Lautman, this is more than just an interesting fact about the 
                                                 
745 Smith, “Axiomatics and problematics” 148. 
746 Lautman, “Structure and Existence” 91. 
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dynamic conception” represented by Brunscvicg. As he writes, “The structural conception and the dynamic 
conception of mathematics seem at first to be opposed: one tends in effect to consider a mathematical theory as a 
completed whole, independent of time; the other, on the contrary, does not separate it from the temporal stages of its 
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necessary incompleteness of mathematical theory. The fundamental problems that mathematical 
theory endeavors to articulate are located in the field of that excessive reality. And even within 
the conceptual framework of metamathematics, these problems are not fully determined, or even 
necessarily well-defined or well-understood. Rather, they are structures of reality that are 
epistemologically and ontologically problematic in themselves. This reality is what Lautman 
calls the “dialectic.” While Deleuze’s concept of the dialectic also draws on Kant and – like 
Lautman – on Plato, the direct import of Lautman’s conception is seen when Deleuze writes: “by 
‘dialectic’ we do not mean any kind of circulation of opposing representations which would 
make them coincide in the identity of a concept, but the problem element in so far as this may be 
distinguished from the properly mathematical element of solutions.”748 Deleuze’s conception of 
the nature of the dialectic draws directly on Lautman’s and is a concept for this essentially 
problematical dimension of reality in distinction from dimensions of reality that operate as 
solutions to the dialectic. 
In the following passage, Lautman uses the terminology of the dialectic to restate the 
point mentioned above that fragmented lines of mathematical theory are often at work 
articulating different aspects of an inexplicit problematic structure. 
 
While it is necessary that mathematics exists, as examples in which the ideal structure of the 
dialectic can be realized, it is not necessary that the examples which correspond to a particular 
dialectical structure are of a particular kind. What most often happens on the contrary is that the 
organizing power of a same structure is asserted in different theories; they then present the 
affinities of specific mathematical structures that reflect this common dialectical structure in which 
they participate.749 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
elaboration. For the former, the theories are like entities qualitatively distinct from one another, whereas the latter 
sees in each an infinite power of expansion beyond its limits and connection with the others, by which the unity of 
the intellect is asserted. In the pages that follow, we would however like to try to develop a conception of 
mathematical reality which combines the fixity of logical notions and the movement with which the theories live” 
(Lautman, “Structure and Existence” 90).  
748 DR 231/178. 
749 “New Research” 207. 
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In other words, despite delimiting a problematic dialectical structure in the specialized 
terms of one theory or another, fragmentary in relation to one another, the logic of that dialectical 
structure organizes such theories, which manifest structural affinities even if those affinities are 
not apparent or well-understood. Occasionally, on this basis, a connection might be made 
between the theories, and part of the problematic structure might become explicated in 
mathematical terms. In this sense, “the proper movement of a mathematical theory lays out the 
schema of connections that support certain abstract ideas that are dominating with respect to 
mathematics.”750 A good example that Smith highlights is found in the early days of classical 
calculus: 
 
[Before Leibniz and Newton] the differential calculus addressed the problematic of tangents (how 
to determine the tangent lines to a given curve), while the integral calculus addressed the 
problematic of quadrature (how to determine the area within a given curve. The greatness of 
Leibniz and Newton was to have recognized the intimate connection between these two 
problematics (the problem of finding areas is the inverse of determining tangents to curves), and to 
have developed a symbolism to link them together and resolve them.751 
 
 
In a way similar to the discontinuous state of differential and integral calculus before 
Newton and Leibniz, for Deleuze what is constituted as solutions at the level of the actual is 
characterized by discontinuity, namely discontinuity between things that are actualized – 
simulacral beings. This discontinuity is found in Lautman precisely in terms of the fragmentary 
status of mathematical theories. For Deleuze, the configuration in actuality of discontinuous 
simulacral beings is determined on the one hand by dialectical Ideas or problems and on the 
other by individuating differences within an actual field of solution, i.e., by actual events. When 
a transformation occurs in the configuration of the field of actuality, an actual event has 
occurred. The example cited above illustrates this wonderfully: prior to Newton and Leibniz, 
                                                 
750 Lautman, “On the Reality Inherent to Mathematical Theories” 28. 
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differential calculus and integral calculus operated as solution fields for different aspects of a 
dialectical Idea or problem that defined the discontinuous fields of their actual operation. With 
the Newton/Leibniz event, a new coordinate within the field of the actual was produced (the rule 
that the problem of finding areas is the inverse of determining tangents to curves) and this 
reconfigured that field. An actual event occurred. I return to these ideas in greater detail in 
Section 3 of this chapter. 
 Explaining the nature of the dialectic is difficult, but is a central aim of Lautman’s 
metamathematical work. As should be evident, the dialectic is not a methodology but a register 
of reality (though its ontological status does have direct implications for scientific methodology). 
The dialectic exceeds the reach of mathematical theory, being “abstract and superior to 
mathematics.”752 It is ideal, though metaphysically real. In fact, the dialectic is “the real” of 
mathematics, or, as Fernando Zalamea puts it, “the mathematical real.”753 It is populated by two 
kinds of things – “dialectical notions” and “dialectical Ideas” – which constitute its structure.754 
Dialectical notions are pairs of counter-posed, correlative terms of the broadest nature, 
which constitute fundamental – though perhaps changing – tensions structuring the dialectical 
register. Some examples Lautman offers are: “whole and part, situational properties and intrinsic 
properties, basic domains and entities defined on those domains, formal systems and their 
realizations.”755 To these can be added “Finite versus Infinite,” “Discrete versus Continuous,” 
“Local versus Global,” “Algebra versus Analysis,” “Commutative versus Non commutative, 
etc.”756 Lautman’s view rejects the historical tendency to take such oppositions as absolute 
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753 Lautman, “Structure and Existence” 89 and Fernando Zalamea, “Albert Lautman and the Creative Dialectic of 
Modern Mathematics” in MIPR xxiii. 
754 “New Research” 204, emphasis removed, and 199. 
755 “New Research” 204. 
756 Jean Dieudonné, “Preface to the 1977 Edition” in MIPR xl. 
  359 
antinomies. As Jean Dieudonné emphasizes, this mistake renders dialectical notions “superficial 
appearances masking much more profound relationships.”757 He adds that “since 1940” “it has… 
been well recognized that these supposed oppositions are actually poles of tension within a same 
structure, and that it is from these tensions that the most remarkable progress follows.”758 As 
poles of tension, these notions prefigure the pre-individual singularities that compose part of 
Deleuze’s virtual Ideas. 
For Lautman, dialectical notions constitute part of the structure of the mathematical real, 
but the mathematical real is the metaphysical or ontological real as accessed in terms of 
mathematics and metamathematics. Dialectical notions are not merely elements or terms of 
mathematical or even metamathematical theory, they form constitutive structures of reality, 
specifically of the dialectical register of reality. 
 In distinction from dialectical notions, Lautman’s dialectical Ideas can be characterized 
preliminarily in two ways. On the one hand, in respect to the relation of Ideas to notions, “Ideas 
envisage possible relations between dialectical notions.”759 That is, they are fields of possible 
structural schemas traversing the gulf between dialectical notions or rendering the poles of 
notions consistent (in the long passage cited earlier from Différence et répétition, Deleuze calls 
these relations ideal “liaisons”: “The problem is … transcendent, because it consists in a system 
of ideal liaisons or differential relations between genetic elements. Immanent, because these 
liaisons or relations are incarnated in the actual relations which do not resemble them and are 
defined by the field of solution”).760 As Zalamea puts it, “an idea [is] a partial resolution of this 
                                                 
757 Dieudonné, “Preface to the 1977 Edition” in MIPR xli. 
758 Dieudonné, “Preface to the 1977 Edition” in MIPR xli. 
759 “New Research” 204. 
760 DR 212/163. 
  360 
polarity [between notions].”761 For example, with respect to the notion of the continuous versus 
the discrete, modern mathematics has articulated the Idea of “the continuous as the completion of 
the discrete (Cantorian right).”762 
On the other hand, in respect to the relation of Ideas to mathematical theories, Ideas are 
“problems” that function as “the structural schemas according to which the effective theories are 
organized.”763 Explaining this will be one of my central tasks in the following paragraphs. 
Likewise, in Deleuze’s account problems are ideal liaisons or relations immanent to actual 
relations in which they are incarnated. Lautman’s account here in which one domain of reality 
organizes or governs another is suggestive of a Platonism. Indeed, for Lautman the term 
“dialectical Idea” draws a reference to Plato’s theory of Ideas and a Platonism characterizing his 
philosophy of mathematics, which is important for making sense of the relation of Ideas to 
mathematical theories. I return to this in a moment. For now, it is important to emphasize that 
Lautman takes care to distinguish his concept of Idea from that found in the standard version of 
Platonism: “We do not understand by Ideas the models whose mathematical entities would 
merely be copies.”764 In other words, mathematical theories are not mimetic or representational 
in respect to Ideas. Rather, theories are organized by them. How this organization is effectuated 
is one of the central problems Lautman tries to solve using Heideggerian ontology. 
For Lautman, Ideas exceed, surpass, or transcend the field articulable by extant 
mathematical theories while simultaneously structuring those very theories. Ideas do not 
disappear with solutions generated in response to them. Rather, “dialectical Ideas are purely 
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problematic.”765 In Heidegger’s terminology, they form the subject matter that the Grundbegriffe 
of mathematical theory work to articulate. Distinct mathematical theories – or indeed the field of 
mathematical theories at any moment in its history – constitute solutions to these problems. Yet, 
because of their purely problematic character, dialectical Ideas exceed the theories or solutions 
generated in relation to them. Stated differently, mathematical theory articulates dialectical Ideas, 
which constitute the reality mathematics thinks. But dialectical Ideas are not reducible to 
mathematics: “the dialectic is not part of mathematics.”766 
Since mathematics bears a necessary relation to a reality that exceeds its own and that is 
constitutive of it, mathematics cannot provide a sufficient ontology in its own terms. This shows 
the need for a metamathematics that theorizes not only about the sufficiency of theories to 
contend with the problems organizing them, but about the nature of the dialectic itself. In 
Lautman’s analysis, Heidegger’s ontology is both consistent with his philosophy of mathematics 
and it provides this metamathematical systematic supplement. Heidegger offers Lautman 
resources to define the ontological status of the dialectic and to articulate the relation of 
mathematical theory to the dialectic. 
Deleuze understands this relation to be one in which “the ideal connections constitutive 
of the problematic (dialectical) Idea are incarnated in the real relations which are constituted by 
mathematical theories and carried over into problems in the form of solutions.”767 Likewise, 
Lautman’s position is that “the intrinsic reality of mathematics… reside[s] in its participation in 
the Ideas of this dialectic which governs them,” and that “in mathematics” the “ideal relations” 
of this dialectic are “realized in concrete ways.”768 In other words, mathematics gains its 
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purchase on reality via its engagement with the dialectic and its Ideas or problems. Lautman 
makes the point again as follows: “the reality inherent to mathematical theories comes to them 
from their participation in an ideal reality that is dominating with respect to mathematics, but that 
is only knowable through it.”769 As with any theory that posits a distinction between two or more 
domains of reality, the fundamental problem it must address is of how the domains can interact 
(cf. Epicurean atomism and the clinamen, the mind/body problem, Spinoza’s rejection of 
Cartesian claim that there exist multiple substances, etc.). As Lautman puts it, “a philosophy of 
the sciences that isn’t entirely concerned with the study of this solidarity between domains of 
reality and methods of investigation would be singularly devoid of interest.”770 
In a broad frame, Lautman’s theory holds that though there is an ontological necessity for 
the irreducibility of the dialectic to mathematics and for their difference, there is also an 
ontological continuity by which the latter is structurally informed by the former. To explain this, 
he understands the distinction between mathematics and the dialectic on the basis of Heidegger’s 
ontological difference between beings and being. More specifically, he argues that the relation of 
mathematics to the dialectic replicates the relation of the ontic (that which pertains to beings as 
beings) and ontological (that which pertains to the being of beings). Knox Peden has put this 
point nicely as follows: “For Lautman mathematical concepts stood in relation to the dialectical 
Ideas that were their conditions in a way not unlike the merely ontic entities of Heidegger’s 
formulation in their relation to the ontological processes constitutive of them. Lautman attempted 
to translate Heidegger’s framework for understanding the ontological question as anterior to the 
ontic answer into a mathematical account of the dialectical problem’s ontological primacy over 
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its conceptual solution.”771 Since Deleuze’s ontology of problems/dialectical Ideas and solutions 
in Différence et répétition adopts Lautman’s, this fact demonstrates a clear line of Heideggerian 
influence on its structure.772 
The central term Lautman uses to characterize the relation of the dialectic to mathematics 
is “domination,” which Duffy translates as “governing” or occasionally as “dominating.”773 
Lautman employs various aspects of Heidegger’s ontic-ontological relation to explain its nature 
and “how the understanding of the Ideas of this Dialectic is necessarily extended in the genesis 
of effective mathematical theories.”774 A particularly important element of the latter is 
“describing the genesis of mathematics from the Dialectic.”775 This entails explaining a 
participation of mathematical theory in the dialectic and a way mathematics realizes or 
incarnates ideal relations in concrete ways. Key here is Lautman’s position that dialectical Ideas 
are simultaneously transcendent and immanent to mathematics. Deleuze adopts this central 
element of Lautman’s theory, both in terms of problems and events. As Deleuze puts these 
points, “the problem is at once both transcendent and immanent in relation to its solutions” and 
“the ideal series [of events] enjoys the double property of transcendence and immanence in 
relation to the real [or actual series of events].”776 I will now reconstruct Lautman’s use of 
Heidegger in arguing for these points. 
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2.2.2: Lautman’s Transcendental Conception of the Governing Relation 
 
Lautman argues for a “transcendental conception of the relation of governing… between the 
dialectic and mathematics,” which entails that dialectical Ideas are simultaneously transcendent 
and immanent in relation to mathematics.777 He uses the terms “transcendental,” “transcendent,” 
and “immanent” in specifically Heideggerian senses. Earlier, I indicated a key sense of 
“transcendence” in terms of the fundamental-ontological movement of Heidegger’s productive 
logic of Grundlegung. I expand upon this and specify the senses of “immanence” and the 
“transcendental” in what follows. It will be helpful to situate this by returning Lautman’s 
mathematical Platonism. 
First, as should be evident, Heideggerian fundamental-ontological transcendence must be 
distinguished from what I will call “metaphysical transcendence.” A philosophical system posits 
metaphysical transcendence if it posits the existence of domains of reality that are really or 
substantially distinct from our own, as in the standard interpretation of Platonic metaphysics (the 
intelligible forms or Ideas are metaphysically transcendent in relation to the domain of the 
sensible icons). Lautman’s philosophy does not advocate any metaphysical transcendence. 
Yet, his position that mathematics engages and is governed by a metaphysically real 
dialectic partially constituted by transcendent Ideas does entail a version of mathematical 
Platonism. In Lautman’s argument, however, this is presented as reconcilable with 
Heideggerianism, and for Deleuze it is consistent with his overturned Platonism. The standard 
form of mathematical Platonism is a commitment to the idea that “there are abstract 
mathematical objects whose existence is independent of us and our language, thought, and 
practices,” objects like “numbers and sets,” and that “mathematical truths are therefore 
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discovered, not invented.”778 In Lautman’s definition, this kind of standard mathematical 
Platonism is found in “any philosophy for which the existence of a mathematical entity is taken 
as assured, even though this entity could not be built in a finite number of steps.”779 
Mathematical Platonism is opposed to mathematical nominalism: the position that such objects 
and truths do not exist independently of us or our cultures but are generated by them. 
Lautman rejects both nominalism and the standard form of mathematical Platonism, 
which he considers to offer only “a superficial knowledge of Platonism.”780 Instead he adopts the 
interpretation of those he calls the “modern Plato commentators” who insist “that Ideas are not 
immobile and irreducible essences of an intelligible world, but that they are related to each other 
according to the schemas of a superior dialectic that presides over their arrival.”781 In Lautman’s 
Platonism, the claim is not that mathematical objects like numbers or sets exist independently of 
mathematicians and their cultures, but that the dialectic and its problems or Ideas (i.e., the non-
mathematical objects of mathematical theory) are metaphysically real and ontologically prior to 
the mathematical theories articulating them. Though this constitutes a realism about the dialectic, 
it is not a standard philosophical Platonism, i.e., Lautman’s ontology is not one of metaphysical 
transcendence. In his words, the type of “cut between the dialectic and mathematics” that is 
found in metaphysical transcendence “cannot in effect be envisaged.”782 
Strikingly, this resembles the character of Heidegger’s post-Kehre thought that I have 
referred to as his “ontological realism.” If what might be called “ontic realism” is a realism about 
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beings (i.e., the claim that beings exist independently of human existence), “ontological realism” 
is realism about ontological structures. As I argued in Chapters II and III, in Heidegger’s post-
Kehre work he maintains such a position, arguing that there are ontological structures more 
originary than human existence (e.g., ἀλήθεια and λήθη in “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” or Zeit-
Raum in Beiträge). These structures ground or enable the existence of human beings and worlds 
of beings, and they are not dependent upon human existence. Similarly, Lautman’s mathematical 
Platonism, as a realism about the dialectic, maintains that dialectical Ideas are ontologically prior 
to mathematical theories and enable such theories to exist. In contrast to standard mathematical 
Platonism, in Lautman’s theory of the governing relation of dialectical Ideas to mathematics, we 
find a “mode of emanation from one to the other, a kind of procession that connects them 
closely.”783 This is, moreover, consistent with Deleuze’s overturned Platonism in which 
dialectical Ideas take the position of the enigmatic or problematic element found in the mythic 
dimension of the Platonic dialectic and the being of simulacra, while mathematics takes the 
position of the actualization of the dialectical Idea in systems of simulacra. 
To help explain this governing relation, Lautman adopts the structure or dynamic of 
Heideggerian fundamental-ontological transcendence. In particular, he has in mind the version 
Heidegger presents in “Vom Wesen des Grundes.” There, as elsewhere for Heidegger, 
“transcendence means surpassing [Überstieg]” and the correlated term “transcendent” (or 
“transcending”) refers to “that which accomplishes such surpassing and dwells in this 
surpassing.”784 For instance, the structure of Dasein’s existence is transcendent since it 
continuously surpasses itself, but is itself precisely in this surpassing. For Heidegger, the 
“transcendental” refers to that which constitutively belongs to the structure of transcendence. 
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Though the term maintains a link with its Kantian heritage, that which is transcendental here is 
not merely the condition for the possibility of experience or knowledge. Rather, since 
Heidegger’s position is that transcendence is the ground enabling the ontic register of beings to 
be (including the ontic register of Dasein), the transcendental is that which belongs to 
transcendence insofar as transcendence constitutes an ontological ground. Heidegger writes: 
“this term [“transcendental”] names all that belongs essentially to transcendence and bears its 
intrinsic possibility thanks to such transcendence.”785 Lautman restates Heidegger’s notion of 
transcendence as follows: “When it is of the essential nature of a thing to go beyond itself in 
order to go towards an entity exterior to it, without which this thing would no longer be 
conceived as existing, this going beyond of the subject towards the entity, this is 
transcendence.”786 Lautman specifically has in mind 1) the transcendence of Dasein towards the 
world and 2) the transcendence of ontological disclosure, i.e., the transcendence of Dasein in its 
ontic register toward the ontological structures constituting its being, via the “rational activity of 
founding [fondement] (Begründung).”787 In his own work, this figures the transcendence of 
mathematical theories toward the dialectic or dialectical Ideas. 
It is interesting to note that in Pierre Lefebvre’s transcript notes of Deleuze’s 1956-57 
hypokhâgne course at the Lycée Louis le Grand, Deleuze recounts just these points as follows: 
 
For Heidegger, the world is the structure of human existence. Then the notion of world can no 
longer be separated from the human being’s way of being. This [way] is transcendence or 
exceeding [dépassement, surpassing]. The word “transcendent’ no longer signifies a being exterior 
or superior to the world, but an act. Human existence exists as transcendent. Heidegger 
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distinguishes that which we exceed and that to which we exceed. Transcendence is the essence of 
subjectivity and he replaces even this word with transcendence.788 
 
Throughout Heidegger’s corpus the movement of transcendence is articulated in a variety 
of registers. The most familiar is found in the existential analysis of Dasein in Sein und Zeit. 
There, “transcendence” designates the structural dynamic of Dasein as described, for example, in 
terms of thrown projection or temporality. In terms of thrown projection, Dasein exists as thrown 
into a world, the conditions of which surpass its control (e.g., historical, material, and socio-
economic conditions, but also particulars like the classmates one has when growing up or the 
bicycle with a faulty chain one is given that leads to a skinned knee). These conditions bear a 
direct constitutive relation to Dasein’s individual existence (e.g., the characteristics of one’s 
body and the way it is inscribed with the fashions of the day). Together, these conditions 
partially constitute Dasein’s facticity, one structural dimension of its existence. On the basis of 
its unique facticity, Dasein interprets and understands its existence, the world, and the projects it 
finds important. And in terms of this understanding, Dasein projects possibilities for itself or 
routes of action it might take to accomplish its tasks in the world. The field of possibilities 
Dasein projects constitute another structural dimension of its existence. “Transcendence” 
designates the continuous movement by which Dasein surpasses its facticity through the field of 
possibilities projected in the world. This, of course, does not mean facticity is left behind, but 
rather that Dasein, as factical thrown-projection, exists as this movement of transcendence 
(Dasein “accomplishes” and “dwells in” this surpassing). Transcendence involves a reflexive 
logic that drives this movement, as I described earlier. By stepping into a possibility, Dasein 
surpasses its current factical state, which in turn alters its facticity: what was once a possibility in 
Dasein’s futural field becomes sedimented into its facticity. This forces a modulation of Dasein’s 
                                                 
788 Deleuze, What is Grounding? 37.  
  369 
interpretation and understanding of itself and the world, and in turn a modulation of the field of 
possibilities it projects. This ongoing dynamic ceases only with death. Dasein is transcendent 
because it exists in a way continually displacing itself beyond itself, into possibilities that surpass 
the previous state of its existence.789 Needless to say, for Heidegger, transcendence is not a 
matter of the autonomous volition of a subject; there is no time in which Dasein exists that it is 
not transcendent. Dasein’s existence is transcendence. Of particular importance for making sense 
of Lautman’s use of transcendence is the form of this movement that I have discussed 
extensively in which Dasein directs itself scientifically toward investigating its own existence 
(the methodological arena in early Heidegger for clarifying the being of beings). This engenders 
the movement of transcendence found in Heidegger’s productive logic, by which Grundlegung 
surpasses established Grundbegriffe toward the originary ground of their subject matter, casting 
increasingly well-grounded articulations of that subject matter. 
At the most basic level, Lautman’s transcendental conception of the governing relation 
means that all the elements of this relation are integrated into an ongoing movement or dynamic 
of transcendence. This entails that 1) dialectical Ideas and notions surpass mathematical theory 
(they are transcendent) without being metaphysically transcendent to it, since mathematics bears 
an inherent structural and constitutive reference to (i.e., participation in) the dialectic; 2) in the 
radical movement where the life of mathematical theory is found, mathematics surpasses itself 
toward the dialectic, without which it would not be; and 3) in this movement mathematics 
articulates new aspects of the dialectic, on the basis of which the particulars of mathematical 
theory are recast. 
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For Lautman, the transcendental account of the governing relation between the dialectic 
and mathematics allows for the simultaneous preservation of their difference without resorting to 
metaphysical transcendence and of their intimacy without identification. In the structure of 
Dasein’s transcendence, Dasein “could not be conceived otherwise than as oriented toward the 
world,” or for that matter, otherwise than as oriented toward being.790 Lautman thus finds in 
Heidegger a model of “transcendence as an act of bringing together [Dasein and world; Dasein 
and being], and not… a state of separation,” in the sense of metaphysical transcendence.791 Yet 
just as Heidegger insists on the ontological difference between being and beings, Lautman insists 
on the difference between the dialectic and mathematics. 
The transcendental account of the governing relation also enables Lautman to specify 
“the type of anteriority of the Dialectic with respect to Mathematics.”792 As should be clear, it is 
not the type of anteriority of axioms in relation to the propositions derived from them (nor is that 
the nature of the genesis involved). Rather, it is “an ‘ontological’ priority,” which Lautman 
formulates alternatively as “that of ‘concern’ [souci] or the ‘question’ with respect to the 
response.”793 The French “souci” is used by Corbin to translate Heidegger’s use of the German 
“Sorge,” which is regularly rendered “care” in English. Care, of course, is a key concept in 
Heidegger’s existential analysis of Dasein in Sein und Zeit. At the end of the first Division of that 
text, “care” designates Dasein’s being, as the ontological ground in which is found the unity of 
all the aspects of being-in-the-world previously elaborated in the text (those found in the 
worldhood of the world, being-with, being-in, etc.). As an example of ontological priority, care is 
ontologically prior to the more derivative structures it grounds. Moreover, we are able to 
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articulate the care structure by means of the fundamental-ontological transcendence enacted in 
the productive logic of Grundlegung, oriented toward the being of Dasein in the existential 
analytic. This is described in the following passage, which I cited in Chapter I: 
 
The totality of the structural whole [Die Ganzheit des Strukturganzen] is not to be reached by 
building it up out of elements.… The being of Dasein, upon which the structural whole as such is 
ontologically supported, becomes accessible to us when we look all the way through this whole to 
a single primordially unitary [ursprünglich einheitliches] phenomenon which is already in this 
whole in such a way that it provides the ontological foundation for each structural item in its 
structural possibility [so daß es jedes Strukturmoment in seiner strukturalen Möglichkeit 
ontologisch fundiert].794 
 
Within this conceptual framework, Heidegger’s account of care is generated precisely as a 
response or solution to the question of being (Seinsfrage), formulated within the parameters of 
the existential analysis of Dasein. 
 
2.2.3: Genesis and Immanence 
 
One of Deleuze’s central concerns in his theory of Ideas is explaining an ontological genesis that 
he refers to as “static genesis.”795 “This genesis takes place in time not between one actual term, 
however small, and another actual term, but between the virtual and its actualization – in other 
words, it goes from the structure to its incarnation, from the conditions of a problem to the cases 
of solution, from the differential elements and their ideal connections to actual terms and diverse 
real relations which constitute at each moment the actuality of time.”796 For Lautman, the 
transcendental conception of the governing relation between the dialectic and mathematics 
enables him to clarify just such a genetic operation whereby the specifics of mathematical 
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theories are generated by dialectical Ideas. That is, it allows him to explain how mathematics 
realizes or incarnates ideal relations in concrete ways, particularly such that “an enrichment of 
knowledge” can be effectuated.797 Here, new mathematical theoretical articulations of dialectical 
Ideas are generated in which those theories gain a more originary and well-grounded grasp of the 
structure of the dialectic and its Ideas. The transcendental conception of the governing relation 
shows how: 
 
…an effort of understanding adequate to the dialectical Ideas, by the very fact that it applies to 
knowing the internal connections of this dialectic, is creative of systems of more concrete notions 
in which these connections are asserted. The genesis is then no longer conceived as the material 
creation of the concrete from the Idea, but as the advent of notions relative to the concrete within 
the analysis of the Idea.798 
 
To explain the process of genesis, Lautman employs a distinction made by Heidegger in 
“Vom Wesen des Grundes” between ontic and ontological truth, together with the structure of 
transcendence that articulates their relation. Ontic truth must not be confused with propositional 
truth about beings. It is non-representational. Rather, what Heidegger means by “ontic truth” is 
the manifestness or unconcealment of beings as beings. In Lautman’s words, “the truth of what 
exists [l’existant] is ontic, and relative to the effective situations of concrete existence. The 
distinguishing feature of the being [l’existant] is to manifest itself, to be revealed.”799 Ontic truth 
is the terrain of beings constituting a phenomenal world at any given time. Ontological truth, on 
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the other hand, pertains to the register of the being of beings. It designates not the manifestness 
of beings, but the disclosure of that which enables the manifestness of beings. More precisely, 
ontological truth is the disclosure of ontological structures grounding ontic truth. Though these 
two registers must be distinguished, Heidegger is careful to point out their essential correlation: 
“Ontic and ontological truth each concern, in different ways, beings in their being, and being of 
beings. They belong essentially together on the grounds of their relation to the distinction 
between being and beings (ontological difference).”800 
To clarify the relation of ontic to ontological truth, particularly insofar as the latter 
renders the former possible, Lautman adapts another fundamental element of Heidegger’s 
ontology: the pre-ontological understanding of being. Including a quotation from Heidegger, 
Lautman writes: this manifestation or “revelation [ontic truth] is only possible ‘guided and 
clarified by an understanding of the being (the constitution of being: what something is and how 
it is) of beings.”801 It is worth noting that “the constitution of being” is used here to translate 
“Seinsverfassung.” Corbin, though, renders this as “la structure de son être,” a formulation 
Lautman repeats in his French text. Consequently, it is easy to see how Lautman connects this 
with his account of dialectical Ideas as structural schemas. In turn, Deleuze sometimes defines 
Ideas as structures: “A structure or an Idea is a ‘complex theme’, an internal multiplicity – in 
other words, a system of multiple, non-localizable connections between differential elements 
which is incarnated in real relations and actual terms.”802 Deleuze’s structure or Idea takes the 
place of Heidegger’s Seinsverfassung, his real relations and actual terms take the place of ontic 
                                                 
800 WG 134/105. 
801 “New Research” 200. Lautman’s French quotation of Heidegger is found in the Corbin translation, Qu’est-ce que 
la metaphysic? 56. Duffy uses a modified version of Malick’s translation of “Vom Wesen des Grundes” for this. 
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throughout. 
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truth, and the genetic process of incarnation takes the place of the disclosure of ontological truth 
and its manifestation in beings. Most important in the Lautman passage just cited is his 
appropriation of the Heideggerian idea that ontic truth is possible only on the ground of the pre-
ontological understanding of being constituted in Dasein’s existence, as the condition for the 
possibility of any ontology. Stated differently, for Heidegger “unveiledness [Enthülltheit] of 
being first makes possible the manifestness [Offenbarkeit] of beings.”803 Lautman, of course, 
transforms this Heideggerian idea, since he is concerned not with the existential analysis of 
Dasein but with mathematics and metamathematics. 
As I have discussed at length, Heidegger calls the structure of Dasein’s originary 
openness to its own being and to a world its “Erschlossenheit” or “disclosedness.” Dasein’s pre-
ontological understanding, as an undeveloped disclosedness with respect to being, grounds the 
possibility of thematizing and developing a science of being (fundamental ontology). By 
pursuing this, Dasein discloses originary ontological structures. In Lautman’s reading, 
ontological truth then is “‘disclosure’ understood ‘as the truth about being.’”804 Since for 
Heidegger the necessary methodological horizon for doing ontology is the existential analysis of 
Dasein, ontological truth is disclosed, i.e., being is clarified, by inquiring into the being of 
Dasein. The ontological processes and structures disclosed are those constituting Dasein’s 
existence, and, in turn, grounding phenomenal worlds of beings. 
An example will help to clarify this. At the level of ontic truth, I might follow Aristotle’s 
question about beings as beings (ὂν ᾗ ὄν), and ask “What am I as a being?”805 As a function of 
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metaphysics. Though Heidegger’s early work of doing fundamental ontology via the existential analysis of Dasein 
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ground independent of it. 
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my particular factical conditions (which include the pop-theoretical frameworks dominant at this 
moment in history), I interpret my existence in various ways: I am a medium sized biological 
organism; my brain is a meat computer; I am an American; I pay my taxes. These are all aspects 
of me that pertain to my being a being, and are designated within the logic of positive science. 
The matrix of such interpretations defines the projects I find worth doing in the world, the routes 
I take endeavoring to accomplish them, and the meaning the other beings I encounter in the 
world have for me. However, when I do fundamental ontology – that is, raise the question of my 
being or existence – I employ the radical-scientific operation of Grundlegung in an effort to 
discern the structures that enable me to give those ontic interpretations. For instance, the 
structure of interpretation itself, for Heidegger, is an ontological element of my existence – i.e., 
one of the “existentialia.” Ontological truth consists in the disclosure of ontological structures 
constituting my being. Examples of these in Sein und Zeit include interpretation, projection, care, 
disclosedness, unconcealment and concealment, historicality, and temporality, among others. 
For Lautman, the distinction between ontic and ontological truth describes the distinction 
between mathematical theory and its purchase on dialectical Ideas. The participation of 
mathematics in Ideas is analogous to Dasein’s disclosure of ontological truth – the disclosure of 
originary ontological structures grounding the ontic. How, though, does this enable Lautman to 
explain the genesis of mathematics from the dialectic or, in other words, the realization of ideal 
relations in mathematical theory? For this, he reconstructs Heidegger’s account of disclosure as 
an “act” of transcendence: “in the analysis of the disclosure of being, a general theory of these 
acts is constituted which, for us, are geneses, and that Heidegger calls acts of transcendence or of 
surpassing.”806 But acts of transcendence are acts by which Dasein surpasses itself, e.g., toward a 
world or toward the Grundverfassung of its own being. Lautman’s discussion addresses both of 
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these, but I will focus on the latter. His reconstruction of disclosure operates in terms of the logic 
of questions and the answers generated in response to them. 
“The disclosure of being” “comes primarily from the act of asking a question about 
something.”807 Of course, the subject matter Heidegger asks about is the being of beings, as 
accessible as the being of Dasein. Indeed, in a certain sense, Dasein exists as a question: it is a 
being that has its own being as an issue. But, more pertinent here is the fact that because of its 
pre-ontological understanding, Dasein can develop a science in which being is explicitly 
conceptualized. Though the act of asking a question does not involve a sufficient understanding 
of the subject matter inquired into, it does constitute a “prior delimitation” of it.808 That is, the 
question itself delimits the subject matter in a pre-conceptual way: it delimits a problematic field 
on the basis of the vague understanding available. In the case of fundamental ontology, this 
delimitation is granted by the pre-ontological understanding of being. By disclosing basic 
structures of that problematic field, a developed “concept of being” can be formed. We know 
from Heidegger’s account of the productive logic belonging to fundamental ontology that this 
operates by the process of Grundlegung. That is, the Grundverfassung of Dasein’s being (i.e., 
Dasein’s Seinsverfassung) is problematized, and the logic of the vague understanding of being 
articulating the question is tracked to the ontological ground enabling that articulation. The 
structures of that ground are elaborated and concepts (Grundbegriffe) are cast articulating them. 
The logic of the ontological structures disclosed is borne in these Grundbegriffe. In Lautman’s 
words, the formation of such a concept of being is “an act by which a structure is disclosed to the 
intelligence,” and on this basis the intelligence “becomes capable of outlining the set of concrete 
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problems relating to the being (l’être) in question.”809 The “act” of asking the question about 
being delimits a thematic space, and the intrinsic relation of the question and the subject matter 
inquired into constitutes a preliminary articulation of that subject matter, which can then be 
elaborated and more formally articulated by a set of Grundbegriffe that serve as an answer to the 
question. 
This genetic movement of the disclosure of ontological truth is essential for Lautman, but 
incomplete without carrying it through to the genesis of ontic truth, or of effective mathematical 
theory. The next necessary step follows quite easily, though: “What then happens, and for us this 
is the fundamental point, is that this disclosure of the ontological truth of being cannot be done 
without the concrete aspects of ontic existence taking shape at the same time.”810 In other words, 
the disclosure of ontological truth simultaneously modulates the ontic state of affairs (and does 
so in a non-mimetic way).811 To continue the example from above, when I disclose the structure 
of interpretation as partially constitutive of my being and work out the logic of interpretation (the 
hermeneutical circle), this undermines the legitimacy of the ontic terms in which I had 
previously hypostatized myself (my being is not defined essentially by “American,” “tax-payer,” 
etc.). This in turn modulates the matrix of projects and meaning constituting my world. The way 
I understand myself and the world – and in fact the way that the world and I are – at the ontic 
level is reconfigured to be consistent with the ontological structure of my being that I have 
disclosed. The logic of interpretation percolates into it. Heidegger describes this change in terms 
of the gravitation toward greater authenticity. In this way, disclosing ontological truth 
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simultaneously modulates ontic truth. For Deleuze, the reconfiguration described here in 
Heideggerian terms becomes recast in terms of actual events. When, for instance, the actual 
discourse of a science is exposed to new aspects of the dialectical Idea that defines the science as 
a field of potential solutions, that field undergoes a reconfiguration. In other words, an actual 
event occurs that produces new fields of solution. Lautman makes the Heideggerian point again 
in a broadly scientific register as follows: “a same activity is seen to … act on two different 
planes: the constitution of the being of the being, on the ontological plane, is inseparable from 
the determination, on the ontic plane, of the factual existence of a domain in which the objects of 
a scientific knowledge receive life and matter.”812 For Lautman, the same inseparability and 
simultaneous – but non-representational – modulation occurs in the relation between dialectical 
Ideas and mathematical theory. Within this context, the way Lautman understands the 
immanence of mathematical theoretical solutions to dialectical problems can be better specified: 
 
Insofar as posed problems, relating to connections that are likely to support certain dialectical 
notions, the Ideas of this Dialectic are certainly transcendent (in the usual sense) with respect to 
mathematics [that is, they constitute a reality that exceeds that of mathematics]. On the other hand, 
as any effort to provide a response to the problem of these connections is, by the very nature of 
things, constitution of effective mathematical theories, it is justified to interpret the overall 
structure of these theories in terms of immanence for the logical schema of the solution sought 
after. An intimate link thus exists between the transcendence of the Ideas and the immanence of 
the logical structure of the solution to a dialectical problem within mathematics. This link is the 
notion of genesis which we give it, at least as we have tried to grasp it, by describing the genesis 
of mathematics from the Dialectic.813 
 
Structurally speaking, the genetic movement described by Lautman is precisely the same 
movement of fundamental-ontological transcendence found in Heidegger. And Lautman’s 
genetic relation can be given more detail by briefly looking to that. When Dasein does 
fundamental ontology, it enacts the movement of transcendence along the radical-scientific axis 
of ground. I examine the fundamental structures in terms of which I currently understand my 
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being and – according to Heidegger – find them insufficient. I inquire into the ground enabling 
those structures to be at all and develop a set of Grundbegriffe to articulate them. Likewise, 
mathematical theory engages the dialectical Ideas or problems and casts a set of Grundbegriffe to 
articulate them. On these bases whole ranges of positive scientific discourse are generated at the 
ontic level. However, just as the structurally problematic dimension of my being is displaced 
beyond the new ontological Grundbegriffe, the problematic dimension of dialectical Ideas 
exceeds the grasp of the new fundamental mathematical theoretical concepts. This drives me (or 
the mathematician) to work out new Grundbegriffe to articulate the problematic element in yet 
more originary ways. In turn, a freshly configured positive ontic or mathematical discourse is 
generated… and so on. The movement of radical scientific or fundamental ontological 
transcendence motivated by the problematic element is genetic of “solutions” at the ontic level. 
On the basis of Lautman’s appropriation of Heidegger, we see that his mathematical 
Platonism consists not in asserting any metaphysical transcendence, but in a certain ontological 
realism – that is, a realism about ontological structures (dialectical Ideas and notions), which 
mathematical theory endeavors to articulate. This constitutes not a constructivism, but a sort of 
rationalism. The theoretical practices of mathematics get their grip on reality by disclosing 
aspects of dialectical structural schemas, adopting the logic of those schemas in the 
Grundbegriffe of mathematical theory, and then recasting the field of positive mathematics on 
that basis. In other words, there is an immanent structural information by which the operation of 
radical mathematics generates mathematical theory that participates in the logic of the dialectic 
and its Ideas. 
There is one further point to make before returning to a more direct analysis of Deleuze. 
While Lautman is primarily concerned with dialectical Ideas or problems and their relation to 
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mathematical theoretical solutions, he takes the structure described here to apply in every 
science. In his words, “mathematical logic does not enjoy in this respect any special privilege. It 
is only one theory among others and the problems that it raises or that it solves are found almost 
identically elsewhere.”814 In fact, he takes the genetic relation of the Idea/problem-solution 
structure to describe the ontological operation by which things are generated in general. “One 
can,” Lautman writes, “in regards to the relations between the Dialectic and Mathematics, follow 
the mechanism of operation closely in which the analysis of Ideas is extended in effective 
creation, in which the virtual is transformed into the real. Mathematics thus plays with respect to 
the other domains of incarnation, physical reality, social reality, human reality, the role of model 
in which the way things come into existence is observed.”815 
 
3: Ideal Event, Multiplicity, and Genesis in Deleuze’s Ontology 
 
Though Deleuze finds mathematics – in particular, classical calculus – to have an important role 
in ontology, the significance of Lautman for him is not limited to the mathematical. In Différence 
et répétition Deleuze embraces Lautman’s claim that dialectical Ideas are not preferentially 
indexed to mathematical solutions/theories, but rather structure multiple solution fields. 
Following Lautman, the genetic relation in the Idea/problem-solution structure supplies a 
description of the ontological operation by which beings of any order are generated. There are 
different orders of dialectical Ideas or problems, which structure a variety of theoretical fields. In 
Deleuze’s words, “mathematics appears with the fields of solution in which dialectical Ideas of 
the last order are incarnated, and with the expression of problems relative to these fields. Other 
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orders of Ideas are incarnated in other fields and in other modes of expression corresponding to 
different sciences. In this manner, a genesis of diverse scientific domains takes place on the basis 
of dialectical problems and their orders.”816 Deleuze takes a step farther yet: in the system 
proposed in Chapter IV of Différence et répétition, reality itself is structured like a problem 
complex, i.e., like the dialectical Idea-solution couple. 
Deleuze adopts the framework of Lautman’s theory of problems/Ideas almost wholesale. 
Recalling three of the central points addressed above, Deleuze defines the problem/Idea-solution 
complex in Lautmanian terms as follows: 
 
Following Lautman’s general thesis, a problem has three aspects: its difference in kind from 
solutions; its transcendence in relation to the solutions that it engenders on the basis of its own 
determinant conditions; and its immanence in the solutions which cover it.817 
 
Given my analysis in the preceding sections of this chapter, the transmission of elements 
of Heidegger’s early ontology to Deleuze is evident here despite the fact that in Différence et 
répétition Deleuze does not acknowledge the influence of Heidegger on Lautman. One must 
simply recall that Lautman defined the difference in kind between problems or Ideas and 
solutions in terms of Heidegger’s difference between the ontic and ontological; that Lautman 
understood the problem’s transcendence in relation to solutions in terms of Heidegger’s 
fundamental-ontological transcendence; and, on that basis, that he understood the problem’s 
immanence in solutions in terms of Heidegger’s immanence of ontological structures in the 
beings constituted on their basis.818 Yet Deleuze’s ontology is by no means reducible to 
Heidegger’s. 
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 Deleuze agrees with Lautman that “problems are always dialectical” and that “the ideal 
connections constitutive of the problematic (dialectical) Idea are incarnated in the real relations 
which are constituted by mathematical theories and carried over into problems in the form of 
solutions.”819 He also agrees that “what is mathematical (or physical, biological, psychical or 
sociological) are the solutions,” not the problems.820 Yet, within this Lautmanian/Heideggerian 
framework, Deleuze recalibrates the nature of dialectical Ideas in terms of his differential 
ontology and recasts the terms of their genetic relation to solutions on that basis. This is where 
his concept of ideal event is defined. For Deleuze, “the problematic or dialectical Idea is a 
system of connections between differential elements, a system of differential relations between 
genetic elements.”821 In his terminology, this can be restated by saying that dialectical Ideas or 
problems are “multiplicities.” Multiplicities are systems of structured difference. Worlds of 
quasi-stable, actual simulacral identities are the solutions to problems constituted as differential 
multiplicities. 
 In ontologies based upon identity, a common paradigm understands events to be the 
alterations of attributes predicated of a subject. This picture is dependent upon the ontological 
priority of the identity of the subject (which takes on the role of its essence) and that subject’s 
ability to bear a variety of inessential or accidental attributes. I might be “two-armed” today and 
then, after an operation, “one-armed” tomorrow, yet my personal identity remains. The event in 
this framework is the alteration of the predicate: from “two-armed” to “one-armed.” But such an 
event is defined in relation to the identity operating as a substratum bearing it. Thus, the event is 
secondary. 
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In Deleuze’s system, a correlate of the ontological priority of difference over identity is 
the position that events are not contingent upon any substratum. Recall that for Deleuze there is 
“a double series of events which develop on two planes, echoing without resembling each other: 
real events on the level of the engendered solutions, and ideal events embedded in the conditions 
of the problem.”822 Granted what we know about Deleuze’s appropriation of Lautman, 
Lautman’s appropriation of Heidegger, and the partial clarifications of Deleuze’s conception of 
actual events above, this double series of events can be given greater structural definition. The 
difference between the two planes on which events develop is structurally analogous to 
Heidegger’s distinction between the ontic and the ontological. Heidegger’s fundamental 
ontology worked to disclose ontological structures constituting the being of Dasein – structures 
like interpretation, care, historicality, and temporality. Though Lautman and to a great degree 
Deleuze were unaware of it, beginning during Heidegger’s Kehre his project proceeded to 
ontological structures diagenically prior to Dasein, structures like ἀλήθεια and λήθη, abyssal 
ground, primordial ground, distorted ground, time-space, and domains of propriety and 
alienation from propriety.823 Deleuze’s differential ontology replaces these ontological structures 
with ideal multiplicities and the singularities or events that structure and reconfigure them. 
Deleuze’s second order of events – on the plane of solutions – take the position of singularities 
modulating the structure of beings in Heidegger’s ontic register. Just as Heidegger’s ontological 
structures are simultaneously transcendent and immanent to the ontic state of affairs, for Deleuze 
ideal events are simultaneously transcendent and immanent to actual events at the level of 
solutions. Ideal events are differential elements, the introduction of which into a multiplicity 
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reconfigures that multiplicity, i.e., produces a new multiplicity. Such events form the conditions 
enabling the production of simulacral systems of actual quasi-stable identities modulated by their 
complex relations. Actual events correlate with ideal events, though in a non-mimetic way, and 
structure the state of affairs composed by solutions or worlds of simulacral beings.  
These points and my analysis in the sections above can now serve to inform a technical 
reconstruction of Deleuze’s account of events as defined in terms of his recalibration of 
dialectical Ideas as multiplicities or structures of difference. Though I will discuss actual events 
to a limited degree, my focus will be on Deleuze’s account of virtual or ideal events. I turn to this 
now. 
 
3.1: Deleuze’s Ontology of Virtual or Ideal Events 
 
In the Platonic dialectic, Deleuze identified the presence of a question-problem complex or 
problematic element that led to his overturning of Platonism. That problematic element was 
found both in the riddle, task, or enigma presented in the myth invoked to provide the dialectic 
with a probative force and in the very existence of simulacra. By affirming the being of the 
enigmatic dimension of myths, their capacity to function as an ideal ground (fondation) was 
undermined. Similarly, affirming the being of simulacra undermined any definition of “being” 
within the bounds of the circuit of resemblance between the ideal ground and icons or well-
grounded claimants. Together, simulacra and the enigmatic character of myth form a problematic 
dimension of the dialectic that is ontologically prior to and in excess over the dimensions of the 
dialectic complicit to the subjection of difference to identity, the reduction of repetition to 
generality, and implementation of representationalism. Deleuze’s overturning of Platonism sets 
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up his interpretation of this excessive dimension of the dialectic in terms of difference and allows 
him to recast the figure of Platonic Ideas as inherently problematical, rather than as loci of 
identity. For Deleuze, “the problematic element, with its extra-propositional character, does not 
fall within representation.”824 Instead, the problematic element is a differential element: “this 
differential element is the play of difference as such, which can neither be mediated by 
representation nor subordinated to the identity of a concept.”825 As I have shown, Deleuze 
appropriates Lautman’s metamathematics to provide the overall framework for his account of 
dialectical Ideas and their relation to simulacra or fields of solution in which they are actualized. 
But Deleuze recasts the problematic or differential element defining dialectical Ideas in terms of 
multiplicity. 
For Deleuze, “an Idea is an n-dimensional, continuous, defined multiplicity.”826 A 
multiplicity is not “a combination of the many and the one, but rather an organization belonging 
to the many as such, which has no need whatsoever of unity in order to form a system.”827 In 
other words, a multiplicity is a differential structure. Recall that for the early Heidegger, 
ontological structures or existentialia of Dasein determine the ontic truth of Dasein’s existence, 
but always do so in conjunction with the unique factical conditions of the world. Likewise, for 
Lautman dialectical notions and Ideas govern the logic of mathematical theories in which they 
are actualized. For Deleuze, multiplicities take the place of Heidegger’s ontological structures or 
existentialia and Lautman’s dialectical notions and Ideas, and they are always conjoined with the 
actual dimension of systems of simulacra. Multiplicities or differential structures consist of three 
aspects: “differential elements, differential relations between those elements, and singularities 
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corresponding to those relations.”828 Genetically speaking, these three aspects compose a track of 
virtual or ideal determination that progresses from undetermined differential elements to 
completely determined singularities. Two orders of ideal events are found in multiplicities, 
corresponding respectively to their determinate and indeterminate aspects. In a primary sense, 
ideal events are differential elements, the introduction of which into a multiplicity reconfigures 
that multiplicity’s structure. Deleuze refers to the production of determinateness in an Idea’s 
singularities and relations as “differentiation.” Since this determinateness is produced exactly by 
the introduction of differential elements, ideal events in this first sense can also be called “events 
of differentiation.” In a secondary sense, ideal events are the singularities, distinctive points, or 
coordinates defining the structure of an Idea. These singularities or distinctive points define the 
potential regular or ordinary points that might be extended in a genetic series proceeding from a 
singularity, points that either converge with or diverge from the series of regular points 
proceeding from the other singularities composing the Idea. Since these singularities are in 
themselves virtual and define the virtual structure governing the production of actual cases of 
solution or simulacral beings, they are also called “pre-individual” singularities. I shall define 
these technical terms in what follows. 
Differential elements, or ideal events in the first sense, are undetermined and can 
therefore be said to constitute a principle of determinability (they become determined). At times 
Deleuze also refers to this as a “principle of quantitability,” since differential elements become 
determined in a quantity of singularities.829 Deleuze struggles to give examples of undetermined 
differential elements, precisely because they are undetermined. His examples (epicurean atoms 
in a “physical Idea,” anatomical elements such as small bones in a “biological Idea,” and who 
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knows what in Marxist “social Ideas”) all seem already to carry determination. Modifying one of 
his better examples a bit, perhaps in the multiplicity of color we can say that white light takes the 
place of an undetermined element: it is in principle determinable in varieties of color. Though it 
is difficult to conceptualize (or in fact impossible, given Deleuze’s position that the differential 
elements in multiplicities disrupt the stability of any concept grounded in identity), Deleuze 
ultimately maintains that differential elements or events are the play of difference as such. As he 
puts it, these differential elements “imply no prior identity, no positing of something that could 
be called one or the same. On the contrary, their indetermination renders possible the 
manifestation of difference freed from all subordination.”830 
Deleuze’s and Heidegger’s evental ontologies are not the same. But the beginnings of an 
important comparison are found in Deleuze’s notion of differential elements. In Chapters II and 
III, I argued that the ontology Heidegger produces in Beiträge is underwritten by a logic of 
difference that is the logic of beyng as event. Beyng as event is the differentiation of pure 
difference from itself, together with the logic of determinateness thereby originated and the 
primal difference that exceeds that determinateness. The logic of determinateness is articulated 
in terms of the registers of truth, ground, time-space, and evental appropriation/expropriation. In 
Deleuze’s account of multiplicity, which replaces Heidegger’s account of ontological structures, 
differential elements are undetermined pure differences that generate determination. In this 
particular sense, they are therefore a Deleuzian parallel to the abyss of Heideggerian primal 
difference. However, while Heideggerian primal difference generates the logic of 
determinateness, there does not seem to be room in his ontology for that difference to interrupt 
the logic of determinateness from just any point along its curves. Heidegger’s undetermined 
difference can be figured as a focal domain in his ontology. In contrast, Deleuze’s differential 
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elements can irrupt into the determinate logic of a multiplicity or milieu of multiplicities from 
any point. The closest thing to this in Heidegger’s ontology are the procedures of 1) Ergründen 
or fathoming the ground, whereby alienated human existence re-grounds itself by disclosing the 
logic of the event through the productive logic of Grundlagen, and 2) Er-gründen or creative 
grounding, in which the evental nature of beyng is made present in a work of art or poem. 
However, these are results of human endeavor, whereas for Deleuze the ideal events that irrupt 
into a multiplicity are aleatory, virtual, and no more indexed onto human existence than onto any 
other simulacral beings. 
For Deleuze, if the differential elements of a multiplicity are undetermined, singularities 
or ideal events in the second sense are completely determined and therefore can be said to 
constitute a principle of complete determination. Deleuze sometimes calls this a “principle of 
potentiality,” since the singularities of an Idea define the range of genetic series that can follow 
from them and the range of potential solutions actualizing the Idea.831 Singularities take the place 
of the counter-posed poles of Lautman’s dialectical notions (e.g., the continuous vs. the discrete, 
algebra vs. analysis, finite vs. infinite, or whole vs. part). For Deleuze, there can be multiplicities 
of any number of singularities. As mentioned above, a singularity is a distinctive point that 
governs the progression of ordinary or regular points that follow from it. To illustrate this, we 
can imagine a geometrical figure – a rectangle, for instance. A rectangle has four singularities, 
one at each of its points. Each singular point defines or functions as a rule governing how a 
series of further points must be extended to compose a line that leads to the next singular point 
and thereby to construct the rectangle. Each singular point is an event, for it changes the rule 
governing how the series must proceed. The series of points that follow the rule and compose the 
line are not distinctive, but regular or ordinary points. Deleuze explains this as follows: “a 
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singularity is the point of departure for a series which extends over all the ordinary points of the 
system, as far as the region of another singularity which itself gives rise to another series which 
may either converge with or diverge from the first.”832 Returning to the multiplicity of color, the 
primary colors – red, blue, and yellow – could be said to form singularities, completely 
determined in the sense that they form distinctive coordinates determining the various series of 
potential color combinations. In another of Deleuze’s examples – that of the Idea of language – 
phonemes constitute such singularities or coordinates determining the range of words that can be 
actualized. 
The third aspect of multiplicities – differential relations – constitutes a principle of 
reciprocal determination. Undetermined differential elements or pure differences generate 
determination by generating differential relations. In these relations, coordinates that become 
fully determinate become singularities. But singularities exist only in states of reciprocal 
differential determination in relation to one another. Deleuze also sometimes refers to this 
principle of reciprocal determination as a “principle of qualitability” since the singular events 
reciprocally determined in these relations are determined as qualitatively distinct: “red” or 
“yellow,” for example.833 The traits of one singularity are defined by differing from other 
singularities. Differential relations constitute, moreover, differential fields or liaisons between 
singularities. In Lautman’s metamathematics, these liaisons were the fields of possible relations 
between dialectical notions, i.e., fields of possible structural schemas traversing the gulf between 
dialectical notions or rendering the poles of notions consistent. For Deleuze, Lautman’s terms 
can be translated by saying that differential relations are intensive fields between singularities, 
where those singularities form poles of tension. In other words, in these differential relations are 
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defined the ranges of series of convergent and divergent ordinary points following from distinct 
singular events. In the multiplicity of color, white light is differentiated and becomes determined 
in the singularities of red, blue, and yellow. But red and blue, blue and yellow, yellow and red 
are determined in differential relations to each other (in a field of pure red, red would have no 
qualitative distinctness, i.e., not be singular). The fields of those differential relations constitute 
schemas of consistency (purple, green, and orange) and inconsistency (purple is inconsistent with 
yellow, green with red, and orange with blue). 
Another point of systematic comparison with Heidegger can be identified here. In the 
logic of Heidegger’s evental ontology, the origination of determinateness is indeed the 
origination of differential relations: difference differs from itself and thereby originates the 
structures of the logic of determinateness. In the register of truth, for instance, originary 
openness and self-concealing are correlated ontological structures that are constituted by the 
differential relation between them. That differential relation is named “Lichtung” or “clearing.” 
Without it, neither openness nor concealment would have any distinctness, i.e., would not be. 
However, it is unclear whether it would be accurate to say that the differential relations involved 
in Heideggerian evental ontology produce singularities in the sense Deleuze has in mind. 
Openness and concealment are qualitatively distinct and, in a way, form coordinates defining the 
ranges of potential worlds of beings that might be. But they are structurally distended, not point-
like. The same can be said of the structures of ground, time-space, and propriety/alienation from 
propriety. 
For Deleuze, all multiplicities consist of the three aspects of differential structure: 
differential elements or ideal events in the primary sense, differential relations, and singularities 
or ideal events in the secondary sense. As such, multiplicities include both indeterminate and 
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determinate aspects. What then should be made of Deleuze’s definition of an Idea as an n-
dimensional, continuous, defined multiplicity? Though “multiplicity” and “Idea” are often taken 
to be synonymous for Deleuze, this is not quite accurate. In a preliminary sense, if multiplicities 
include both indeterminate and determinate dimensions, Ideas are multiplicities insofar as they 
are determinate. Dimensionality, continuity, and definition describe aspects of this determinacy. 
The dimension of a multiplicity refers to “the variables or co-ordinates upon which a 
phenomenon depends,” i.e., the number of a multiplicity’s singularities.834 “The Idea of color” 
“is a three-dimensional multiplicity” because it has three singularities: red, blue, and yellow.835 
The Idea of language has a dimensionality equal to the number of phonemes. A clear distinction 
between Deleuze, Heidegger, and Lautman is evident here. The dialectical notions that Lautman 
discussed were each two-dimensional. Similarly, if Heidegger’s originary ontological structures 
of openness and concealment or propriety and alienation from propriety could in fact be called 
singularities, the Ideas they respectively compose would be two-dimensional. Moreover, 
Heidegger does not seem to hold that these structures are themselves subject to radical 
reconfiguration or decomposition. However, Deleuzian multiplicities come in any variety of 
dimensions and can be entirely transformed with the introduction of new differential elements or 
events in their systems. 
The second aspect of an Idea’s determinacy is its definition. An Idea is a defined 
multiplicity because an Idea is always constituted by a distinctive set of singularities and their 
correlated dimensionality, qualities, and relations. If an event were to occur with respect to the 
singularities of an Idea, i.e., if a singularity were to change its quality, be added, or removed, a 
new Idea would be composed. Thus, Deleuze writes: “by definition, we mean the elements 
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reciprocally determined by these relations, elements which cannot change unless the multiplicity 
changes its order and its metric.”836 If the singularity of “red” were to change its quality and 
become some new color, were to dissolve into indeterminacy, or if a new color singularity were 
introduced into the Idea, the Idea of color would become a different Idea. In this sense, “the 
conditions of a problem themselves imply events such as sections, ablations, and adjunctions,” 
and these events redefine an Idea, i.e., produce a new Idea.837 
Finally, the reason Deleuze calls an Idea a continuous multiplicity is not straight forward 
and has to do with its genetic operations. Recall that for Lautman, mathematical theories that 
serve as actual answers to dialectical problems appear in a state of fragmentation with respect to 
one another. Though they might articulate different aspects of a dialectical problem, the logic of 
each theory is discontinuous with that of the other(s). In contrast, each theory is genetically 
continuous with the dialectical problem, that is, there is an ontological continuity by which 
mathematical theory is structurally informed by the dialectic. Similarly, for Deleuze, simulacral 
beings at the level of the actual are discontinuous with respect to one another (they exist in states 
of explication). However, there is a continuity in the flow of ontological genesis by which they 
are produced. It is this continuity of ontological genesis that Deleuze has in mind when he says 
that an Idea is a continuous multiplicity. At the level of the virtual, continuity describes the 
genetic progression of determination: the progression from undetermined differential elements to 
determination in differential relations to complete determination in singularities.  
Since Ideas are never produced in a vacuum, but always in the milieu of multiplicities, it 
amounts to the same thing to say that continuity describes the genetic progression by which one 
Idea changes into another. In Deleuze’s words, “by continuity, we mean the set of relations 
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between changes in these variables,” i.e., in singularities.838 Here, continuity is not simply the set 
of relations between singularities, but the set of relations between changes in singularities. In 
other words, if an Idea’s singularities enter into new differential relations or change qualities, 
thereby producing a new Idea, there is a genetic continuity from one Idea to the subsequent one. 
At the level of determinate singularities, such changes are events like sections, ablations, or 
adjunctions. But these types of events result from changes in the field of differential relations 
determining the singularities. And even if the changes in differential relations can be traced in 
chains through the milieu of multiplicity in which an Idea is located, changes in differential 
relations are ultimately the result of the introduction of differential elements into their system, 
i.e., the result of ideal events in the primary sense. Such an event changes the relations of 
reciprocal determination, which changes the quality of singularities and perhaps their quantity, 
i.e., the dimensionality of the multiplicity. This completely reconfigures the Idea or, rather, 
produces a new Idea with a distinct definition. For Deleuze, the logic of change in the register of 
virtual multiplicities and Ideas is the logic of events. The continuity of a multiplicity at the 
virtual level is the genetic track of the logic of ideal events. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In Chapters I-III of this dissertation, I reconstructed Heidegger’s ontology of the event as found 
in Beiträge. There, the nature of beyng as event is accessed through the problematic of truth and 
the concept of pure difference that Heidegger placed at the heart of his ontology. I developed an 
account of the differential structure of the event by elaborating the logic of difference in terms of 
truth, which is one of the key registers of the event. I then further elaborated the structure of the 
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event in terms of the correlative registers of ground and time-space. Through my analysis of 
these concepts, I reconstructed the account of the event in Beiträge in terms of the logic of 
difference that underwrites the ontology in that text. There, beyng as event is the differentiation 
of pure difference from itself, together with the logic of determinateness or structure of the Da of 
Da-sein thereby originated and the abyss of difference that exceeds that determinateness. The 
logic of determinateness is defined in terms of the correlative structures of truth, ground, time-
space, and appropriation/expropriation. The differential logic defining beyng as event in Beiträge 
shows that in its most advanced state, Heidegger’s ontology was much closer to Deleuze’s than 
is recognized by most scholars. 
 In Chapters IV and V, I turned to an analysis of Deleuze’s ontology of the event. I built 
this around one of the central tasks that Deleuze set for himself, a task that connects his work 
directly to Heidegger’s ontology at a systematic level: developing a sufficient ontology of 
difference. In Chapter IV, I also highlighted a set of related points of contact between Heidegger 
and Deleuze that are important for establishing the connection between their ontologies of the 
event. Of particular importance were the way Deleuze adopted the problematic of being framed 
by Heidegger’s ontological difference, their critiques Aristotelian ontology, their shared 
commitment to the radical critique of the regime of representation, the fact that both advanced 
certain forms of ontological realism, and their shared claim that in one way or another being is 
evental in nature. 
 Deleuze’s theory of events is presented especially in two contexts in Différence et 
répétition: first is the preliminary account given in terms of the third synthesis of time and 
second is the more developed account given in terms of his theory of problems, dialectical Ideas, 
or multiplicities and their actualization in systems of simulacra. In order to set up an analysis of 
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the second of these in Chapter V, in Chapter IV I began with an analysis of Deleuze’s treatment 
of the problem of difference, i.e., the problem of the history of the subordination of difference to 
identity (together with the correlated problems of the reduction of repetition to generality and the 
perpetuation of the conceptual framework of representation). This is necessary in order to see the 
motivation of Deleuze’s ontology and its approach to the philosophy of difference within which 
his concept of event is defined. I focused in particular on Deleuze’s engagement with Aristotle 
on this matter. An especially important factor here are Deleuze’s arguments showing that 
systems subjecting difference to identity are unable to explain individual beings without reducing 
them to particular instantiations of general kinds. I then reconstructed the basic framework of 
Deleuze’s univocity of being, which he finds to be a necessary step in producing an ontology of 
difference able to account for individual beings. I focused in particular on the way Deleuze 
employed Nietzsche’s eternal return as a figure for the univocal genetic flow of being. Deleuze’s 
account of univocity leaves the structure of that genetic flow somewhat vague. Thus, I turned to 
a brief reconstruction of Deleuze’s complex theory of time to give more conceptual structure to 
it. This treatment of time also enabled me to establish Deleuze’s first, preliminary definition of 
the event in terms of the third synthesis of time. There, the event is the caesural pure and empty 
form of time that enables the processes involved in the pure past, living present, and future. The 
event is the form of ontological determinability, i.e., the form in which anything that occurs in 
time occurs. Finally in Chapter IV, I turned to an analysis of Deleuze’s engagement with 
Platonism. Here, I showed how Deleuze subjected a certain standard form of the Platonic 
dialectic to the test of the eternal return in order to bring about an overturning of that Platonism 
and develop a basic theory of beings as systems of simulacra. This is crucial for framing 
Deleuze’s more developed account of the nature of events in his theory of dialectical Ideas, since 
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dialectical Ideas are precisely the virtual dimension ontologically determining systems of 
simulacra. 
 In Chapter V, my focus turned to the nature of events as defined within Deleuze’s theory 
of dialectical Ideas, problems, or multiplicities. In this context, there is a profound indirect 
Heideggerian influence on Deleuze’s ontology mediated by Albert Lautman. Deleuze developed 
his theory of dialectical Ideas (in which he gives his theory of virtual or ideal events) largely 
through an appropriation of Lautman’s metamathematical theory. In Lautman’s 
metamathematics, he distinguishes between a register of virtual non-mathematical dialectical 
Ideas or problems and the mathematical theories that operate as actual solutions to them. 
Lautman, however, developed his theory of dialectical Ideas or problems largely through an 
engagement with Heidegger’s early ontology. I provided an extensive analysis of this historical 
and conceptual lineage – running from Deleuze to Lautman to Heidegger – in order to establish 
the important Heideggerian influence on Deleuze’s theory of dialectical Ideas and events. I 
focused on a set of particularly important links. First, Deleuze understands the relation between 
dialectical Ideas or problems (together with the events defining them) and actual solutions in 
terms of Lautman’s account of the relation between metamathematical dialectical Ideas and the 
mathematical theories that act as solutions to them. Lautman, though, understands this relation in 
terms of Heidegger’s ontological difference between being and beings or, more precisely, the 
distinction between the ontic and ontological registers of beings. Second, one of Deleuze’s 
essential claims about this relation is that virtual dialectical Ideas or problems are simultaneously 
transcendent and immanent to actual solutions. Likewise, ideal events are simultaneously 
transcendent and immanent to actual events and their solution fields. Deleuze again explicitly 
borrows this characterization from Lautman. And, again, Lautman understood the simultaneity of 
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transcendence and immanence in terms of Heidegger’s ontology. Namely, he understood the 
transcendence of dialectical Ideas to mathematical solutions in terms of Heidegger’s account of 
Dasein’s constitutive transcendence or “surpassing.” Of particular importance were Dasein’s 
transcendence 1) toward a world and 2) more importantly, along a diagenic axis when engaged in 
the radical scientific methodology of Grundlegung (particularly as a part of doing fundamental 
ontology). Correlatively, Lautman understood the simultaneous immanence of dialectical Ideas 
to solutions in terms of the immanence of Dasein’s ontological structures to its ontic life. Third, 
Deleuze maintained that dialectical Ideas or problems are genetic in certain respects to actual 
solutions. Correspondingly, the logic of ideal events is understood as a logic of ontological 
genesis in relation to the determination of virtual Ideas and, in turn, of fields of solution at the 
level of the actual. Again, Deleuze understood the genetic relation between the virtual and actual 
in terms of Lautman’s account of the genesis of actual mathematical theories on the basis of 
dialectical Ideas. Here, Ideas define the structure of formal mathematical theories that aim to 
articulate them. Lautman, in turn, understood the nature of this genetic relation in terms of that 
between Heideggerian ontological and ontic truth. Together these points are crucial for making 
sense of Deleuze’s theory of dialectical Ideas (together with their ideal events) and their 
actualization in fields of solution, as well as demonstrating the essential Heideggerian influence 
on Deleuze with respect to this matter. 
 Within this context of Deleuze’s theory of dialectical Ideas, a statement of the nature of 
virtual or ideal events can be given. While Deleuze maintained the relational framework between 
the virtual and actual just described, he replaced the Heideggerian ontological structures of 
Dasein’s existence with differential multiplicities or Ideas. Multiplicities are composed of three 
differential components: differential elements, differential relations, and pre-individual 
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singularities. Ideal events come in two forms: they are 1) differential elements and 2) pre-
individual singularities or distinctive points. An event occurs when a differential element is 
introduced into an extant multiplicity, thereby fundamentally reconfiguring that multiplicity and 
redefining the singularities governing the structure of actual solution fields. Likewise, the 
redefinition of an Idea or multiplicity’s singularities is an event, since this fundamentally 
reconfigures the actual solution fields governed by those singularities. 
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Conclusion 
 
Why is it necessary and what exactly does it mean to conceive being as event? I have aimed to 
answer this question in terms of the ontologies advanced by Martin Heidegger and Gilles 
Deleuze. Heidegger inaugurates the move to evental ontology in the twentieth century. Deleuze 
advances evental ontology in ways that move beyond Heidegger. In available scholarship, 
Deleuze is ordinarily taken to be a decisively non-Heideggerian thinker. However, analyzing 
their respective ontologies with an eye to the event reveals close connections, both at the level of 
systematic comparison and the level of the Heideggerian influence on Deleuze. Attention to 
these connections is crucial for making sense of Deleuze’s overall ontology in Différence et 
répétition and especially his theory of the event. 
 Heidegger’s most developed account of the evental nature of beyng is presented in 
Beiträge and the related private manuscripts. Interpreting these is a difficult task, since they were 
not polished for publication. However, with a proper methodological approach, good sense can 
be made of Heidegger’s evental ontology. His ontology evolves in a complex way along a 
diagenic axis, i.e., an axis of ground. In other words, Heidegger’s methodology operates in the 
manner of the productive logic or Grundlegung enacted by radical science. It examines a set of 
extant fundamental concepts used to articulate the problematic of being, inquires into the ground 
enabling that articulation, and recasts the fundamental concepts in a more originary way in terms 
of that ground. Heidegger’s work repeats this pattern over and again, thereby progressing along a 
diagenic axis. Making proper sense of Heidegger’s often abstruse concepts – particularly those 
involved in his account of the event – requires reconstructing this complex evolution and 
locating the concepts in their position on diagenic and syngenic axes. Failing to do this means 
failing to register the level of the ontology at which any particular concept operates and thereby 
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fundamentally confusing the character of that concept. Much of the more perplexing scholarship 
on Heidegger results precisely from failing to take this methodological order into account.  
Heidegger’s evental ontology in Beiträge evolves from his earlier formulation of the 
ontological problematic in Sein und Zeit. There, Heidegger established Dasein as the condition 
for the possibility of doing any ontology. Fundamental ontology progresses by inquiring into the 
being of Dasein. In other words, the necessary arena for doing fundamental ontology is the 
existential analysis of Dasein. Making sense of Heidegger’s later account of beyng as event 
requires tracking the evolution of his ontology from its formulation in terms of the existential 
analysis of Dasein. In Beiträge, Heidegger claims that the problematic of truth is the problematic 
preliminary to that of beyng as event. This makes good sense given the role of the problematic of 
truth in his work during the early 1930s and the place of truth in the existential analysis in Sein 
und Zeit. In Sein und Zeit, truth is understood phenomenologically as the unconcealment of 
beings or ἀλήθεια. Untruth on the other hand is not falsity, but λήθη: the occlusion or 
concealment of beings that is coessential with truth. Both truth and untruth are grounded in 
Dasein’s disclosedness. Overall, this forms a first a-lēthic account of the essence of truth in 
Heidegger’s ontology. In the 1930 lecture “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit,” Heidegger’s project 
progresses along a diagenic axis, recasts the nature of truth in a more originary way, and 
produces second a-lēthic account of the essence of truth. Here, the problematic of being is 
explicitly articulated in terms of the problematic of truth. Rather than ἀλήθεια and λήθη being 
grounded in Dasein, they come to be ontological structures prior to Dasein on a diagenic axis. In 
other words, ἀλήθεια and λήθη are ontological structures enabling human existence and the 
world of beings to be. Here, Heidegger distinguishes between “Dasein” or human existence and 
“Da-sein” or the more originary ontological structure of disclosedness constituted by the a-lēthic 
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structures. The account of these structures constitutes a form of ontological realism that will 
persist in Heidegger’s ontology in the 1930s and 1940s.  
Most interpretations of Heidegger’s account of the essence of truth in Beiträge hold that 
truth, there, remains within the second a-lēthic stage. However, this is a serious mistake that 
leads to confusing the most important parts of the ontology presented in that text. Instead, 
Heidegger progresses once again along a diagenic axis by inquiring into the ground enabling the 
very structures of ἀλήθεια and λήθη. This ground is pure difference. This difference is prior to 
the difference between any two determinate beings or ontological structures. It is a difference 
characterizing beyng as event and enabling the ontological difference between being and beings 
to be cast at all. The essence of truth in Beiträge is differential in this sense, not a-lēthic. Since 
the problematic of truth serves as the problematic by which the evental nature of being is 
accessed and first articulated, mistaking the differential account of the essence of truth with an a-
lēthic account confuses everything. Instead, the evental structure of beyng can be elaborated first 
in terms of the differential essence of truth. In other words, the logic of difference can be 
elaborated in order to provide an account of the ontological genesis and constitution of the 
correlative structures of ἀλήθεια and λήθη. Since the essence of truth constitutes part of the 
structure of the event, the differential logic worked out in terms of the essence of truth provides a 
foothold in the logic of the event. Here, the logic of the event is the logic of pure difference that 
must be taken to underwrite the ontology presented in Beiträge. More precisely, beyng as event 
is the differentiation of difference from itself, together with the logic of determinateness this 
originates and the abyss of difference that exceeds that determinateness. The logic of 
determinateness is the logic of beyng’s self-intensification, distension, and elaboration, i.e., the 
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origination of the Da expressed in the term “Da-sein.” This logic of determinateness is 
articulated in terms of the correlative problematics of truth, ground, and time-space. 
Even though Deleuze did not have access to Heidegger’s Beiträge or the related private 
works, establishing the differential logic of the event underwriting Heidegger’s ontology in that 
text sets the ground for systematic comparison between the two thinkers (though I carry out this 
comparison only to a certain extent in the current project). In Différence et répétition, the central 
problems that Deleuze is concerned with are the subjection of difference to identity, the 
reduction of repetition to generality, and the perpetuation of the conceptual framework of 
representation. Given the direct systematic connection of the problematic of difference with 
Heidegger’s evental ontology, I have focused on Deleuze’s treatment of it and the way it leads to 
his ontology of events. Deleuze gives two accounts of the event in Différence et répétition. The 
first, preliminary account is given in terms of his third synthesis of time. The second, more 
substantial account is given in terms of the differential structure of problems, dialectical Ideas, or 
multiplicities and their actualization in systems of simulacra. In this second account, Deleuze 
identifies two main series of events: virtual or ideal events and actual events. I focused upon 
virtual or ideal events since Deleuze’s virtual register corresponds in important ways with 
Heidegger’s ontological structures (as contrasted with the ontic dimension of beings that they 
structure). Since virtual or ideal events are differential factors defining dialectical Ideas or 
problems and the potential solution fields actualizing them in systems of simulacra, examining 
Deleuze’s accounts of dialectical Ideas and simulacra are essential steps in reconstructing his 
conception of events. Both of these, though, require showing the problem with historical 
treatments of difference upon which Deleuze focuses. 
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In the history of philosophy, difference has been subjugated to identity, and this has 
prevented the development of a sufficient ontology. Among other requirements, a sufficient 
ontology must be able to account for individual differences, i.e., the differences that make an 
individual thing this thing, rather than another one. The problem with the subjection of difference 
to identity that Deleuze focuses on can be seen particularly well in terms of Aristotle’s categorial 
system. In it, difference appears in the forms of specific difference and generic difference. At the 
bottom end of Aristotle’s categorial system, specific difference is inscribed in a genus in order to 
define distinct kinds of beings. The difference “rational,” for instance, is applied to the genus 
“animal” and thereby defines the kinds “rational animals” and “non-rational animals.” The 
difference between these kinds, however, is grounded in the identity of the genus or third term. 
In this system, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Alexander can be each be defined as an 
instantiation of the kind “rational animal,” but the individuating differences that make Socrates 
distinct from Plato cannot be properly explained. At the top end of Aristotle’s system, difference 
is generic difference, i.e., the difference between equivocal genera. Here, difference remains 
subjected to identity insofar as the being of each genus must be defined in reference to the single, 
unifying sense of being, “substance.” 
In order to move toward an ontology of difference that is not subjected to identity, 
Deleuze argues for the univocity of being. Univocity offers a framework for explaining the 
differences determining beings not in terms of the extrinsic predication of a subsistent identity, 
but as intrinsic and intensive difference. Deleuze develops his account of univocity through 
engagements with Scotus, Spinoza, and Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s eternal return is particularly 
important here because it offers a figure for thinking the genetic movement of being in terms of 
forms of difference and repetition that are not subject to prior identity. It also offers a 
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simultaneously methodological and ontological test by which superior or affirmative forms of 
difference are distinguished from average forms of difference derived from prior identity or 
inscribed with negativity. Yet, the account of the univocal movement of being in terms of the 
eternal return remains quite vague. The genetic sequence involved in Deleuze’s three syntheses 
of time offers a way of giving greater conceptual definition to this movement. In this genetic 
sequence, the passing present of the first synthesis is grounded by the immemorial memory or 
pure past described in the second synthesis. If time were reducible to just these two syntheses, 
though, it would be a circular repetition of the same events with no capacity for fecundity. Thus, 
Deleuze argues that a third synthesis must enable the first two. The third synthesis is a caesura of 
time that fractures the circle of the first two syntheses and opens up time to an ordinal and 
creative progression into a future. In this context, Deleuze gives his first, preliminary definition 
of the event. Here, the event is the caesural pure and empty form of time that enables the 
processes involved in the pure past, living present, and future. The event is the form of 
ontological determinability, i.e., the form in which anything that occurs in time occurs.  
In order to proceed to Deleuze’s second, more substantial account of events, his 
conception of simulacra must be clarified. Deleuze develops his concept of simulacra by 
submitting a certain version of the Platonic dialectic to the test of the eternal return. By showing 
that the Platonic dialectic implicitly acknowledges the being of two things that it works to excise 
from reality, Deleuze argues that the dialectic can be overturned. Those two things are 1) 
question-problem complexes that are built into the mythic structure of the dialectic and that 
violate the circuit of resemblance and identity between icon and Idea and 2) simulacra. 
Affirming the being of these two things shatters the world of beings conceived on the basis of the 
identity of the Idea and replaces it with a world of simulacral beings or systems of simulacra. For 
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Deleuze, systems of simulacra are systems of being that rely upon no prior identity for their 
constitution. Rather these systems are ones in which different relates to different on the basis of 
difference itself. Ontologically speaking, simulacra have both actual and virtual dimensions. 
Dialectical Ideas, problems, or multiplicities and their related events are the virtual differential 
structures that determine the character of simulacra. More precisely, simulacra are sites for the 
actualization of dialectical Ideas, problems, or multiplicities. 
Deleuze developed many of the core aspects of his theory of dialectical Ideas, problems, 
or multiplicities and the events they involve by appropriating elements of Albert Lautman’s 
metamathematical theory. Lautman distinguished between 1) non-mathematical virtual or 
dialectical problems and 2) the properly mathematical solutions that actualize the structures 
contained in those Ideas. Lautman, though, developed his metamathematical theory especially 
through an engagement with Heidegger. Of particular importance for Lautman were the ways 
Heidegger’s early ontology allowed an account of the distinction and relation between dialectical 
Ideas or problems and mathematical solutions. Lautman was especially concerned with the way 
Heideggerian ontology allowed him to explain 1) the distinction between Ideas and solutions in 
terms of the Heideggerian ontological difference between being and beings or between the 
ontological and ontic dimensions of beings, 2) the simultaneous transcendence and immanence 
of Ideas to solutions, which Lautman modeled on Heidegger’s account of the movement of 
transcendence characterizing Dasein and the immanence of constitutive ontological structures to 
the ontic dimension of Dasein, and 3) the genetic relation of dialectical Ideas with respect to 
solutions insofar as solutions incarnate or are genetically informed by Ideas. To explain this 
genetic relation, Lautman borrowed the Heideggerian account of the way that ontological truth is 
disclosed and informs ontic truth, that is, informs the manifestation of beings as beings. In turn, 
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Deleuze directly adopts the Lautmanian accounts of the distinction and relation between 
dialectical Ideas and solutions, the simultaneous transcendence and immanence of Ideas in 
solutions, and the genetic relation whereby Ideas are incarnated or actualized in those solutions. 
Thus, a profound but covert line of Heideggerian influence is present in Deleuze’s theory of 
virtual dialectical Ideas (together with the events defining them) and their actualization in 
systems of simulacra. 
Though Deleuze maintains the relational characteristics provided by Lautman’s theory 
(and in turn by Heidegger’s), he recasts the composition of dialectical Ideas in terms of 
multiplicity. Deleuzian multiplicities take the place of the Heideggerian ontological structures 
constitutive of Dasein. For Deleuze, multiplicities are composed of three differential 
components: undetermined differential elements, fully determinate pre-individual singularities, 
and the reciprocal differential relations in which singularities are determined. There are two 
levels of virtual or ideal events in Deleuze’s system. At the most originary level, an ideal event is 
a differential element, the introduction of which into an extant multiplicity or Idea reconfigures 
that Idea by changing the differential relations involved in it and, in turn, the singularities 
defined by those relations. At the second level, pre-individual singularities themselves are events 
in the sense that they operate as distinctive points governing the series of potential ordinary 
points that progress according to their rule. When a series of ordinary points progresses to a 
singular or distinctive point, an event occurs: the rule is changed for how the series is to 
continue. Moreover, these singularities define the fields of potential actual solutions to problems 
or Ideas, i.e., they define the virtual structure of the systems of simulacra that actualize such 
solutions. At the level of Deleuze’s account of dialectical Ideas, there is a genetic order of 
determination that moves from 1) undetermined differential elements or events to 2) reciprocal 
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determination in differential relations and, finally, to 3) fully determinate singularities. This 
order is that of the ontological genesis of a dialectical Idea. Since, however, dialectical Ideas 
never exist in a vacuum, but always in a milieu of differential elements, relations, and 
singularities, the genesis of a new Idea is the reconfiguration of relations and singularities within 
a differential system. Such reconfigurations occur upon the introduction of new differential 
elements, i.e., as the result of virtual or ideal events. 
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